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Note on use of terms 
The following terms are used throughout the thesis: 
Arrangements: this term refers to the activities involved in demonstrating or securing accountability. 
Forms: 
Models: 
Qualities: 
Themes: 
this term refers to the four forms or types of accountability that will be investigated in 
this thesis. 
this term is used to refer to two alternative ways that accountability might be used in 
practice to enhance service outputs and sustainability. 
this term refers to the three distinct qualities or aspects of accountability found in the 
literature: information, power and action. 
this term is used to refer to themes found in the literature on the forms of accountability 
identified; together these themes represent a theoretical framework. 
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Abstract 
Key words: accountability, urban, infrastructure, sustainability, community, responsiveness, 
participation, influence, services. 
It has been suggested by academics and practitioners alike that the effectiveness of urban services 
depends on whether the institutions of service provision are accountable to citizens. This thesis 
explores the use of accountability arrangements to improve the outputs and sustainability of such urban 
services as water supply, sanitation, solid waste management, drainage, roads and paving, street 
lighting and community halls. 
A multiple case study methodology was adopted for this research. Case studies were selected from 
UK, South Mrica, Bangladesh and South Korea to provide practical examples of how accountability is 
applied to the delivery of urban services. Both qualitative and quantitative techniques were used for 
data collection. During the research 370 questionnaires were completed, 133 semi structured 
interviews were conducted, 379 documentary records were reviewed and structured observations were 
conducted in selected neighbourhoods of the case study locations. The research presents a within-case 
and cross<ase analysis of accountability for urban services. 
A number of testable propositions for the functioning of accountability were identified from a literature 
review. For example, the literature suggests that accountability works best when multiple strategies of 
accountability are used and when there are information symmetries, sanctions and incentives. 
Moreover, social capital, user voice and answerability to the community are to be encouraged in urban 
service provision. These propositions have been reassessed in light of the fieldwork and their 
implications discussed. 
It was concluded that for the cases studied and potentially for similar situations, accountability 
arrangements will improve the outputs of urban services, and will improve the relative chances of 
sustainability, depending on how accountability is used and whether accountability itself can be 
sustained. Areas of future research are proposed. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Accountability and urban services: an overview 
"Services are failing because they are falling short of their potential to improve outcomes. They are 
often inaccessible or prohibitively expensive. But even when accessible, they are often dysfunctional, 
extremely low in technical quality and unresponsive to the needs of a diverse clientele" (World Bank, 
2004; 19). 
"The success of service delivery depends on whether institutions of service provision are accountable 
to citizens'' (Ahmed et al, 2004) 
The above quotes illustrate that, despite considerable investment, urban services are widely perceived 
to be unsatisfactory and deteriorating. A renewed emphasis on the outputs of urban services has put 
the issue of accountability on the agenda. Enthusiasts in donor agencies and academia alike foresee 
improved outputs, greater responsiveness to the needs of service users and sustainability as a likely 
consequence of greater urban service accountability. 
Historically, the provision of urban services was seen as the responsibility of the state, yet 
internationally governments have been unable to provide, operate and maintain public services in line 
with rapid urbanisation', population growth, and resource deficiencies2• Public sector faUure has been 
largely attributed to a supply driven approach, whereby governments provide services through top 
down, rule-based mechanisms with little involvement of the service user. This approach is said to have 
created urban services that are inflexible and unresponsive to local specificities and individual needs. 
Instead, it is argued that a more demand-driven, evidence-based, customised, and entrepreneurial 
approach to service provision is required (Osboume and Gaebler, 1993). Service users are expected to 
play a central role in reformed service delivery, for example through planning processes and 
complaints procedures. Holding service providers and policy makers directly and indirectly 
accountable for effectively delivering urban services is key to this approach. Accordingly, attention 
has been given to ways of making the public sector more accountable in its provider role as well as 
increasing opportunities for service users to espress their demands through voice and other forms of 
consumer style behaviour. Greater accountability for urban services requires fundamental changes to 
front line service providers roles, and, in many cases, the delivery of services has also been redesigned 
to support these changes. 
1 UN Habitat (2003a) estimated that by 2020 more than half the population of developing conntries will live in 
cities. 
2 This may lead to crime, nnequal distribution of income and wealth, nnemployment, civil disorder, poverty, and 
enviromuental degradation. 
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Nevertheless, the notion of accountability for nrban services is under developed in existing literature. 
This research will examine the potential of four different forms of accountability, selected after 
literature review, to realise sustained improvements in service delivery. These forms are: 
• Professional accountability 
• Political accountability 
• User accountability 
• Managerial accountability 
These four forms will be described in greater detail in subsequent chapters and analysed with reference 
to a conceptual framework. Within this framework accountability is defined to include aspects of 
information, action and power. Two simple alternative models are presented to illustrate how 
accountability might be used in practice to enhaoce service outputs and sustainability. This framework 
is used to test the hypothesis on accountability, which is set out in Chapter 4 of this thesis. The 
discussion will be illustrated with empirical evidence from fieldwork undertaken in UK, South Africa, 
Bangladesh and South Korea. This thesis fmds that accountability arrangements in practice have 
improved the outputs of nrban services. It will be concluded that, for the cases studied and potentially 
for similar situations, accountability arrangements will improve the relative chances of sustainability. 
It was found that the potential of accountability to improve the sustainability of urban services 
depended on how accountability is used and whether accountability itself can be sustained. 
The thesis expands this area of research by contributing to our understanding of accountability for 
urban services in the presentation of 4 case studies of accountability. It adds scope to the area of 
research with consideration of sustainability and by adopting a case study research design. By seeking 
both service users and service providers views, a fuller picture of accountability for urban services is 
presented than has been provided by existing research. 
The purpose of this introductory chapter is to provide the context for the research. This chapter begins 
by defining nrban services and outlining the purpose of service delivery. It is argued that adequate and 
appropriate nrban service delivery depends on the sustainability of two conceptually different service 
outputs: technical quality and user satisfaction. This chapter describes how accountability 
arrangements might realise sustained improvements in service delivery performance. The chapter 
concludes by outlining the structure ofthe rest of this thesis. 
1.2 What are urban services? 
The term 'urban services' covers a wide variety of activities but is defined here as those services 
derived from physical infrastructure networks or installations, including water supplies, sanitation, 
drainage, access roads and paving, street lighting, solid waste management and community halls. 
These services are normally the responsibility of an nrban local government, but may be provided by 
14 
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the private sector and Non Government Organisations (NGOs). The term includes those services that 
operate at a household level and as such are excludable, for example, sanitation facilities, rubbish 
disposal system and water supplies, as weil as those community wide services like street lighting, 
pavements and roads, community halls and storm water drains. 
1.3 Stakeholders in urban service delivery 
Key stakeholders in urban service delivery are identified in Table I below. 
Table 1: Stakeholdcr responsibilities for urban services (after Cotton and Taylor, 2000). 
Stakeholder TYJ>ical role and responsibility 
Central Statutory responsibilities include policy making, planning, providing subsidies, setting 
government regulations, setting and monitoring standards. conservation and provision of resources. 
Local Statutory responsibilities relate to waste collection, drain clearing and street sweeping, often 
goverrunent managed by councillors. Other responsibilities include acting on demands and promoting 
interests of constituents, issuing planning permission and making by-laws. 
Specialist line These typically have responsibilities for water supply and power supply, jurisdiction varies 
agencies over parts of tbe networks. 
NGO/CBOs These are often engaged in self-help activities, campaigning for better services or even 
procurement and supply of services. NGOs and CBOs have a role in supporting community 
managed O&M. 
Private sector These may be small entrepreneurs operating in tbe informal economy or formal sector 
companies providing services. 
Service users Service users may be commercial, industrial, public institutions, or domestic. Users have 
responsibility for on tbe plot services, payment, and to conserve resources. 
Donors Donors and international financing institutions have a role in fm1ding service provision and 
mav influence government oolicv on urban services. 
This research is focused at the tertiruy level of service delivery; therefore, the stakeholders of key 
concern here are urban service users and 'front line' service providers: 
• Urban service users can be distinguished from their rural counterparts by the size and population 
density of the settlements they live in and by their relative dependence on established systems of 
infrastructure in the public and private sector to meet needs, usually in the context of a cash 
economy (Gilbert et a!, !996; 5). 
• The term 'front line service providers' refers to those workers at the bottom of the service 
provider's organisational hierarchy. These people work at the tertiruy level of service delivery and 
are often directly answerable to the public on a daily basis. The term front line provider suggests a 
potentially combative relationship with service users. Front line service providers may be field 
engineers, skilled workers (such as meter readers or plumbers) or labour teams, and the term may 
also include administrative and revenue functions. 
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1.4 Purpose of urban services 
The provision of urban services is intended to achieve a nnrnber of goals, such as: 
• Human development goals: including public health, well being, welfare, security, comfort, 
convenience, income redistribution, poverty reduction, and enhancing hnrnan capital. 
• Economic development goals: these relate to economic growth, efficiency of economic 
activities, facilitating trade, and creating employment. 
• Environmental sustainability goals: including improvements to the environment and 
conservation of natural resources. 
• Governance goals: for example the promotion of urban management, civil harmony and social 
integration. 
• Financial goals: improving the household's ability to generate income and savings, for 
example, by enabling a more productive use of women's time, or enhancing the scope of 
household-based businesses. 
The specific benefits of urban services for service users at the household and commnnity level are 
summarised below in Table 2. 
Table 2: The benefits of urban services for communities. 
Water supply The literature published during the International Drinking Water Decade has extensively 
doemnented the health, time, and labour benefits of improved reliability, availability, quantity 
and quality of water. 
Sanitation The benefits of sanitary latrines include improved health, increased productivity, reduced public 
and private health spending, imprOved environment, convenience~ privacy, prestige. and 
comfort. However, Pickford (1995; 19) notes that it has proved difficult to demonstrate 
conclusively that sanitation has direct health outcomes. 
Storm water The benefits include reduced frequency and duration of flooding, water logging and erosion. 
drainage Poor dntinage results in flooding of shelter and damage to property, the creation of damp and 
unhealthy living conditions, pollution of water sources and damage to latrines in low lying 
areas. Puddles of water or open drains can act as breeding sites for Culex mosquitoes, 
(transmitters ofBancroftian filariasis and Rift Valley Fever), Anopheles mosquitoes 
(transmitters of Malaria), or schistomsomiasis (Jiardoy, Caimcross and Sattherwaite, 1990). 
Access and hnproving pedestrian access and roads may increase the mobility of residents. increase access 
paving to livelihood opportunities, enable the provision of affordable public transport, and make travel 
safer and more comfortable for pedestrians,_{in terms of air pollution and traffic safety). 
Solid waste Refuse storage facilities and collection prevents the breeding of vectors of disease, such as flies 
management and rodents, and also prevents rubbish blockin~ drains, or sewers. 
Street lighting Increased level of street lighting can reduce crime in urban neighbourhoods, and improve 
security, particularly in terms of violence against women, and prevention of accidents resultiug 
from traffic risks and poor pavin~. 
Community Community halls give a focal point for meeting and action in a community. It can also be used 
halls as an address for visitors and mail. and for storing comnnmity resources and documents. 
Community halls may be a source of income for the community through private hire, for 
example, for parties. 
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1.5 Outputs of urban services 
How far urban services achieve human development, economic, environmental, governance and 
financial goals depends to a great extent on whether certain outputs are delivered. The literature 
conceptualises the outputs of urban services in two specific ways. For example, Zeithaml (1988) 
distinguishes between the technical aspects of service delivery and the consumer's experience of 
service delivery. Gronroos (1983) introduced the tenns technical quality and functional quality to refer 
to this distinction. 
The technical quality of urban services basically refers to whether the service does what it is supposed 
to. Technical quality is an objective concept, and can be measured by conformance with engineering 
based specifications. Variances in quality can be detected by those with technical expertise. For 
instance, the technical quality of urban services can be assessed with reference to standards for water 
pressure and quality, number of storm water overflows, number of missed bins or quality of sewage 
disposal. Technical quality tends to be producer driven, which makes it hard for non-experts to judge 
technical quality (Deming, 1986; Crosby, 1986; Kayaga, 2001). 
Non-technical or functional quality refers to the service user's definition of quality, which is a more 
subjective concept. For example, Bijker et a! (1987) developed the concept of 'interpretative 
flexibility' to describe the way people can have varying criteria of whether a technology works. A 
similar concept, social constructivism, has been used in social science theory to suggest that there is no 
objective knowledge. Instead, there is only constructed knowledge that is representative of a point of 
view (Burr, 1995). Both these concepts indicate that judgements over the success or failure of the 
outputs of urban services are relative. It is possible, therefore, for one person to see a service as being 
of high quality and another to see it as of poor quality, with both citing precisely the same criteria in 
support of their argument (Walsh, 1995; 248-9). 
In an increasing number of countries attention is being focused on the quality of public services as 
measured by customers satisfaction (Myers and Lacey, 1996; 331). Brudney and England (1982; 129-
130) argue that satisfaction with the 'impacts' of services is significant in itself but also provides 
important descriptive information to policy makers, which they suggest is especially important in the 
absence of the market mechanisms of private ownership and competition. Satisfaction with urban 
services can be understood in a number of different ways. User satisfaction can be defined as the 
difference between one's expectations of service performance' and an evaluation with the actual 
outcomes of service delivery (Cronin and Taylor, 1994; Kayaga, 2001). In this model if technical 
performance is higher than expectations then the customer is satisfied. If performance is less than 
expectations then the consumer is dissatisfied. However, someone with low expectations may find low 
service quality exceeds expectations and so would be as satisfied as a customer with high expectations 
and better quality of service. 
3 Based on perception and expetience (Maister, 1985). 
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Alternatively, it has been suggested that service users develop realistic expectations of service quality 
which change in keeping with their experience of service delivery (Johnson et a!, 1996). Thus user 
satisfaction is a changeable but uniform concept, as it would be envisaged that all those using a 
particular service would have similar levels of satisfaction with that service. 
Other definitions of user satisfaction refer to the interaction between users and employees rather than 
the tangible service characteristics (Zadek et al, 1997; 145). User satisfaction with service delivery in 
this case might relate to the interpersonal skills of service providers, such as being caring, courteous, 
understanding, informative, sympathetic, sensitive, communicative, credible, helpful, knowledgeable, 
responsive, and so on (Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry, 1985). 
Ultimately, this research takes the view that reported satisfaction with urban services may be 
influenced by a multitude of contextual factors, only some of which will be related to the 
characteristics of the service itself (Deichmann and Lall, 2003). 
1.6 What are the problems with urban services? 
Stakcholders in developing countries and developed countries alike have concerns over aging and 
obsolete urban infrastructnre, which is in need of repair, replacement and upgrading. The apparent 
failures of service providers to deliver adequate and appropriate services have been summarised from 
the literature in Table 3. 
Table 3: Shortfalls in the delivery of urban services. 
Shortfalls in Poorly maintained assets mean services are not delivering according to their design targets. For example, 
quality in many instances, water and sewerage systems have reached the end of their useful life reducing the ability 
to meet water qua:iitv and other envi:ronmenta.l standards. 
Shortfalls in Shortfalls in funding have had impacts on ability to perform O&M, as well as to meet additional comumer 
funding demand in areas that have experienced population growth The American Society Civil of Engineers 
(2003; 7) estimates it will cost 1.6 trillion doJJars to restore the USA's infrastructure to good condition. 
Commercial Inefficient billing and reverrue collection as well as illegal cormections results in the failure to cover 
los..<:es operating costs leading to under-investment in assets and a lower level and quality of service. 
Producer Engineering departments have been top down and supply driven in their approach. Urban services are 
dominance overly responsive to provider concerns in terms of overstaffing. professional autonomy, lack of sanctions_. 
unclear respons1"bility, limited capacity for regulation by the public sector and so forth, all of which means 
that urban services are not meeting service users needs. 
Inappropriate Joint consumption of urban services leads to a homogenous service and the potential for over/under supply 
levels of service of quality due to the inherent difficuhies in differentiating quality. Standardised services are not tailored to 
the heterogeneous urban population. or to the needs of the poor and disadvantaged. in tenns of appropriate 
levels of service for each household and manageable connection fees and tariffs. 
Asymmetric Imperfect information means it is difficult for service users to assess quality of a service before it is 
information consumed, creatin• the possibility of health and safety risks. 
Limited access or Benefit incidence studies typically show that only a small share of public money is used to ensure that poor 
service coverage _people have access to urban servi~_(World Ban( 2004). 
Poor attitude and Service provider attitude and behaviour may be problematic, for example. shirking. incompetence. cormpt. 
behaviour rude or abusive attitude. lack of motivation or professional pride, poor commitment to the job, professional 
or social distance between service user and provider. 
:Failure to deal It is argued that public sector provision has not effectively managed the negative externalities of service 
with extemallties provision, such as environmentalibeahh impacts., or promoted positive externalities such as accessibility. 
Key sources: Pau~ 2002, Goetz and Gaventa, 2001; Deiclnnann and Lall, 2003; Rakodi, 2003; World Development Report 2004. 
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It is argued that the consequences of these failures are of particular importance to poorer, marginalized, 
and discriminated against people because they are more likely to rely completely on the state for 
accessing urban services; Narayan et a! (2000; 270) report that the poor identifY access and quality of 
services as a key dimension of poverty. Sattherwaite (2003) highlights the importance of living 
conditions when defining and measuring poverty. He has drawn a distinction between what he calls 
'income poverty' and 'housing poverty' to represent the difference between households with a below 
poverty line income but who have access to urban services, and households without these entitlements 
who are clearly more vulnerable4• The disadvantaged in all societies typically lack both equitable 
access to public services as well as effective mechanisms to ensure that their voice is heard in service 
delivery. This may be due to physical, financial, information, political or legal barriers. Table 4 
presents UN Habitat estimation of the number of people lacking water supply and sanitation. 
Table 4: Nwnber of people lacking water sopply and sanitation. 
Number of people lackine a water supply Number ofpeople lackine decent sanitation 
Africa 150 million 180 million 
Asia 700 million 800 million 
Latin America 120 million !50 million 
Source. UN HabJtat 2003b. 
1. 7 Sustainability of urban services 
Concerns for sustainability have arisen in the context of an 'urbanising world'. This has necessitated a 
reassessment of the environmental problems in urban areas that reduce quality of life such as 
inadequate water and sanitation, or solid waste disposal: the so-called 'brown' agenda ' 5 (McGranahan 
et a!, 200 I; 9). The concept of sustainable url>anisation has led to various commitments in the area of 
the urban environment, for example, those of the United Nations Millennium Declaration (2000), the 
Declaration on Cities and Other Human Settlements in the New Millennium (2001), and the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (2002). 
The literature finds that urban services are sustainable if the outputs continue to be realised over the 
long term. For example, with reference to drinking water supply, Davis and Brikke (1995; 6) state that 
sustainability depends on whether: -
• The water consumed is not over-exploited but naturally replenished. 
• Facilities are maintained in a condition that ensures a reliable and adequate potable water supply. 
• The benefits of the supply continue to be realised over a prolonged period of time. 
4 
"Vulnerable people are those who are more exposed to risks, shocks and stresses and with the loss of physical 
assets and fewer and weaker social snpports, they have fewer means to cope without damaging loss" (Neefjes, 
2000; 47). 
5 Discussed in the Basic Needs Approach (early 80s-mid 80s), Rio Earth Swnmit ( 1992), and the Global Campaign 
on Urban Governance (Habitat and Habitat II 1996). 
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Also with reference to water supply, Abrams (1998) claims that 'if the water flows, then all of the 
many elements which are required for sustainability must have been in place. There must have been 
money for recurring expenses and for the occasional repair, there must have been acceptance from the 
consumers of the service, the source supplying the service must have been adequate, the design must 
have been properly done, there must have been sound construction." Carter, Howsam and Tryall 
(1999), present a similarly pragmatic defiuition of sustainability. In their view, the test of sustainability 
is whether or not water supply systems, excreta, or wastewater disposal systems, continue to work over 
time and be used as planned. Likewise, Parkin (2000 a and b), defines the sustainability of 
infrastructure as the 'capacity for continuance', The literature suggests that sustainability is not a 
stand-alone goal in service delivery but that outputs and sustainability are mutually interdependent: 
sustainability cannot be achieved without adequate outputs and vice versa. Sustainability is therefore 
"a general measure of successfulness" (Hardoy, Mitlin and Sattherwaite, 1992; 178). 
It has become commonplace to hear the term social sustainability with reference to urban services. 
Social sustainability refers to the importance of people and social relationships to the sustainability of 
an urban service. For example, the sustainable operation and maintenance of urban services is thought 
to depend on social relations of C(K)peration, trust, civic engagement, and, most important to this 
research, accountability6 between service providers and users. Ubels (1989; 185-198) argues, "The 
techuical system cannot be seen merely as a technical or productive system which is a goal in itself. It 
is a basis for social interaction, and the outcome of this interaction detennine not only the ways in 
which it is used, but also the concrete techuical properties of the system constructed". For Ubels, urban 
services are both conditioned by human relationships and politics but, moreover, infrastructure also 
actively shapes social relations. Similarly, Osbourne and Marvin (2001; 71) describe how the 
development and maintenance of infrastructure networks embody and express power relations. Winner 
(1999; 33) concurs with this observation: 'The issue that divides or uuites people in society are settled 
not only in the institutions and practices of politics proper, but also, and less obviously, in tangible 
arrangement of steel and concrete, wires and transistors, nuts and bolts". 
Based on these two areas of interest, this thesis is concerned with two key forms of sustainability. 
• Technical sustainability - the continued techuical performance of the physical facility, such that 
the benefits of the service are realised over the long term. 
• Social sustainability - the stability of social relations and societal norms, that detennine the 
allocation of resources and power associated with service delivery and the accountability of 
service providers. 
This research understands social and technical aspects of sustainability, not as separate concerns, but as 
an interactive force. 
6 These are aspects of what Putnam (1993) calls social capital. 
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1.8 Accountability for urban services 
The potential of accountability to improve the outputs of urban setVices has been identified 
(Hirschman, 1970; Paul, 2002; Goetz and Gaventa, 2001; Deichmann and Lall, 2003; Rakodi, 2003; 
Grindle, 2003; Casely, 2003; Balkrishnan, 2002; World Bank, 2004). Like the term 'community 
participation' before it, accountability has become a means to an end in the delivety of urban services. 
The main reasons advanced for applying accountability to the delivety of urban services can be 
summarised as: -
• Reduce discretion: Front line service providers have had too much discretion in decision-making 
at the point of delivety. This discretion has had the effect of introducing bias into service delivety, 
which may result in denying full service provision to certain people, or the selective provision of 
in1brmation. Increasing accountability for decisions and actions can reduce this discretion. 
• Improve information flows: The natore of urban services and professional competencies involved 
in service delivety mean there are inevitably asymmetries of information and expertise between 
provider and user. Greater accountability can make information on the performance of services 
more widely available to service users, who are then equipped to ensure better quality and 
standards of service, and more effective use of resources. 
• Compensate for weak political accountability: Traditionally, the electorate holds the public sector 
accountable through their elected representative. However, democratic deficit, clientelistic politics 
and patronage in service delivety has weakened the voice of voters in service delivety. Currently, 
attempts are being made to rework the relationships involved in service delivety, so that service 
providers are more directly accountable to service users. 
• Create demand for better services: It has been observed that when citizen voice is weak service 
providers do not deliver the outputs people want, even though services might be accessible and 
available. This, in turn, leads to a low demand for better services. Putting accountability 
arrangements in place can work to change levels of tolerance for poor service leading citizens to 
reveal their demand for better quality and more accountable urban services at the community level. 
Introducing a more demand responsive approach to service dclivety will enable service providers 
to operate on a more commercial basis and foster greater efficiency in service delivety. 
• Induce greater monitoring by service users: Providers often dominate decision-making in urban 
service provision. This tends to be a consequence of greater skills, expertise and power. Service 
providers are typically accountable to the policymaker rather than to service users. Greater 
accountability to service users is thought to lead to better monitoring of quality and standards of 
service, and more effective use of resources. When citizens exert their influence over service 
providers it ensures that service providers (and policy makers) have the incentives to respond to 
their preferences. 
• Protect the socially and economically disadvantaged: More recently the term accountability has 
become gynonymous with social justice. As well as extending access to urban services, greater 
accountability of service providers and policy makers can be used to protect the qnality of supply 
available to marginal and excluded groups in society. 
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• Improve public sector provision: Growing antipathy towards the provision of urban se!Vices by a 
large, hierarchical, public sector has led to attempts to reduce and reorganise the public sector and 
improve the accountability of its activities. 
• Address fragmentation: In some countries, the for-profit private sector, non-government 
organisations, and community-based organisations, are key se!Vice providers. Despite the fact that 
such participation has resulted in some improvements in urban service provision, these service 
providers are perceived as having fallen short of achieving expected outputs and sustainability. 
Attention is being paid to the allocation of accountability in the context of fragmented se!Vice 
delivery. 
• Improve cost recovery: Greater accountability in the delivery of urban services may have the 
consequence of improving cost recovery since se!Vice users may be more willing to pay for the 
services they receive. Improved cost recovery means that se!Vice providers may have the 
resources to fund capital investments and meet operational costs, thereby, further improving 
service delivery. 
1.9 Structure of the thesis 
The following chapters of this thesis are organised as follows:-
Chapter 2 provides a theoretical review of the existing literature on accountability for urban se!Vices. 
The review explores a number of general issues that should be taken into consideration when looking at 
accountability for urban se!Vices and provides four specific examples of how accountability can be 
applied to the delivery of urban se!Vices. The forms of accountability discussed in this chapter are 
professional, political, user, and managerial accountability. This chapter also problematizes many of 
the implicit assumptions made in the literature on accountability, these assumptions are presented as a 
list of testable propositions that will be reassessed in light of evidence collected in the fieldwork. 
Furthermore, this chapter identifies the gaps in existing knowledge, and states the contribution of this 
research to existing knowledge. 
Chapter 3 uses the existing literature to devise a conceptnal framework with which to assess 
accountability for urban se!Vices. This chapter presents the production of outputs, accountability and 
sustainability as a three-fold goal for the delivery of urban se!Vices. It defines accountability for urban 
se!Vices as a relationship between those providing and using a se!Vice set up for the purpose of 
improving the outputs of urban se!Vices. It is suggested that effective accountability depends on three 
core qualities: information, power and action. Moreover, two simple alternative models are presented 
to illustrate how accountability might improve the sustainability of urban services; these models are 
derived from the literature review. This chapter further summarises the four forms of accountability, 
listed above, that will be explored through fieldwork. 
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Chapter 4 sets out the research questions and hypothesis of this thesis. It is hypothesized that 
accountability arrangements will improve the outputs of urban services and will improve the relative 
chances of sustainability. This chapter provides the rationale for, and a description of, the case study 
methodology, which is used to test this hypothesis, and of the qoalitative and quantitative techniques 
used for data collection. This chapter introduces the case studies that were selected from Bristol (UK), 
Buffalo City (South Mrica), Dhaka (Bangladesh) and Seoul (South Korea). The methodology was 
chosen to be adaptive to these different research contexts and resulted in four distinctive but 
interrelated stodies. The following research techniques were used: -
• Document review: 379 documents were collected from case study locations. 
• Semi-structured interviews: 133 interviews were conducted with front line service providers, 
managers, local government staff, academics and NGO workers. 
• Questionnaires: a survey was conducted of 370 households. 
• Observations: direct observation was undertaken in 4 neighbourhoods in each case study location 
together with participant observation in some cases. 
The intention of Chapter 5 is to present the case stodies and their research findings. Within each case 
study the research questions are answered using a comprehensive summary of the qualitative and 
quantitative findings collected from the fieldwork. 
Chapter 6 presents a cross case analysis of the data generated from the case studies of the previous 
chapter. The chapter revisits the research questions, which are answered in turn using the information 
collected from all four case studies. Subsequently, the research hypothesis is tested. 
Chapter 7 returns to the testable propositions for the functioning of accountability identified in Chapter 
2. These propositions are reviewed in light of the fieldwork and the wider implications of the findings 
for urban service delivery are discussed. 
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes this thesis with a summary of key research findings; it evaluates the 
research process and assesses the potential of accountability arrangements to improve urban services. 
This chapter also highlights the role for further research. 
The appendix contains the references, bibliography, tables, questionnaire, aide memoir, observation 
checklist, case study contact list of the key informants who took part in the semi structured interviews, 
plates and graphs. The structure of the thesis and linkages between the chapters is summarised in 
Figure I. 
1.10 Chapter summary 
This chapter has introduced the key concerns of this thesis. It has defined the urban services of interest 
to this research and described the purpose of nrban service delivery. The outputs of urban services, 
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technical quality and user satisfaction, were discussed and sustainability was defined with reference to 
the continued production of these outputs over the long term. It was noted that the outputs and 
sustainability of urban services tends to be conflated in the existing literature. The ways in which 
urban services are falling short of their potential were noted, and the potential of accountability to 
improve the outputs of urban services described. 
The issues raised in this chapter will be more fully discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, which provides 
a literature review. Despite the enthusiasm in governments, donor agencies, and academia, the affect 
of aCCQUntability on the outputs and sustainability of urban services is an important research area not 
fully explored in existing studies. 
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Figure I: Road map illustrating the structure of this thesis and linkages between the chapters. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter one provided a broad introduction to this research on accountability arrangements for urban 
services. The purpose of this chapter is to present a more in-depth review of the relevant literature in 
order to elaborate on the aforementioned research issues. This chapter is split into three sections: -
I. The first section provides a theoretical discussion of accountability and the rationale for 
applying accountability to the delivery of urban services. Based on these theoretical findings, 
a number of testable propositions for the function of accountability are identified. These will 
be reassessed later in the thesis in light of the fieldwork. 
2. In the second section of this chapter four specific forms of accountability of contemporary 
interest will be identified, and the key features of each form will be considered; this section 
contains a theoretical framework for each form of accountability. 
3. The third section concludes this chapter by identifying the gaps in the existing debate and the 
potential significance of this piece of research to the existing knowledge on accountability for 
urban seiVices. 
2. 2 Conceptualising accountability: different disciplines, different 
concerns? 
This section reviews what accountability is understood to mean, before moving on to describe the 
rationale for applying accountability to the delivery of urban services. This section examines how 
accountability improves urban services in theory and concludes by disaggregating a number offorms in 
the study of accountability. 
2.2.1 What is accountability? 
Accountability has attracted a great deal of interest from scholars of various academic disciplines. The 
term accountability means different things to different people, depending on the context and the 
purpose for which accountability is sought. For example, Table 5, (found in Appendix I), outlines the 
"multiple and fragmented" nature of accountability (Sinclair, 1995; 231), and selVes to illustrate the 
way accountability has become the "ultimate moving target" (Kearns, 1994; 187). Thus effective 
analysis of accountability must be interdisciplinary to capture economic, social, and political factors as 
well as both macro and micro scales. 
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Definitions of accountability are frequently made by way of contrast with the term responsibility. For 
example, "public sector actors have a duty to be responsive to the member of the public with whom 
they interact but to account for their actions to their seniors, who account to the legislature and the 
executive, to financial auditors, and to higher court judges" (Goetz and Jenkins, 2002; 8). Oliver and 
Drewry (1996; 13), claim that the difference between accountability and responsibility is blame: 
responsibility is having a job to do and taking the blame when things go wrong, whereas accountability 
is having the duty to explain and making amends without necessarily accepting blame. However, 
Shergold (1997; 295), acknowledges that the distinction between responsibility and accountability is 
often less clear-<:Ut in the public sector: "I may be responsible for departmental errors, and WE may 
together be answerable to parliament and the public for that mistake, but it is pretty certain that it will 
be YOU who is accountable for it! Ambiguity rules OK?" Hambleton and Hogget (1990), find that it is 
the dual role of local government as service provider and democratic institution, which means they are 
both responsible and accountable, whereas a private contractor may only be responsible for service 
delivery. 
By way of general definition, Schedler, Diamond and Plattiner (1999; 17) state "A is accountable to B 
when A is obliged to inform B about A's (past or future) actions and decisions, to justifY them, and to 
suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct". According to this definition, accountability has 
three qualities (Schacter, 2000; Bertolini, 2004): -
• Information: informing stakeholders in service delivery about (past or future) actions and 
decisions, and how these deviate/comply with standards. 
• Power: accountability depends on a power differential in terms of the power to call someone to 
account, power to punish someone in case of misconduct and the power required to give an 
account. 
• Action: accountability is essentially the demand for a reaction (having to explain or justifY one's 
actions and to rectifY problems) to an action or inaction. 
These concepts are discussed in greater detail below. 
Information 
Service users and policy makers face two specific difficulties in assessing information about urban 
services. Firstly, explicit in the Principal-Agent framework is the attempt by service providers (agents) 
to deliberately hide information about their actions and decisions from principals (service users and 
policymakers). Asymmetries of information create transaction costs for principals in monitoring 
service performance and means that service providers have an incentive to undercut the quality of 
service they provide. Secondly, urban services can be described as 'credence' or 'experience' goods, 
which means imperfectly informed consumers can not easily determine the performance of the service 
they are using (e.g. whether the water they are consuming is contaminated or whether the road they use 
is adequately tarred). Accountability arrangements place an obligation on service providers to inform 
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service users thereby lowering transaction costs for service users, and, together with existence of 
sanctions, enforces trust (Schedler, 1999; 16)7• 
A concern with accountability has led to a number of innovations in the way information about urban 
services is disseminated. For example, the media have a key role in providing information on service 
levels, investigating the causes of poor services, and informing a public debate. The Internet has been 
widely used in developed countries for making information generation more efficient. Grassroots 
channels of communication have been particularly effective in developing countries, for example the 
right to information legislation (Goetz and Gaventa, 2001), community-based audits of public works 
(Parivartan in Delhi), joint state-Otizen initiatives such as budget analysis in South Africa, expenditure 
tracking in Uganda, vigilance committees in Bolivia, and the systematic report cards of user 
satisfaction carried out by NGOs in Bangalore. 
However, Day and Klein (1987; 242), suggest that information in itself is unlikely to empower service 
users. These authors have noted that consumers do not generally use information about producer 
performance to press for changes in service provision, or to influence practice in such a way as to 
increase consumer control. For example, more information on the repair and maintenance of 
infrastructure has been made accessible in New South Wales, Australia. However, Walker et a! (1999) 
question "how the mere disclosures of general descriptions of assets and estimates of the cost of totally 
replacing assets which are already owned, could be of general relevance to 'users' of public sector 
financial reports". Similarly, Robinson (2003; 171), reports that "performance measurements can 
become a tool that confounds rather than promotes the connection of people and government 
processes" in Canada. The authors suggest that in addition to knowing where and how to get 
information, people also need to have the capacity and power to make it useable. 
Power 
" ... any action that will achieve a positive change must be faunded on an understanding of the need for 
a redistribution of power" (Lappe and Collins, 1977:331) 
Pluralists would view service providers as benign, apolitical and impartial institutions, acting as the 
umpire between competing sets of stakeholder interests, with the intention of creating equal 
opportunities for all in service delivery. Other commentators argue that power differentials exist 
between service providers and users. Wilding (1982) identifies a number of different types of power 
exercised by welfare professionals in policy making and administration. For example, professionals 
use power to define the needs and problems of their clients, in the allocation of resources, as well as in 
1 The kinds of information required about service provision includes: roles and responsibility of front line service 
providers, asset utilisation and capacity, physical condition of assets, O&M activities, asset performance and 
reliability, resources (fmances labour~ material, p1ans~ inventory stock control)~ regu1atory procedures and user 
feedback on service delivery (Rakodi, I 993; 272-273). 
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the way se!Vices are delivered, and the way that provision affects clients. Skelcher (1993) further 
categorises the use of power by se!Vice providers:-
• SeiVice power (determining how, when, and in what form se!Vices are delivered, access to 
services, discretion of employees, speed of response, physical accessibility, gate keeping). 
• Strategic power; (determining service policies, levels of resource, degree of consumer choice, 
interaction of officers or politicians, or deciding who has privileged access). 
• Structural power (determining who has access to decision making, who decides which issues are 
important, who sets the agenda, who participates, who decides the issues up for discussion, who 
determines acceptability and legitimacy of user involvement). 
According to Skelcher (1993), seiVice providers will be more willing to offer users involvement in 
se!Vice delivery in relation to se!Vice power and strategic power than structural power. In this respect, 
Illich (1976, 1977) views service providers as disabling those who receive se!Vices in the sense that the 
emphasis on the skills of the provider sidelines the competency of a layperson to judge performance. 
Bachrach and Baratz (1970) have also reviewed the ways in which se!Vice users might fail to get their 
needs represented on se!Vice provider's agendas: for example, this might be because of the failure of 
se !Vice users to press their demands, a failure of those in powerful positions to respond to demands or 
the mobilisation of bias which involves the manipulation by the powerful of the values, beliefs, and 
opinions of the general public. The mobilisation of bias is a key concern in Lukes (1974) review of 
power. 
Lukes (1974; 34) defines power as" A exercises power over B when A affects Bin a manner contrary 
to B 's interests". He further distinguishes between 
• One-dimensional view of power, which refers to 'influence' and 'control'. 
• Two dimensional view of power, which refers to coercion, force and manipulation. 
• Three dimensional view of power, which refers to influencing or determining what someone 
wants, i.e. the third dimension of power/mobilisation of bias prevent conflict from arising over an 
issue in the first place. 
This third dimension of power relates to what Foucault (1980; 153) terms the 'disciplinary gaze'', 
which is manifest in systems of surveillance, monitoring, and oversight. Foucault claimed, "There is 
no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze. An inspecting gaze, a gaze 
which each individual under its weight will end by internalising to the point that he is his own 
overseer". Internalising the gaze or discourse9 on accountability means that service providers would 
freely subject themselves to the scrutiny of others, especially experts and seiVice users, a result of what 
8 An example of this 'disciplinary gaze' is Jeremy Benthams Panoptical: a prison designed so that inmates could 
always be observed; Bentham thought that people would behave better if they thought they were being watched. 
9 
"A discourse refers to all sorts of meaning. metaphors, representation. images. stories. statements. and so on that. 
together, produce a particular view or representation of events (or person or class) (Burr, 1995; 48). Essentially, 
"Discourse are practices which form the objects of which they speak" (Foucault, 1972; 49). 
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Power (1997) tenns a "compliance mentality". But, more importantly in Foucault's analysis service 
providers would develop self-scrutiny so that people exercise self-control over the way they behave. 
With reference to gender, the issue of mobilisation of bias has been analysed by Molyneux (1985) and 
Moser ( 1989) in tenns of practical and strategic interests. Briefly, practical interests refer to immediate 
basic needs such as wban services that will improve daily lives but do not address the power 
differentials in society. Strategic interests refer to "the fonnulation of an alternative, more satisfactory 
set of arrangements to those which exist" (Molyneux, 1985; 24), and require improvements to one's 
position in society relative to others (for example, men and women will have different strategic 
interests)10• 
Table 6 below, represents an attempt to outline some of the practical and strategic interests of urban 
service providers and users. This table suggests that those who administer services, those who provide 
them, and those who consume them, do not necessarily share a common interest in service delivery just 
because they all derive some benefit from the service. Service providers may be mainly concerned 
with jobs and improved pay, and consumers concerned with adequate and reliable services. Service 
producers tend to have a variety of resources at their disposal to improve services and ensure they have 
their interests heard; yet service users typically lack the time and money to defend wban services. 
Table 6: A comparison of service providers and users interests in service delivery. 
Practical interests Strat~ic interests 
Service Adequate and appropriate services, affordable tariffs, Eliminating inequalities and inequities in 
users environmental benefits, safety, quality of life, public service delivery, control over decision 
goods. making, distribution of power and 
resources in society, prevent conflict from 
arising, etc. 
Service Enjoyable work, status and recognition, securing Control over decision making, distribution 
providers higher wages, improved working conditions, greater of resources and power in society, setting 
benefits etc. from an employer. agenda in service delivery, determine 
acceptability and legitimacy of user 
involvement etc. 
By definition infrastructure are structures that exist but which are not perceived by people, Scott (1992) 
introduced the tenn ' infra-politics' to describe the ways the use of power can also go unseen and 
unnoticed. He talks about hidden transcripts, or 'muffied voices' (such as rumours, gossip, folk tales, 
songs, gestures, or jokes), through which subordinate groups challenge the powerful in society. These 
can be used both as a safety value and to challenge the status quo in society, based on poor people's 
ideas of moral economy and their conception of rights, obligations and social justice. 
10 Strategic and practical interests can also be tmderstood as poles of a continuum, rather than in opposition to one 
another. 
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Action 
People are called to account over something they have done or not done. Accountability requires one 
to explain, or justiJ'y one's actions, and then to rectify a situation. The benefits ofwban services can 
only be realised if action is taken to ensure services are effectively operated and maintained. Action 
refers to the proper operation of services, which contributes to a reduction of breakdowns and 
maintenance needs, the rectification of complaints and prevention of the same problems recurring, as 
well as regular inspection and servicing to preserve assets and minimise breakdowns. Such tasks might 
refer to improving coverage, ensuring services are actually delivered, expanding services to marginal 
groups, improving quality of services, expanding the range of services, ensuring the availability of 
resources, reducing breakdowns and maintenance needs, rectification of complaints and prevention of 
the same problems recurring, as well as regular inspection and servicing, ensuring good treatment of 
customers, and responding to the voice of service users. 
2.2.2 Forms in the study of accountability 
Jabbra and Dwivedi (1989) present a number of forms in dte study of accountability, dtese denote d1e 
contexts in which people might be held accountable. For example: 
• Organisational or administrative accountability: hierarchical relationships of internal 
reporting. 
• Legal accountability; legislative and judicial checks on politicians and officials. 
• Professional accountability: professional codes of conduct. 
• Political accountability: enforced by legislature, competitive political parties and elections. 
• Moral accountability: moral principles in accordance with prevailing societal norms. 
O'Donnel (1999; 2-3) makes a further spatial distinction between the forms of accountability. For 
example, horizontal accountability is characterised by 'the capacity of state institutions to check abuses 
by other public agencies and branches of government'. Vertical accountability refers to the 
relationship between citizens and state and includes electoral systems, civil society activity, the media, 
public meetings, and formal grievances procedures. Grant and Devas (2000a, 2000b) distinguish 
between the vertical downward accountability of elected councillors to citizens and vertical upward 
accountability of local councillors to central government. 
The literature presents mixed evidence on the effectiveness of vertical forms of accountability. Until 
the 1980's, there was a consensus that citizens should seek accountability for Uiban services by holding 
policymakers accountable through voting in a parliamentary democracy. This strategy is based on the 
premise that citizens have delegated to elected representatives the responsibility to ensure that urban 
services meet citizen's expectations. However, in the context of a democratic deficit, traditional 
vertical accountability arrangements are insufficient to make government deliver effective services. 
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Instead, other approaches are needed to strengthen citizen voice and participation to guarantee results 
in service delivery. More recently, a participatory scyle of democracy has been recommended to make 
local government more accountable, more responsive to citizens, and also more effective in service 
delivery. Participatory democracy relies on people representing themselves in decision making and 
engaging in the state's internal oversight functions (Rakodi, 2001). Citizens have been involved 
directly in the workings of horizontal accountability institutions, for example, in participatory auditing, 
participatory evaluation of public spending, or citizens' juries on public policy. Goetz and Gaventa 
(2001) call this diagonal or 'hybrid accountability'. 
Blair (2000) provides a comparative study of various horizontal and vertical accountability 
arrangements in six countries; these include elections, political parties, civil society mechanisms, 
media, public meetings, formal grievance procedures and opinion surveys. He found that elections, 
parties, civil society mechanisms and the media are the most useful mechanisms to securing 
accountability, but suggests that no one mechanism alone is effective in producing accountability. 
Schacter (2000; 2) maintains that horizontal accountability must be buttressed by strong vertical 
accountability, since effective vertical accountability causes governments to take horizontal 
accountability seriously. However, other commentators argue that too much accountability "can clog 
up the works, diverting resources and opening organisations to perverse pressures" (Considine, 2002; 
21). According to Edwards and Hulme (1995; 9), multiple accountabilities will cause the problems of 
having to 'over account' (because of multiple demands), or being able to under account due to 
confused roles which will result in an accountability vacuum. 
2.2.3 The need for accountability for urban services 
Invariably, accountability is needed in the context of low trust. The institutions traditionally 
responsible for service delivery have been accused of abusing the trust of citizens, for example, in their 
use of public money as well as their capacity for impartial and predictable provision of urban services. 
The complex nature of the services provided and professional competencies involved means there are 
inevitably asymmetries of information and expertise between service provider and user, making trust of 
particular importance (Walsh, 1995; 50). Trust in the delivery of public services "requires everyday 
working evidence that public officials really do care, really do respond, really do improve things and 
that it is the public's will that prevails, not the will of professional politicians, career public servants 
and expert consultants" (Caiden, 1989; 25). 
Fukuyama (1995; 26) defines trust as "the expectation that arises within a community of regular, 
honest and co-operative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of 
that community". Pntuam (1993; 171) presents a more calculated definition, "yon do not trust a person 
(or an agency) to do something merely because he says he will do it. You trnst him only because, 
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knowing what you know of his disposition, his available options and their consequences, his ability and 
so forth, you expect that he will choose to do it". Therefore, trust in service providers is an expectation 
based on a number of factors, such as past exchanges with service providers, formal trust producing 
mechanisms in service delivery, and personal characteristics. 
The literature finds the principal reason for distrust in the provision of urban service is the relative 
autonomy and discretion of front line service providers. Discretion enables front line service providers 
to impose their own subjectivity on service delivery in terms of exercising personal choices, opinions 
and behaviour. For example, discretion may be a question of selecting what or whose demands for 
services to respond to. To eliminate discretion front line providers would, ideally, operate on the basis 
of a set of 'decision rules' regarding services allocations and delivery; these are rational criteria that 
make service delivery routine, achieve efficiency in use of resources, and simplitY decision-making11 
(Weber, 1948). Yet Lipsky (1980) suggests that regular decision rules with predictable actions would 
reduce the quality of service provision and increase the costs. Lipsky (1980) argues that front line 
workers require systematic discretion at the operational level to tailor services to service users needs 
and respond to contingencies in. service delivery. Thus, Lipsky (1980) poses a dilemma for 
accountability, since the discretion necessary for service quality entails that front line workers are less 
controllable by the agencies for which they work. Lipsky (1980) suggests that the norms and values of 
front line service providers, as well as the broader social and political context, is key to promoting high 
quality service outcomes. 
If service users and other stakeholders do not trust front line service providers to use discretion 
appropriately, systems of accountability are needed. Day and Klein (1987; 24) indicate that formal 
systems of accountability are required if there is no longer the kind of trust that results from more 
informal, face-to-face opportunities to keep in touch with what is going on. This suggests that 
accountability and trust might be particular problems in wban society. Wade (1988; 489) has explored 
trust with reference to the management of canal irrigation systems. He concludes that stopping farmers 
from stealing or bribing more water than they are entitled to depends on a system of monitoring, 
inspection, and direct accountability to consumers. These mechanisms reduce the need for trust, but, 
paradoxically, increase the likelihood that trust will be forthcoming. Thus, the more accountable urban 
services are, the more they can be trusted. This research acknowledges the symbiosis of trust and 
accountability in service delivery. However, by presupposing a culture of mistrust in service delivery, 
accountability arrangements can also contribute to, produce, and intensify mistrust (Dean, 1999; 169), 
raising the issue of second order accountability - Who watches the watcher? 
"Although Weber found these rules might be applied selectively, depending on a person's strategic interests for 
self-preservation. 
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2.2.4 To whom are service providers accountable? 
Front line service providers are typically accountable to a number of different stakeholders (see Figure 
2). Front line service providers are first, and, foremost, accountable through line management 
structures within the organisations for which they work. Service providers 'internally' account through 
formal reporting systems to superiors, such as department heads, managers or elected councillors, in 
the context of bureaucratic hierarchies. The local government is answerable in turn to central 
government departments, ministers, and citizens. 
Secondly, and increasingly more importantly, services providers are accountable to service users for 
providing and maintaining urban services that are effective and efficient. Traditionally, service 
providers were made accountable to service users through legal accountability (judicial proceedings), 
or political accountability (electoral systems). However, there are now increased opportunities for 
citizens to call providers directly to account, for example, through market accountability, 
operationalised through price, choice, competition and freedom of information; and user accountability, 
the ability of users of services to make demands on services (Stewart and Collet, 1998). 
Thirdly, service providers are accountable to their peers and fellow professionals, in terms of meeting 
shared values and standards. Stewart and Collet (1998) term this 'service provider interest 
accountability', which is demonstrated through the technical, professional, managerial and 
administrative processes of service planning and delivery, and the legal and financial environments 
within which service delivery is undertaken. Furthermore, service providers are ethically and morally 
accountable to themselves and society for working in accordance with personal and societal norms and 
expectations. 
Ultimately, services providers are accountable to taxpayers. Taxpayer's money is needed for the 
delivery of community services, like refuse collection, street lighting, storm water drainage and 
community halls. Particular attention has been given to ensuring that public funds deliver value for 
money, as well as demonstrating cost effectiveness to local taxpayers. 
Figure 2: Accountabilities of Front Line Service Providers. 
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2.2.5 Who is accountable? 
Pinpointing who, in particular, is accountable to these various stakeholders is a complex issue. Day 
and Klein ( 1987) recognise the difficulties in assigning accountability for the performance of a service 
because of the variety of actors involved in service delivery. These actors include policy makers, 
service provider organisations, front line service providers and citizens. Bovens (1998) describes this 
as the 'problem of many hands'. In his analysis accountability might lie with the:-
!. Service provider organisations (in a way similar to the accountability of autonomous citizens): 
this is corporate accountability. 
2. The person at the top ofthe organisational hierarchy- the managing director of the company or 
the government minister: this is personal accountability. 
3. Every member of the service provider organisation is equally liable for the conduct of the 
organisation: this is collective accountability. 
4. Individuals are accountable to the extent that their actions have contributed to the service 
provider organisations conduct: this is individual accountability. 
Bovens notes how a policy of collective accountability means no one in particular is accountable, 
which can easily lead to collective unaccountability and questions whether corporate entities can really 
be held accountable for individual actions. He advocates a strengthening of individual accountability, 
based on each individual taking responsibility for his or her actions. Pypcr (1996) describes this as 
'role responsibility' whereby individuals are required to give an account of the actions they undertake 
in their professional capacity. 
2.2.6 What are service providers accountable for? 
Having established who is accountable, there is a need to specify what front line service providers are 
accountable for. Recently, what service providers are being held accountable for has changed. Current 
understandings of accountability go beyond conventional concerns with legal and financial uses of the 
term. Accountability is increasingly expected to reflect norms of a 'moral economy' and social justice. 
Goetz and Jenkins (2004) call this the new accountability agenda, which has four basic elements (1) a 
more direct role for ordinary people and their associations in demanding accountability (2) a more 
diverse set of jurisdictions, using (3) an expanded repertoire of methods, and on the basis of (4) a more 
exacting standard of social justice. With respect to urban services, social justice requires the fair 
distribution of the outcomes of the services provided to ensure that everyone enjoys the same level of 
well-being and quality of life (entailing the redistribution of wealth) together with changing the 
structures responsible for producing social exclusion. 
James Scott observed a moral economy in peasant societies, designed to secure everyone's right to 
subsistence. A moral economy is based on conceptions of social justice, of rights and obligations, 
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reciprocity, social insurance, risk pooling and mutual assistance (Scott, 1976; vii). As the term 
suggests moral economy refers to moral principles and social norms rather than law and legal 
entitlements. If people's expectations of social justice are violated then moral outrage might lead to 
public action. Public action would be restorative in nature, seeking to reinstate traditional institutions 
and procedures, and may take overt or covert forms. Covert forms of resistance, are what Scott calls 
'everyday forms of resistance', and are characteristic of situations where out-right defiance is too 
dangerous. Scott 's analysis has been extended to the urban poor: the moral economy of the urban poor 
refers to their rightful expectations of jobs, adequate public services and housing etc. For example 
Wa!ton and Seddon (1994; 48) document the food riots, a defensive reaction against threats to 
subsistence, which resulted from Structural Adjustment Programmes in developing countries. 
Conventionally, urban services, or collective consumption as they are sometimes called12, operate as a 
social arrangement to assure the right to subsistence. When urban services fail demands for 
accountability might result not only because needs are unmet but because perceived rights were 
violated. The shortcomings of urban services were outlined in sections 1.5 and 1.7 and include lack of 
access and low availability of services, ineffective and inefficient service delivery and design, 
corruption, elite capture of public resources, lack of exit options, bias in budget allocations, and weak 
voice of citizens. It is possible to distinguish between two trends in the literature on accountabiliry in 
the delivery of urban services:-
• Accountability for the technical process of service delivery. 
• Accountability for the outcomes of service delivery- such as social justice. 
Accountability for the way services are run is relatively easy to secure, as it is based on the technical 
competence of service providers decisions and actions. Accountability for outcomes, on the other 
hand, is often more difficult to discern, difficult to isolate form the wider environment, and service 
evaluations are often subjective and political (Day and Klein, 1987). Table 7 illustrates how the 
providers of urban services are accountable in terms of the forms identified by Jabbra and Dwivedi 
(1989) and Stewart and Collet (1998). 
12 Collective consumption refers to a range of goods and services provided by the state to individuals on the basis 
of social need and citizenship rights rather than persooal wealth or income. Caste lis ( 1976) placed public services 
within the context of class conflict and struggle. He suggested that collective consumption fonns part of a social 
wage whereby the state provides services to the worlcing class (the proletariat) in order to reproduce labour power 
and increase economic growth, but also to defer the class struggle. 
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Table 7: Practical ways of demonstratiog accountability for urban services. 
Fonn of Function 
accountability 
Professional Service providers are accountable for policies, programmes, operations, processes, compliaoce 
with laws and regulations. Professional competence in the preparation of designs, construction 
of works, operation and maintcnaoce of installations, personnel maoagement aod organisational 
planning. P= assessments- professional standards, peer review, ISO 9000. 
Financial Service providers must ensure value for money, cost recovery, equitable user charges, ftnancial 
administration and accoWiting, efficient invoicing and fee collection, regulated private sector 
participation, consumption measurement, and consumer registration. 
Political Service providers must ensure that they act in public interest, are effectively controlled by 
ministers, parties, councillors and parliament. Refers to voting in an election and rights in a 
legal system. 
Moral Codes of conduct aod regnlar disclosure of assets of public officials. Ethics of public service, 
doing a good job in an honest way, demonstrating integrity, fairness, aod ethics, meeting 
societal norms and expectations. Potter (1988) stressed that providers should also be 
accountable for ensuring equality in service delivery. Citizens should have eqnal access, 
shares, treatment and outcomes of senrice orovision. 
Administrative Administrative accountability refers to inventory of assets, creating a stock for maintenaoce, 
storage and distribution of material like tools, spares, chemicals, vehicles used by agency, 
together with effective bureaucratic procedures, planning, and regulation. Accountability 
demonstrated by local authorities self assessment processes, external audits assess performaoce 
through service insoection, or COf!tpliance assessments. 
Legal Service providers are accountable for conforming to legislation/regulation/constitutional 
requirements/statutory duties/policy on infrastructure and employment, human rights, legal 
entitlement, rules aod decisions. 
User User accountability refers to the ability of users of services to make demands on service 
providers. This is demonstrated by consultation with citizens on city frnancial matters: 
participatory budgets, transparent tendering and procurement procedures, integrity pacts, 
monitoring mechanisms in process, internal independent audit capacity, audit reports, public 
feedback mechanisms, ombudsmen, hotlines, complaint procedures, report cards, public 
petitioning, public interest litigation, user assessments linked to customer perspectives: and 
citizen satisfaction surveys. 
2.2. 7 How does accountability improve urban services? 
The World Development Report (World Bank, 1994) reached the broad conclusion that it is the 
institutions traditionally responsible for public service provision that are the cause of most 
unsatisfactory service. It made three recommendations for the reform of these institutions: namely the 
use of competition, application of commercial principles to service providers, and increased 
involvement of users in planning, operating, regulating and financing services. Ten years on, the 
World Development Report (World Bank, 2004) returns to the theme of getting the institutions of 
infrastrncture provision right. Thns, improving the sustainability of urban services requires changes to 
institntional design, and supervisory mechanisms (Israel, 1992). 
Institutions are "humanly devised constraints" (North, 1990), 'complexes of norms and behaviours' 
(Uphoff, 1986; 8-9), the social rules, conventions, and other elements of the strnctural framework of 
social interaction (Bardhan, 1989). Institntions serve collectively valued purposes by reducing 
uncertainty, for example, by making information available, and making behaviour or another's actions 
predictable. Accountability operates as an institution by formalising expectations of action or 
behaviour, creating sanctions for failure, enabling trnst, and providing the motivation and incentives to 
use resources efficiently and effectively. 
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The literature typically uses the "principal agent" theory to analyse the problem of accountability for 
service provision. This theory describes a relationship in which a principal, (service users in this case), 
attempts to secure services from an agent (service providers). Agents are expected to be prone to moral 
hazard'' and hide the information that principals require to monitor their performance. 
In small face-to-face communities the transaction costs involved in monitoring service delivery would 
be less than in large scale urban societies. This is because urban areas are characterised by more 
heterogeneity, impersonal exchange processes and uncertainty in social interactions. All of which 
creates considerable scope for all kinds of opportunistic behaviour, (cheating, shirking, moral hazards) 
and leads to high transaction costs nf monitoring. Incentives are needed to induce agents to act in ways 
that deliver the desired type and level of performance to meet users needs, as well as reduce the costs 
of monitoring service delivery and disciplining service providers at the point of delivery. 
The theory of New Institutional Economics has been used to analyse and evaluate those institutions 
concerned with the provision of infrastructure services (Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne, 1993). It is 
argued that public services have got the incentives wrong in the design, finance, construction, 
operation, maintenance and the use of facilities. Service providers lack the incentives to prioritise the 
use of resources, to provide services for those in need, and users lack incentives to use services 
optimally (Reddy in Mwambu, 1995). Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne (1993) conclude that market 
based incentives14, for example, those associated with private property generate better use of resources 
and more effective and efficient service delivery, as well as ensure greater sustainability than those 
provided by the state. 
2.2.8 Propositions for the function of accountability 
The literature reveals that many important assumptions are made about accountability and these are 
often taken as given in theory and practice. However, these propositions have implications about the 
particular nature and role that accountability has been set up to play, and so should be identified and 
tested. For example, accountability has emerged as a current concern within a context of political and 
social trends that support an emphasis on the individual (both on people's responsibility to help 
themselves and ability to define how best their needs can be met), on achieving results, on demand 
responsiveness, and on adopting private sector techniques in a public sector context. These trends have 
framed the way in which accountability for mban services is presented. The intention here is to 
problematize the meaning of accountability and explore these propositions. Accountability was 
defined earlier as composed of three qualities: information, power, and action, and the following 
propositions have been organised to reflect these components. 
13 Agents only pursue principal's interests \\hen they coincide with agent's own interests. 
14 Another example is Hardin's Tragedy of the Conuuons (1968), \\here a resource is overused because the 
resource is non excludable. 
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Information related propositions 
• Information and other resource symmetries are required 
Information on the performance of seiVices overcomes weak horizontal accountability between 
policymakers and providers, creates competition in seiVice delivery (in terms of political and 
commercial reputations of service providers), and solves collective action problems for seiVice users 
(Heeks, 1998, 1999; Jenkins and Goetz, 1999; Casely, 2003; Balkrishnan, 2002; Davies, 1994; Walker 
et a!, 1999; Robinson, 2003). 
• Service providers are untrustworthy 
Trust is an expectation based on a number of factors, such as past exchanges, personal characteristics, 
and formal trust producing mechanisms. The institutions traditionally responsible for seiVice delivery 
have been accused of abusing the trust of citizens, for example, in the use of public money as well as 
their capacity for impartial and predictable provision of urban services. Distrust has created a context 
conducive to demands for greater accountability (Tendler and Frcedheim, 1994; Wade, 1988; 
Fukuyama, 1995; Dean, 1999; Day and Klein, 1987; Jabbra and Dwivedi, 1989). 
• Service providers and users need incentives for action 
Reforms in the delivery of urban seiVices have focused on the incentives needed to ensure that service 
providers focus on the outputs of seiVices and results in seiVice delivery and have an interest in finding 
and fixing problems. SeiVice users also need incentives to monitor nrban seiVices and overcome 
collective action failures (Wade, 1988; Goulet, 1989; Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne, 1993; Lipsky, 
1980; Walsh, 1995; Jabbra and Dwivedi, 1989). 
• User voice is needed for effective service delivery 
User voice in seiVice delivery can increase accountability for seiVice outputs and monitoring. The 
effects of increased voice in seiVice delivery are to match seiVices to demands and discipline service 
providers. Strengthening service user's voice and participation can further increase satisfaction with 
service delivery (Hirschman, 1970; Narayan, et al, 2000; One World Action, 2002; Paul, 1991a; Paul, 
1992; Goetz and Gaventa, 2001; 2002). 
Power related propositions 
• Sanctions are needed for accountability 
SeiVice providers are often at an advantage in seiVice provision in terms of knowledge and power 
structures. SeiVice providers can be made more accountable through sanctions such as improved 
supeiVision, administrative monitoring and enforcement, together with professional sanctions, fostering 
citizen's voice and choice in seiVice delivery (Paul, 2002; Goetz and Gaventa, 2001; Deichrnann and 
Lall, 2003; Rakodi, 2003; Grindle, 2003; World Bank, 2004; Schedler, Diamond and Plattiner, 1999). 
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• Homogeneous service users 
The literature tends to view service users either as a homogenous group, or else focuses on specific 
groups, such as poor people, without recognising the range of service users and the interaction between 
these social groups (Skelcher, 1996, 1993; Stephens, 1996; Molyneux, 1985; Moser, 1989; White, 
1996; Pretty 1995; Arnstein, 1969; Hogget and Hambleton, 1987; Paul, 1987; Oakley and Marsden, 
1984). 
• Service providers should be answerable to the community 
The literature suggests that accountability should be disintermediated, i.e. service providers should be 
accountable directly to service users; potentially this can remove rent seeking 'middlemen', such as 
policymakers (Tiebout, 1956; Tendler and Freedheim, 1994; Goetz and Gaventa, 2001, 2002; Bovens, 
1998; Pyper, 1996; Wilding, 1982; Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Illich, 1976, 1977; Hambleton and 
Hogget, 1990; Considine, 2002). 
• Social capital is required 
Accountability will be affected by the social capital available. Social capital is needed to overcome 
collective action problems, enforce a response from service providers, to balance the competing interest 
of citizens, to enhance individual's ability and willingness to monitor service provision, and for better 
regulation of services (Wood, 1999; Evans, 1996; Fowles, 1993; One World Action, 2002; Rakodi, 
2003; Goetz and Jenkins, 2002; Putnam, 1993; World Bank, 2004). 
Action related propositions 
• Multiple accountabUity arrangements are necessary 
The literature suggests that accountability works best when multiple arrangements are encouraged 
(Blair, 2000; Schacter, 2000; Sinclair, 1995; Kearns, 1994; Goetz and Gaventa, 2001; Schedler, 
Diamond, and Plattiner, 1999; Grant and Devas, 2000a, 2000b; Jabbra and Dwivedi, 1989; Stewart and 
Collet, 1998; Edwards and Hulme, 1995; Day and Klein, 1987). 
• O&M is neglected in practice 
Operation and repair is critical to the success of urban services. However, in practice, urban services 
are failing in terms of quality and quantity. Failing services has created a logic and legitimacy for 
greater accountability (World Bank, 1994; UNCHS, 1989; Worley International Ltd, 2000; World 
Health Organization et al, 1994; Singh, 1996; World Bank, 1994; World Development Report, 2004). 
• AccountabUity is a cydical process 
Accountability is often discussed in cyclical terms; for example as a cycle of problem, complaint and 
rectification (World Bank, 2004; Schacter, 2000; Raynard, 2000; Day and Klein, 1987). Cycles carry 
the metaphor of nature (lifecycles, seasons, ecosystems) where there is no end and no beginning 
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(Quirk, 1997). Implementation of accountability policy is often viewed in terms of the execution of an 
already specified plan of action with expected outcomes (Long and Long, 1992). 
• Service providers and users are self-interested 
Service users and providers are essentially deemed self-interested and utility maximising. 
Accountability arrangements for urban services are often based on methodological individualism; the 
well being of society as a whole as dependent on individuals and small groups pursuing their own 
interests (Zwarteveen and Neupan, 1996; North, 1990; Uphoff, 1986; Bardhan, 1989; Ostrom, 
Schroeder and Wynne, 1993; Shergold, 1997; Oliver and Drewry, 1996). 
2.2.9 Forms of accountability 
As well as highlighting a number of propositions for the functioning of accountability, the recent 
literature usefully identifies arrangements particularly snited to securing accountability for urban 
services (Skelcher, 1993; Hambleton and Hogget, 1990; One World, 2002; Stewart and Collet, 1998). 
Four of these forms have been selected for further research in this thesis, these are: 
• Professional accountability 
• Political accountability 
• User accountability 
• Managerial accountability 
Professional accountability refers essentially to the self-regniation of service providers to improve 
quality standards. Improved quality in the provision of urban services can be promoted through 
improving the morale and intrinsic motivation of employees, promoting the 'rules of the game' in 
service delivery, or setting professional, ethical, and technical standards. Professional associations can 
monitor providers and improve service quality via accreditation and professional standards. Grindle 
and Hilderbrand (I995; 441) have found that effective individnal performance depends on meaningful 
work, shared professional norms, teamwork, and promotion based on performance. 
The nature of political accountability has been reworked in recent years (Rakodi, 2001). It has been 
recognised that centralised service production tends to discourage innovation and initiative by 
professionals and undermines professional autonomy. Furthermore, the state may deliver urban 
services but not in the way that people want, or may be overly responsive to producer concerns and, 
consequently, services fail. The literature on participatory democracy recognises that service 
provision, finance or regnlation are perceived to be a public responsibility but that top down, rule-
based, mechanisms of control are not responsive to local input. 
User accountability reflects the growing voice of civil society for better quality services. This 
approach is based on ideas of empowerment and is intended to overcome producer dominance through 
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the promotion of collective action. For example, community associations or user groups may act as 
regulators of service, and ensure that policymakers have incentives to respond to their preferences. 
This model of accountability includes ideas of eo-production with users working in partnership with 
the producers of mban services. However, the unequal power relations between users and providers 
are also recognised. 
Managerial accountability usually takes the form of public sector reforms and refers to cost cutting, and 
the application of ideas of the market. Service users have standards to expect from services and, where 
these measures are not met, there are complaints procedures. Complaints are an important way for 
service providers to monitor service performance. Service users are to be consulted about the provision 
of services and are expected to behave like consumers in the private sector. 
These different forms in the study of accountabilities, summed up in Table 8, are also practical 
arrangements to improve the sustainability of urban services and will be explored further in the 
following section. 
Table 8: Review of 4 key accountability arrangements for urbao services. 
Professional Political User accountability Managerial 
accountabilitv accountabilitv accountability 
Diagnosis Technical solutions. Political solutions. Socio-pclitical Managerial solutions. 
of problem solutions. 
Immediate Technology failure Centralised Corruption, Poor bureaucratic 
cuuses of and lack of govenunentunableto discrimination and rules and regulations. 
problems professional provide effective mis-management by 
competence by services. service providers. 
service providers. 
Structural Inappropriate Poor government Inequitable resource Inappropriate 
cause of technology and policies, inaccessible and power property rights, 
failure trainiug. government. distribution. institutions. 
Strategy Improve Collective user Extend the capacity of Making services more 
professionalism, involvement in users to speak for responsive to the 
urban infrastructure services through themselves and needs and preferences 
and services. democratic channels. participate in service of the individual 
management. users. 
Discipline Engineering. Politicians, political Sociologists, activists, Management, 
scientists. NGOs. bureaucracv. 
Focus of Service based, Focus on electorate, Community based, Focus on changes to 
this model pragmatic, practical. extend democratic change capacity and managerial 
institutions and voice, voice of service users accountability of 
decentralisation. through bottom-up organisations. 
participation. 
Initiator Service provider led. Local ~ovcnnnent led. Service user led. Service orovider led. 
Focus on Consumers. Citizens. Citizens. Customers. 
(Sources: Walsh, 1995; Skelcher, 1993; Hambleton and Hogget, 1990; One World, 2002; Stewart and Collet, 
1998). 
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2.3 Accountability arrangements for urban services: description of 
forms 
In the previous section it was acknowledged that there is no over arching theory that adequately 
explains the way accountability works, or ought to work, if it is to improve urban services. 
Accordingly, four forms within the concept of accountability were identified. These forms are: 
• Professional accountability 
• Political accountability 
• User accountability 
• Managerial accountability 
These forms provide distinct understandings of the topic of accountability and it is the purpose of tl1is 
section to explore a number of issues around each of these forms. These issues represent a theoretical 
framework for each form of accountability. Insights will be drawn from a range of theoretical 
approaches and acadentic literature. These forms and the relationship between key stakeholders are 
illustrated below, in Figure 3. 
Figure 3: Accountability forms. 
Political 
representative 
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Polftical accountability 
Municipality 
Front line service 
providers 
/ 
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Service User Service User 
2.3.1 Professional accountability 
Infrastructure 
Professional accountability refers to professional competence in the preparation of technical designs, 
construction of works, operation and maintenance of installations, and personnel management. 
Accountability to service users in this model is a consequence of technical competency and principally 
supply driven approaches. Internationally, modifications have been made to service delivery to 
improve quality as well efficiency and effectiveness. Broadly speaking, these changes have taken the 
form of:-
• A life cycle approach to asset operation and maintenance. 
• Separation of key institutional roles for policymaking, service delivery and regulation. 
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• Defined service levels and performance standards linked to planning objectives. 
• Changes to the role ofthe professional and technical expertise in service delivery. 
It is intended that these changes result in more appropriate service design, better maintenance, more 
user-friendly procedures, and greater accountability in service delivery. These changes are 
characteristic of an approach called strategic asset management in New Zealand and Australia and have 
been adopted in a number of developing countries, including Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Fiji 
and India, particularly for road rehabilitation projects, and urban water supplies. These themes 
represent a theoretical framework for professional accountability, and will be discussed in greater detail 
below. 
2.3.1.1 Life cycle approach to operation and maintenance of urban services 
The benefits of urban services can only be realised and sustained if services are effectively operated 
and maintained. Operation refers to those activities required to use the service, where maintenance 
includes the activities that keep assets in a serviceable condition. Proper operation of a service 
contributes to a reduction of breakdowns and maintenance needs. The term maintenance covers:-
• Preventative maintenance: regnlar inspection and servicing to preserve assets and minimise 
breakdowns. 
• Corrective maintenance: minor repairs and replacement of broken and worn out parts to sustain 
reliable facilities. 
• Crisis maintenance: unplanned response to emergency breakdowns and user complaints (Da\ies 
and Brikke, 1995). 
With reference to urban services, the common O&M tasks are summarised in Table 9. 
Table 9: Conunon maintenance tasks for urban services (adapted from UNCHS, 1989). 
Option Common operation tasks Common maintenance tasks 
Water Supply Operation of distribution mains. treatment plants,. Detection and repair of leaks. de-sihing of pipes, 
pumping stations, reservoirs. catchments basins, deep structural maintenance of storage tanks, motor and 
wells, mechanical/electrical installations, valves, ftre pump maintenance. monitoring of water quality/ 
hydrants, public taps. house connections and meters. pressure, and household repairs like tap replacement. 
Sewerage Operation of sewers, manholes., oxidation ponds., Cleaning, maintenance and replacement of sewer 
treatment plants, public latrines, pumping stations and pipes, cutting and sludge removal from waste 
pumps. stabilisatiou ponds. Maintenance of 
mechanical/electrical installations in treatment 
plants. Minor household O&M includes unblocking 
oflatrincs. of septic tank/pit 
Solid waste Operation includes kerbside collection, emptying Maintenance of drains. maintenance of mechanical 
management oommunal storage units, street sweeping, transfer to plants and municipal vehicle fleet 
disposal site, operation of transfer stations/sanitary 
landfill!incinerators/ COillpOSiing plants. 
Storm water Operation of drains, canals. culverts, dikes,. retention De--sihing of drain channels, cleaning of line drains 
drainage basins, pumping stations, pumps, gates, oontrol and catclunents basins, structural maintenance of 
equipment drain lining, cleaning and minor reshaping of unlined 
drains. repair and patching. cleaning of culverts, 
reeular street sweeoing. and solid waste removal. 
Streetlights Management of electricity supply. Maintenance of overhead lines or buried cables, 
replacement and cleaning of bulbs/tubes, fuses, 
switches, wiring, visual impection of equipment, 
poles, lamp post, brackets, etc. 
Roads and Management ofroad use. Replacing gravel or bitumen of roads, potholes 
__1>3ving r'l"'iT, replacement of paving, and regular .weeping. 
Community Management ofbuildings. Cleaning. repair, renovating and extension of 
halls buildings. 
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There are various institutional arrangements for managing the operation and maintenance of urban 
services. Three broad types of maintenance models, based on the typology formulated by Arlosoroff et 
at (1987), are relevant to this research:-
• Centralised maintenance model: where local authority line departments undertake infrastructure 
maintenance. A centralised maintenance system is most appropriate for complex types of 
maintenance, like sewer maintenance, major roads, drainage and water supply, which require a 
high level of capacity and funding. 
• Contractor maintenance model: involves the local authority employing contractors, either private 
sector firms or community contracting arrangements, for maintenance tasks (Sohail and Cotton, 
2000). The main advantage of the contractor maintenance model is as both an alternative 
financing mechanism and a way to improve the qnality and cost effectiveness of services. The 
contractor maintenance model is appropriate for refuse removal, street sweeping, community halls, 
minor roads and drainage. 
• Community based maintenance model: Service users contribute cash or labour for O&M of 
facilities. Community participation increases user ownership and responsibility for maintaining 
the service, supplementing the limited resources of public agencies, and is said to result in more 
appropriate facilities. Common tasks include minor road and storm water drain maintenance, 
minor repairs of water mains aud pit latrine emptying, refuse collection, street sweeping, trimming 
road verges, and maintenance of community halls (Cotton and Franceys, 1991). 
Israel (1992) states that good maintenance is the most cost effective way to increase service delivery 
and enhance infrastructure's contribution to the economy. For example, the World Bank has estimated 
that neglected maintenance in 85 countries, over 20 years, resulted in $45 billion in lost road 
infrastructure, and that US$25 million in vehicles costs could be saved every year in Ghana through 
good road maintenance (Fox, I 994; 36). Whilst skimping on maintenance expenditures may appear 
cheaper in the short tenn, an Urban Management Programme (1989) study found that agency costs 
could be 5 times larger for rehabilitating roads, than for providing adequate maintenance. 
Lack of maintenance leads to more frequent breakdowns, premature replacement, increased operation 
costs, unreliable supplies, financial losses, waste of inputs (chemicals, labour, energy, imported 
materials), and poor service levels or availability (Upholf, !986; 4). An examination of World Bank 
development projects revealed that badly maintained water supply systems deliver an average of 70% 
of their output, compared to design targets of 85% (World Bank, 1994). Furthermore, deficiencies in 
one maintenance sector often raises costs in another, for example, lack of street sweeping or refuse 
collection can lead to increased costs for roads, sewers and drains. In Madras, failure to maintain storm 
water catchments necessitated the allocation of 10% of the annual municipal budget for otherwise 
unnecessary flood relief operations (UNCHS, 1989). The poor operation of urban services also 
includes 'administrative losses' through poorly managed metering, billing, payment collection, poor 
consumer relations, and illegal connections. Inadequate operation and maintenance of urban services 
has reduced both technical performance and cnstomer satisfaction with service delivery. 
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The reasons why maintenance tends to have such a low priority in service provision include a 
concentration on the construction of facilities, the low priority of specific services, lack of awareness of 
O&M, lack of resources, (spare parts, fuel, chemicals, tools, materials, skilled personnel and so forth), 
lack of regulatory requirements or incentives, overlapping responsibilities, and inappropriate 
technology. Furthermore, political leaders are often short sighted, focusing on their tenure in office 
rather than on the life cycle of the facility (Davis and Brikke, !995; Fox, 1994; 36). 
2.3.1.2 Separation of policy makers and service providers 
Government is the foremost provider of urban services; government finances 70% of infrastructure 
investment in Less Developed Countries (DFID, 2002; 2), and 90% of water systems worldwide are 
fully public utilities (The Economist, 2003; 5). Sociological and economic theories suggest three 
arguments for government intervention in urban services: the merit good argument15, the market failure 
argumene6, and the public goods theory. Samuelson (1954) distinguished between those private goods 
that are applicable to market distribution, and public goods, for which market distribution is 
uneconomic or inefficient. The three basic criteria that define public goods are:-
• Joint supply- if a good can be supplied for one person it can be supplied to others at no extra cost. 
• Non-excludability- free riders cannot be prevented from benefiting from the good. 
• Non rejectability- the good is of benefit to all (Pinch, 1985; 7). 
According to these criteria, urban services like solid waste collection and disposal, drainage, 
streetlights, roads and paving and community halls can be described as public goods. Whilst it is 
possible to charge and exclude non-payers from access to sewerage and water supply, the high negative 
externalities of untreated sewage, or unregulated water provision, suggest the need for continued 
government involvement in service provision. 
Nevertheless, public service providers have fallen short of expectations. By the early 1990's, an 
international consensus had emerged which viewed state provision of services as expensive and 
unsustainable. For instance, it was posited that publicly owned capital deteriorates faster than privately 
owned capital, as the private sector tends to devote more resources to maintenance (World Bank, 
1994). Critics have used such deficiencies to question the overall role of the public sector in the 
provision of urban services, and to examine the alternatives to state provision. Moreover, 
accountability is claimed to be enhanced by the introduction of competition in service delivery through 
a clear split of responsibility for policy definition, service provision and monitoring. 
15 Merit goods, like health and education, are underprovided through the free working of the market mechanism 
because it fails to take account of externalities. An argument for state providing merit goods free of charge is that it 
is undesirable that low income people can not afford them. 
16 Services best suited to market distribution are rivalrous, excludable, with low entry barriers, and few 
externalities. Market failure of public good style services might present a high level of risk to public health. 
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The participation of the private sector in service delivery has been widely adopted in developed 
countries and increasingly advocated by donors in developing countries as part of economic 
readjustment. Governments are advised to create an enabling environment for private sector and NGOs 
involvement in service provision", through legal and regulatory frameworks that increase competition 
in services and willingness to pay in order to achieve sustainability. 
The relative merits of private sector participation have been extensively debated in the literature on 
urban services. The private sector is recommended as both an alternative financing mechanism, and a 
way to improve the productivity, quality and cost effectiveness of services throngh changing the 
incentives operating in service delivery18. Above all, a market-based approach is intended to overcome 
producer dominance in service delivery (Walsh, 1995; 13). The scope of private sector involvement 
ranges from delivery of services, maintenance of installations, meter reading, collection of service 
payments and data processing. The regulation of private contractors has itself been contracted out in 
some developing countries (Gaza and the Gabon) to enhance the effectiveness of tariff setting, 
monitoring service quality and service coverage, as well as customer protection". 
Bately (1996), distingnishes between formal programs of privatisation of infrastructnre services and the 
relatively more common informal privatisation, whereby, households, NGOs, and community-based 
organisations (CBOs) find their own solutions to failures in public services. Harper (2000), refers to 
this as 'micro-privatisation' to describe a process where the provision of the service remains in the 
public sector, but private entrepreneurs often 'unofficially' provide or manage some aspect of the 
service at the local level. 'Micro-privatisation' may enhance access to services, improve service 
quality, or reduce costs. It is often claimed that NGO provision leads to better, more effective, more 
equitable, and more representative provision of services. This is due to NGO's comparative advantage 
over the public sector in terms of flexibility, responsiveness, experimentation, motivation, and 
community participation. In a more market based approach, citizens pay individually for the service of 
their choice and competition between service providers guarantees quality and accountability. 
However, the private sector and NGOs have also been criticised for lack of regulation, lack of co-
ordination with the public sector, duplication, competition for resources, poor quality of services, sub-
standard work, and poor accountability to beneficiaries. There is also the concern that privatisation and 
sub-contracting means services users have less protection from government if they encounter problems 
with private providers (Van de Walle, 1989; 610). Newell (2002; 92) warns privatisation might lead to 
accountability gaps in cases where changes to political authority in service delivery take place without 
the creation of new accountability mechanisms. 
17 Reflecting John Turner's (1976) and Hamdi and Goetbert's (1997) view on housing and De Soto's (1989) stody 
of the 'infonnal' economy of Peru. 
18 For example conunercial pressures~ contracts~ regulatory procedures, property rights and cost recovery are said 
to change incentives. 
19 Nevertheless, the trend of private sector management of water and sanitation has begun to slow down. The 
World Bank's Jnfrastructore Action Plan reflects the 45% ($128 billion) drop in private infrastructore fmancing 
between 1997 and 2002 (World Bank, 2003). 
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2.3.1.3 Performance measurement 
One of the reasons for involving the private sector in service delivery is the need for improved 
performance of services, which is often deemed inadequate. Recently, mban service providers have 
become more concerned with measuring the performance ofmban services. One way service providers 
have done this is the publication of performance tables that rate the results of service delivery. In 
addition specific output/performance standards, quality objectives or inputs20 may be defined in sector 
legislation, or in contracts with private operators. In the case of privatisation, it is claimed that 
government has a greater incentive to monitor and enforce service quality arrangements, as they stand 
to gain from penalty payments required each time a service standard or general indicator of quality 
performance is breached. However, Alexander and Kessler (2003), point out the irony that Less 
Developed Countries are expected to have the capacity to set up complex and expensive regulatory 
structures to monitor private service provision when they have failed to deliver such services. 
When private sector participation is not feasible in service delivery, benchmarking has been promoted 
as a way of creating incentives for improving the performance of public urban services. Service 
providers are required to collect performance data on a range of operational, financial and tariff 
indicators. The Australian Institution of Engineers and the American Society of Civil Engineers have 
both published Report Cards that benchmark the nation's infrastructure. These report cards rate the 
asset condition, asset availability and reliability, asset management and sustainability of services 
(including economic, environmenlal and social issues). It is hoped that service providers will compare 
current performance with historical performance, or with national, or international standards for 
performance in particular service areas. Comparison is expected to trigger internal reforms in terms of 
policymaking and monitoring, better resource planning, better accounting, auditing and procurement, 
and better performance. Benchmarking is also intended to enable service users and NGOs to make 
comparisons of the performance of different operators in different regions, to use voice in an informed 
way, and create a competitive pressure for service providers to improve. Performance measurement is 
a tool for improving performance, strengthening accountability, increasing productivity and improving 
the budgetary process. Dean (1999; 169-171) might describe benchmarking as a 'technology of 
performance' aimed to improve the performance of services by making them more calculable and 
comparable. Myers and Lacey (1996; 6), claim that implicit in performance indicators is an 
acknowledgement that public services, like those provided by the private sector, "are products to be 
tested against the needs of service users and purchasers". 
However, others claim that performance indicators are far from neutral technical artefacts (Jacobs and 
Manzi, 2000; 85), but reflect value judgements - what ought to happen in someone's analysis of the 
problem. Gaster (1995; 9) rejects the notion of 'qnality' as "a value free concept, aiming to achieve 
something as apparently scientific and neutral as statistical control, conformance to specification, non-
variation, uniformity, and standardisation". She is concerned with how quality is defined, what 
20 Such as the amount to be spent on maintenance. 
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concepts are used, where they came from, and why they were chosen. Brett (1993; 281) suggests 
performance measurements "are not absolute, but relative to social expectations, the availability of 
resources, the tasks at hand and the organizational alternative available to achieve given ends". 
Therefore, pre-determined standards of service, based on developed country standards, may be 
unsuitable in the context of rapid mbanisation and limited resources of developing countries. Universal 
standards for the performance of mban services may be inappropriate for a variety of reasons: for 
example standards may be a colonial legacy that fails to recognise local conditions, culture and 
traditions; service providers may lack the required institutional capacity, or teclrnical expertise to meet 
the standard; attaining standards may be unaffordable because they favour imported materials and 
skills, or incur high monitoring costs; standards may be difficult to enforce; or else lead to professional 
resistance in adopting a level of service other than top quality (Mugova et al, 2000). The further 
danger with regard to accountability is that accountability "becomes reduced to meeting of pre-stated 
performance targets, and that activity is manipulated to show that these have been met" (Walsh, 1995; 
215). 
2.3.1.4 Professionalism 
Day and Klein (1987; I) indicate that the dependence on professional expertise in service delivery can 
lead to the 'privatisation of accountability', in so far as professionals and experts claim that ouly their 
peers are able to judge their own conduct and performance. The ramifications of this are to diminish 
the notion of 'accountability as stewardship' nf public resources (Gray and Jenkins, 1993a), and a 
weakening of the traditional line of political accountability (Pyper, 1996; 2 I 7 -8). 
Engineers, especially in a development context, have been criticised for 'we know best' values, 
attitudes, and behaviour in service delivery. For example, Edwards (1989; 118) stated, "The natural 
consequence of a concern for teclrnical interpretation of reality is that knowledge, and the power to 
control it, becomes concentrated in the hands of those with the teclrnical skills necessary to understand 
the language and methods being used". Chambers ( 1993) has critiqued both normal bureaucracy and 
normal professionalism, and their tendency towards top down planning, prescriptive blueprints, 
centralisation, standardisation, reductionist thinking and control. The values, methods and behaviour 
characteristic of this 'normal professionalism' means front line service providers tend to assess 
problems with mban services as purely technical issues amenable to professionally determined, 
technological solutions. For example, Cotton and Kolsky (1996; 137) recognize that "Engineers 
usually value depth rather than breadth of understanding; they like to do things carefully, precisely and 
systematically ... they like clear-ail analysis and tangible results and are often very uncomfortable 
with the world of negotiation and politics." 
Gaster (1995) provides a discussion of how the particular values and motivation of service providers 
influence the quality of services. She claims that, just as local councillors values are legitimated 
through the election process, the values of the service providers are legitimated through service 
delivery. These values may be commercial ones like efficiency, effectiveness, self-interest, choice and 
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economy, or values like public service ethic, citizenship, flexibility, equality, empowerment, trust and 
integrity. Goulet (1989) also recognises how incentives to do a good job may come from a variety of 
sources such as money, goods, prizes, as well as moral incentives, such as ideological commitment to 
the public sector. 
Chambers (1993) encourages engineers to accept that non-technical issues can indeed determine the 
technical delivery of urban services. Such an acknowledgement will require professionals to take on a 
dllferent role in service delivery, for example, by recognising the importance of culture, environment, 
gender, appropriate technology, human well-being in service delivery and by incorporating the 
knowledge and skills of communities into service delivery. For Chambers, accountability is ultimately 
an individual choice, requiring an agenda of personal change in attitudes, values and expectations, and 
greater self-<:ontrol over one's own actions, attitudes and behaviours. 
Box l Theoretical framework for professional accountability 
This section has described improvements to the design and delivery of urban services as a mechanism to increase 
accountability and presents a nwnberofissues arotmd this form of accountability. These are:-
• A lifecycle approach to the O&M of services. 
• Purchaser-provider split. 
• Perfonnance measurement. 
• Professionalism. 
2.3.2 Political accountability 
As noted earlier, the delivery of urban services has historically been the responsibility of the state, in 
terms of provision, finance or regulation. It is argued that service providers cannot and should not 
answer to each individual consumer for delivery, but should be made accountable to the wider 
community through accessible local democratic structures. Elections, both central and local, provide 
citizens with accountability in terms of information and explanation for actions, and the ability to 
impose sanctions on politicians if performance is deemed inappropriate. Political accountability rests 
on the assertion that service delivery decisions are made close to the top of the organisational 
hierarchy, i.e. senior officials and elected councillors. Yet urban services are said to have become 
inoperable due to weak institutions and structures of local government. Improving urban services has 
been linked to certain forms of political change, namely, a changed role for govenm1ent in service 
delivery, recognition of the political aspects of service delivery, a rights based approach, and attempts 
to make government more accessible through good governance, decentralisation, and urban 
management. These themes will be discussed in greater depth below. 
2.3.2.1 Role of government in service delivery 
Government was once claimed to be the most appropriate vehicle for the provision of services and the 
main actor in social change (Migdal, 1988). Governments have the responsibility for the provision of 
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affordable, equitable, and effective service delivery. In liberal democracy, 21 power is delegated to 
representatives and a range of institutions, i.e., parliament, ministers, councils, ombudsmen, and courts. 
Elections, both central and local, also provide accountability in terms of information and explanation 
for actions, and impose sanctions if information or actions are deemed inappropriate. 
The role of government in service delivery has since been debated. The inability of governments, 
particularly in Less Developed Countries, to provide, operate and maintain public services in pace with 
rapid urt>anisation and population growth has been well documented. The literature argues that the role 
of government as direct providers of services has given rise to heavily subsidised, loss making utilities, 
operating to rigid rules with political interference. This is said to create inefficient services that are 
unable to improve or expand. As a result, it is suggested that representative democracy has not 
universally enhanced equitable service delivery, and appears to have little impact on social inclusion. 
Public Choice Theory is used to further undermine the role of government in service delivery; it 
demonstrates that public officials would systematically benefit some economically powerful interest 
groups over others through public expenditures, goods, services and state regulations on the basis of 
self interest (Grindle and Thomas, 1991; 25; Estache, 1994; Gclb, Knight and Sabot, 1991; 1186). 
Politicians have also been criticised for clientelistic politics, capturing rents from urt>an services, and 
distributing them to their clients, for example, when the poor sell their vote in return for short term 
tangible needs such as basic services and land tenure (Beall, 1997; Moore and Putzel, 1999). In 
industrialised countries there has also been concern with a democratic deficit in representative 
government in terms of low voter turn ont, unrepresentative councillors, political apathy and low levels 
of popular participation (Barnes, 1999). The effectiveness of voting at elections as a mechanism to 
secure accountability over urt>an services has been contested since "traditional politics is too blunt an 
instrument for sensitive assessments" (Lewis and Birkinshaw, 1993; 85). 
Nevertheless, Hambleton and Hogget (1990; 18) argue access and quality ofurt>an services ultimately 
hinges upon the quality oflocal democracy. They suggest that local government might be improved by 
either the collectivist or consumerist approach. The consumerist approach enhances the responsiveness 
of local government towards the consumer, for example, through consumer-based market principals or 
complaints systems. The collectivist approach, on the other hand, gives primacy to local government 
as a political system and to the democratisation oflocal government service provision. They favour the 
collective approach and suggest collective democratic reforms such as:-
• Improve representative democracy: voter registration, support to councillors. 
• Extend representative democracy: area committees of councillors. 
• Infuse representative democracy with participation: ward committees of councillors and 
commuuity. 
• Extend participatory democracy: community development, user groups, or grassroots movements. 
21 Liberal democracies are characterised by individual rights, private property, liberty, rule of law, political rights 
and freedoms, accountable government, free and fair election, popular participation, and a party system. 
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There are a number of recent examples of extending participatoty democracy in service delivety. The 
Right to Information Legislation and public hearings have been used to audit government budgets in 
India (Goetz and Jenkins, 200 I). Participatoty public expenditure tracking surveys were carried out in 
Uganda ( 1996) to find out why Structural Adjustment Programmes specifically supporting spending on 
basic services had not improved development outcomes of service delivety. Abers (1998) documented 
the use of participatoty budgeting in Brazil for the scrutiny of past year expenditure, to set spending 
priorities and allocate funds for public investments. This approach has been particularly useful in 
increasing transparency, reducing clientelistic relations, and securing better services in the favelas. In 
Colombo, Community Development Councils associated with the government's Million Houses 
Programmes (1980's-1990's) enabled residents and communities to work with government officials to 
identifY local problems, set priorities, and develop solutions (Russel and Vidler, 2000). 
The literature on political accountability has a tendency to suggest that the adequacy of urban services 
depends, to a great extent, on a well functioning liberal democracy. Notoriously, Fukuyama (1992; 4) 
argued that 'histoty has ended' in the sense that the struggle between capitalism and its ideological 
alternatives has been resolved in favour of the "universalisation of Western Democracy as the final 
form of human government". The ideological significance of this perspective is that accountability 
requires certain types of institutional change, (capitalist institutions, parliamentary democracy, property 
rights, human rights, free markets and good governance). However, the problem with this kind of 
evolutionist thinking is the assumption that accountability for urban services (and development in 
general) is unilinear, with the West as the end point. Interestingly, Moore and Pntzel (1999; 8) found 
that "some of the best performance in poverty reduction over the past half century has been the 
(former) socialist states, that were undemocratic by conventional criteria, but highly focused on 
improving mass welfare for reasons of ideology and politics". Tllis evidence suggests that a political 
comnlitment to social justice, redistribution, welfare, equality and the alleviation of poverty, may be 
just as important for accountability for urban services as the level of income or type of government of a 
countty. 
2.3.2.2 Political dimensions of service delivery 
Whilst many of the criteria for decision-making in urban services may appear rational and technical, 
they are inherently political in character. According to Leftwich (1983; 82-83), politics is not only 
found in the formal political institutions, (which he terms state politics), but politics can also refer to 
the origins and distribution of power over resources in society (which is pervasive politics). Winner 
(1999; 33) refers to this distinction with reference to infrastructure: "The issues that divides or unites 
people in society are settled not only in the institutions and practices of politics proper but also, less 
obviously, in tangible arrangements of steel and concrete, wires and transistors, nuts and bolts". de 
Swaan (1988) provides an analysis of 'pervasive politics' in the construction of urban sanitation in 
nineteenth century Western European cities. At this time, high-income communities in urban areas 
paid for private provision of water and sewer networks. Over time, governments connected the poorer 
areas of the city to the networks due to the low cost of doing so, the great benefits to social stability (in 
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terms of public order, labour harmony and public health), and the interests of the capitalist class (by 
meeting the needs of labourers, consumers and political supporters). de Swaan argues that universal 
access to water and sewerage services resulted from the enlightened self-interest of government and the 
middle class. 
Chaplin (1999; 145) applies this analysis to her research in India. She reviews how the middle class 
has been able to monopolise what basic wban services the state provides at the expense of the urban 
poor. Chaplin proposes "the only real hope for sanitation reform in India that addresses the inequalities 
and inequities of the current situation lies with the development of a 'threat from below' ". However, 
she observes that social stability is unlikely to be threatened, in part, because of the minimal influence 
of the urban poor, but also because it is not in the enlightened self-interest of the upper income groups 
to ensure the poor can access urban services. This is because medicine and civil engineering have 
lowered the health risks that society in general might face from the sanitation related diseases. Chaplin 
describes a situation where only the middle class in India have the ability to have their problems 
defined as 'public need' and thus the poor are, in effect, excluded from public goods. 
Wuyts (1992; 31) asserts that access to public goods, like urban services, is socially defined and 
constructed; the outcome of 'complex political processes which evolve around the definition of public 
need in response to poverty and deprivation in society'. Wuyts (1992) uses the example of Apartheid 
in South Africa to illustrate the virtual exclusion of the black population from the ability to have their 
problems defined as 'public need', and thus were excluded from public goods. Stephens (1996) is also 
concerned with the process by which some people are made vulnerable by other people. She makes the 
distinction between ineqnality and inequity; inequalities in access to services may lead to health 
inequalities. However, if one group, (usually the wealthy), benefits from service delivery at the 
expense of another group (usually the poor), this is a health inequity (1996; 13). 
Urban sociologists have analysed the distribution of resources within urban areas, to reveal who gets 
what in the city (Castells, 1977; Harvey, 1973; 1989; Pickvance, 1976; Saunders, 1986). Njoh (1999) 
suggests that an individual's status, class and social capital, the physical distance between an 
individual's residence and the location of a service, or the affordability of the service can all impede, or 
facilitate accessibility to public goods and services. The Chicago School (Park et al, 1967) represented 
the city as a 'survival of the fittest'. In this school of thought, competition for living space means 
residents must adapt and specialise in order to capture scarce resources or services; inequalities in 
access to services are the inevitable result of competition. Pahl (1970) argued that access to resources 
might also be constrained by spatial issues, 22 or by social gatekeepers, (planners, bureaucrats and other 
wban managers), who may discriminate against certain residents. Other commentators take a structural 
understanding of inequalities across the city within the framework of underdevelopment, class relations 
and politics. For instance, uneven development in the city is the manifestation of capitalism (Smith, 
1990). Castclls (1977, 1983) recognised the importance of urban services in reproducing labour power 
22 For example, exclusion from resources may be a result of tapering (distance from services), jurisdictional 
partitioning, or the geometry of the city. 
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in capitalist cities. He maintained that a crisis in urban services had the potential to mobilise and unify 
producers of urban services and consumers to defend service provision. This mobilisation may take 
two forms: he distinguishes between urban protest movements which are solely concerned with 
improving the service, and urban social movements whereby a failing urban services can potentially 
lead to a challenge to formal political processes and social relations; the difference between these 
movements is political consciousness. 
Whether failing urban services leads to radical social change in practice is debatable. Tendler (1982) 
argnes that although urban service projects are often based on equity justification23, they are less 
'politically' radical because, unlike rural projects, they offer no control of the means of production, and 
thus primarily serve to reinforce the status quo. Other commentators claim that it is more likely that 
when service users and providers are faced with a problem with urban services there will be a 
fragmentation of interests rather than co-operation. Dunleavy's (1980) Sectoral Consumption Theory 
posits that service users wonld not mobilise to defend urban services on a collective basis because of 
'vertical cleavages' in society based on the different identities of ratepayers, occupation groups, or 
class. Saunders' ( 1986) Dual State Thesis contends that producers and consumers have fundamentally 
incompatible interests, which are dealt with at different levels of government. Service producers are 
concerned with jobs and improved pay, consumers are concerned with adequate and reliable services. 
and, whereas producers have more organisational, financial, legal resources at their disposal to improve 
services, consumers lack time and money to defend services. The Dual State Thesis argnes that when 
service users experience problems with urban services, it would lead to a different political process 
than when service providers have a problem: the politics of production operates at nationaVregioual 
level on a class based agenda, and politics of consumption occur at local level in the competitive 
system of electoral politics, which is not class based. 
A variation of the Dual State model can be seen in Bangalore, where two circuits of politics and 
administration have been observed. An 'upper circuit', composed of corporate interests, formal 
planning, and national and state administration, and a lower circuit composed of councillors and lower 
level officials. On the lower circuit, the city government provides low-income residents with political 
representation, and ward councillors use their connections with lower level bureaucrats to favour poor 
groups in return for electoral support. Whilst this process reinforces dependency and clientism, the 
poor have been able to use these mechanisms to obtain essential services (Benjamin, 2000). 
2.3.2.3 Rights to services 
The dependency of the poor on patron client relations to ensure access to urban services reflects an 
inability to enforce their legitimate rights. In the 1990's, development policy revealed a concern for 
the achievement of human rights in the context of service delivery within a framework of international 
legal instruments, which states are obliged to protect and realise (Calagnas, 1999). The human right to 
23 In contrast to rural projects much rely on justifications of increasing agricultural production. 
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urban services is implied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which acknowledges, 
"Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of 
his family'' (Article 25, http:/lmvw.un.org/Overview/rights.htmll. The governments of South Africa, 
Philippines, Peru, and Ecuador have recognised the right to a healthy environment in their national 
constitutions and refer to infrastructure services in their poverty reduction strategies (UN, 2003c). 
Furthermore, the right to adequate living standards, as well as water and sanitation, is stated in the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women. More recently, in 2002, the United Nations recognised water as a 
human right through a formal comment by the UN committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. The General Comment affirms that "the human right to water entitles everyone to sufficient, 
safe, acceptable, physically accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic uses". lt further 
recognises that "State parties have an obligation to progressively extend safe sanitation services". By 
incorporating rights to urban services into national laws and policies, national governments are 
accountable to electorates for progressively realising access to urban services. Citizens can then lobby 
governments to deliver these services and enforce their rights to urban services, for example, through 
Public Interest Legislation. 
A Human Rights approach focuses attention on those with less social, political and economic resources 
to achieve their basic rights and dignity (Calaguas, 1999). Over the last three decades the importance 
of urban services to people who live in poverty has been addressed in a series of international political 
conferences dealing with development. For instance, the Habitat Agenda (19%), the Millennium 
Summit (2000), and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002), have acknowledged the 
importance of urban services for poverty reduction, and have set goals and targets for action. The UN 
Millennium Declaration set a target for 2015 to halve the 1,200 million people in the world without 
sustainable access to adequate quantities of affordable safe water. The UN World Sununit on 
Sustainable Development set the target of halving the 2,400 million people who lack improved 
sanitation by 2015, and to achieve improved water and sanitation for all by 202524. Although, these 
targets have been criticised for being too narrow, too concerned with measurable outcomes, and too 
reliant on indicators that are inadequate, or inaccurate (Satterthwaite, 2003; 182). 
2.3.2.4 Accessible government 
Such conferences and targets have highlighted the importance of strong institutions and structures of 
local government in the operation of urban services. Consequently, donors have focused on certain 
forms of political change to improve the O&M of urban services. Urban management, decentralisation, 
good governance and promotion of partnership between private sector, government and civil society 
have become legitimate aspects of urban service related development programmes. Devas (2001; 207) 
distinguishes between urban governance and urban management. Whereas good urban management is 
"It was estimated that US$ 180 billion is required if these Millenniwn Development Goals are to be met by the 
report of the Camdessus group on the World Panel on Financing Water Infrastructure at the Third World Water 
Forwn at Kyoto, 2003. 
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concerned to maintain and enhance the capacity of nrban services through fonnal, technical 
bnreaucratic structnres, good governance would improve the fonnal and infonnal political processes 
that influence what happens in a city. 
The concern of the Urban Management Programme (UMP)25 with infrastructure management emerged 
in response to the impact of deteriorating services, and physical infrastructure on local economies 
(Stren, 1993; 129). Under UMP nrban infrastructnre delivery has been 'integrated' in order to reverse 
the trend of inappropriate standards of provision, inadequate operation and maintenance, non-
sustainability, unreliable services, and constraints to economic productivity (Wegelin and Borgman, 
1995; 130). However, others are concerned that Uiban management tends to depoliticise the social 
processes that determine service delivery through a focns on technical and procedural measures, rather 
than focus on democratic votes or voice (Jenkins, 2000; 13 9). 
The promotion of 'good' governance internationally by donors and financial institutions has come to 
prominence over the last few decades in the context of structnral adjustment lending, neo-liberalism, 
and the rise of pro-democracy movements (Leftwich, 1993; 606-610). The governance of nrban 
services typically depends on many actors: these include municipalities, politicians, public agencies, 
service users, NGOs!CBOs, the private sector, ministries (such as water, health, errvironment), and 
agencies of restraint (i.e. watchdogs and regulators). Core characteristics of good governance for water 
and sanitation are good administration, cost effectiveness, political support, technical competence, and 
capacity to deliver good quality services (UNCHS, 2003b; 229). To date, the approach to promoting 
good governance has mainly related to public sector management, institutional refonn, creation of new 
laws, internal oversight rules and increasing civil service pay. However, these kinds of measures are 
perceived to have failed, since good governance has not improved worldwide. In fact, the World Bank 
has found a negative relationship between growth in per capita incomes and quality of governance -so 
called 'growth without governance' (Kanfamann and Kraay, 2002 ). Consideration has instead been 
given to promoting checks and balances from civil society to improve governance and mechanisms 
through which the voices of citizens and users can be heard. Yet, while good governance holds the 
potential that the voices of the poorest and most vulnerable are heard in the decision-making processes, 
there is little emphasis on enforcing positive responses to vulnerable groups (Goetz and O'Brien, 
1995). Like critics ofUMP, Kiely (1998; 74) contends that good governance reduces the politics of 
development to pnrely technocratic issues, which are capable of being carried out in isolation from a 
country's history, cultural tradition of politics or political cultnre. Indeed, the 'good' in the good 
governance agenda is a value judgement, reflecting western liberal democratic ideals of individual 
freedom, equity, efficiency, legitimacy, representation and accountability. 
Complementary to good governance and nrban management is the decentralisation of responsibility of 
service provision, financing and management to local government, markets (private sector 
participation), or communities (community driven development). Decentralisation is defined as the 
25 One of the largest urban global technical assistance progranunes of the UN and the World Banl<. 
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"transfer of responsibility for planning, management, and the raising and allocation of resources from 
the central govermnent and its agencies to field units of govermnent agencies, subordinate units of 
level of government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, or wide, regional or 
functional authorities or non-govermnent private or voluntary organisations" (Rondinelli, 1986). 
Decentralisation is intended to improve performance of urban services (in terms of greater efficiency, 
effectiveness, economies of scale, management and maintenance), as well as to generate the resources 
locally to pay for them (UNCHS, 2001). Decentralisation may also improve governance by increasing 
responsiveness, facilitating monitoring by residents, promoting accountability, increasing local 
ownership, reducing corruption and improving cost recovery (Azfar et a!, 1999; 2). This is because 
decentralisation induces government to respond to the local population by exposing them to the choice 
of the consumer in a direct way (Bailey, 1996; 25). Goetz and Gaventa (2001) suggest that 
decentralisation can improve the responsiveness of public service providers to the needs of service 
users, particularly the poorest service users. A number of recent experiments in decentralisation have 
proved particularly successful, for example in Bolivia, the Law of Popular Participation and the 
establishment of Organizacions Terretorial de Base provide the legal basis for local decision-making to 
plan local infrastructnre and monitor municipal budgets. However, Crook and Manor's (1998) 
investigation of democratic decentralisation in Ghana, Cote D'lvoire, Bangladesh, and India, found that 
decentralisation is not directly related to performance outcomes. Moreover, Moore and Putzel (1999) 
state that there is no reason to expect that decentralisation will be pro-poor. Plummer (2000; 85) 
suggests that decentralisation alone is not enough to facilitate community participation in municipal 
planning without internal organisational reforms; the municipal status quo may remain anti-poor, 
detached and inaccessible, and will block the development of participatory initiatives. 
Box2 Theoretical framework for political accountability 
This section has described increasing participatory democratic control over service delivery as a mechanism to 
increase accoWltability and presented a number of issues aroWld this form of accoWltability. These are: 
• Role of government in service delivery 
• Political aspects of service delivery 
• Enforceable rights to services 
• Accessible govenunent (good governance, urban management and decentralisation agenda). 
2.3.3 User accountability 
More contemporary innovations in accountability rely on the voice and participation of service users to 
improve the outcomes of policy making, planning, operating, regulating and financing in urban service 
provision. Strengthening the voice and participation of service users in service delivery is intended to 
overcome producer dominance and to make service providers directly accountable for effectively 
delivering urban services. Service users are considered best placed to monitor the services on which 
they depend, due to greater incentives and information, as well as the possibility of face-to-face 
interaction with frontline providers. The involvement of citizens in promoting accountability 
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compensates for weak government institutions and regulation by exposing professionals to the choice 
of consumers in a direct way. This model in effect breaks up hierarchical accountability of traditional 
Weberian bureaucracy, (i.e. reporting up the line to the senior officers and politicians) and replaces it 
with direct accountability of service providers to communities. This kind of direct accountability to 
service users acts as a proxy for property rights in service delivery. The literature on this subject refers 
to principal-agent models, community participation in service delivery, empowerment of service users 
and eo-production of services. These themes will be discussed below. 
2.3.3.1 Principal agent style models 
The impact of residential mobility on the quality of public goods is a central assumption in the 
theoretical literature. Tiebout (1956) hypothesised that when people choose where to live they base 
their decision on the tax rate and thus the level of public goods they wish to be supplied; individuals 
were said to 'vote with their feet' for urban services. This mobility creates competition between local 
governments for residents, (just like firms for customers), since loss of residents means loss of taxes, 
and this competition is thought to impose accountability (Ostrom, Schroeder and Wynne, 1993). 
Tiebout's model assumes perfect information, (individuals are fully informed regarding service levels 
iu both source and destination areas), and no transaction costs, (e.g. costs of searching for 
neighbourhoods with appropriate service levels). The theory is based on methodological 
individualism, whereby the 'general welfare' of society depends on enabling individuals and small 
groups to pursue their own interests (Dean, 1999; 158). 
The flaw in Tie bout's model comes from the failure to recognise residents' "unequal consciousness of 
needs and interests, unequal ability to articulate demands, and unequal ability to influence the process 
which transforms demands into decisions" (Shah, 1997; 109). The model also ignores the lack of 
consumer choice in much public service delivery because of the nature of the service, low incomes, or 
emotional ties to a locality. The danger inherent in Tiebout's model is that it creates a two-tier system 
of service delivery, with high quality services for those who can pay, and a declining standard of 
service and lack of choice for the poor (Burns, Hambleton and Hogget, 1994; 23). 
Hirschman (1970) adapted Tiebout's model to describe the relations between the firm and the 
customer. He hypothesised that if a firm's products decline in quality, customers have three alternative 
responses. Hirschman characterised this as the Exit-Voice-Loyalty trilogy:-
!. Exit: some customers stop buying the firm's products, revenues drop, and management is 
impelled to correct whatever faults have led to exit. 
2. Voice: customers express their dissatisfaction, management searches for the causes and 
possible cures of dissatisfaction. 
3. Loyalty reflects the attachments people have to organisations, which affect their willingness to 
exit or use voice. 
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Exit is associated with the market and so depends on choice in service provision. However, as Zadek 
et a! (1997; 14) note, exit is unlikely to be helpful in understanding why the service has failed to meet 
expectations. Voice, on the other hand, is associated with politics, and so is 'more messy' (Hirschman, 
1970; 15). Voice can be expressed directly to service providers through complaints or customer 
consultation or by protest. The advantage of voice is as a mechanism for providing information on 
service performance, thereby providing service providers with the opportunity to improve 
organisational planning and decision making (Shah, 1997). Beresford and Croft (1986) introduced the 
concept of 'self advocacy' to describe having a voice in service delivery, but whlch also refers to how 
service users are treated and regarded by service providers, and the potential of service users to have 
greater control over the whole of their lives. 
Hirschman (1970; 52) asserts that those most able to use voice, the most articulate, are those who seek 
high quality products. These customers are therefore most likely to leave an organisation when 
products decline in quality. The exit of those with the loudest voice has the potential to lead to further 
deterioration in the quality of the services (Shah, 1997; 107). To overcome thls problem it might be 
suggested that the most articulate customers should be prevented from exiting from service delivery, 
however, "the inability to exit then, weakens ones voice" (Rothstein, 1998; 1 %). Hirschman (1970; 
24) makes the observation that exit and voice operate most effectively as strategies when they are 
combined. For exit to work as a mechanism to improve service delivery when performance fails, it is 
necessary to have a mixture of alert and loyal customers; the alert customers provide feedback, whlle 
the inert customers provide the firm with the time and money needed to improve performance. 
Gremler and Brown (1999; 273) define customer loyalty as the "degree to which a customer exhlbits 
repeat purchasing behaviour from a service provider, possess a positive attitudinal disposition towards 
the provider, and considers only using thls provider when the need for the service arises". Similarly, 
Andreassen and Lindestad ( 1998) state that people might be loyal to a company for three reasons: Wgh 
switching barriers, lack of alternatives or customer satisfaction. In Hirschman' s model loyalty is 
ambiguous. However, Lowery et a! (1992; 76) presents loyalty as both constructive, (satisfaction \vith 
services or trusting that service providers will sort any problems out), and negative, (service users may 
be apathetic, not caring), to reflect the possible neglect of services by communities. 
Paul (1992, 1991) has reviewed the scope for using Hirschman's framework in the context of public 
services. Pan! proposes that if the service is a private good, then property rights and exit may be more 
effective at improving urban services. If the service has public good characteristics, then voice of 
service users is of greater benefit at securing adequate services. Pan! promotes the use of exit and 
voice by service users to disciple service providers 'from below', instead oftop-down mechanisms like 
legal or democratic accountability. In particular, Paul has demonstrated how organised public feedback 
in the form of report cards can be used to challenge service providers to be more efficient and 
responsive to consumers. Signals from the exit or voice of service users shonld be picked up through 
'hierarchlcal control' within the agency, (e.g. monitoring and incentives), which should then take 
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corrective action in delivery. However, if hierarchical control is inadequate, service providers "may 
continue their 'quiet life', despite the exit or voice actions of the public" (Paul, 1992; 1048). 
The World Development Report (World Bank, 2004) has developed Paul's marlcet based approach to 
accountability as a way to promote pro-poor service delivery. It conceives service delivery as a 
relationship between providers, clients and policy makers. Accountability can be differentiated into the 
short route, (a contract between citizen and provider), and long route, (from citizen, to policymakers, to 
provider). World Bank (2004) states a preference for the short route and proposes a number of ways to 
give the urban poor a greater voice in service delive,Y6• A central assumption of the report is that if 
the poor have a say in service delivery, either directly to service providers or via government, they 
would be more likely to get access to affordable and appropriate services. 
2.3.3.2 Community participation in service delivery 
Other commentators have recognised that tbe collective nature of urban services means that community 
structures, rather than individual choices, are critical to service delivery. Communities, or groups of 
people may be formed on the basis of common concerns, 'communities of interest', or geography, 
which are communities of place (Bums, Hambleton and Hogget, 1994; 227). Community is a 
particular concern in urban societies. Nineteenth century European social philosophers were concerned 
with a perceived loss of community that accompanies urbanisation. Durkheim (1982) and Tounies 
(1957) depicted this transition as a shift from communities based on homogeneity in terms of work, 
ideas, values, interests and norms of behavionr, to heterogeneous forms of association in cities where 
there are a variety of jobs, lifestyles, values and aspirations. However, this view has been challenged 
by Jacobs (1961), who portrayed the city as an inherently social and friendly place. She argues that 
values, kinship ties and social cohesion are manifest in urban areas. 
Community participation is seen as a legitimate aspect of urban service programmes. Service users 
have been encouraged to become "the active makers and shapers of services, exercising their 
preferences as consumers and their rights as citizens" (Cornwall, Lucas and Pasteur, 2000; 2). If the 
users, and particularly the poor, can monitor and discipline poorly performing service providers, this 
will result in better services. Community participation means different things to different people, it can 
be used as goal in itself or a strategic device to increase project efficiency, a way of making people take 
responsibility for improving their own lives, or as a political instrument intended to increase people's 
ability to make demands on government (Oakely, 1991; Gilbert and Ward, 1984). 
Evidence from the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (1981-1990), showed 
that community participation could be used to provide skills, resources, labonr, and cost recovery in 
service delivery. If the delivery and O&M of services are devised in consultation with users it may 
26 Increasing client's choice in services through private. sector delivery and voice in policymaking and service 
delivery processes. 
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improve service levels, provide better channels of communication with provider agencies, more 
appropriate service delivery, better maintenance and more user-friendly procedures. It has been 
observed that sustainability is secured where communities have local ownership, and demand for 
services as well as the resources, information, and incentives to manage them27 (World Health 
Organisation et al, 1994). These lessons have since been applied to the management of networked 
services. In the context of service delivery, Burns, Hambleton, Hogget (1994; 206) summarise the ways 
in which participation is used as a spectrum from citizen non participation (customer care), to citizen's 
control over operational practices, expenditure decisions and policymaking. Participation in service 
delivery can also be a means by which individuals protect their rights, express opinions, or shape their 
own life chances (Boaden et al, 1982; 168). 
Recognition of the needs and priorities of poor people in urban service delivery has led to experiments 
designed to increase their voice and involvement in planning. For example, users are represented on 
public utility regulatory bodies in Ghana and involved in nationwide consumer watchdog groups In 
Zambia. In Indonesia, an NGO called Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen collects consumer complaints via 
newspaper adverts, brochures, radio adverts, and organises meetings between complainants, regulators, 
service providers, and the media, so user's problems can be resolved (Lazzarini, 2004). 
Participation in service delivery is not only necessary in developing countries; in the UK, the National 
Consumer Council, known as WaterVoice, has been set up wilhin the regulator's office to monitor 
water and sewerage companies. The American Society of Civil Engineers (2001; 38-39) also 
encourages citizens to participate in service delivery. For example, it suggests people should engage 
with local infrastructure problems, contact public officials and civil engineers to learn about plans for 
ensuring adequate services, attend local meetings about infrastructure, find out who has responsibilities 
for resolving problems, research infrastructure issues on the Internet, and look at magazine and 
newspaper articles, make infrastructure an election issue, organise citizen advisory committees dealing 
with infrastructure issues, and write letters to newspaper/governor/expressing their opinions on 
infrastructure. 
Arnstein (1969; 216) stated, "citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power. It is the 
redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and 
economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future". According to Freire (1972; 172) "True 
participation is a threat to powerful vested interests". Such authentic participation is risky; it is aimed 
at transfurnting the political and social structures that reproduce, or advance certain interests. White 
(1996; 14) recognised that participation "has the potential to challenge patterns of dominance", if 
participation means that voiceless gain a voice it should threaten the status quo and those who benefit 
from it, and this would be expected to bring coullict in society. 
27 One example of which is the concept of Village Level Operation and Maintenance ( 1980s ), conceived to enable 
water supply to be handed over to the community following installation. 
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Although public involvement in local service provision has increased in recent years, little has been 
achieved by way of a fundamental shift in power (Boaden et al, 1982; 179). Assessments show that the 
ablllty of the poor to exercise real influence over service delivery is limited by their social position and 
lack of expertise. The poor often lack the necessary financial and political resources to mobilise 
effectively or to seek redress through appropriate public accountability institutions, which 
compromises their ability to "strike at the heart of practice that preserve the powers of bureaucrats and 
politicians" (Goctz and Jenkins, 2001; 9). Hart, Jones andBains (1997; 197), and Skelcher (1993; 16), 
take objection to the increasing demands that citizens use their voice to improve services when 
providers fail to relinquish power in any meaningful way. For example, by ignoring consumer 
demands, making closed decisions, not providing choices, breaking promises, withholding information, 
and not providing adequate support. Such behaviour leads to resentment and criticism by local 
residents, who, in turn, become less active and more passive in their involvement with service delivery. 
Moreover, Beresford and Croft (1986) suggest that public participation in the UK has typically led to 
an over representation of white, middle aged, middle class, able-bodied men, which ignores and 
reinforces the inequalities to be found in society. 
The assumption that services users will mobilise around urban service delivery is itself problematic. 
Attempts to secure accountability for urban services might suffer collection action problems due to the 
joint nature of certain urban services, and the public good characteristics of accountability. These 
characteristics mean it is impossible to exclude those who do not take part in accountability related 
collective action from receiving better-managed or maintained services. Olson (1965) claimed the 
'Logic of Collective Action' means that individuals will not participate in matters of public interest 
unless they are coerced to overcome the temptation to free ride, or incentives for action outweigh the 
costs of doing so. From an economic perspective, accountability for urban services might present a 
Prisoner Dilemma, wherein people act in short term self-interest bnt would not co-operate for collective 
benefits. 
Studies have shown that community enforcement mechanisms and co-operation are weaker in more 
heterogonous communities, for example, Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999), found that in the USA 
ethnic diversity is associated with a lower level of public goods provision of sewerage and refuse 
collection, education, welfare, fire protection and roads. With reference to irrigation, Dayton-Johnson 
(1999), and Lam (1996), have also shown that the supply of public goods is negatively correlated with 
heterogeneity in the population. Furthermore, Gujit and Shah ( 1998) talk about the myth of 
community, since some people have more control and access over resources than others. They suggest 
instead that community is characterised by differences (of age, religion, gender, caste, ethnicity, and so 
on). However, Ostrom (1994) has described instances of successful common property management by 
communities. She found that reducing the costs and uncertainties of taking part in collective action 
would decrease the incentive for free riding, cheating, shirking and rent seeking. 
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2.3.3.3 Empowerment 
Successful common management of services and the ability to make demands for accountability from 
service providers depend on service users becoming empowered with more choice, access and 
influence on decision-making and control over service delivery. Much of the existing literature on the 
empowerment of service users relates to social care (Taylor et al, 1992; Croft and Beresford, 1995; 
Barnes, 1999). User empowerment in this context means "creating a relationship in which users can 
explore their own needs and the various ways in which they might be met" (Mearns et al, 1994; 181). 
Empowerment requires not only personal empowerment, but also reducing dependence on service 
producers so that "people have the support, skills and personal resources they need for self-organisation 
and participation to achieve broader social change" (Croft and Beresford, 1995; 63). 
Within the past few decades, development practitioners and theorists have argued that empowerment 
shonld be a development objective (Gilbert and Ward, 1984). Empowerment is a concern of both those 
who question the role of the state and emphasize individual self-reliance, and those who promote 
empowerment to address the structural causes of poverty"'. Panlo Freire (1972) set out much of the 
agenda for thinking on empowerment. He proposes empowerment necessarily entails an educational 
approach, which leads poor people reflecting for themselves on the reasons for their poverty and how 
L'ley can take action to change their situation. Empowerment, in his view, is characterised by increased 
control over resources, changes to the social and economic structures, resistance and confrontation 
between state and community. 
Enabling service users to influence service providers more effectively has been the objective of the 
'Empowering Customers' policy found in many Commonwealth countries (Ayeui, 2001). Rather than 
taking Freire's approach, Empowering Customers recommends extending customer choice, ensuring 
diversity, and flexible in service provision, providing a means to complain, the right to information, 
setting service standards, giving users a share in decision-making, or letting users have direct control 
over service delivery. Considine (2002) found that the rise of empowered consumers has 'reversed the 
traffic' along the traditionally vertical line of accountability, perhaps at the expense of fundamentally 
changing power relations in service delivery. 
Considine's observation is clearly illustrated by Anand's (2000) review of NGO activity in waste 
management. In his analysis, NGO service delivery meets practical needs rather than strategic needs 
because it is "not aimed at fundamentally altering the nature of the state, but merely at adjusting its 
actions at the margin to accommodate the needs of those with a 'voice'". Anand argues that NGO 
provision of services can legitimise (and institutionalise) rent seeking behaviour and fails to change the 
structural causes of inadequate services. His work stands in opposition to assumptions that the 
delegation of public goods provision to international aid agencies or NGOs is less politicised than 
government provision, and more driven by citi7£n preferences. 
28 i.e. unjust class structures, political exploitation, alienation and economic discrimination. 
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Analyses of empowerment often draw on ideas of conflict and resistance. In the Actor Oriented 
Approach people have agency, which is the abili1y to resist, to subvert, and to change the conditions of 
their lives (Long and Long, 1992; 22; Kabeer, 1994; 224). Indeed, the term empowerment suggests 
gaining power at the expense of another, yet Foucault describes power as a relationship between 
individuals, rather than a zero sum game. "Power must be analysed as something which circulates ... 
power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals 
circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and 
exercising power. Individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application" (Foucault, 1980; 
98). 
2.3.3.4 eo-production 
Ostrom (1996; 1073) introduced the idea of eo-production of urban services as 'a process through 
which inputs from individuals who are not 'in' the same organisation are transformed into goods and 
services', which can improve service delivery. Ostrom (1996) and Watson (1995) have documented 
schemes for installing low cost sanitation in shan1y towns in Brazil, combining centralised provision of 
trunk lines and local involvement of 'engaged citizens' in financing, maintaining and designing 
household connections. The condiminial sewers run through the backyard of households instead of in 
the middle of the street, maintenance requires co-operation between service users and providers 
because individual connections are no longer independent of each other. These authors find that the 
quali1y and outcomes of services depend on the eo-produced features. Ostrom (1996, 1073-75) 
contends that: "Good agency performance results not from strengthening public sector agencies, but 
from increasing their responsiveness to customers. This fosters an active, vocal constitoency that puts 
in motion the accountability mechanisms needed for good agency performance." Ostrom found that 
eo-production involves the contribution of local knowledge and experience to service delivery, which 
strengthens the sigual system about performance to service providers. Thereby, eo-production gives 
service providers an incentive to respond to service users demands. 
The potential ofinstitotionalised eo-production to improve irrigation has been well documented, (Lam, 
1996; Moore, 1989; Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988). Co-production necessitates that the farmers and staff 
of irrigation agencies actively co-operate to deliver effective irrigation. Lam (1996) highlights the 
'social embeddedness' of irrigation officials in the local communi1y, and the importance of daily 
informal social interaction between farmers and officials. Social embeddedness creates a social 
pressure to do a good job, so that any wrong doing on their part that causes harm to the local 
community could lead to social ostracism. Other kinds of eo-production arrangements have been found 
in health care. In her stody of Ceara, Brazil, Tendler (1997) examines how health workers were made 
accountable and self-regulating outside their agency through monitoring by the communities. 
Communities were informed by central government publicity about their rights, how public services 
are supposed to be working and the standards of performance. But the health workers were also 
embedded in a relationship of trust with clients, which created accountability. Mackintosh (1997) 
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posits that such a pattern of infonnal regulation has also occurred in health care in Kerala, where a mix 
of local public pressure, expectation, competition, information and publicity ensure accountability is 
shared between users and service producers. 
Putnam (1993) argues "Engaged citizens are a source of discipline and information for public 
agencies". By implication then, good services are associated with a civil society characterized by 
social capital, reciprocity, altruism, trust, cooperation and accountability. Crook and Manor (1998) 
suggest that civil organizations can help to foster fairer, more honest, transparent, democratic and 
accountable governance. Sen (1992) proposes the eo-production of appropriate public services 
whereby, "we can think of people participating along with governments in defining needs, in making 
choices appropriate to those needs, and in enforcing accountability." Sen (1992; 275) has described the 
success of public services in Kerala as due to the "willingness of people to join together to demand 
accountability from the systems and their employees". In addition, Dreze and Sen (1989; 259) have 
characterised public action in the process of social change as either collaborative, whereby people 
support government actions, or adversarial, where public demands initiate services. However, 
adversarial public action also has the potential to undermine service delivery. Migdal (1988; 275-6) 
writes that strong society means weak states as the state tries to control people's social behaviour, 
mobilise resources and impose a single set of rules, whilst a strong civil society leads to other social 
organisations applying different rules in parts of the society. 
Box3 Theoretical framework for user accountabilitv 
This section has described increasing the influence of service users as a mechanism to increase accountability and 
presented a munber of issues around this fonn of accountability. These are: 
• Principal-agent model 
• Commnnity participation 
• Empowerment 
• eo-production 
2.3.4 Managerial accountability 
Just as accountability initiatives may seek to increase the influence of service users, so attempts are 
being made to improve the responsiveness of service providers to service users. Improving the 
responsiveness of service providers is in essence a managerial reform, requiring the separation of 
political and managerial accountability for service delivery. In managerial accountability, decision-
making is delegated down the organisational hierarchy as close as possible to the point of service 
delivery, with answerability of low-ranking staiT to superior staiT in an organisation. Consumer 
responsiveness aims to make the hierarchical accountability of traditional Weberian bureaucracy, 
(reporting up the line to the senior officers), more efficient. Greater consumer responsiveness aims to 
change the underlying incentives for service delivery, and is an attempt to avoid producer interests 
dominating service delivery. Service users are given standards to expect from services, and, where 
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these measures are not met, there are complaints procedures. Complaints are an important way to 
monitor service performance in this model. The adoption of customer responsiveness in the delivery of 
urban services, particularly in public service organisations, reflects the growth of consumerism in 
democratic societies and more flexible forms of service production that are more relevant to customer 
need; these are characteristics of an approach called post fordism. Improvements to the responsiveness 
of service providers include managerial reforms, adoption of a demand responsive approach, a 
reassessment of the customer-provider relationship in service delivery and adequate redress for 
complaints. These issues are discussed in greater detail below. 
2.3.4.1 Managerial reforms 
Weber provided an account of bureaucracy, which in its 'ideal 1J1>e' is characterised by standard 
routines and distinct tasks, formal procedures, clear hierarchy (pyramid of authority), promotion by 
merit, impersonal rewards and sanction, job security, and separation of careers and private lives 
(Albrow, 1970). Reeks (1998) provides a comparison of the 'ideal' model of bureaucracy with what 
actually happens in public service provision, for example, high public expenditure, waste, delay, mis-
management, corruption, inefficiency, rent seeking, centralisation, unaccountability and inadequate 
services. 
During the 1980's, successive governments in Australia and New Zealand" undertook wide ranging 
economic and structural reforms using private sector style management techniques aimed at improving 
the efficiency and accountability of public sector managers. These reforms were known as New Public 
Management (NPM) and became an important model for managerial reform in the UK, the USA, and 
Japan (Minogue, 2000; 5; Barron and Scott, 1992; 538). 
NPM is directed at improving customer service in the public sector as a form of qnality assurance. 
This is considered important because failure to deliver is not typically signalled by 'exit' or shopping 
elsewhere. The literature talks about giving people choices in service delivery, matching supply and 
demand, having faith in the ability of users to sort out problems for themselves, and getting closer to 
users. The focus is on achieving results, in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and quality of service at 
the individnal, department and organisation level. Examples of New Public Management reforms 
range from:-
• Improving customer orientation: Paying greater attention to service users needs, making access 
easier, simplifYing procedures, publishing standards for service users, implementing customer 
complaints procedure, and more courteous customer care. 
• Restructuring of central and local government and reducing the size of the public sector: The 
literature suggests that improved customer service must be complemented by a 'reinvented 
29 In parallel to the reforms of the infrastructure sector. 
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government', a form of government that is more accessible to citizens 'and shares many of the 
qualities of business' (Osbourne and Gaebler, I 993 ). 
• Introducing private management practices in public services: i.e. better value for money, 
introducing competitive pressures, commercialisation, market incentives and sanctions. A 
reinvented government would separate policy making from implementation and service delivery 
functions. 
• Improving the results of service interventions: using resources efficiently and effectively, 
monitoring quality, measuring performance against targets, exterual validation of performance, 
benchmarking, monitoring complaints, and information dissemination on seiVice. 
Much of the research on why the public sector of developing countries has achieved inappropriate 
results in seiVice delivery, points to the top down management of services, a lack of technical 
rationality or skilled human resources and the excessive influence of elites in society'0 (Grindle and 
Thomas, I 99 I; 68). Hood (1991) claims New Pnblic Management can be adapted to all organisations, 
policies, levels of government, political agendas and countries because it is flexible and rational. As 
such, recent managerial reforms in Less Developed Countries have replicated the New Pnblic 
Management initiatives of Western industrialised nations (Ayeni, 2002; 3), for example:-
• Management reforms: Performance-based agencies have been set up for tax collection and road 
maintenance in Ghana, Uganda, and Zambia; private sector quality assurance techniques like Total 
Quality Management or ISO 9000 have been used in Uganda, Zambia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Republic of Korea, and Ghana; the Governments of Singapore and Malaysia 
have conducted public seiVice pay review; performance-based compensation systems have been 
used in South African public seiVices; flexible recruiting practices are used in Hong Kong and 
Singapore; in Malaysia there is a programme for inculcating positive attitudes and a code of ethics 
in the public sector. 
• Provision of information: Information on seiVice delivery has been improved through one stop 
shops as in the Ministry of Industry, Mauritius; the Malaysian government is using IT to achieve a 
paperless administration; electronic government is being promoted by the Bangladesh Computer 
Council and in South Africa by the State Information Technology Agency; opinion surveys on 
urban service delivery have been used in India and Uganda and willingness to pay surveys were 
conducted for the Sri Lanka Natioual Water Supply and Drainage Board; attempts have also been 
made to decentralise decision making for example the South African constitution favours the 
provinces, Zimbabwe is decentralising responsibility in health, education and social welfare to 
local governments, and Sri Lanka has devolved powers to eight provincial councils. 
• Senice Charters: Over 60 countries worldwide have adopted mban service charters, these are 
documents that publish measurable seiVice standards that customers are entitled to expect (Ayeni 
30 Elites are 'people who make or share the main political and economic decisions; ministers and legislators; 
owners and controllers of TV and Iadio stations and major business enterprises and activities; large property 
owners, upper level public servants, senior members of the armed forces; police intelligence service, editors of 
major newspapers, publicly prominent intellectnals, la\ryers and donors, influential socialites, heads oflarge trade 
IUlions, religious establislnnents and movements, tmiversities, development NGOs" (Hossian and Moore, 2002). 
67 
An investigation of improvements to urban services through accountability 
2001). For example, in India, citizen charters are used for tackling low-level corruption by 
providing citizens with access to information about government commitment to standards of 
service. 
Other commentators are more cautious about the potential of transplanting administrative models from 
other cultural contexts. Turner and Hulme (1997) reject the prescription of one-size fits all approach to 
public sector reform. Bjur and Zommorrodian ( 1986) claim the success of western administrative 
models would be undermined by 'mismatches in supporting values", such authors propose the need for 
indigenous administrative theories. 
In effect, customer service initiatives like New Public Management are concerned with doing more 
with less, based on the assumption that delivery of services is essentially a private issue for the 
Individual user (Walsh, 1995; 250). NPM "offers the possibility of separating unpopular decisions 
from politics and representing them as technical matters" (Gray and Jenkins, 1993; 144). Service 
delivery becomes not so much an issue of political ideology as one of managerial expediency (Kaul, 
1998; 1). As Kaul (1998; 3) notes, this is attractive to some politicians because it protects them from 
some of the political consequences of hard financial decisions and infuriates others because they cannot 
influence the detail of decision-making. However, managerialism is inherently political, it determines 
in a particular way how issnes are defined and dealt with. Mackintosh (1998; 85) snggests NPM may 
reinforce social exclusion through the individualisation of service users, which can disempower the 
more vulnerable. There is, therefore, the potential for less equity in public service provision, as some 
users inevitably become 'more' empowered than others and may themselves become service 
gatekeepers or else become eo-opted by service providers (Harrow and Shaw, 1992). Whilst the 
introduction of market-based mechanisms into the public sector has been criticised by those on the 
Left, Cheung (1997; 451) suggest that NPM may, in fact, be used to withstand further attacks from the 
privatisers by expanding managerial power. 
2.3.4.2 Demand responsive approach 
A central issne in public sector reforms is making service provision responsive to service users, or 
better yet, 'demand driven'. Osbourne and Gaebler ( 1993) claim that customer driven systems should 
be more innovative, giving people choice between different kinds of services, waste less, depoliticise 
the decision of choosing among competing providers, empower users to make choices thereby making 
them more committed customers, and force service providers to be accountable to customers. 
A demand responsive approach ensnres consmners are engaged in the process of selecting levels of 
service that meet their demands and willingness to pay. It was found that services not based on user 
preferences had problems of under use, poor maintenance, and poor cost recovery. It is hoped that 
responding to users demands in service delivery will force providers to match supply to demand, and 
31 For example the values for public life set out by the Nolan Committee in the UK (1995), such as selflessness, 
integrity, objectivity, accountability, opeuncss, honesty and leadership. 
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thereby behave more like a business with a focus on efficiency. Implicit in the demand responsive 
approach is the view that service users are the best judges of their own interests and can best determine 
how these can be fulfilled in service delivery. A demand responsive approach is complemented, 
wherever practical, by providing choice in service delivery, for example, in 'unbundling' financing and 
services provision. Demand responsive approaches are thought to be more sustainable than supply 
driven approaches. 
Demand can be assessed by the 'revealed preference method', which measures demand indirectly 
through market research, opinion surveys, customer panels, or by the 'contingent valuation method', 
where people are asked directly what kinds of service they would be willing to pay for. More 
qualitative forms of data collection, such as participatory appraisal, can also be used to generate 
information on anitudes, opinions, experiences and perspectives on service delivery. Skelcher (1996) 
observes the potential for such regular and systematic oonsultation with users to increase 
accountability. However, if people see that, even after consultation, the agency fails to keep its 
promises, or fails to provide an acceptable and oonsistent level of service, or is unresponsive to user 
requirements, this may result in feelings of anger, frustration, resentment, criticism, apathy and defeat 
which results in a reduced demand for services (Hart, Joncs and Baines, 1997). 
A demand driven approach to service delivery can be critiqued on the basis that it fails to sufficiently 
address the imbalance of power between service providers and user, especially oonceming the differing 
capacity of groups of service users to influence public agencies and for the assumption that service 
users are best placed to make decisions on how their needs can be met in service delivery. Moreover, 
responding to such conflicting priorities may undermine the impartiality of service providers. 
Ultimately, the importation of private sector ideas such as demand responsiveness into the public 
sector, fails to account for the absence of choice over the majority of urban services, together with the 
fact that the majority of urban services are oonsumed on a oollective basis. 
2.3.4.3 The customer- provider relationship 
One of the key ideas in demand responsive public sector reforms is the "disputed identities of 
'oonsumer' or 'citizen' " (Bames, 1999; 82). Burns, Hambleton and Hogget (1994; 51) provide a 
categorisation of the different perceptions of service users in Table 10. 
Table I 0: Description of service users. 
Description of person Tbe relationship i• strongly shaped by 
Client The dominance of the client by the professional. 
Customer The experience of the customer in using the organisation. 
Consumer The interest of the consumer in the product or service provided. 
Citizen The concern of the citizen is to influence public decision which affect 
the local quality oflife. 
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Citizens are members of a community, with collective rights and obligations; the term connotes ideas 
of social solidarity, shared interests, and collective political decisions. According to Bames et a! 
(1994; 7-10), the term citizen has three dimensions: citizen as tax payer and voter, citizenship as social 
justice and social rights, and citizen as community participant in social, economic and civic life. 
Identifying the users of mban services as consumers suggests services should cater to individualistic 
preferences and choices, based on the individual's ability to pay (Gabriel and Lang, 1995; 176). The 
word consumer describes the relationship of a person to a product or service rather than to other 
members of the community. 
Consumerism in public services has been attacked on the basis that it presents an individualistic 
understanding of public services, for bringing business-like practices into government, and for its 
potential to destroy public sector values, like social justice, equity, probity, integrity and political 
independence. It is feared that consumerism might further disadvantage the less privileged in society. 
Furthermore, "to emphasise the satisfaction of consumer preferences as the primary objectives of 
public services provision seems implicitly to deny that the moral basis of such provision, or citizenship 
itself, could be entitlement based on need. It therefore suggests that the meeting of needs may no 
longer be regarded as essential to the ideal of citizenship" (Barron and Scott, 1992; 544). The idea of 
the customer of public services is related to that of customer driven government that meets the needs of 
customers, rather than the bureaucracy. The danger of this 'consumerist approach' is that shaping 
service delivery to respond to individual complaints might skew priorities towards the tertiary level of 
service delivery, e.g. the distribution network, rather than the bulk water treatment facility, which will 
have long term consequences for provision. 
It has been argued that the 'service encounters' between service providers and users are decisive in 
shaping the quality of services (Skelcher, 1996; 41). 'Getting closer to the consumer' in the 'service 
encounter' requires providing information to users and listening to their feedback, becoming more 
physically accessible to the consumer, and more socially accessible, e.g. greater sensitivity to users, 
especially minority groups (Hambleton and Hogget, 1990). Skelcher (1996; 66) is concerned that 
increased consultation puts front line service providers in a difficult position of both welcoming and 
controlling the public, however they may be poorly equipped to undertake these two roles, let alone 
resolve the inherent contradictions. 
The role of the front line service provider in service delivery has been reworked in recent years to adapt 
to greater consmuerism in public services. Proponents of more accountability claim that frontline 
service providers have had too much discretion in their activities, (which makes them pursue their own 
interest over service users, conceal information about their activities, and display bad behaviour such as 
poor motivation), and have too few sanctions. This has allowed service providers to become 
unaccountable and unproductive. In response, responsibility has been devolved from central bodies to 
line departments, and to line managers. In order to inculcate a stronger sense of personal 
responsibility, shifting emphasis on to the individual, (and the private sphere in general), and seems to 
reflect a frustration with bureaucratic, centralized public service provision. 
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Other remedies to improve accountability include clarified employee responsibility, recognition of 
individual effort, improved pay, employment pmctices, and working methods, training and 
development According to Bovens (1998), the scope for greater individual accountability offront line 
service providers for their own actions depends on service users being able to make informed 
judgements about service delivery, service providers being able to assess the consequences of thcir 
organisation's actions and determine their contribution to it, clarified lines of responsibility within 
organisations, and the power and resources being available to individuals to act. 
Rather than seeking an individualised approach to service delivery, Rhodes (1997; 10-11), concludes 
that, in light of fmgrnented service delivery, accountability shonld no longer be made to fit an 
institution, but must instead lie with the policy and its network. Considine (2002; 30) also proposes a 
'networked' accountability, which is non-hiemrchical and agency-based rather than organisational. 
'Networked accountability' might "be defined as a willingness to regard other actors as sharing in a 
wider agency right, or responsibility for a particular service or group of services". Networked 
accountability offers the possibility of providing a culture of responsibility for urban services \\ithout 
sacrificing the role of exterual scrutiny. Considine goes on to consider the concept of 'double loop 
learning', whereby stakeholders engage both in the activities that demonstrate how resources are 
accounted for and those activities that help adjust future actions. 
2.3.4.4 Complaints redress 
"Complaints and complaints systems are playing a centml part in the development of citizens rights and 
consumerism in the public service" (Skelcher and Walsh, 1992; 7). Service providers need to have 
good complaints handling systems in place so that, if service standards are not met, or consumers are 
treated badly, they can get proper redress, flag np their concerns and make proposals for change. 
Within the private sector, customer's complaints are actively sought and valued in 'double loop 
learning' (Considine, 2002) as a means to secure continuous improvements in service delivery. 
However, the public sector has been typically slow to respond to citizen complaints. Recently, a 
complaints system and rights of redress have been advocated as a proxy for choice in the context of the 
public sector. For example, courtesy campaigns, customer care training, and comprehensive 
complaints procedures ensure that service users are seen as actively freely choosing customers rather 
than passive recipients of monopolistically provided state services (Kaul, 1998; 57). 
Effective complaints handling systems should be:-
• Straightforward. 
• Widely publicised inside and outside organisations. 
• Guarantee a response, set clear times or standards for investigation and response. 
• Make the link between grievances and disciplinary procedures. 
• Provide feedback for management decisions to prevent a recurrence of the problem. 
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• Liase with service users and respond to the service users desired outcome from complaint (this 
might be an apology, a different decision, a proper service that should have been provided in the 
first place, or a change to the way things are done). 
• If the complainant is not satisfied with the reply to the complaint there should be an ombudsmen or 
adjudicator to whom they can take their complaint (Skelcher and Walsh, 1992; Service First Unit 
wcbsite, www.servicefirst.gov.uk). 
Complaints often result from service users not being adequately informed about what the service 
provider will and will not do. Skelcher and Walsh (1992) found that service users need information 
about:-
!. The services provided; how it is provided; who it serves; where it is available; what frequency or 
standards it will meet; behaviour expected of employees. 
2. Rights of service user, i.e. rights of equal service; rights to have specific needs met; rights to be 
consulted about service specification. 
3. A named individual responsible for managing the service, the office address and phone number. 
4. What the authority undertakes to do in the event of service not being available, or not meeting the 
specific standards. 
5. Rights of customer in event of service failure, such as complaint procedures, independent arbiter, 
or access to alternative service provider. 
Goetz and Gaventa (2001) note most state bureaucracies tend to be 'responsive' to complaints, but not 
on an equitable basis, favouring elites rather than socially excluded groups. For example, "poor people 
repon rudeness, arrogance, insensitivity and lack of respect from those in authority" (Narayan et al, 
2000; 287). As well as being more likely to complain, Mlandeuka (1989; 577) found residents of high-
income areas, or homeowners, also have the resources to commit more effective campaigns. In turn, 
middle and upper income groups are more likely to meet a favourable response from sympathetic 
municipal bureaucrats because, as a profession, bureaucrats identifY more with the better off than the 
poor. Middle and upper income service users are typically characterised in the literature as "concerned 
with bow the cake is cut, than trying to make it bigger" (Walsh, 1995; 20). In fact, Boaden et al (1982; 
34) state that "Most of the attempts by government to involve people in local service provision have 
been designed to reincorporate the middle classes, giving them back the access, the proximity, the 
sense of legitimising influence, which many of the middle class may think is their rightful place in 
politics". 
Box4 Theoretical framework for mana~etial accountability 
This section has described improving the responsiveness of service providers as a mechanism to increase 
accountability and presented a number of issues around this form of accountability. These are: 
• Demand responsive approach 
• Managerial reforms 
• The customer-provider relationship 
• Complaint redress 
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2.4 Gaps in the debate and the significance of this thesis 
"Evaluating innovative service arrangements- such as new forms of accountability- is rarer still. If 
systems don't build in wcys of learning about how to do things better, it should be no surprise when 
they stagnate ... Finding out how a particular intervention works in each country setting is crucial, 
since history, politics and institutions determine what works, what doesn't and why" (World Bank, 
2004; 26). 
As this quotation suggests, there are a number of gaps in the existing debate on accountability for urban 
services. These are outlined below. 
The literature reveals a multiplicity of different, but equally authentic, views on what constitutes 
accountability and how it can be applied to the delivery of urban services. However, there is a need to 
get to grips with how accountability for nrban services works in practice in order to 'learn about how to 
do things better'. 
Existing research tends to depict acconntability as a technical tool capable of rectifying problems with 
urban services, yet fails to recognise that accountability also has the potential to transform social 
relations. 
Existing studies teud to conflate the outputs and sustainability of urban services, whilst there is 
evidence to suggest that accountability arrangements might improve the outputs of service delivery its 
implications for sustainability appear to have gone unnoticed and understudied. 
Existing studies of accountability for urban services tend to be desk-based studies or else operate at a 
theoretical level and little evidence has been presented that is grounded in practical experience. This 
literature tends to present accountability from the perspective of academics or practitioners; there are 
relatively fewer studies that examine accountability from the point of view from the subjects of 
accountability reforms. To date, accountability has not been fully understood in terms of a relationship 
between service providers and service users, this appears to be a major weakness when researching 
accountability. 
The few studies that have taken the perspective of service users are based on an implicit assumption 
that service users are a homogenous group, with shared interests in service delivery. Moreover, there is 
an assumption in accountability theory that the rich and poor are able to secure their needs in service 
delivery through similar sets of relationships. Approaches to accountability identified in the literature 
review are limited to the extent that they tend to individualise problems, according primacy to the act 
of complaining and the individual's experience of poor services. Theories of community participation 
suggest the importance of exploring variations in entitlements and expectations of services, since these 
differences will have consequences for the assistance people can legitimately demand in order to 
improve the outputs of nrban services. 
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Aiming to fill this knowledge gap, the following areas, under-developed in the existing research, must 
be considered. For example:-
• This research is concerned with such urban services as water supply, sanitation, drainage, access 
roads and paving, street lighting, solid waste removal and community buildings. Whilst research 
has been undertaken on individual forms of infrastructure, there has been comparatively less 
analysis of urban infrastructure as a cluster of services. 
• This research will problematize many of the existing propositions, perspectives, and theories of 
accountability, identified in the literature review and suggests a re-weighting of theory as a result 
of more empirical evidence. 
• This research will investigate four contemporary forms of accountability as practical ways to 
improve urban seJVices. 
• This research will present evidence from the perspective of service users and service providers. 
• This research will draw conclusions about the value and potential of accountability as a 
mechanism to improve the outputs of urban services (technical performance and user satisfaction), 
and the sustainability of urban services. 
• This research will indicate the ways practitioners can improve accountability for urban services. It 
is hoped that this research will have practical application, for instance, in guiding development 
planners, service providers and users on the strengths and limitations of accountability for 
sustainable urban services. It is anticipated that a better understanding of the practical relevance of 
accountability arrangements will lead to more relevant advice to on the ground realities. 
2.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has reported on a literature review carried out on the issue of accountability for urban 
services. Section one of this chapter provided a descriptive review of accountability as a concept and 
outlined the rationale for applying accountability to the delivery of urban services and is summarised in 
Table 11 below. The literature presents a number of testable propositions about the functioning of 
accountability, these were sununarised in this chapter and will be tested through the fieldwork. 
Table 11: Questioning accountability. 
Who? Front line service providers, individual office holders, impersonal government systems. entire 
govenunents. 
To To all citizens affected by actions, to households, to the neighbourhood, to local govenunent and 
whom? administration, to national ~ovemment, to constituencies, to the media, and so on. 
For For service delivery, inputs, outputs, impaet, outcomes, policy, management, fmances, budgets, 
What? progranunes, decision-making, information, efficiency, productivity, equality, choice, organisational 
objectives (content analysis), personal behaviour, organi_sational action, overall action of ~ovenunent. 
When? For every action, day to dav O&M, or periodic review (i.e. elections, financial year). 
Why? For O&M of services, detect errors, to follow rules and procedures/regulations/targets, to reduce 
discretion or for local connnunity participation. 
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Section two described four fonns of accountability in greater depth, these are:-
• Professional accountability. 
• Political accountability. 
• User accountability. 
• Managerial accountability. 
Section three of this chapter snrnmarised the literature review and identified the research gaps. It can 
be concluded that there is a need to test the general propositions for the functioning of accountability 
set out in the literature, and for an in-depth, empirical examination of the impact of accountability on 
the outputs and sustainability of urban services. As such, this study aims to addresses two key areas 
underdeveloped in the existing research. The following chapters deal with these research gaps by 
developing a conceptual framework, research questions, and a hypothesis for the research. 
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Chapter 3 Conceptual Framework 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a framework for exploring accountability for urban services in practice. A 
number of concepts related to accountability for urban services have been introduced in the preceding 
chapters. Chapter 1 identified the background to the research problem - poor outputs and 
sustainability of urban services - as the low level of accountability. The previous chapter presented the 
literature review conducted on the subject of accountability and urban services. Chapter 2 found a need 
for further research to address two key areas underdeveloped in the existing research: firstly, to explore 
in greater detail the application of accountability to urban services, and, secondly, to test whether 
accountability can improve the outputs as well as the sustainability of urban services. This chapter 
brings together the key concepts introduced in Chapters I and 2, to develop a conceptual framework for 
analysing the issue of accountability in the context of urban services. This framework will be used to 
review the links between accountability, service outputs, and sustainability in practice, and to draw 
conclusions about the effectiveness of accountability in improving the sustainability of urban services 
in different contexts. 
The conceptual framework of this research consists of four components:-
1. This chapter begins by outlining a threefold challenge for the operation of urban services: 
outputs, sustainability and accountability, (as previously introduced in sections 1.5, 1.7, 1.8). 
2. In the following section accountability is defined to include qualities of information, action 
and power, (as presented in section 2.2.1). 
3. Two simple alternative models are presented in the third section to illustrate how 
accountability might function in practice to enhance service outputs and sustainability, (as 
described in section 2.2.5). 
4. Finally, the four contemporary forms of accountability (professional, political, user and 
managerial accountability) selected for further research are summarised (these were first 
presented in section 2.3). 
3.2 A three-fold challenge for urban services 
Urban services are failing with respect to technieal performance of the physieal facility and user 
satisfaction with the service. The literature (see section 2.2.7) indicates that the low level of 
accountability for urban services is the cause of poor outputs. The outputs and sustainability of urban 
services are recognised in the literature as inter-dependent goals, thus tackling quality issues should be 
fully supportive of sustainability. The literature (sections 1.5, 1. 7, and 1.8) points to accountability, 
76 
An invesh·gation of improvements to urban services through accountability 
quality of outputs and sustainability as a three-fold challenge for service providers. These concepts 
were discussed more fully in Chapter I and 2. 
3.3 Definition of accountability for urban services: actions speak 
louder than words 
Sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 reviewed who is accountable for urban services and to whom. It was 
suggested that accountability is demonstrated in the relationship between individuals and depends on 
an agreement of what constitutes acceptable perfonnance or behaviour, and how people should defend 
their conduct/actions. This relationship is based on a power differential between those who can call for 
an account, and those who should explain their actions and rectify the situation (Day and Klein, 1987; 
5). As introduced in section 2.2.1, the qualities of accountability have been defined as information, 
action and power. 
Studies of accountability have a special interest in the relationship between street level bureaucrats or 
front line service providers (Lipsky, 1980) and service users. For the purpose of this research, 
accountability for urban services is characterised as a relationship between those providing and using a 
service set up for the purpose of improving the outputs of service. Based on this definition, 
accountability does not operate when there is no improvement in the performance of urban services, or 
when there is improved performance, but no increased user satisfaction. 
Accountability has been defined in this way to shift attention away from current preoccupations with 
voice or answerability. Whilst voice and answerability may force agencies to make public their 
decisions and otherwise justify their actions, these concepts fail to emphasise a hands on approach to 
accountability; that accountability requires action to improve urban services and achieve social justice. 
It is hoped that making this distinction will reveal whether accountability can make a tangible 
improvement to the outputs of service delivery. 
3.4 Two analytical models of accountability for sustainable urban 
services 
The literature reviewed the potential of accountability to improve urban services. Two simple 
alternative models for the functioning of accountability are apparent in the literature: accountability for 
the process of services delivery, and accountability for outcomes of services, as suggested in section 
2.2.5. These two models differ in their effects on sustainability. 
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Practical model: The literature suggests that those services that are fully accountable to users will have 
the highest performance, and will therefore prove to be most sustainable. Conversely, service 
providers with limited accountability to users will also have limits to their perfonnance and 
sustainability. Accountability in this model is a practical response to an immediate need caused by the 
failure of a service. It is understood that accountability operates in a cyclical way (World Bank, 2004; 
Schacter, 2000; Raynard, 2000; Day and Klein, 1987), and works to conserve or restore the technical 
quality and functional qnality of nrban services. Practical accountability arrangements include calling 
service provider help lines, visiting service providers offices, nsing service provider suggestion boxes, 
and visiting service provider interne! sites. Figure 4 below illnstrates this model. 
Figure 4: Practical accountability model. 
Information 
I \ 
Accountability Action Power ( 
Sustainability Service outputs 
Strategic Model: The literature concerned with gender needs, community development and 
community participation, (Molyneux, 1985; Moser, 1989; White, 1996; Pretty, 1995; Amstein, 1969; 
Hogget and Hambleton, 1987; Sketcher, 1993; Paul, 1987; Oakley and Marsden, 1984), often uses 
typologies or spectrums to show how participation can be used in increasingly meaningful ways. This 
approach can also be adopted in the study of accountability with reference to action, information and 
power, see Table 12. For example, a low level of accountability to service users suggests fire-fighting 
in the operation and maintenance of wban services and minimal mechanisms of redress in event of 
service failure. Whereas, if service providers were fully accountable this might involve user control 
over decisions making processes, citizen monitoring of service deliVCIY and planned preventative 
maintenance of services. 
Table 12: T}POlogy of accountability. 
Action Information Power 
Low level Replacement of Transparent, simple understandable Mechanisms of redress. 
accountability faulty parts. s. 
Corrective Customer feedback (complaint Consmner protection agencies. 
maintenance. forms, su~~estion boxes, surveys). 
Overhaul. Consultation on needs. Consumer representation. 
Opportunity Standards and quality assurance. User involvement to detennine 
maintenance. service policies. 
•r Fault finding Advocacy and lobbying to Power to determine levels of maintenance. inflnence planning. resources and allocation. 
High level Planned Citizen monitoring and evaluation User control over service delivery 
accountability preventative of services. decision making. 
maintenance. 
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Furthermore, the community development litemture suggests that, if the poor were to have a voice in 
service delivery, it would threaten the status quo iu society, as previously repressed, quiet, or apathetic 
groups defend their rights to adequate urban services. If such an analysis were taken to its logical 
conclusion, then accountability may give rise to confrontation and conflict in society. Therefore, 
accountability in this model should be properly understood as a mechanism for challenging existing 
social, economic and political frameworks, rather than working within them. Strategic accountability 
arrangements might include protesting/demonstrating, using the law, forming or joining a user group, 
contacting an ombudsmen or inspector, contacting politicians, holding a public meeting, or voting for 
politicians. This model is illustrated below in Figure 5. In this model the qualities of accountability 
(information, action and power) would progressively augment one another, so that there is constant 
change in both service delivery and social relations, suggesting that accountability would operate in a 
spiral like way. 
Figure 5: Strategic accolUltability model. 
SERVICE OliTP!ITS 
Action 
Action Information 
Action Information 
The key difference between the practical and strategic models is their conceptualisation of the 
ramifications of accountability for urban services. The practical model has a short -term focus on 
restoring the function of urban services. In effect, accountability is grafted onto the status quo in 
service delivery, reinforcing dominant interests, rather than fundamentally changing the way urban 
services are delivered. 
Strategic accountability, on the other hand, is used to address the power differentials in society by 
protecting one's position, or promoting one's interests relative to others. In its strategic form, 
accountability is about changing social relations and norms and so would not always be conducive to 
the sustainability of urban services. The fundamental nature of strategic accountability is described in 
the following quote: 
"Chaos theory tells us to think of change as discontinuous; as unpredictable, as liquid .. when we 
consider the nature of changes we witness all around us in society, at work and in our everyday life, 
these changes were have to manage in our organisations are more like fires (Bergquist, 1993). Fires 
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consume things, they don't just change them. Things which once burnt can never be unburnt. And 
fires change the state of things in quite unpredictable ways. Moreover, fires are all process and no 
substance. Is not this the essence of the changes we witness? Change as process with no pre-figured 
end-state; change as irreversible force" (Qui de, 1997; 570-1). 
3.5 Forms of accountability 
The complexity of accountability is taken to be a core premise of the research. Four fonns of 
accountability were previously identified in the literature review in section 2.2.8. These fonns are used 
to facilitate an examination of accountability in practice. These forms are clearly different and 
represent contrasting understandings of accountability, and of what constitutes adequate service 
performance. They also differ in their view of service users, who may be the creators of the services 
they use, or else consumers of a finished product. The main characteristics of the four models are 
outlined below in Table 13. 
Table 13: Fonns and qualities of accountability. 
How can this be Examples of the three core qualities of accountability 
achieved? 
Quality--> Information Action Power 
Form 
t 
Professional Technical studies, Service providers strive to Professionals (administrators, 
accountability technical knowledge, match output to design engineers, public officials) retain 
professional values and targets. Problem control over service provision. 
technical standards. identification and solving 
by expert. 
Political Information on service Citizens identifying Control through democratic 
accountability standards and political problems and institutions and politicians, 
manifestos. communicating them to although public voice and 
politicians who opinion, common good and 
conummicate problems to general public ioterest has 
service providers. ultimate power. 
User Users request iofonnation Problems identified by Control by citizens, C01l111lunity 
accountability on senrice delivery. citizens and remedied by ioterests, households, grass roots 
voice and eo-production organisations, NGOs and social 
with service providers. pressure, bottom up. 
Managerial Users are supplied with Attempts to match service Making improvements to service 
accountability infonnation on levels of outputs to self ioterest of quality io response to consun1er 
service and resource consumer- reactive and identified problems. 
allocation. individualistic. 
3.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented the research problem in greater detail. The conceptual framework for this 
research has been developed from the literature review and will be used to facilitate an examination of 
accountability in context and comment on sustainability. The research problem was discussed in tenns 
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of a three-fold challenge for urban services: accountability, quality of outputs and sustainability. A 
conceptual definition of accountability was provided and two alternative models for the research were 
outlined. The literature on urban services suggests a practical model for accountability, wherein 
accountability would improve the sustainability of urban services. However, the literature on 
community development implies that this model takes insufficient recognition of relative power in the 
delivery of urban services, meaning, in practice, accountability would not necessarily improve the 
sustainability of urban services. Together, these models predict that accountability will improve t.'le 
outputs of urban services, and their relative chances of sustainability. This chapter concluded with a 
su.!nmary of the four different forms of accountability to be examined in greater detail through 
fieldwork. The conceptual framework will be used to help interpret the empirical data, and to draw 
conclusions about the effectiveness of these forms of accountability in improving the sustainability of 
urban services. As such, this thesis addresses two areas under-developed in the existing research. The 
next chapter, Chapter 4, presents the hypothesis, research questions and research design, together with 
an account of the fieldwork, and the data collection procedures. 
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Chapter 4 Research Design and Methodology 
"Doing research is a process of construction. First; a vague 'problem', 'hypothesis', 'area of interest' 
or 'mere hunch' is discerned. A .framework of ideas, notions, theories and concepts is assembled in 
order to define that problem more closely. Fieldwork is done, human experiences ... are transformed 
into 'data' which are stored in notebooks, as tape recordings, on survey schedules or on computer 
disks. The whole is painstakingly assembled into a 'coherent' account which in some way relates to the 
'problem' .from which the journey originate<!' (Barnett and Blaike, 1994; 226). 
4.1 Introduction 
Moving on from the theoretical literature review and conceptual framework of the previous chapters, 
the aim of this chapter is to describe how and why this piece of research was constructed. This chapter 
outlines the theoretical and practical details of the fieldwork on which this thesis is based. The research 
process involved five principle stages: -
1. The first stage built on the conclusions of the literature review and the conceptual framework 
to set aims and objectives for the study, determine the research questions for this study and to 
formulate a hypothesis. 
2. In Chapter 2, the concept of accountability was disaggregated by identifying four of its forms; 
case studies were selected for the fieldwork to illustrate each of these forms. 
3. The next stage in the research process was to select a suitable methodology for researching 
accountability and to determine the data gathering and analysis techniques. 
4. As the overall research design began to take shape, the logic behind the research was clarified. 
5. The last stage of the research design process was to begin data collection in the field. This 
data was then evaluated, analysed and used to test the hypothesis, and answer the research 
questions. The results of this final state of the process will be explored in the subsequent 
chapters of this thesis. 
This chapter discusses each of these stages, as summarised in Fignre 6, concluding with a description 
of how the fieldwork was set up and a description of the factors that informed the choices made. In 
practice, this research was an iterative process, adapting to changing contexts, circumstances, and 
understandings, which demanded flexibility in research techniques, reworking research questions, and 
hypothesis testing. 
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Figure 6: The process of setting the research methodology. 
""1 Defining aims and objectives for the study I I Assess conclusions ofliterature review I 
-----1 Formulate hypothesis I 
-----1 Set research questions I 
r---1 Selection of study areas I 1 Improving service design and delivery: UK I 
~ Improving participatory democracy: South Africa I 
____J Increasing user influence: Bangladesh I 
L___j Increasing service provider responsiveness: South Korea I 
___.., Selection of case study methodology I : Select metliOdology I I L{ Select research tcclmiques I 
l Document review J 
~- Interviews J 
L 
Observation I 
: Questiormaire I 
_, Overall research design I R=archplan I I Lf ClariJY logic behind research I 
---..t Fieldwork I I Data oollection I I 
----1 Data processing I 
----1 Test hypothesis/research question I 
4.2 Research questions, hypothesis, and objectives. 
The research process began with a look at the academic literature concerning the use of accountability 
arrangements for mban services. A number of significant and important gaps were identified in the 
existing literature on accountability for urban services; these were presented in section 2.4. These gaps 
were used to make a list of research problems; these were then formulated into research questions. 
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This process represented a provisional attempt at working through the subject of accountability for 
urban services. Room was left for other research questions to be added or substituted as the research 
process developed. The research questions are concerned with the effectiveness of accountability, at 
improving the outputs of service delivery, and thus making services more sustainable. The overarching 
primary research question has been defined as: 
Have accountability arrangements improved the outputs and sustainability of urban sen;ices? 
This question was formulated in order to explore the linkages of accountability with the outputs of 
urban services and their sustainability. 
The research will endeavour to answer the following sub-research questions: -
I. What entitlements do citizens have to urban services? 
2. How is accountability demonstrated? 
3. How does accountability aJTcct the outputs of urban services? 
4. How sustainable are urban services? 
Research Question 1: What entitlements do citizens have to urban services? 
This question is primarily concerned with how access or entitlement to services varies within and 
between the case studies. It is envisaged that a distinction would be made in the research between the 
expectations of citizens to an acceptable standard of service and their enforceable rights. The 
distinction between expectations of social justice and legal entitlements will have consequences for the 
kinds of accountability people can legitimately demand if a service fails. 
Research Question 2: How is accountability demonstrated? 
The purpose of this question is to present and descnoo both the range of arrangements by which service 
providers endeavour to increase their accountability for urban services, together with the ways in which 
citizens seek redress for failing urban services. As such, this thesis recognises both the top-down, 
formal arrangements and bottom np, informal kinds of accountability nsed by service nsers and 
providers, and reviews the way these approaches might be reconciled in service delivery. 
Research Question 3: How does accountability affect the outputs of urban services? 
A review of the literature led to the formulation of a definition of accountability: accountability for 
urban services is characterised as a relationship between those providing and nsing a service, which is 
set up for the purpose of improving the outputs of service. The outputs of urban services of concern to 
this research are the technical perfonnance of the physical installation and users satisfaction with the 
service. Based on this definition, accountability does not operate when there is no improvement in the 
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performance of urban services, or when there is improved perfonnance but no increased user 
satisfaction. The concern of this question is to establish whether accountability in practice operates in 
the way suggested by the literature review. The question will determine if outputs differ in relation to 
the range of services provided, and across the range of service users. 
Research Question 4: How sustainable are urban services? 
It was noted that the literature tends to conflate the outputs of urban services with sustainability. The 
concern of this question is to establish whether increased accountability has made urban services more 
sustainable. This thesis is concerned with two key forms of sustainability: the sustained technical 
performance of the physical facility, and the stability of the social relations associated with service 
delivery. This research understands social and technical aspects of sustainability not as separate 
concern, but as an interactive force. 
Table 14 below summarises the key considerations of each research question. 
Setting the research questions led to the development of a research hypothesis: Accountability 
arrangements will improve the outputs of urban services, and will improve tbe relative chances 
of sustainability. 
The hypothesis of this thesis concerns the outputs and sustainability of urban services, and is based on 
findings of the literature review presented in Chapter 2, together with the practical and strategic models 
of accountability set out in section 3.4 of the conceptual framework of this thesis. These two models 
differ in their treatment of sustainability; it was suggested that in the practical model of accountability 
the outputs of urban services would improve, thereby guaranteeing the sustainability of urban services. 
However, in the strategic model, accountability is used to meet people's practical needs in service 
delivery by way of their strategic interests. It was predicted that this strategy would not necessarily be 
conducive to the sustainability of service delivery. This reasoning led to the formulation of the 
hypothesis that accountability arrangements will improve the outputs of urban services and will 
improve the relative chances of sustainability of urban services. 
This hypothesis will be tested in two inter-related ways: firstly, whether accountability has led to 
improvements in the outputs of service delivery (related to the perfonnance of the physical installation 
and to user satisfaction with services), and, secondly, whether the sustainability of urban services has 
been improved 
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Table 14: Summary of research questions, research techuiques, and considerations for research. 
Research questions 
What entitlement do citizens 
have to urban services? 
How is accowttability 
demonstrated? 
How does accountability 
affect the outputs of urban 
services? 
How sustainable are urban 
services? 
Research Techniques Considerations 
• Questionnaires • How do people define fonnal/infonnal and 
perceived/actnal entitlements? Are there 
variations in entitlements? 
• Semi-structured 
Interview 
• Docwnent review • Is everyone facing the same problems, or are some 
problems specific to some people? • Observation 
• Docwnent review 
• Semi-structured 
interviews 
• ObsetVation 
• Questionnaires 
• Questionnaires 
• Semi-structured 
interview 
• Observations 
• Document review 
• Semi-stroctured 
interviews 
• Observation 
• Document review 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Gendered dimension to impacts of poor services . 
Perceptions of security, risk, vnlnerability, local 
definitions of well being, poverty. 
Observe the qna!ity and extent of nrban services, 
observation of the interface between users and 
providers. 
Tenure (secure/insecure), and how this affects 
access to urban services/ability to negotiate with 
service providers. 
Local organisations set up to tackle poor urban 
services. 
• How do users/providers defme accountability? 
• How can users seek redress for failing services? 
• What are the arrangements, and how do they 
work? 
• How have providers increased their 
accountability? 
• Have opportunities for improving urban services 
increased or decreased? Why and for whom? 
• Are service providers' accountability 
arrangements an importaot component of people's 
coping strategies? 
• What are the most importaot formal and informal 
accountability arrangements, and why? 
• What are the effects of accountability 
arrangements? 
• What are the expectations of service qnality? 
• How do users/providers defrne good service 
performance? How do people defme satisfaction? 
• Have accountability arrangements improved levels 
of user satisfaction? Why and for whom? 
• Have accowttability arrangements improved the 
qnality ofnrban services? Why and for whom? 
• What services do people think they have some 
influence over; who has most control? 
• Do some people have more power than others in 
society and why? Who benefits from this? 
• Do users place trost in service providers, why? 
• Are officials willing to engage with community 
representatives? 
• Are there grievance/complaint redressal systems-
are residents aware of arrangements? 
• What is the role of the local media/CBOs/NGOs 
in airiog residents' problems? 
• How do people rate the sustainability of services? 
What factors do they consider to judge 
sustainability? Are there differences? 
• What are the constraints on sustainability/ 
organisational performance and service delivery? 
• How sustainable are social relations in service 
deliverv? 
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4.3 Source of data 
Through the literature review four forms of the concept of accountability were identified. Multiple 
cases for fieldwork were sought on the basis that each study would illustrate each of these four 
different functions of accountability in the delivery of urban services, as shown in Table 15. Case 
studies were chosen on the basis of some known initiatives, which had been adopted by service 
providers. The cases chosen to test the research hypothesis and answer the research questions are: -
I. Bristol, UK: This case study was chosen to illustrate professional accountability in the form of 
an improvement in the design and delivery of services. The fieldwork took 4 weeks and was 
affiliated with a local CBO called Community At Heart. 
2. Buffalo City, South Mrica: This case study was chosen to illustrate political accountability 
through increased citizen participation in representative democratic structures. The fieldwork 
took 8 weeks and was affiliated with a local NGO called Afesis Corplan. 
3. Dhaka, Bangladesh: This case study was chosen to illustrate top-down attempts to increase 
user influence over urban services in terms ofinformation creation and eo-production of urban 
services. The fieldwork took 4 weeks and was affiliated with Transparency International 
Bangladesh. 
4. Seoul, South Korea: This case study was chosen to illustrate managerial accountability and 
investigated reforms to the management of urban services that have increased service provider 
responsiveness to service users. The fieldwork took 8 weeks and was affiliated with 
Transparency International Korea 
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Table 15: Sununary of the literature review: case study selection criteria. 
Form of Characteristic Meaning Justification 
accountability 
Professional Explicit standards Definition of goals, targets, indicators of Acconntability requires clear statement of 
accountability and measures of success, preferably expressed in goals, efficiency requires set objectives. 
performance qnantitative terms. Standard usually created on a non-
statutory basis. 
Life cycle O&M Emphasis on operation and maintenance Need to ensure sustained performance of 
of urban services. urban services to ensure they meet users 
needs. 
Professionalism Integration of ail aspects of service Acconntability requires clear assigrunent 
delivery. of responsibility for action, not diffusion 
of power. 
Purchaser-provider Separate provision and production Market like pressure as the key to lower 
split interests, gain efficiency advantages, and costs and better standards. Overall 
intnxluce choice between public, private rationalisation and efficiency. 
sector, NGOs. 
Political Accessible Formal delegation of responsibility of fucreasing users voice in improving 
accountability govenunent control and devolution of decision making performance of goverrunent. 
to the local level. Urban management to Decentralise power, state minimalism, 
C()-{)rdinate and integrate public and and efficient allocation of resources, 
private actions. promoting choices. 
Role of goverrunent Fair and predictable allocation of services, bnproving existing pathways of local 
democratic mechanisms, voting rights, governance. 
active civic and political participation. 
Political Need for a political system in which Extend citizen control of social 
responsibility people can make voices heard, claim 
rights. 
structures. 
Rights to services Citizens have some rights to adequate Rights to safe, affordable, accessible and 
services (equal opportunity to access sufficient services. Accountability should 
service and equal outputs of service secure an expansion of rights and 
delivery). entitlements for the disadvantaged. 
User Empowerment Vocal and informed public demanding Empowering service users to make 
ac~ountability quality of service. decisions concerning the nature of the 
service. 
Principal agent Monitoring front line workers by service Improved responsiveness to local 
model users to reduce risk/moral hazard in concerns. 
delivery. 
Community Self help arrangements to mobilise People centred approach rather than a 
participation conununity. service focus. Reduce dependency on 
state. 
eo-production eo-production requires nnbnndling Separate provision and production 
management to fill gaps in service interests, gain efficiency advantages. 
provision. 
Managerial Demand responsive Re--orientation to meet needs of service It is in the conunercial interests of service 
accountability users not service providers, in order to providers to respond to users demands in 
improve operational efficiency and business practice. A way of improving 
motivation (rewards, sanctions, detection 
mechanism~). 
service delivery for the same money. 
Managerial reforms Reduce centralised bureaucracy to address Need to use proven private sector 
the needs of users, rewards linked to management tools in the public sector. 
measured performance. Entrepreneurial culture. 
Customer provider Dealing with public sector customers in a Concern with citizens needs not those of 
relationship similar way to the private flnn. bureaucracy. 
Complaint redress Stress on private sector styles of complaint Offer redress when aspects of service fall 
redress, rather than more political below mandated service standards. 
arrangements. 
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4.4 Case study methodology 
The nature of the research led to the selection of the case study as the methodology for data collection. 
Burton (2000; 215) notes that despite the widespread use of case studies there is little consensus about 
what the term actually means. For example, a case can be an individual, group, institution, community 
or country. However, Gillham (2000a; 1) suggests the case is "A unit of human activity embedded in 
the real world which can only be studied or understood in context, which exists in the here and now and 
that merges in with its context so that precise boundaries are difficnlt to draw''. Similarly, Yin (1994; 
23) defines the case study as an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real life context and in which multiple sources of evidence are used. 
Case studies are a method partieularly suited for gathering comprehensive, systematic and in-depth 
information about a case of interest. Roche (1999; 154) commends case studies "where broad, 
complex questions have to be addressed in complex circumstances", The method is suited to 
contemporary real life situations, for a detailed contextual analysis of events and their inter-
relationshlps. Long (1989; 248) describes the chief advantage of the case study methodology as its 
emphasis on the context in which people actually manage their lives and attempt to resolve certain 
problematic situations. In particnlar, Yin (1978; 296) has recommended the case study as a 
methodological approach for the study of accountability of public agencies in order to capture the 
complexity of the issue under analysis. 
The case study methodology was selected for this research because: -
I. The case study is recommended when the researcher is asking 'how' and 'why' questions, 
such as the research questions developed for this research, and where the study focuses on real 
life, contemporary and human situations, involving many variables and no control over the 
phenomena under study. 
2. Yin ( 1978, 1994) has demonstrated that case studies are particularly effective in researching 
accountability. Furthermore, he recommends the case study methodology for use when testing 
propositions, which is another concern of this research. 
3. Applying the case study methodology to this research provides a useful contrast with previous 
work on accountability for urhan services, which have in the main been desk-based reviews. 
4. Having face-to-face contact with the respondents and undertaking the research in context was 
considered important by the researcher. 
5. The flexibility of the case study methodology allows for the selection of a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative research techniques that are appropriate and effective in this 
research. This will allow the research to be adaptive to changing contexts and circumstances, 
as well as acting as a means of triangulation. 
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4.5 Reliability 
For research findings to be as ''valid as possible, and to be seen to be as valid as possible, the evidence 
that is gathered needs to be cross-<:hecked" (Roche, 1999; 86). As well as veriJYing the research 
findings cross-<:hecking is needed to expose bias. and to deepen the researchers understanding of the 
topic. Crosschecking or triangulation can be done in a number of ways (Burgess, 1984; 145), such as: • 
• Using two or more methods to ask the same questions, and combining qualitative and quantitative 
methods (methodological triangulation). 
• Interviewing more than one person (interviewee triangulation). 
• Using more than one investigator on same problem and comparing results (investigator 
triangulation). 
• Investigating the same issue over time (time triangulation). 
• Using more than one investigator of a different discipline on the same problem (discipline 
triangulation). 
This research used all of the above methods of triangulation to ensure the reliability of the data. For 
instance, multiple sources and forms of data were collected using qualitative and quantitative 
techniques and by a number of different enumerators. 
Another way to ensure the reliability of data specific to the case study methodology is the case study 
database. This database comprises of case study notes, documents, spreadsheets. and transcriptions. 
Care was taken during the fieldwork to ensure that a database was carefully maintained. For example, 
the majority of interviews performed were recorded and transcribed the same day, references were 
noted and observations were documented in field notes (visual observations, reflections on days events 
and experiences), and a country report was compiled at the end of each case study before an overall 
synthesis report was produced. In this way a chain of evidence was created between the questions 
asked, the data collected, and the conclusions drawn, in order to increase the reliability of the 
information presented in a case study (Yin, 1994; 78). 
4.6 How the data was collected 
In keeping with the case study methodology (Yin, 1994; 78), the data collection techniques selected for 
the fieldwork are direct and participant observation (including physical artefacts), secondary data 
review (documents and archival records), face to face semi-structured interviews with key informants 
and questionnaires32• The details of these techniques are summarised below together with reflections 
on their use. 
32 Yin (1994; 85) states that the questionnaire can be used as a data collection tool within the case study, provided 
it is used in relation to other forms of evidence rather than a stand-alone assessment of a situation. 
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4.6.1 Questionnaire 
"Surveys are undeniably a blunt instnunent ... However they remain the only method involving direct 
contact with people that can make some claim to being representative as that is understood by 
numerical criteria" (Beresford and Croft, 1986; 22). Questionnaire based surveys provide a structured 
and therefore relatively rapid and easy means of gathering comparable and quantifiable data from a 
relatively homogeneous group (Gillham, 2000b; 1). Surveys may be 'self-completion questionnaires' 
or require that someone else, an enumerator, ask the questions face to face with the respondents -
'interview surveys'. Interview surveys are based on a standard, prepared questionnaire that the 
interviewer works through with the respondent. Questionnaire format should be designed to ensure (I) 
ease of following the questions and putting answers in the right place (2) ease of visual understanding 
for checking and data extraction, and, (3) ease of processing (Coleman, 1993; 106). Pre-testing of the 
questionnaire is necessary in order to ensure that that the questionnaire will provide useful information 
before administering the questionnaire to a wider group of respondents. 
Surveys can be nsed to predict attitudes, opinions, values, and behaviour based on what people say 
(Fink, 1995a; 14). However, questions about attitudes, opinions and beliefs are problematic because: -
• 
• 
• 
• 
People often do not have developed opinions . 
Attitudes are often complex, so that fitting them with a question is difficult. 
Attitudes also vaty in intensity . 
People often do not use the whole of satisfaction scales, they are often more or less positive 
(Gillham, 2000b; 26). 
Reflections on the use of questionnaires: A survey of residents in the case study locations was 
undertaken to measure levels of satisfaction concerning the mban services provided by various 
organisations. The questionnaires developed for this research were the interview survey and the postal 
survey. These consisted of approximately 25 mainly multiple-<:hoice questions and were divided into 
sections according to particular themes: -
• Personal data: these questions seck to establish the characteristics of the respondents in terms of 
residential areas, age, gender, education, house type and income. It was assumed that these 
categories wonld affect expectations of urban services, tendency to complain, and knowledge of 
entitlements. Questions were also asked to assess the levels of social capital and social inclusion of 
respondents. 
• Households access to services: these questions concentrate on access and how efficiently service 
providers deliver mban services, and establishes whether payment is made for the services. 
• User satisfaction with services: the respondent is asked to evaluate the degree to which they are 
satisfied with the quantity and quality of different services, and about the information they receive. 
• Service provider's accountability: the questionnaire ends with a section on complaints, which asks 
respondents how they wonld resolve a problem with urban services, whether they have complained 
to service providers about a particular service in the last 12 months, and how they would describe 
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the effectiveness of complaint mechanisms. The respondent is asked whether they would describe 
service providers as trustworthy, and what they consider services providers accountable for. 
Lastly, respondents were asked whether they thought they had a voice in service delivery. 
The process of implementing the survey began in July 2002 and ended July 2003. In Mdantsane, 
Dhaka and Seoul, graduates that bad previous experience of data collection were hired to perform the 
questionnaires. In Mdantsane 120 questionnaires, and in Dhaka and Seoul 100 questionnaires were 
performed in four areas of each city (2 non-{!eprived areas and 2 deprived areas). 25 questionnaires 
were taken from each of the four areas ofDbaka and Seoul and 30 in the four areas ofMdantsane. The 
deprived and non-{!eprived areas of the city were selected on the basis of the enumerators' knowledge 
of the housing types and service levels in these areas. The enumerators selected respondents on a 
random basis, whilst ensuring a roughly equal number of men and women were interviewed. A face-
to-face interviewing method was used and interviews lasted about 40 minutes. The questionnaire was 
written in English and was translated into Bangla and Korean for these case studies. In the South 
African case, the questionnaire was written in English but enumerators were able to substitute words of 
isiXhosa if it would facilitate the respondent's ease of understanding. 
Pre-testing the questionnaire involved making sure that the questions were understandable and 
appropriate to different contexts, eliminating embarrassing/ambiguous wording, and ensuring a suitable 
length of interview before the questionnaire was administered to a wider group of respondents. These 
changes meant that the content of the questionnaires varied slightly between cases. For example, in 
Seoul the questionnaire was shortened and questions on sanitation were re-phrased in order to avoid 
potential embarrassment to the respondents. An additional feature of the research in Dhaka was the use 
of a supervisor to monitor the enumerators. The gift-giving culture in Seoul made it appropriate to 
offer the respondents a persuasive present in return for completing the questionnaire, a small set of 
soaps was chosen. 
In Bristol, there was a feeling of consultation fatigue associated with the government regeneration 
programme, New Deal for Communities, and during the research period a MORI door-to-door 
questionnaire was also being performed. Instead of performing an interview survey the residents' 
board of the community newspaper, Grass Roots, agreed to publish an article about my research and to 
include the questionnaire as an insert into the community newspaper (see Plate 1). The strategy was to 
rely on people's goodwill to fill the questionnaire in and return it This change of plan presented the 
need to design a short and easily understandable survey with questions restricted to a double-sided 
sheet of A4 paper. However, ti1C effectiveness of this approach was compromised by low response 
rates and those surveys that were completed were perhaps unrepresentative of all residents. In order to 
compensate for this, semi-structured interviews were also undertaken with residents. 
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4.6.2 Semi-structured interviews 
The most positive feature of the interview is the richness and vividness of the material it turns up 
(Gillham, 2000c; 10). Interviews may be necessary because:-
• Direct measurement is possible but too time consuming, or too costly. 
• The information required may relate to the past. 
• Social or practical reasons might prevent direct observation. 
• Prior information about the respondent's knowledge, opinions, perceptions or attitude necessitates 
an interview (Coleman, 1993; 105). 
Burgess (1984; 101) has produced some 'rules' about 'proper' interview behaviour. He suggests 
interviewers should be friendly, but not over-sociable, in order to overcome problems associated with 
'bias'. Roche (1999; 113) highlights the importance of paying attention to the non-vernal dimension of 
interviews such as expressions, eye contact, gestures, physical contact, personal space, posture and 
orientation, alertness and active listening. In addition, attention should be paid to ways in which the 
interviewer encourages people to talk, steers and structures the interview. Coleman (1993; 105) 
suggests a number of ways to avoid leading respondents unconsciously, through politeness, or using 
misleading language to assume that certain answers are expected. He also recommends the interviewer 
be aware that the respondents may see the interview as an opportunity to push an agenda, or otherwise 
provide unreliable data. 
Reflections on the use of semi-structured inteniews: Before arriving in the case study location a list 
of potential interviewees was researched and requests for interviews were sent through e-mail. Those 
who had not replied were chased up with phone calls on arrival in country. Further respondents were 
selected on a snowball principle. The interviewees received prior information introducing the 
researcher, the purpose of the interview and the research project, and a suggested length for the 
interview. 
This research typically relied on a consultative style interview with service providers, NGOs, 
academics, and others with an insight into the research topic. The interviewees were selected on the 
basis that they had extensive knowledge of the issue and often knew other people to speak to, and 
where documents and records were to be found (Gillham, 2000c; 63). The semi-structured nature of 
the interviews allowed for new information to arise in conversation and to be explored within the 
context of the interview. An aide memoire for the interviews had been drawn up beforehand to ensure 
uniformity and consistency in data collection. Nevertheless, it was considered important to ensure that 
the conversation remained natural and relaxed so that the interviewee might divulge interesting 
information. The aide memoire was constantly adapted as the fieldwork progressed, and further 
questions were included if they had proved useful in conversation. Jntnition helped to guide the 
sequencing and appropriateness of questions and the length of the interview. Each interview typically 
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lasted an hour, however, this varied according to the extent the interviewee was engaged in the 
conversation. 
The interviews were typically carried out in the respondent's office, on reflection in a more neutral 
setting respondents may have felt freer to talk. The respondents were asked whether anonymous quotes 
could be taken from their interviews and had the opportunity to sign a confidentiality agreement. The 
majority of interviews were recorded with a tape recorder and the interview transcribed later that day, 
alongside personal thoughts and an evaluation of each interview. Interviews were taped to avoid 
forgetting important points raised, to facilitate the easy flow of conversation with the interviewee, and 
to prevent suspicion/exclusion arising through note taking. However this decision presented other 
issues, such as the time taken to transcribe the tapes. Initially, interviews in Seoul were tape-recorded, 
however, it was found that the time taken in translation made note taking during the interviews more 
efficient. In two interviews, one in Bristol and one in Dhaka, neither tape recording nor taking notes 
seemed appropriate, so notes were then written up after the interview. 
Translators were used to assist with the interviews in Dhaka and Seoul, meaning there were inevitably 
missed meanings and misunderstood parts of the dialogue. Particular care was taken over the phrasing 
of questions in the Dhaka and Seoul cases, where questions of accountability are intertwined with 
accusations of corruption. On reflection, the interviews in Seoul were not as productive as they had 
been in other case studies, primarily due to issues with translation, but also because the key informants 
selected were not as candid or critical. Hierarchy and gender were felt to be definite issues in the 
interviews, and not having a name card was a disadvantage. 
In addition, semi-structured interviews were also conducted with residents of Bristol, to compensate for 
the poor response rate to the postal questionnaires. In total, 37 interviews were conducted, and an aide 
memoire was used to gnide questioning. Potential respondents were approached in the streets and in 
the seated areas around the flats, typically these interviews lasted about 20 minutes. 
4.6.3 Field observations 
Gillham (2000a; 49) states that observation is at the 'heart of the case study method'; he details two 
main kinds of observation: participant observation which is mainly descriptive or qualitative, and direct 
observation which involves watching from outside in a carefully specified way and is quantitative. The 
primacy purpose of observation is in highlighting the distinction between what people have written, 
what they say, and what they actually do. Observation can help to discover things that people may not 
wish to reveal in interviews, or may not be asked about in surveys (Roche, 1999; 128). The major 
advantage ofthis approach is the researcher's first hand experience of a situation, which will enrich the 
information collected and provide insights into the various events, situations and actions that slhe is 
studying. Direct observation allows the researcher to "see for themselves the conditions of the urban 
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setting under consideration . . . it enables them to form a preliminary opinion about how things work, 
based on a variety of indicators: long lines at standpipes might tell about catchments areas, inadequate 
water pressure, poor maintenance, or unanticipated densities, for example. Puddles will tell about poor 
drainage, accumulated garbage about the efficiency or appropriateness of solid waste collection" 
(Hamdi and Goethert, 1997; 35). However, observation can over-simplify situations, and so should not 
stand-alone but serve to triangulate questionnaire and interview findings. 
Reflection on the use of observation: The kinds of observation used in the case studies were both 
direct and participative and ranged from days spent collecting refuse with the Pathfinder crew in 
Bristol, attending ward committee meetings in Mdantsane, and visiting slum water and sanitation 
projects in Dhaka. Direct observation was employed as a tool when performing structured observations 
at the neighbourhood/tertiary level of service delivery, and when visiting service delivery 
organisations. An observation checklist was drawn up in advance of the fieldwork and was performed 
by the researcher and questionnaire enumerators. This checklist included questions on provision of 
street furniture, the quality of housing, maintenance of open spaces, and urban services that households 
receive, and asked for the enwnerator's impressions of the areas visited, and how the residents interact 
with urban services. The enwnerators were provided with disposable cameras to take pictures of the 
services in the areas where they conducted the questionnaire and observation checklist. During the 
fieldwork, field notes were made to record more general observations (e.g. of the case study location, 
of the interviewees, on the way the fieldwork progressed) that might assist with assessments of data 
and flag up potential issues for the final report. 
4.6.4 Document review 
Documents were distinguished into primary33 and secondary'14 sources, public documents and private 
documents, and unsolicited sources" and solicitcd36 documents (Burgess, 1984; 124). 
Reflections on the use of document review: Preliminary docwnent review, prior to the fieldwork, was 
used to identify the research questions and hypothesis for this study, and enabled a rough checklist of 
questions for the aide memoire to be formulated. Relevant secondary material on accountability for 
urban services in the case study locations was obtained from the websites, public libraries and 
document centres of universities, governments, service provider agencies and NGOs. These archives 
were searched for books, reports, conference papers, journals, government statistics, newspapers, 
articles, maps and photos. Computer packages were searched for journal abstracts, indexes and theses. 
Book bibliographies were reviewed for further leads on the topic. 
33 These are ftrst hand accmmts of a situation. 
34 These have been published. 
35 These are pr<Xluced without research in mind. 
" These have been produced at the requests of the researcher. 
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4.6.5 Sampling 
As Roche ( 1999; 66) notes, there is very rarely the time or the money to talk to, or contact, everybody 
in a given case study location, which suggests the need for sampling. However, Yin (1994) states that 
the case study is not an experiment and the goal of the case stndy is not to achieve statistical 
generalisation but to expand or generalise theories. Thus, whilst using sampling to select respondents 
for the questionnaires and interviews, this research did not set out to perform a statistically significant 
survey. 
The selection of samples for the questionnaires was loosely based on a stratified sampling technique. 
Care was taken to ensure key socio-<X:Onomic groups were represented in the sample in order to enable 
comparison and special efforts were made to talk to equal numbers of men and women37• It was 
decided that residential area, education, employment, possession of a vehicle, number of people in a 
household and satisfaction with income would be taken as a proxy for poverty. Halfthe sample in each 
case except Bristol came from non-deprived areas and half the sample from deprived residential areas 
of the city. Existing knowledge of the research area was used to select a residential area for 
administering the questionnaire. 
The sample sizes varied, for example, in Bristol 3, 500 questionnaires were sent out, in Mdantanse 120 
were performed, and in Dhaka and Seoul the sample was fixed in advance with 100 questionnaires per 
case stndy. This sample size is too small to claim to be representative, however, it is an attempt to 
understand some of the circumstances, opinions and attitudes towards urban services and service 
providers that exist in these cities. The size of samples in this research was a compromise necessitated 
by the logistics, available time, cost and resources for collecting and analysing the required data. 
Enumerators were instructed to use their judgement in ensuring that the findings were as representative 
as possible of the range of people in the sample area. For example, an enumerator would not sample 
one single street or block of flats, but take samples from a number of different streets or blocks in a 
residential area, or would wait in some communal area. This was also intended to help with 
triangulation. 
The interviews, on the other hand, relied on a strategy of non-random sampling, whereby the researcher 
found informants who were willing to be interviewed. Informants were selected according to their 
experience or their specialised knowledge. Tills form of sampling is thought to be more relevant for 
selecting interview respondents, yet requires that the researcher has some knowledge of the social 
situation (Fink, 1995b; 9-10). Snowball sampling was also used in some cases whereby the researcher 
began by interviewing one or two people, who were then asked to name others who might be able to 
take part in the research until a chain of informants has been established. Care was taken to avoid bias 
in the sample of respondents. 
37 For example by calling at households during the day when women may be expected to be in (Bangladesh), or 
waiting in comrmmal areas. 
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4. 7 Data analysis 
The data collected through this research was both quantitative and qualitative. This decision was an 
explicit attempt to overcome the "gap between qualitative studies whose reliability and validity are 
uncertain and open to challenge, and quantitative methods that tend to be crude and superficial" 
(Beresford and Croft, 1986; 22). The qualitative techniques used were semi-structured interviews with 
key informants, literature review, and participatory observations; the quantitative part refers to the use 
of questionnaires, aspects of the literature review and direct observation. Table 16 shows which 
research technique was used to answer each research question. 
Table 16: Application of research tools. 
Questionnaire Semi-structured Obsenrations Document 
inteniew Review 
What entitlement do citizens have to • • • • 
urban services? 
How is accountability demonstrated? • • • • 
How does accountability affect the • • • • 
outputs of urban services? 
How sustainable are urban services? • • • 
After enumeration was completed, the questionnaires were checked and the data was entered into a 
spreadsheet. Responses to the closed questions were processed using a quantitative code and checked 
for error before being analysed using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Scientists). This package 
was used to provide descriptive statistics and cross-tabs were run to differentiate the data between key 
variables (these were residential area, income, gender, age and housing type). It should be remembered 
that the sample interviewed was not representative of the entire population, as a consequences the 
results are not statistically significant. The answers to the only open question on the questionnaire 
were read through and certain responses were highlighted, for example, where typical themes emerged 
as well as where the respondent made a more unusual and interesting response. A similar tactic was 
employed to the analysis of the transcripts of the semi-structured interviews. 
The fieldwork involved a number of interviews with a variety of key informants from utilities, local 
government, private companies, NGOs, and academics in the countries under investigation. Most 
interviews were taped and transcribed later. A decision was made not to analyse the transcriptions with 
NUD.IST software, instead transeripts were used to provide a comprehensive overview of issues 
concerning service delivery, sustainability and accountability. Quotes representing typical themes, as 
well as those of significant interest, are used to support observations and other data collection 
techniques. 
Where the data generated from the questionnaires and semi-structured interviews are supported by that 
generated from observations and secondary data the findings have been integrated into a within case 
and cross case analysis of all four cases. 
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4.8 Rationale for the research design 
Yin (1994; 19) describes research design by analogy to ajonrney or road map for getting from 'here' to 
'there', where 'here' refers to the initial set of questions to be answered, and 'there' as the answers to 
these questions, along the way relevant data is collected and analysed. This research is an attempt to 
understand whether accountability arrangements improve the outputs and snstainability of urban 
services. The previous sections of this chapter have stated the hypothesis and research questions that 
the research sets out to test and an account of the research methodology has been given. The aim of 
this section is to describe how and why this piece of research was constructed and to consider the wider 
picture in which this research is located. Given the nature of the research and the interdisciplinary 
training of the author the account given will not be restricted to one discipline, but employs concepts 
which will enable a coherent account to be given. 
This research aims to have some practical relevance, however, Chambers claims that academics are not 
very good at addressing practical problems"; "At one pole we have academic social scientists 
preoccupied with the 'what' and 'why' of development and underdevelopment, with political economy, 
especially who gets what, why and how, and with the processes which they see as determining the 
answers, and at the other pole we have practical administrators and technical scientists who concern 
themselves with the 'how' of development with trying to change things and with trying to get things 
done" (Chambers, 1983; 29). In order to resolve this dichotomy between research and practice 
Chambers (1983; 45) commcnds a pluralist approach, which straddles "academic analysis and practical 
experience"39• According to Burr (1995; 162) research should also aim for praxis, being both the 
discovery of 'facts' but also effective in making a practical difference to people's experience40. 
In order to achieve practical relevance this research adopts a methodology that reflects both the 
respondent's and interviewee's own understanding of the research topic. The importance ofboth front 
line service provider and service user's views of service delivery and accountability are emphasised in 
the research process. Accountability has been defined as a relationship between service providers and 
users set up for the purpose of improving the outputs of service. This definition ascribes people with 
agency, the capability to cope with problems, influence their situation and make a difference to events, 
which creates differences in an individual response to 'similar structural circumstances'. These are all 
characteristics of an actor oriented approach (Long and Long, 1992). Of key importance in this 
analysis is the interface, an encounter between "individuals or units representing different interests and 
38 
"Think of all the books, learned journals and PhD theses, all the schools of architecture, planning and 
engineering, all the aid agencies with their money and wisdom, all the good intentions and good ideas. Then ask: 
why is there so little benefit being felt hy those to whom all these efforts are purportedly directed? Why, in many 
f,laces, are things getting worse, not better?'' (Hamdi, 1996; I). 
9 A good researcher, according to Chambers (1983; 63) should avoid "the pedantJy of the short-sighted, slow-
moving snail amassing facts; and the dilettantism of the butterfly that flits from flower to flower ... more snails 
should look up and become, if not air borne, at least more aware of their wider SWTounding". 
40 Paulo Freire (1972) recognised the importance of action and reflection for development; according to Freire 
people must be aware of their social reality, reflect on it and wotk to change the social structures that 'dehumanise' 
people. Harndi also talks about "This cycle of doing and learning, learning and doing, acting and reflecting" 
(2004; 127). 
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backed by different resources ... [and] may result in the reshaping of the goals perceptions, interests and 
relationships of the participating parties" (Drinkwater, 1992; 371). This research attempts to find out to 
what extent outputs and sustainability are improved at the 'interface' between service provider and 
user. 
Feminist researchers have been instrumental in de-mystifying the research process, and have 
highlighted instances where pmctice may fall short of idealised theories. Such authors have also 
revealed the importance of a reflexive research process and critiqued "hygienic research"; the 
censoring out of the mess, confusion and complexity of doing research, so that the accounts bear little 
or no relation to real events (Kelly, Burton and Regan, 1994; 46). The role the researcher plays in 
shaping the fieldwork and the selection and interpretation of field material should be acknowledged 
(Drinkwater, 1992; 368). Denzin and Lincoln (1994) recognise the need for the researcher to be aware 
of the self in the research process and realise that objective and value free research is impossible. They 
claim that all research is interpreted through 'filters' - sets of beliefs, theories or methods. They 
suggest the need to problematise the position of researcher and her relationship with the researched. 
Inevitably, my own identity (age, gender, class, nationality, education, ethics, perceptions, priorities, 
understandings, aspimtions, bias, self censorship and prejudices) has shaped the research process, and 
this will have affected how understandings and conclusion are reached. 
4.9 How the research was set up 
Case studies were sought on the basis that each study would illustmte a different function of 
accountability in the delivery of urban services. The case studies chosen to test the research hypothesis 
and answer the research questions are: -
I. Bristol, UK: chosen to illustmte an improvement in the design and delivery of services. 
2. Buffalo City, South Mrica: chosen to illustmte increased participation in representative 
democratic structures. 
3. Dhaka, Bangladesh: chosen to illustmte increased user influence over urban services. 
4. Seoul, South Korea: chosen to illustmte increased service providers responsiveness. 
It is important to consider how these case study locations were chosen. Potential cases highlighting 
best practice in accountability and urban service delivery were identified from preliminary reviews of 
litemture, NGO/donor reports and web searches. The cases were chosen on the basis of the criteria of 
the theoretical fmmeworks derived from the litemture review. Multiple cases were selected because 
"single case studies are genemlly a weak base from which to genemlise abont neighbourhood 
phenomena" (Yin, 1982; 29), and, given the time and resource constmints, four cases seemed most 
feasible. Once the selection of the cases had been made, fieldwork began by first contacting 
organisations in the case study locations to ask for their assistance with the fieldwork in return for 
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voluntary work. A summary of the research aims and objectives, along with brief details of research 
design, was prepared and sent (e-mailed and posted) to NGOs working in the prospective case study 
locations. Transparency International, an international NGO based in Berlin, hosted the case studies in 
Seoul and Dhaka. This NGO works at promoting transparency and acconntability as a key component 
of anti-corruption reforms. Afesis Corplan is a local NGO in East London (in Buffalo City 
municipality) concerned with governance and urban service delivery and agreed to host the case study 
in South Africa. The Bristol case was hosted by Community At Heart, a residents led body set up to 
deliver the regeneration project in Barton Hill. 
The time prior to each field visit was spent compiling a list of potential interviewees, establishing 
contacts, identifying research organisations and academic institutions. Gaining access to these sources 
of information was an essential phase in the research process. Typically access had to be negotiated 
with gatekeepers: "those individuals in an organisation that have the power to grant or withhold access 
to people or situations for the purpose of research" (Burgess, 1984; 48). Efforts were made both before 
and in the first weeks of the field visit to contact these gatekeepers and negotiate access. 
Nevertheless, one of the largest obstacles to conducting research in Dhaka was accessing respondents 
in a short space of time. Telephone calls and e-mails were not generally a successful tactic here; 
instead, it was necessary to make personal visits to potential key informants to ask for an interview. 
Staff at Transparency International Bangladesh assisted the process and a local contact translated 
interviews, navigated Dhaka City Corporation departments, arranged meetings with officials in 
DW ASA and made introductions to NGO colleagues. 
The response to e-mailing as a strategy to arrange interviews with key informants was also 
disappointing in Seoul. This was due to an Internet virus that affected South Korean servers at the 
time, together with the fact that the incidence of English speaking was lower than expected. 
Furthermore, it was nnusual for a student to request an interview with an official directly; there were 
issues with hierarchy, and, on reflection, it would have been better for someone of higher status to 
make the approach on my behalf. My visit to Seoul was planned so that I could attend the International 
Anti-Corruption Conference organised by Transparency International. This proved to be a useful 
introduction to issues of corruption and accountability in Seoul, and provided an opportunity to meet 
South Korean academics, NGOs, and public sector workers. Table 17 (fonnd in Appendix l) 
summarises the data collection techniques used in each case study location. 
4.10 Reflections on the research process 
The context for the research was changeable and "messy'. For example, during my stay in South 
Africa, I spent some time in a small town called Hamburg where Afesis Corplan (the NGO to which I 
was affiliated) was conducting a waste management project. The project had hit an impasse and the 
NGO was keen to have some input on potential ways forward. I thought this might be a potential case 
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study for the research so I spent 2 weeks in the area conducting a questionnaire of residents, however, 
entrenched power structures and antagonisms made this research ultimately unsuccessful. Another 
example of the changeable nature of the research was a proposed case study in Argentina that fell 
through and was replaced at short notice by the study in Dhaka. However, at the time of the fieldwork 
US and UK troops invaded Iraq and protests in Dhaka constrained the research to a certain extent. 
Interview respondents noted the irony of undertaking this topic of research when military and 
economically powerful super states are neither accountable for their actions, nor transparent in their 
decision-making processes. Respondents from Dhaka usefully highlighted the importance of morality 
and culture in understandings of accountability, and reflected on how lack of both affects the 
accountability model. 
As the research progressed, I felt taking a reflective attitude and iterative approach to the fieldwork 
enabled me to be responsive to local situations, reflect the respondent's own understanding of the 
research as well as to consolidate my own ideas and research questions. Reflecting on errors, successes 
and failures in the fieldwork was an important resource for learning (Dudley, 1996; 190) and helped to 
develop the practical problem-solving abilities and skills needed to respond quickly and effectively to a 
variety of circumstances (Edwards, 1996; 20), as well as to apply corrective measures, or to modifY the 
norms and methods of enquiry and action for next time (Hamdi, 2004; 128-135). I also received many 
useful comments on my approach to this research from the local NGOs and research networks with 
which I was affiliated whilst conducting the fieldwork. Findings and interpretations were circulated to 
a set of interested parties in order to integrate the fieldwork and writing processes and to continuously 
assess the validity of my findings41 • The case study methodology is flexible, and was well suited to 
adapting to new insights and when changes were made to the research design they were documented in 
the database. 
4.11 Data base summary 
A record was kept of all the information collected and notes made during the research in the form of a 
case study database. The database allows the 'critical reader' to 'inspect the database that led to the 
case study conclusions' (Yin, 1994; 95). This database also enables a chain of evidence to be 
developed between the questions asked, the data collected, and the conclusions drawn increases 
reliability of the information in a case study. Table 18 provides a summary of the research database. 
Table 18: Database swrunary. 
Data Number analysed 
Questionnaires 370 
Semi-structured interviews 133 
Documentary records 379 
Structured observations 15 (Dbaka 4; Seou14; South Africa 4; Bristol 3) 
41 The data collected was synthesised into a country case study and disseminated back to the affiliated local NGO. 
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4.12 Chapter summary 
This chapter introduced the research hypothesis and research questions, together with the methodology 
selected for this research. The research process began with a review of the literature to establish what 
prior studies have determined about the issue of accountability for urban services. This review was 
used to define a number of research questions for the study. The overarching primary research 
questions is 'have accountability arrangements improved the outputs and sustainability of urban 
services? The research will also endeavour to answer the following sub-research questions: -
I. What entitlements do citizens have to urban services? 
2. How is accountability demonstrated? 
3. How does accountability affect the outputs of urban services? 
4. How sustainable are urban services? 
This chapter has set out the hypothesis that 'accountability arrangements will improve the outputs of 
urban services and will improve the relative chances of sustainability'. 
The case studies selected were from Bristol (UK), Buffalo City (South Africa), Dhaka (Bangladesh) 
and Seoul (South Korea). These case studies were chosen to illustrate these various forms of 
accountability. Multiple sources of data were collected using qualitative and quantitative research 
techniques, these were observation, secondary data review, semi-structured interviews with key 
informants and household questionnaires. Within case and cross care analyses of data were selected as 
analysis techniques and these analyses are presented in the next two chapters. 
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Chapter 5 Case Studies 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided a list of research questions and hypothesised that 'accountability 
arrangements will improve the outputs of urban services and will improve the relative chances of 
sustainability '. Chapter 4 set out the intention to test this hypothesis using the case study methodology 
and described the data gathering and analysis techniques involved. 
Four case studies were chosen on the basis that they would offer a different perspective on 
accountability for urban services, these are illustrated below in Table 19. These cases represent a 
practical solution to the issue of how to improve accountability for urban services. The intention of this 
chapter is to present these case studies from the UK, South Africa, Bangladesh, and South Korea and 
their research findings. 
Table 19: The case study reforms. 
Case studv Form of accountability Kev feature of refonn 
Bristol, UK Professiooal accountability Improved design and delivery of urban services. 
Mdantsane, South Africa Political accountabilitv Imvroved ll3rlici1Jil(ory democracy. 
Dhaka, Baogladesh User accouotability Improved nser influence. 
Seoul, South Korea Maoa~erial accountabilitv Improved service provider's responsiveness. 
As such, this chapter is divided into four sections. The case studies presented in each section typically 
begin with a short introduction to the critical issues associated with the research area, such as the 
accountability reform, the policy context, and the case study location. The research questions are then 
answered in turn using a comprehensive summary of the qualitative and quantitative findings. The 
entitlements of the respondents to urban services are evaluated, accountability is reviewed in terms of 
the theoretical framework of the literature review and the impact of enhanced accountability on user 
satisfaction, the performance of services, and sustainability of urban services is discussed. In the 
conclusion to each case the hypothesis is tested and the case is summarised in a table. Where useful, 
graphs, tables, and figures have been used to support the text and also to summarise data, for example, 
where statistical tests have been used. 
This chapter is structured around the four components of the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 
3. Each case study represents an attempt to deal with the threefold challenge for the operation of urban 
services: outputs, sustainability and accountability. Each case was selected to illustrate one of the four 
contemporary forms of accountability (professional, political, user and managerial accountability) 
selected from the literature review for further investigation. Within each case study a review is made 
of the operation of three different qualities of accountability: information, action and power. The two 
models of accountability (presented in Chapter 3) are used as diagnostic tools to identify how 
accountability functions to enhance service outputs and sustainability. 
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This chapter draws on multiple sources of data, such as semi-structured interviews with key informants, 
observations, secondary document review and household questionnaires; both qualitative and 
quantitative techniques are used. The questionnaire, supported by other sources of data, revealed that 
those living in deprived areas also had unsatisfactory incomes, tended to live in informal housing, had 
low levels of education, often did not possess a vehicle, had a higher number of people in the 
households, and were either unemployed or performed unskilled labour. Accordingly, the term 
'respondents from deprived areas' is used throughout this chapter as short hand to describe the range of 
deprivations that exist in these areas. This term was also selected in recognition that problems with 
urban services cannot be reduced to the problems of the poor individuals; these problems are typically 
attached to places. The term interviewee is nsed to refer to informants in semi-structured interviewees. 
In Chapter 3 it was stated that accountability is demonstrated in the relationship between service 
providers and users and as such is dependent on agency. For that reason, the research design adopted 
in this thesis represents both users and producers views of services, these are analysed and are 
presented together in the context of this thesis. The research design chosen for this thesis takes an 
actor-<>riented approach to understanding the significance, for urban services, of accountability. This 
research design was selected to stand in contrast with other studies of accountability that typically take 
a structural approach to accountability, with an emphasis on constraints, rules, and procedures. Taking 
this approach to the research design has meant that, whilst each case predominately addresses one kind 
of accountability, the fieldwork was not restricted to any single form. 
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5.2 Professional Accountability: Bristol, UK 
5.2.1 Introduction 
This case study is designed to illustrate professional accountability, and refers to professional 
competence in the operation and maintenance of nrban services and organisational planning. This case 
study describes how Project Pathfinder has created an innovative approach for accountable delivery of 
waste management and other environmental services in a deprived neighbourhood of Bristol called 
Barton Hill. The project is an experiment involving public sector (Bristol City Council), private sector 
(SIT A GB Ltd), an NGO (ResourceSaver, a not for profit recycling contractor), and community 
partuership (Community At Heart). The Project Pathfinder is a single, dedicated team trained to 
produce an integrated and more locally responsive way of delivering waste collection, street cleaning, 
grounds maintenance, household bulky collection, gnlly emptying and recycling services. The case 
study also refers to a project to improve street lighting in the neighbourhood. These changes to the 
design and delivery of urban services have resulted in improvements to the performance of waste 
management, wider environmental improvements and increased service responsiveness to local 
residents. 
5.2.2 Policy context 
In 1999, Project Pathfinder was launched as a response to national debates in the UK on public sector 
modernisation, the need for efficient and high qnality services, the needs of the most disadvantaged in 
society, the importance of local level responsibility and control, as well as Best Value in waste 
management. 
Since April 2000, all local authorities responsible for waste management have a statutory duty to 
provide Best Valne. Best Value is part of the UK government's commitment to improve the overall 
effectiveness of local public services from the perspective of the users. According to Best Value, 
authorities should assess the services they provide according to the four C's (Audit Commission, 
2001): 
• Challenge: whether existing services arc needed and who is providing a service. 
• Compare: performance across a range of indicators, performance targets and views. 
• Competition: to secure efficient and effective services. 
• Consult: la>.'Payers, service users, partuers, service providers, business community and so on. 
Under Best Value, services are to be reviewed every 5 years, but service providers are expected to 
demonstrate that they secure continuous improvement in the way they operate. Councils must report 
their performance against Best Value Performance Indicators (BVPis) in their annual Best Value 
Performance Plans. Failure to meet BVPis means the service will be identified as a failing service and 
central government may intervene in service delivery. The main Best Value Performance Indicators 
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for waste management cover cost of collection per household, recycling rates, number of missed bins, 
cost comparison, and benchmarking of waste services (DEFRA a & b, 2000). 
Project Pathfinder was developed in Bristol through the policy New Deal for Communities, which is a 
neighbourhood based regeneration policy. The New Deal has the aim of improving employment, 
health, and educational achievement in deprived areas of the UK, as well as tackling crime. Improving 
neighbourhood management and making better nse of public services is key to the initiative, and 
involves tailoring services to the specific needs of a particular neighbourhoods (bending services), and 
by giving people a say in how services are run, and an opportunity to manage them (reshaping 
services). New Deal for Communities also recommends developing partnerships between the public 
and private sectors, and involving residents in decision-making. New Deal for Communities will meet 
the objectives of the Social Exclusion Unit that, within 10-20 years, no-one should be disadvantaged 
by where they live. Central government oversees the New Deal for Communities process, allocates 
resources, determines how the New Deal programmes will be delivered, and requires that targets in 
certain key service areas be met. Specific initiatives under the New Deal include Employment Zones, 
Health Action Zones and Surestart (DETR, 2001). The New Deal was officially launched in Barton 
Hill in 2000 after a competitive bidding process. 
Project Pathfinder was developed around the same time as the New Deal for Communities bid in 
Barton Hill from discussions between SIT A management and the Head of Infrastructure Services at 
Bristol City Council about how to apply Best Value to waste management Barton Hill was identified 
as a pilot neighbourhood to trial the experiment since SIT A management and Bristol City Council 
could take advantage of community development process underway and ensure "we had a lot of quick 
wins" said a SITA worker. SITA undertook an assessment of the resources deployed in Barton Hill, 
and worked out that a team of 5 or 6 workers would be needed to work full time in the area. Similarly, 
ResourceSaver estimated that 2 personnel were needed to collect recycling from the neighbourhood 
one day per week. A team of 5 were recruited from the existing SITA workforce to work on the 
Project by way of publicity at the local depots. The project originally aimed to attract existing staff that 
lived in the Barton Hill area, but this proved problematic because people did not want to be seen 
sweeping the streets, or collecting bins in the area where they lived. However, SIT A did manage to 
recruit a new employee who lived in the Barton Hill area after one team member left the project Of 
the remaining 5-team members, 3 are HGV drivers, and 2 have sweeping experience, together with 
drain maintenance. Recently, two of the council's grounds maintenance staff have also been 
incorporated into the Project 
The motivation for Project Pathfinder varied between the stakeholders: SIT A was faced with the duty 
to provide Best Value in service delivery, and were aware that they had a contract coming up for 
renewal in a year and a half. Bristol City Council was keen to promote ways to strengthen local 
democracy, community involvement, and neighbourhood management in the New Deal area. An 
experiment to bend mainstream service delivery to reflect local resident's priorities was welcomed by 
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conununity members in Barton Hill as it was seen as a way of secnring New Deal for Conununities 
funding, since it gave Barton Hill a comparative advantage over other competing wards in Bristol. Key 
aspects of the Pathfinder are: -
• Multi-functional team and integrated service: Street cleansing, recycling and grounds 
maintenance have been integrated under the Pathfinder umbrella. The Pathfinder team is 
comprised of7 (5 SIT A crew and two of the council's grounds maintenance staff, I post funded by 
Conununity at Heart). Two people from ResourceSaver are assigned to collect recycling weekly 
on Tuesdays. The council has trained SIT A and grounds maintenance to undertake aspects of each 
other's work. 
• Branding: The pathfinder logo on the uniforms and on the dedicated bright blue vehicles (see 
Plates 2 and 3) has increased the profile of the Pathfinder crew and meant they are easily 
identifiable. Furthermore, the crew's pictures are displayed on the notice board at the New Deal 
Shop. 
• Volunteers: Volunteers were drawn from the existing workforce to form the Pathfinder team with 
the incentive of a small one-<>ffbonus and a change of work. 
• Administrative support: Under the New Deal a One-Stop Shop has been set up in Barton Hill, the 
crew call into the shop on a daily basis and residents can drop in with queries about waste 
management or grounds maintenance. The team can also be contacted via the shop on their mobile 
phones. 
• Flexible service delivery: There is no contract specification set by the council for the project, 
which allows the crew more discretion. The service has become more frequency based than output 
based; for example, if a street is dirty it is swept and if not it is left. The team have autonomy to 
prioritise their own work in response to local needs. The team are willing to 'bend' standardised 
ways of working. This flexibility has been particularly successful with respect to bulky waste 
collection (see Plate 4). 
• No extra cost to the council: Although the costs of waste management in Barton Hill have 
increased these have been absolbed within the existing contract by SIT A. 
• Getting closer to service users: Liaison meetings (on Fridays) between the team, SIT A, BCC 
officers, Conununity at Heart are open to anyone interested in the Project Pathfinder. 
Crewmembers also act as informal community wardens, reporting abandoned cars, crime, 
damaged lamp posts etc. 
5.2.3 Barton Hill 
Bristol is a city of around 400, 000 people, and is the regional centre for the South West of England. 
The city's economy was built on trade and conunerce relating to its seaport. However, more recent 
industries include aerospace, technology and financial services. After rapid growth and afiluence in 
Bristol in the 1980's, the recession of the 1990's led to a general economic downturn. Significant 
pockets of deprivation exist within the city and, according to the Index of Multiple Deprivation 2000 
(based on income, employment, health and disability, education, housing and access to services), five 
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wards in Bristol are among the 10% of the most deprived areas in England, and constitute 15% of the 
population of Bristol (Bristol City Council, 2002). 
The New Deal for Communities area has about 5, 900 residents and consists of Redfield, Barton Hill, 
Lawrence Hill, and The Dings. These are quite distinct residential areas. Redfield has mostly terraced 
housing, owned and occupied by a mix of elderly people and professionals. In Barton Hill, Lawrence 
Hill, and The Dings, the majority of housing is local authority high-rise flats and maisonettes, with 
some owner occupied terraced family housing. The Dings is an isolated area on the eastern side of 
Barton Hill. The housing is of varying standard, some properties are seriously substandard and have 
been earmarked for demolition, others have been abandoned or boarded up, and the area is dotted with 
empty unused spaces. 
Housing is a key local issue and has a major impact on residential stability and the sustainability of the 
area. Respondents talked about being 'stuck up in the high flats where you can't see anyone'. They 
found living in the flats to be an nnsocialable and isolating experience, where it is difficult to get to 
know their neighbours. High turnover rates in social housing make it difficult to make friends and 
further weakens attachment to neighbourhood and community. One resident said, "when your block is 
lined up for demolition you are getting the foundations on which people are building their lives wasting 
away and they are not laying down any new relationships. So, that does impact on the whole". 
A swvey conducted as part of the New Deal for Communities bid points to higher than average 
deprivation in the Barton Hill area. For example, the area has a high proportion of children and older 
people: 14% of households are headed by a lone parent, 25% of households claim income support, 42% 
of children live in workless families, 35% of working age population are not economically active, 37% 
of working age population do not have any qualifications, and 17% have low literacy skills, and 22% 
have low numeracy skills. The crime rate is 2.8 times the national average, 53% of residents feel it is 
unsafe to walk alone after dark and the area has high mortality rates, and major drug and alcohol abuse 
problems (Community at Heart, 1999). Young people are a particular source of tension in the 
neighbourhood, some have displayed anti-social behaviour such as drug dealing, digging up the plants, 
intimidating residents, riding their bikes over the grass, torching and dumping stolen cars and 
vandalism. The situation today contrasts with Jennings (1962) description ofBarton Hill at the turn of 
the twentieth century as 'one big family', where 'individuals and families were bound together by 
personal ties and common interest'. 
However, there is also a long tradition of self-help in the area, for example, the University Settlement 
Centre provides community services and facilities for voluntary groups, and a self-bnild housing 
project in Barton Hill was completed in 1998. Many of the older residents have local family or 
friendships, and belong to local clubs and societies. In discussions, they reveal their local pride and 
strong sense of attachment to the area; they keep an eye out for other residents despite a feeling that the 
neighbourhood has gone 'down hill'. Whereas, for some newcomers, the neighbourhood and 
neighbours play a minimal role in their lives for a variety of reasons, and plan to move at the first 
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available opportunity. The New Deal area is home to a small number of refugees from Algeria, Bosnia, 
Somalia, and Burundi. 
A postal questionnaire was sent out to residents in the New Deal area; however, only 51 out of 3500 
questionnaires were completed. Nevertheless, this questionnaire revealed that the majority of 
respondents are happy living in Barton Hill (51%). However, when asked whether they would like to 
move, respondents were split between those who did (31 %), and those with mixed feelings (31 %). 
Respondents were also asked whether they had performed any of a list of activities chosen to indicate 
active citizenship (see Graph 1). The majority of respondents reported that they had voted in an 
election (90%), spoken at a public meeting (57%), or signed a petition (51%). Respondents were most 
likely to belong to a school association (28%), a political party (16%), or a Community Based 
Organisation (14%). However, 18% of those with inadequate income did not belong to any 
organisations, compared to 11% of those with adequate income. 
5.2.4 Entitlements to urban services 
Despite universal entitlements to urban services in the UK, the government's neighbourhood renewal 
strategy has demonstrated that services perform well below the national average in disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods of the UK. It is acknowledged that, compared to the rest of the country, residents in 
deprived areas face multi-deprivations, including fear of crime, higher levels of stress, harassment, 
noise, unpopular social housing, vandalism, graffiti and litter, which creates a stigma such that 
residents are keen to move out, and new people are discouraged from moving in. These problems bear 
unequally on different groups in society, for example, 70% of all ethnic minorities live in deprived 
areas. Todorovic and Wellington's study 'Living in Urban England' (2000) found that around a tenth 
of all households nationally are dissatisfied with the services they receive, and the groups more likely 
to have expressed dissatisfaction with services are: • 
• Unemployed heads of household (19%). 
• People living in deprived areas (18%). 
• Lone parents (15%). 
• People living in social rented housing (15%). 
Over the years, Barton Hill has benefited from various sources of funding intended to change the 
entitlements people in deprived areas have. Residents tended to be quite cynical about funding 
schemes, they recognise that, although they may be the 'flavour of the moment' due to the New Deal 
initiative, or 'shouting the loudest' to draw funds into an area, they have been disappointed by past 
regeneration efforts. When the funding stream disappears, assets are not typically maintained and the 
community is no longer consulted about their priorities or aspirations. The sitoation reverts to one 
where residents are told what they are getting. Most respondents spoken to about the New Deal 
initiative took the attitude that 'nothing ever changes' including their entitlements to services. 
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5.2.5 Accountability arrangements 
Traditionally, if a resident had a complaint with waste management, they would contact the council 
either over the phone, in writing or in person. The complaint should be acknowledged within 5 
working days, and a written reply sent within 15 working days. If the citizen is dissatisfied with the 
outcome of their complaint they can fill in a complaint form, which if not resolved satisfactorily, the 
complainant then has the right to have their case heard by council committee. The last resort for the 
complainant is the Local Government Ombudsmen. Alternatively, citizens can seek political 
representation through elected councillors. 
Accouutability within the Project Pathfinder has been improved through shorter lines of 
communication between residents and front line service providers for example through: -
• Attending weekly and monthly team meetings. 
• Leaving a message on the Project Pathfinder notice board. 
• Calling into the New Deal Shop with requests or complaints. 
• Finding members of the team on their rounds. 
To begin with, the Project Pathfinder attempted to regularise participatory mechanisms of 
accountability into durable, institotionalised structures through the introduction of weekly and monthly 
stakeholder meetings. However, it was always the 'same faces that turn up' to meetings. On 
reflection, a community worker observed that the "structures that we think will work in a working class 
area, or an estate, are often more complicated than they are in a middle class area. We expect people 
with less education and less time and more social problems to be able to work within those structures". 
Instead, most residents preferred accountability to be more spontaneous, ad hoc and opportunistic, 
taking place outside formal organisations. For residents, catching the Pathfinder team on their rounds, 
or calling into the one-stop-shop and leaving a message on the Project Pathfinder notice-board, were 
more important in shaping accountability since "you don't necessarily need to know the phone number 
for the Pathfinder office. you know the person running the service" said a council worker. 
It was observed that "accountability has evolved down to a proper local/eve/, which fits into the lives 
of people, instead of fitting into how we think it should be", said a community worker. Residents 
preference for more informal accountability arrangements have marked a change in the community's 
relationship with and dependence on service providers; "almost to the point where ... [managers from 
SITA and the Council} are redundant, they don't need us any more. This made us think, you know, 
don't we make the rules, don't we tell people what they want?" said a SIT A worker. The impact of the 
fieldwork on the theoretical framework for the case study is discussed below and sununariscd in Table 
20 (found in Appendix 1). 
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Purchaser-provider split 
The delivery of waste management services in Bristol has been split into purchasing and providing 
functions, the key actors are: -
• The Neighbourhood and Housing Services department of the Bristol City Council delivers waste 
and recycling services in the city, including rubbish collection, removal ofbulky waste items, gully 
emptying, provision and emptying of litter bins, kerbside recycling, removal of fly tipping and 
abandoned cars. 
• SITA GB Ltd, part of the multinational Lyonnaise des Eaux, has provided refuse collection, street 
cleansing, and recycling services, in Bristol since 1994. 
• Direct Services Organisation (DSO) a trading arm of Bristol City Council, which competes with 
other contractors to run Bristol's services, and currently operates the city's grounds maintenance 
contract. 
• ResourceSaver Ltd is a 'not for profit company' which operates the kerbside 'black box' recycling 
collection service in Bristol and is under subcontract to SIT A. 
• Conununity at Heart is a charitable resident led company established to deliver the £50 million 
New Deal for Communities I 0 year regeneration programme in Barton Hill, Redfield, Lawrence 
Hill, and the Dings. 
Cross agency relationships and co-ordination are a key feature of the Project, and are crucial in 
determining a successful service delivery. However, it seems that successful cross-agency 
relationships have been difficult to achieve. For example the caretakers have responsibility for litter 
picking around the flats in Barton Hill, but are not part of Project Pathfinder. This led to problems in 
terms of co-ordinating duties, to the point where "there is no point having the Pathfinder approach if 
the housing ojjlce doesn't play the game. It has to be embedded in the whole culture of all the service 
providers". One interviewee said that certain people in the process felt threatened by working more 
closely "ith local residents because "the residents were supervising the men by setting the standards 
for them, and the team themselves took ownership for it ... So there were some people who felt they 
hadn't got a role anymore and ... would have more time to spend, not checking and monitoring, but 
talking to the community". 
Furthermore, there appears to be little co-ordination between the ResourceSaver team and the other 
Pathfinder partners, such that no representative from ResourceSaver attends the weekly or monthly 
meetings. This is partly due to ResourceSaver's wish to retain its distinctive ethos and identity, and to 
maintain their credibility as a recycling NGO. Partnerships are difficult to maintain in the context of 
this mismatch of values. For example, it was pointed out that SITA profits are based on the volume of 
waste produced, whereas the not-for-profit NGO is advocating the production of less waste. 
From the resident's perspective, the purchaser-provider split has not improved services. The majority 
of respondents perceive SIT A as an 'unaccountable multinational' 'projiteering on public services'. 
Residents were unhappy that they had no way of holding the company to account for their actions and 
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for the way they spend taxpayer's money, "/ wish the corporation would have its own team. I don 't 
like these private firms- you don't know who to complain to" said one resident 
Life cycle operation and maintenance 
The literature on mban services suggests that integrated operation and maintenance is the key way to 
improve service outputs and sustainabili1y. The operation and maintenance of services in the New Deal 
area has improved under the Project Pathfinder as follows: -
• Street cleansing; This service has become more responsive with the daily presence of the 
Pathfinder team. For example, the team has at its discretion when to perform mechanical or 
manual street cleaning and to decide whether streets should be swept or washed. Increased 
flexibility also allows the team to respond quickly to requests for street sweeping. In particular, 
litter outside the schools and doctor's SUigery in the area has been reduced. Efforts have been 
made to tackle litter hot spots such as extra sweeping around take-aways in the New Deal area, and 
putting dustbins near a bus stop to prevent litter dropping. The team has also made links with local 
schools to enoourage the children to stop dropping litter. 
• Recycling: The kerbside recycling is coilected weekly in Barton Hill but has not been as successful 
as hoped, in part, because of the difficulties of storing and collecting recycling from the flats, but 
also because of the lack of local interest in the scheme. The recycling element of Pathfinder 
appears to be bolted on to the Project, rather than an integral part. 
• Refuse collection; Residents of the high-rise flats dispose of their rubbish through chutes, which 
feed into large metal dustbins. In the past these chutes had become blocked when a collection was 
missed, or if people used them to dispose of bulky items, e.g. TV's or engines. Under the 
Pathfinder the caretakers of the flats requested three collections per week in order to prevent the 
chutes beooming blocked. 
• Bulky waste collection; Collections have improved significantly under the Project Pathfinder, 
whereas once the service took weeks, collections are now made within one or two days, or 
sometimes within hours. Residents can make a request for a collection from the New Deal Shop, 
or catch the crew on their rounds. Fly tipping remains a oommon problem, although the constant 
presence of the team in the area means they are able to remove items quickly. Improvements to 
bulky waste collection service have also reduced the number of blockages in the rubbish chutes of 
the flats. 
• Drain maintenance; Drain maintenance is conducted every 6 months, according to the street 
cleansing contract. However, the team can remedy any blockages immediately, and potential 
problems can now be anticipated. 
• Grounds maintenance; Grounds maintenance was included in the project in response to resident's 
complaints about grass cutting. There are two grounds maintenance staff in the Project Pathfinder. 
One of the team performs routine tasks like leaf collection, grass cutting, grass edging, floral 
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bedding, trimming shrubs and herbaceous borders, maintaining hedges, as well as cutting back 
growth encroaching over footpaths, and keeping the grounds free of litter, debris, sharps and 
weeds. The other employee has a bit more flextbility to do tasks under the Pathfinder umbrella, 
like looking after elderly people's gardens. The crew also work in conjunction with Groundforce, 
an initiative developed under the New Deal for Communities to encourage local people to get 
involved with improving green spaces in the area. 
One of the spin-offs from the Project Pathfinder has been Operation Cleansweeps, special events 
usually held over Bank Holidays to clean up the New Deal area, prune shrubbery, renovate gardens, 
paint fences and playground equipment, picking up litter. Cleansweeps use hundreds of volunteers 
from Bristol's business and churches together with local residents. The Project Pathfinder crew have 
also given up their weekends to support these events in terms of the collection of waste. These events 
have been praised for involving young people: "I have never seen young people work so hard and put 
so much effort into the area" said a local resident 
Professionalism 
In the past, operatives in Barton Hill had specialisations, which led to inefficiencies in service delivery. 
For example, 80 different workers a week were delivering the SIT A contract in Barton Hill; refuse was 
collected by 4 or 5 separate teams every weekday; litter picking was carried out by 2 different teams; 
the gullies were cleared by another team; pavements were washed by another team, and weeds killed 
by another; ResourceSaver collected the recycling under a subcontract. Bulky waste items were 
removed by appointment, often taking 2 weeks, and complaints passed through 3-4 levels of 
management within SIT A and Bristol City Council before reaching the operatives. 
Under Project Pathfinder, there has been a change to 'normal professionalism'. The team collects 
household refuse on Monday and Wednesday, the same team also picks up the litter, clears gullies, 
washes the pavements and collects bulky waste. More importantly, the crew are able to respond 
quickly to local residents' demands of service delivery. Training was provided in refuse collection, 
operating the vehicle, street sweeping, heavy goods vehicle (HGV) driving licence, and drain 
maintenance. This integration has improved the efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery. For 
example, the team now takes extra care when emptying bins because they would have to clear any 
spillage rather than a different sweeping crew. The Council has also paid to train SITA staff on the use 
of grass cutting equipment, however, it was found that the councils health and safety standards did not 
match those standards set in SIT A's contracts, and so the SIT A crew are unable to perform these tasks. 
The creation of a one-stop shop in Barton Hill represents the central government aim of joined up 
working across different levels and departments of government. The shop is located in a parade of 
council owned shops, and serves several essential social functions. For residents, it offers a meeting 
place and is instrumental in accessing services and information. Residents can pop in to find out what 
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is going on locally without having to actively participate in New Deal projects, events or meetings. 
The aim of the shop is to change 'normal administration' by eliminating all unnecessary tiers of 
bureaucracy; "it is about a face they know and it is about someone they can go back to later and sey 
why hasn't it happened?" said a community worker. The New Deal Shop also acts as the base for the 
Project Pathfinder where residents can find the crew on their tea breaks, and the manager of the shop 
acts as a co-ordinator for the Project team, and fields requests from service users. 
Nevertheless, changes to 'normal' behaviour have been difficult to adopt. For example, the grounds 
maintenance crew employed by DSO are keen to retain their distinctive identity, like ResourceSaver 
employees, and were uneasy about such close association with the private sector and perhaps did not 
want to be mistaken for bin men. Issues over status, identity and poaching each other work, together 
with personality clashes, have reduced conmmnication between grounds maintenance and SITA, which 
has led to duplication of work or tasks left undone. Moreover, the operation and maintenance in 
Barton Hill still represents a patchwork of responsibilities and accountabilitics. For example, the 
Pathfinder crew are responsible for "picking up litter from the pavement, but not for the litter next to it 
on the grass verge", said a council worker. The residents, on the other hand, do not view their 
neighbourhood in a fragmented way. One resident drew an analogy with her work as a housewife, 
"you don't just clean one room, you have to keep the whole house clean". 
Standard setting and performance monitoring 
New Labour has initiated various quality schemes and charters to raise the standard of services and 
increase the responsiveness of public sector. In addition to Best Value Performance Indicators for the 
number of missed household waste collections, volume of refuse collected, tonnes of waste recycled, 
number of premises, or amount of time taken to remove fly tips, the Project Pathfinder must comply 
with the statutory recycling targets for household waste in the National Waste Strategy, EC Landfill 
Directive targets, and local Agenda 21 o~ectives (DEFRA, 2000a). Furthermore, SITA is a member of 
the National Association of Waste Disposal Contractors to whose Code of Practice they subscribe, and 
has been accredited under the BS5750 and the IS9000 scheme (SIT A, 2001). The nature of Project 
Pathfinder as a cross-agency partnership means "every agency has its set targets and they conflict, it is 
not obvious why they conflict when they are there to make things better" said a community worker. 
The most obvious way that Bristol City Council monitors the performance of the Project is through its 
contract with SIT A. If the crew fail to achieve a satisfactory standard of service in street sweeping or 
refuse collection it can result in a Default Notice on the SIT A contract, and a deduction from monthly 
payments. If more than 8 default notices have been issued in one week, the council's client officer can 
deduct £44.70 for each Default Notice in waste collection, and £47.07 for street sweeping. Where 
more than fifteen Default Notices are recorded in any one week, the Council may terminate the 
contract. However, formal rectification procedures are generally avoided in Project Pathfinder. A 
more informal rectification procedure has been developed between residents, the client officer, the 
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crew and staff at the one stop shop, which ensures flexibility and speed of response, but is also 
important in demonstrating good will on the part of Bristol City Council and commitment to the 
Pathfinder partnership. 
Consultations, user participation, and consumer feedback, to improve the quality and efficiency of 
services are now an integral part of public service delivery in the UK. Bristol City Council also has 
various mechanisms in place to ensure local people have a voice in decisions affecting public services 
delivery. These initiatives are part of a wider commitment on the part of Bristol City Council to 
'Serving Bristol Better', for example, by creating a sustainable environment, strengthening community 
infrastructure and delivering value for money. In 1999, Bristol City Council instigated a Citizens Panel 
to iuform decision-making on issues affecting public services. The panel is consulted on how public 
services are delivered and their responses are used to review how services are delivered, track changes 
in public satisfaction and expectations of services. In 1999, 40% of respondents on Bristol's Citizens 
Panel felt that council services are satisfactory, people suggested they were most satisfied with refuse 
and waste collection (76%), recycling (71 %), street lighting (62%), street cleaning (59%) and 
pavements (46%). The Bristol Citizens Panel (2001) found that 67% of respondents were satisfied with 
environmental services, 68% thought that the council does the best it can with the money available, and 
64% felt that the council listens to local people before it makes a decision that affects them. 
In Barton Hill, there have also been a variety of consultations associated with the New Deal funding. 
However, the local councillor appears to view the key features of the New Deal, (such as greater 
participatory democracy and shortened lines of communication between residents and service 
providers) as a threat to his role as the 'authentic voice' of the local people. As the first Liberal 
Democrat, elected into a previously safe Labour seat, he attributes his success to being a representative 
of the people. He continues to have a role in service delivery, where local residents contact him 
directly with complaints, especially those who are not in the area during the day. 
In fact, the unusual amount of attention the Project Pathfinder has received in articles and pictures in 
the local media, specialist regeneration journals, academic papers, and the New Deal literature, has 
created a kind of self-regulation in service delivery. The crew have hosted visits from dignitaries 
(ministers, councillors and royalty), and community activists from other New Deal for Community 
areas, and were included in a TV documentary about the New Deal for Communities. The publicity the 
project generated has also had a major impact on increasing worker morale, commitment and service 
performance. The publicity also meant that residents had more information than usual about waste 
management, they also know how the project is supposed to work, and what level of service they are 
entitled to expect, and this means that the crew are tackled directly by residents if they feel the service 
has slipped. 
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Accountability assessment 
Information: A key feature of the project is shortened lines of communication between residents and 
service providers. As well as ad hoc, face-to-face contact with Project Pathfinder, residents can access 
information through the one stop shop, leaflets associated with the New Deal, TV programmes such as 
local news items, the area-based Grassroots newspaper, and word of mouth. Most respondents said 
they found out about waste management by leaflets, and by calling the council or one stop shop, as well 
as by talking to staff, although most would prefer to get more information on the radio42, see Table 21. 
Residents also have the possibility of attending weekly and monthly Pathfinder meetings, although 
attendance remains low. Respondents were asked why they had not used the information they knew 
about service deliver to secure improvements, and the majority said it was because they were not 
interested in doing so. 
Table 21: Comparison between how people fmd out about urban services, and their preferred methods. 
Power: The Project was designed to ensure a degree of dis-intermediation such that residents have 
more direct control over service providers rather than having to approach local goverrunent. Local 
residents had the potential for considerable influence over the definition of their needs in service 
delivery and in the management of services, but attempts to involve consumers in institutionalised 
meetings failed, due to lack of interest. User involvement in Project Pathfinder tends to be reactive and 
informal, and so the power users demonstrate in service delivery is variable and hard to measure 
overall. Whilst all residents have benefited from improved environmental management in Barton Hill, 
the kind of street level, face-to-face accountability the project offers is of particular benefit to residents 
living in terraced housing (whose refuse is collected in a more personal way than that of residents 
living in the flats), and those residents who are at home during the day and can talk to crew or call in at 
the one stop shop. Furthermore, some residents in Barton Hill exert a greater claim on service 
providers, for example those older residents who have lived in Barton Hill for many years. These 
residents tend to have a more active concern about the appearance of the neighbourhood. However, 
user power has been undermined by SIT A's operational constraints elsewhere in the city, which meant 
that dedicated Pathfinder staff were transferred to other areas of the city, and the service delivery in 
Barton Hill suffered. Consequently, user power over service delivery and urban service accountability 
has been lost and regained many times in Barton Hill. 
Action: The project has achieved higher standards of refuse collection and street cleaning than the 
SIT A average in the rest of the city. The project has improved the responsiveness of waste 
42 A community radio station was latmched in 2003 under the New Deal for Communities. 
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management by operating at the neighbourhood level and delivering services through a team of 
workers dedicated to the area. Project Pathfinder team have made themselves efficient, effective and 
user responsive because they enjoy the greater variety of tasks, the greater autonomy with respect to the 
scheduling of wmk, and discretion to deal with problems/user requests as they arise. One spin off from 
the project has been the Operation Cleansweep where the community has mobilised voluntarily to 
improve the appearance of the neighbourhood. 
5.2.6 Impact on user satisfaction 
"The environment is exceptionally important, because, if you walk out your door and outside it looks 
crap you don't feel good about where you live. If you can tidy up that environment, then, if your 
environment looks good, you feel better about where you live, and you feel better about your life, and 
you are more inclined to try and make a difference to your life, and the life around you. So our duty is 
to try and take awcy one of the barriers to people fteling good about their live8' said a community 
worker. 
Table 22 shows that respondents were most satisfied with the overall provision of refuse collection, 
community halls, streetlights, and drains in Barton Hill. They were also satisfied with the information 
they had received about streetlights, drains, and removing abandoned cars. Respondents are most 
dissatisfied with the overall provision of removing abandoned cars and recycling, and dissatisfied with 
information tltey received about refuse collection and street sweeping. 
Table 22: Levels of satisfaction with the overall provision, quality and information about urban services. 
Very Satisfied Fairly Fairly Dissatisfied Very 
satisfied satisfied dissatisfied dissatisfied 
OVERALL SERVICE 3 2 1 -1 -2 -J 
PROVISION 
Refuse collection % 14% 86% % % % 
Community halls % 59"/o 41% % % % 
Drain maintenance % 4% 96% % % % 
Street lights % 8% 94% % % % 
Recycling 2% 59% 33% 6% % % 
Street sweepin~ 16% 51% 12% 16% 6% % 
Bulky waste collection 12% 65% 16% 4% 4% % 
Abandoned car disposal 8% 61% 25% 6% % % 
INFORMATION 
SUPPLY 
Refuse collection 4% 37% 18% 28% 14% % 
Community halls 12% 53% 18% 18% % % 
Drain maintenance 8% 43% 22% 16% 12% % 
Street lights 16% 29% 6% 42% 8% % 
Recycling 20% 47% 26% 8% % % 
Street sweepin~ 37% 43% 10% 10% % % 
Bulky waste collection 43% 37% 8% 12% % % 
Abandoned car disposal 28% 49% 18% 6% % % 
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With respect to the Pathfinder, respondents agreed with the statements that, 'service providers are 
happy to hear users ideas·, 'service providers are more responsive now·. and, 'service providers are 
friendly and helpful'. Most respondents described services as 'reliable' (84%), 'under-funded' (47%), 
and 'effective' ( 41%). Certain people were more likely to describe services as 'effective', for example, 
women ( 43%), those with adequate income ( 44%), and those with sometimes-adequate income ( 48%). 
The majority of respondents (88%) were also generally satisfied with local government, and 37% of 
respondents are satisfied with the way local government informs residents. However, only 4% of 
respondents stated that they trust service providers. 
Respondents were asked if they had complained to the service provider about an urban service in the 
last 12 months. The majority had complained about water and sewerage (61%), and roads (18%). 
Most respondents (20%) stated that they had complained about these services in self-interest. Of those 
that had made a complaint, the majority said they did so by telephone or by visiting the council office 
in person. Respondents were generally satisfied with· the council's response to their complaint. 
Respondents were also asked what they would do if they had a problem with waste management, the 
majority said hold a public meeting (57%), visit the service providers office (24%), or contact an 
ombudsmen (24%). Women, and those with inadequate income, were more likely to state they would 
hold a public meeting (61%), whereas more men would prefer to visit the service provides offices 
(26%). 
Semi-structured interviews with residents revealed that few knew how to make a complaint to the 
council, particnlarly the young, or ethnic minorities. This was because they said they had never needed 
io contact the council, or else would not complain if they had had a problem. Some respondents said 
that they had not complained about litter or rubbish collection because there is "no point when they just 
laugh in your face"; "because the kids will just mess it up again"; "no-one is going to do anything 
about it so why care"; "who are you going to tell, you know if you do tell them they are not going to 
listen, we have had years of that. So why bother?' One elderly resident said he had complained in the 
past, but all the stress it involves is bad for his angina. However, other respondents said that sorting out 
problems with solid waste management was "better now", "it is quicker" "it is easier", "the bin men 
are more helpfuf', and "the boys are more approachable, we can chat to the boys'. SITA managers 
reported that they found that the number of complaints, or at least the number of complaints reaching 
SIT A management, had reduced since Project Pathfinder. 
In interviews, community workers highlighted the way the delivery of urban services is often based on 
a power differential, and recognised that "the people in power in any city are not necessarily from the 
iocal estates. They are from the better areas. The better areas are normally the first to get sorted out 
and the estates are the lasf' said a community worker. Many of the interviewees spoke of how 
residents in upper income areas of Bristol are better able to influence service providers. "/think a lot of 
residents in places like Clif/on, places which are more ajjluent, will have more of a sense of their rights 
and what the council should do. They are more likely to ring up and maybe they have less distracting 
118 
An investigation of improvements to urban services through accountability 
things in their lives" said a community worker. Furthermore, "people in more a.fjluent areas are often 
more educated and know how to access services. They know who to complain to and how to ask, and 
how to escalate a problem until it becomes a question at foll council" said a council worker. Those 
living iu deprived areas, on the other hand, were said to exert limited influence on the decision making 
process and tend to have limited capacity to do so, due to limited time, money, or know-how. 
Residents were asked about the most serious problems affecting them in Barton Hill and the majority 
said the kids 'running around and intimidating people', muggings, drug dealing and abandoned cars. 
When asked whether Project Pathfinder had helped with any of these problems, residents said they had 
because, "they are like the police", "the boys make people feel safer" by ''just being around, a face that 
everyone knows" and "they work hard to make the place look nice". One council worker said "the 
thing that surprised us all {was that] it wasn't about getting the streets clean. It was about the 
visibility of the crew and the differences they were making to peoples lives". The Pathfinder crew visits 
residents houses at least twice a week, which is an opportunity for a chat for some residents, and the 
team have become a source of local information and advice (they carry council leaflets and contact 
details in their truck), and help link up vulnerable residents with the NDC shop. The team have in fact 
substituted for the police in certain instanccs43, and have had a direct influence on anti-social 
behaviour, like vandalism and drug dealing in the area44• "These stories mean that it is more than just 
collecting waste. It means that they are truly concerned for the community and they want to do all that 
they can do, over and above collecting bins and sweeping the streets" said a council worker. 
5.2. 7 Impact on the perfonnance of services 
Improvements to street cleaning has had a dramatic effect on the appearance of the area. Although, 
baseline information was not collected at the outset of the project, SIT A and ResourceSaver have kept 
records on tonnage collected from Project Pathfinder refuse, recycling and street sweeping rounds. 
Refuse collection tonnages peaked initially, and have remained fairly constant, with a slight reduction 
in tonnage, maybe due to a slight increase in recycling, or the slippage of service delivery standards in 
the New Deal area. The street sweeping tonnage also peaked after the Project was implemented, and 
again fell. Whilst the Project has improved the delivery of waste management in Barton Hill, one of 
the problems Pathfinder has experienced is the comparatively low rate of recycling in the New Deal 
area, and the difficulty of implementing the black box scheme in the high-rise flats. Observation 
reveals that residents use their recycling boxes for storing car parts or toys, and that kids kick the boxes 
along the street. 
The success of the Pathfinder at improving service delivery has meant it has been extended to two other 
areas of Bristol. In total, 11,500 homes in the city are served by a Pathfinder crew, and, over the next 
43 An elderly woman had been burgled and she would only speak to the Pathfinder crew, she did not want the 
police or social services involved because she felt comfortable with the team. 
44 The team realised drug dealers were using a particular telephone kiosk for dealing, and so they swept around it 
as often as possible. Dealers had slung trainers across telephone wires to advertise their whereabouts. so the team 
cut these trainers down. 
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2-3 years, there are plans to extend the scheme to another ten areas. Selection of Pathfinder areas are 
made on the basis of the Indices of Multiple Deprivation, total number of properties, an existing 
community organisation, community office/Bristol City Council area office to act as a co-<>rdinating 
base, and community development initiative in place. 
A further improvement in service delivety under the New Deal for Communities involved street 
lighting. Consultation with residents highlighted inadequate street lighting as a local concern. 
Residents were scared to go out at night because of the incidence and fear of street crime. A street 
lighting project was used "in a very mercenary sense to buy ourselves time to do the real development 
work" so that "people can see for themselves where some of the New Deal money has gone" said a 
community worker. The project was completed in 2002, with 350-400 strcctlights improved or 
replaced in the New Deal Area. Residents decided where to install the new lights, Bristol City Council 
managed the technical side of installing streetlights, and Community At Heart paid for the hardware 
and acted as project coordinator. The council is now responsible for the ongoing maintenance and 
management of the lights. Improving street lighting was also intended to increase local stocks of social 
capital: "the idea is not to make people feel safe at home and never come out, that is not what it is all 
about. We wan/to get people out and socialise more, and take up the benefit of services that are there 
... It is when you bring the community together ... you get/he stable and safe community, people are 
looking out for each other" said a community worker. 
However, the project did not run smoothly. The quality of light has changed from a low level pinky-
orange light to a much brighter stronger white light (see Plate 5). It was the first time the Council had 
used these kinds of lights and implemented this type of scheme in a built up residential area. The 
change in the level oflighting came as a 'shock' to a number of residents, and there were 20 complaints 
that the lights were too bright "A lot of complaints that we got were unexpected We thought everyone 
was going to embrace the idea of street lighting and not everyone did ... It created a problem for 
people, you know their cars were safe but they weren't sleeping" said a community worker. 
Complaints were resolved by the purchase of blackout curtains, readjusting the lighting angle so that it 
wouldn't throw so much light back into the houses, and changing the type oflantern on the street lights. 
Along with the other tackling crime initiatives, improved street lighting has contributed to an 18% 
decrease in domestic burglaty in 12 months. 
Interviewees stated a major factor in improvements to service delivety under Project Pathfinder was 
that "we have got the right team ... That team has come together to work effictively together as a team, 
they support each other, they like each other and they get on with it, and they do a terrific job ... There 
is no doubt that when they have brought new people into this team they haven 'I got the same results. It 
must be something about the worked' said a community worker. Traditionally, rates of remuneration, 
the demanding nature of the work, and low job status, make it difficult for SIT A to attract and retain 
staff. The crew volunteered for the project because they wanted to 'do something new' and 'thought it 
would be a challenge' because it would involve a greater variety of tasks, greater autonomy and 
discretion, and also wanted to feel more appreciated by residents. Under Project Pathfinder, the crew 
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have improved motivation, are more satisfied with their job, make better use of their skills, take pride 
in their achievements, and the added significance of the Project makes them feel good about their work. 
As such, the team displays low absenteeism, higher individual productivity, higher retention, higher 
standards of refuse collection and street cleaning than the SITA average in the rest of the city, and 
increased commitment to the community, although not necessarily to the company. The team had a 
commitment to 'not letting the community down' and residents in turn spoke about the Pathfinder crew 
in terms that highlighted pride, and relations of trust. One resident said that "Its not the service, it's the 
people who have made the difference". Interestingly, the crew said that they were not generally 
community minded, for example, they don't engage in community activities where they live. 
Respondents were asked whether they thought there had been an improvement in both the appearance 
of Barton Hill in the last 3 years (see Graph 2), as well as an improvement in the waste management 
services (see Graph 3), the results are shown in Table 23 and confirmed by the observation checklist 
performed in Barton Hill (Table 24 found in Appendix I). Whilst the majority of respondents said 
there had been no improvement, women and respondents aged 25-30 were more likely to say there had 
been a small improvement in service delivery, and in the appearance of Barton Hill over the last three 
years. These findings were not borne out in the semi-structured interviews, where the majority said 
until recently there had been an improvement in services, but recently noted a slippage in services so 
that the area 'was as dirty as ever' and 'back to normal'. When questionnaire respondents were asked 
whether they had noticed a change in the appearance of Barton Hill in the last 6 months, 98% said Yes-
a change for the worse, which might account for this discrepancy. 
Table 23: Perceptions of improvements in Barton Hill and in waste management services in last 3 years. 
Cbaner-d appearance of area in laU 3 yn Improvement in wa<~te manael'ment in last 3 yrs 
% % 
Bi~ improvement 4% 12% 
Small improvement 290.4 31% 
No improvement 45% 45% 
Services are worse 22% 18% 
Don't know 2% 0% 
Tight contract margins have led SIT A to rework the routes for sweeping and refuse collection in the 
city as a whole. Invariably, routes became bigger, and resulted in workloads for operatives that are 
difficult to deliver. Drivers have been withdrawn from the Project Pathfinder to cover staff shortages 
in other areas of Bristol. This has meant a slippage from Pathfinder standards in Barton Hill and 
defaults on the contract. At the time of fieldwork, respondents said they were fed-up with blocked 
drains, weeds growing out of pavements, rubbish in the car park areas, and missed bins. Residents 
thought that the ' the novelty has worn off for the Pathfinder partners". One resident said, "Obviously 
there are problems, but we don't get to hear the reasons why- that's not for us to know. I suppose 
there are manpower problems, with not enough people to clean the streets, or people not wanting to do 
it". 
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The occasional redeployment of the Pathfinder crew created a lot of local anger. According to the 
cmmmmity newspaper, the withdrawal of the crew on a previous occasion led to "a long period of 
intense negotiation, letters of protest, and even a 1000 plus signature petition was submitted, showing 
the depth of feeling amongst the local connnunity" (Grassroots Aprii!May, 2002; 1). One local 
shopkeeper said "when we heard they were being mucked around we got a petition out on the counters 
in the shops and no one could buy anything until they signed it. Everyone wanted them to stay" (see 
Plate 6). Fignre 7 is one example of 'weapons of the weak' used by local residents against SIT A 
management in the local newspaper. This cartoon says 'SIT A making cash from trash since 1989'. 
Being 'binned' are ideas like 'public service', 'community relations', 'project pathfinder', 'happy 
workers', 'people first', 'fresh ideas', 'greener cnviromnent'. Also see Plate 7. 
Figure 7: A cartoon from Grassroots newspaper. 
Another recurring problem from the conncil's perspective is the permanent storage of wheeled bins and 
bags of refuse on the pavement outside homes that do not have a back garden or back alleys. This 
creates an eyesore, a potential health risk, and a hazard to other people walking along the street (see 
Plate 8). If complaints about refuse storage on pavements have been received, the Conncil Cleansing 
Officer will contact the specific household or stteet involved with a warning, and if the bin continues to 
be left on the pavement it will be removed without notice. 
5.2.8 Impact on sustainability 
Sustainability is a general concern in Barton Hill. Typically, the capital funds from deprivation related 
funding schemes are available to install facilities, but historically maintenance has been more 
problematic "whatever you put in there is dragged down to the quality of the surrounding area", said 
an interviewee. If maintenance cannot be gnaranteed then "it would just be another thing that people 
would see wasn't getting done so they [the council] would rather it was left". Nevertheless, 73% of 
respondents thought that Batton Hill as a neighbourhood had become more sustainable since the New 
Deal for Communities programme started, particularly men (75%), and those with adequate income 
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(100%), and respondents who owned their house (78%). However, the performance of the Pathfinder 
has not been sustained since its implementation. 
Technical sustainability is concerned with the continued performance of the service, such that the 
benefits are realised over the long term. Whilst Project Pathfinder has improved the technical outputs 
of service delivery performance, the sustainability of services has been undermined by a number of 
problems. These can be summarised as: -
• SITA management has 'borrowed' HGV drivers from the Pathfinder Project team to make up the 
numbers in other parts of the city. 
• Agency workers brought in to cover for Pathfinder crew do not know the area or the route, and 
"don't take as much pride in their worlt'. 
• Ironically, the success of the Pathfinder has had the effect of increasing fly tipping and 'people 
have been coming to Bar/on llill to wreck things' (see Plate 9). 
• A change of depot has reduced the flexibility of the Pathfinder team, and reduced the autonomy of 
the crew. 
• The additional cost of the Project Pathfinder of about £25,000/annum has 'backfired' because 
SIT A has tight margins within their contract. 
• The grounds maintenance crew have experienced problems regarding the digging up ofthe planted 
beds ("some people round here have nice hanging baskets!" said one of the crew). In addition to 
equipment being stolen from their truck. 
• Short -term political pressures led to a focus on visible qnick wins that can be delivered rather than 
sustained improvements in service delivery over the long term. 
Sustained improvements in Project Pathfinder are contingent upon costs. There is a perception among 
project partners that SIT A "will talk about Best Value and will talk about continuous improvement and 
they will talk about working in a partnership, but if it affects the bottom line, then it becomes very 
dif}icult to get things done" said a council worker. This sentiment was borne out in an interview with 
SITA employee who described the Project Pathfinder as "running away with itself and becoming 
expensive". Furthermore, the cost of the Pathfinder could have a knock-on effect for recycling in the 
city, which is funded through savings on the refuse contract. However SIT A recognised that "the 
future for us isn't just collecting waste and putting it into holes in the ground ... The key for us is 
staying one step ahead of the game, and our competitors like Onyx, Bi.ffa, and C/eanaway'. The need 
to maintain this competitive edge might also affect the long-term sustainability of Pathfinder. 
In recognition of the vulnerability of Project Pathfinder, community development workers plan to set 
up a residents management organisation controlled by local residents, together with stakeholders from 
Community at Heart, SIT A, residents and BCC. The committee would have a ring-fenced budget for 
management of services like street cleaning and grounds maintenance, and would also monitor the 
quality of other public services. A local service standards agreement would ensure that performance is 
sustained over the long tenn, and also resolve demarcation disputes with other service providers 
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operating in the New Deal Area. "We need to define roles and responsibilities. We need to define 
what quality of service is needed or o:pected in the area. We need to define our mutual responsibility 
and accountability to one another" said a conncil worker. Nevertheless, "the complication with 
neighbourhood management is that it adds another level ofbureaucracj' said a community worker. 
Social sustainability is concerned with the social relations and societal norms that ensure services 
continue to function over the long term. The Project Pathfinder is specifically targeted at an area with 
a variety of social problems such as nnemployment, crime, a rnn down environment, and lack of co-
ordination in the provision of services, "The issue that people are struggling with the most is anti-
social behaviour from young people, drug dealing, drug misuse; those kinds of long term historic 
problems you are not going to solve with anything technical, they are about people" said a community 
worker. 
The social relations involved in waste management have been changed through Project Pathfinder for 
example, a closer relationship between dedicated front line workers and residents has developed, 
together with shorter lines of commnnication. Interviews with commnnity development workers were 
instructive with respect to social sustainability, these interviewees referred to the role of Project 
Pathfinder in the process of changing local residents entitlements and expectations. For example: -
• "They want their children or grandchildren to have access to the opportunities everyone else has" 
(Council Worker). 
• "The problem with people around here is that they have no ambition, they eat food out of bags and 
drop it, or they eat sweets and drop the wrappers" (Caretaker). 
• One community development worker saw his work as to "change the status of peoples lives. From 
being a person who is on benefits and taking just what lift deals them, to getting to a point where 
they connect with other people's lives around them, doing things together, collaborating to take 
charge of something. It is very important and Pathfinder is an important part of that process" 
(Community Worker). 
• "You sometimes have to give people permission to feel that they are somebody. They have been 
knocked back so many times and in the end you start believing what you are told, and just stand 
there passively and receive all the things that people say that I am entitled to. So it is about 
building people up" (Community Worker). 
• Respondents reported a number of problems affecting their lives including joblessness, ill health, 
crime and disorder, nnderachievement, youth inclusion, racial harassment, scapegoating, temporary 
accommodation, poor housing, feeling isolated and alienated, long term dependence on benefits, 
anti-social behaviour, concentration of vulnerable people in a deprived neighbourhood, high 
turnover and so on. One community worker said that 'there are a number of people with a whole 
raft of problems impacting on their lives, and one of the last things that they want to worry about is 
dropping litter'. 
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The announcement of new service norms, greater prominence of service providers at the 
neighbourhood level, and high profile commitments have enhanced public expectations, and put greater 
pressure on staff. Not only has the project changed the expectations of residents, but it has also assisted 
in the development of better social relations and new social networks. For some elderly people, the bin 
round is an event and the team are visitors for a chat "there is a real sense that it brings neighbours 
together, somehow. I know that rubbish collection is basic really and if it is not done everyone notices, 
but you can see that/he Pathfinder crew is a part of people's lives", said a community worker. The 
social accessibility of services in Barton Hill was improved through a new local one-stop shop, service 
delivery has been made more straightforward, service providers have learned more about the problems 
faced by users, and accessibility has been improved by an increased presence and visibility of the crew 
at the street level. However, community participation in service delivery is spasmodic, ad hoc, 
disorganised, and opportunistic. 
5.2.9 Hypothesis testing 
It was hypothesised that • accountability a"angements will improve the outputs of urban services and 
will improve the relative chances of sustainability'. The findings of this case study have proved the 
hypothesis. Project Pathfinder has successfully improved the managment and delivery of refuse 
collection, street cleansing, drain maintenance, bulky waste collection, grounds maintenance and 
recycling with the best standard of work in Bristol. Respondents were most satisfied with the overall 
provision of refuse collection, community halls, streetlights and drain cleaning. Respondents were 
most pleased with the attitude of the Pathfinder crew, who are said to be 'happy to hear users ideas', 
more 'responsive', 'friendly' and 'helpfuf. However, at the time of the fieldwork the project was 
experiencing a dip in performance due to city-wide resource constraints, and respondents were 
dissatisfied with the amount of street litter and quality of refuse collection although most said they had 
not complained about it. Sustainability of improved services has been undermined by resource 
constraints, increased expectations and lack of coordination/communication between the different 
agencies working in Barton Hill. 
5.2.10 Conclusion 
Best Value and the New Deal for Communities aim to make services work better through localised 
delivery, better co-ordination, giving residents a say in how services are run, as well as the opportunity 
to participate in service delivery. The Project Pathfinder has provided a more integrated approach to 
the delivery of waste collection, street cleaning, grounds maintenance, household bulky collections, 
gully emptying and recycling services. The project is a partnership between the purchaser (Bristol City 
Council and Community at Heart) and providers of waste management in Bristol (Direct Services 
Organisation, SIT A, and Resource Saver). The Project has the highest standard of waste management 
in Bristol. Accountability most commonly comes about through ad hoc face-to-face personal contact 
and shortened lines of communication between residents and crew. Information dissemination has 
enabled residents to keep workers in check, but publicity also boosts worker morale and commitment. 
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Improved performance can be attributed to high levels of worker motivation principally as a result of 
recognition and pride and feeling more appreciated by residents. Whilst, increased professional 
accountability appears to have improved the outputs of urhan services it has not improved their 
sustainability. The case study is summarised below in Table 25. 
Table 25: Swnmary of the Barton Hill case study 
Bristol 
What are the Historically services perform well below national average in the most disadvantaged 
entitlements to neighbourhoods. Pathfmder Project intends to make the service delivery more responsive 
urban services? and accowttable to citizens by giving local residents more control over service delivery in 
their communities. It is hoped that enabling front line service providers to work more 
closely with the local community will change resident's sense of entitlements !Uld 
expectation of service standards. I lowever, the project has been less successful at including 
minority l!fOUDS, or those living in high-rise flats in Barton Hill. 
How is Accountability is demonstrated through weekly and monthly team meetings and informal 
accountability arrangements such as catching the team on their rounds, leaving a message on the Project 
demonstrated? Pathfmdcr notice board, or calling into the New Deal Shop with requests or complaints, as 
well as the traditional channels for complaints, e.g. Cowtcil help line. Pathfmder has 
increased discretion, but new pressures to Perform come from the community. 
What is the impact Residents are most satisfied with the overall provision of refuse collection, community 
on user halls, streetlights and drain cleaning. However, respondents stated that they would like to 
satisfaction? see more infonnation about refuse collection and street cleaning. Respondents were most 
pleased with the attitude of the Pathfmder crew, who are said to be happy to hear users 
ideas, more responsive, friendly and helpful. At the time of the fieldwork, the project was 
experiencing a dip in performance doe to SITA resource constraints, and respondents were 
dissatisfied with the amount of street litter and quality of refuse collection although most 
said thev had not complained about it. 
What is the impact Project Pathfmder has successfully improved the managment and delivery of refuse 
on perfonnance? collection, street cleansing, drain maintenance, bulky waste collection, grotmds 
maiotenance and recycling. Project team has the best standard of work in Bristol (speed, 
quality, and frequency of service, as well as the attitudes of staff that deliver them). 
Improvements to urban services in Darton Hill has meant residents feel better about where 
they live, the bin-round is an event for some residents, and an opportunity for a chat with 
the crew. Street lighting is getting people out of their homes and socialising. Low 
recycling rates remain a problem, particularly in the high-rise flats. 
How sustainable Sustainability has been undennined by increased expectations and lack of coordination with 
are urban services? those agencies not directly involved in the Project, there is a need to for better 
communication between all agencies working in Darton Hill. The project also suffers from 
a lack of fmances and budget constraints, although it is anticipated that it will generate 
savings in long term. Nearly everyone had seen a drop in the standard of service in the last 
6 months but most said the area as a whole had become more sustainable. 
Hypothesis testing Based on the fmdings from the fieldwork, the case has proved the hypothesis that 
accountability arrangements will improve the outputs of urban services and will improve the 
relative chance of sustainability. 
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5.3 Political Accountability: Mdantsane, South Africa 
5.3.1 Introduction 
nJs case study focuses on political accountability in terms of the role of popular participation in 
government through committees in attempts to get more appropriate and accessible public services. 
Ward committees ensure that government works with citizens to find sustainable ways to meet their 
needs in the delivery of urban services. A ward committee is composed of a ward councillor and 10 
elected members. This case study reviews the role of ward committees in promoting participatory 
democracy and, more especially, involving communities in planning service delivery and monitoring 
performance. This case stndy makes particular reference to the urban services water supply, sanitation, 
access roads, and streetlights. 
5.3.2 Policy context 
The Mnnicipal Systems Act (Republic of South Africa, 2000), states that a municipality must 
complement formal representative government with a system of participatory governance, so that the 
local community can participate in the affairs of the municipality. The Municipal Structures Act 
(Republic of South Africa, 1998) sets out the role of ward committees in promoting participatory 
democracy. The ward committee consists of a ward councillor and ten elected members. Five of the 
members represent the community of the ward, and the other five normally represent sectors, such as 
youth, women, business, religion, and sport or culture. The ward committee advise the ward councillor 
with regard to matters concerning the ward, acting as a link between the council and residents, and 
encourage residents to get involved in local government issues. 
Each municipality, through its ward committees, is required to produce an Integrated Development 
Plan every 5 years. This is a strategic plan outlining the municipality's development priorities with 
respect to urban services. Communities are involved in setting indicators and targets for service 
delivery and reviewing municipal performance. Accountability is also demonstrated ward committees 
monitoring service delivery performance against the indicators contained in the Integrated 
Development Plan. 
5.3.3 Mdantsane 
The fieldwork for this case stndy was undertaken in a suburb of East London called Mdantsane, which 
is about 20 minutes car journey from East London city centre, see Plates 10, 11 and 12. East London is 
a small coastal city in Buffalo City municipality in the Eastern Cape Province. It has approximately 
105,000 households. The economy is based on a commercial river port, electrical, food and motor 
127 
An investigation of improvements to urban services through accountability 
industries, notably Daimler Chrysler. The city has good air, road, and railway travel networks. During 
the homeland policy East London bordered the two homeland states of Transkei and Ciskei. 
In 1957, East London City Council was instructed by central govermnent to establish a new township 
to address the critical shortages of housing in East London's squatter location, Dun can Village. A 
'white' farm called Umdanzani was selected as a suitable location for the township, and was declared a 
'released area' by Act of Parliament (with respect to the Group Areas Act 1951). The decision was 
based, in part, on the proximity of the farm to a railway line, which would enable residents to commute 
to work in East London. 
In an attempt to attract residents to Mdantsane, the streets of the first and second zones were tarred, and 
trees were planted at the roadside. In the 1960's, the area around Mdantsane was earmarked for special 
industrial development, and the first residents to move in to Mdantsane at the end of 1963 were 
workers at a new textile factory. The first forced removals from Duncan Village began the following 
year; compensation was paid to Dnncan Village residents for the value of their home if they owned it 
(Daily Dispatch, 1.9.63). 
Single storey, four roomed houses, were built of concrete blocks, with outside plumbing and were set 
out on individual plots. Apparently, "some women uttered cries of delight when they saw their new 
homes because they were so superior to the shanties they had abandonetf' (Daily Dispatch, 11.6.64). 
Although not all were so impressed"/ was not happy when I first came to Mdantsane where there were 
all the problems- transport, absence of shops and markef' (Daily Dispatch, 2.6.68). Mdantsane was 
proclaimed a homeland town in 1966, and formed part of the former Ciskei. When the forced removals 
to Mdantsane were suspended in 1983, 88,000 people had been relocated from East London. East 
London City Council officially took over the administration of Mdantsane on July I'' 199745, as well as 
the responsibility for urban service provision, metering, billing, and credit control systems. 
Mdantsane lacks the businesses, shops, and amenities, normally associated with an urban area of its 
size46 Few people have access to private transport, and most rely on public transport to take them into 
East London, where goods, services and employment can be better accessed. Mdantsane exemplifies 
the spatial effects of apartheid, which marginalized black citizens on peripheral land, furthest from jobs 
and increased the costs of both public transport and municipal infrastrocture. 
In total, 120 questionnaires were completed in four areas ofMdantsane, 50 in non-deprived areas (30 in 
Golden Highway and 30 in NUI7), and 50 in deprived areas (30 in NU 12, and 30 in RDP housing area 
ofNUI7). Respondents were asked if they had done any of a list of activities chosen to indicate active 
citizenship (see Graph 4). The most common forms of participation were to vote in an election, attend 
a public meeting, and speaking at a public meeting. Gender, age, and income, did not appear to be 
45 Provincial government provided an initial R70 million grant for administration of the township to the city 
council (Daily Dispatch, 3.5.99). 
" Mdantsane is the 2"" biggest black location after Soweto. 
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factors affecting these activities. Respondents were most likely to belong to a religions society, 
followed by membership of political parties, and women's groups. Only 10% of respondents stated 
they did not belong to any organisations. 
On average, the majority of respondents in this research, (40%), are happy living in Mdantsanc, with 
those in non-deprived areas more happy than those in deprived areas. Those aged 56 and over, were 
the happiest living in Mdantsane. However, when asked whether they would like to move, the w.ajority 
said Yes (44%). The respondents that were most likely to want to move were those with inadequate 
income, those living in shacks, and the younger respondents. Those over 56 were less likely to want to 
move. 
5.3.4 Entitlements to urban services 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Mrica (1996) grants all citizens an equal and inalienable 
right to housing and water, and requires the state to fulfil these rights. Similarly, the Municipal 
Structures Act stipulates that a "municipality must ... ensure that all members of the local community 
have access to at least the minimnm level of municipal services". During apartheid, white South 
Mricans benefited from subsidised services and infrastructure at the expense of the black population. 
With the creation of a single municipal tax base, the ANC promised to restructure physical access to 
services and make them more affordable. The Reconstruction and Development Programme (1994) 
made the redistribution of municipal resources and provision of basic services to blacks a major policy 
focus. 
The White Paper on Reconstruction and Development (ANC, 1994; section 2.5.6) recommends the 
"approach to housing, infrastructure and services must involve and empower communities, be 
affordable, developmental, and sustainable; take account of funding and resource constraints and 
support gender equity". The Reconstruction and Development Programme set specific targets for 
service provision and provides for progressive realisation of service levels, these are shown below in 
Table 26. Municipalities are free to determine what level of service to provide, but the level they 
choose should reflect the needs in the communities and their ability to pay for them. 
Table 26: RDP service levels in South Africa. 
Service Tyne Level! Ba•lc Level2 Intennediate Leve13 Full 
Water Communal staud posts. Yard taps and tanks. In house water. 
Sanitation VIP latriues. Septic tank. Full water born. 
Electricity 5-8 amp used with a 2lJ..amp supply with 60 amp (full service), 
entmeter. tmeter. entmeter. 
Roads Access to plot with a Access to plot with a Paved streets with kerbs. 
graded or grnvel road. narrow paved road. 
Storm Water Earth lined open channels. Oven channel. Underttouod oioes. 
Solid Waste Disposal Transfer to communal Organised transfer to KerJ>.side collection. 
skips. communal skips. 
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The Growth, Employment and Redistribution (Republic of South Africa, 1996) policy emphasises 
partnerships with the for-profit private sector, cost recovery principles and 'fiscal discipline' to meet 
service backlogs. However, COSATU, (the union movement), has argued that municipalities lack the 
regulatory capacity to contract, monitor, and control private provision; COSA TU are concerned about 
universal service coverage, wide scale retrenchment, and anti-union policies. In response to union 
concerns, The Local Government Municipal Systems Bill (Republic of South Africa, 2000), and The 
White Paper on Municipal Services Partnerships (Republic of South Africa, 2002) makes clear that 
public sector is the preferred mode of delivery. 
At the time of the first democratic elections in 1994, 14 million South Africans did not have access to 
clean drinking water, and 21 million people did not have adequate sanitation; 14% of South Africans 
had no form of refuse removal, and over 20 million people did not have access to electricity (ANC, 
1994; 28). President Mbeki's reviewed government progress against its objectives in his State of the 
Nation address in February 2004. He stated that 1.6 million houses have been built for the poor (1.9 
million housing subsidies have been provided), 9 million people have gained access to clean water, 
63% of households now have access to sanitation, and 70% of households are connected to the grid 
(Mbeki, 2004). 
Increased coverage has been facilitated by a combination of cross subsidies via block tariff and targeted 
credits available to assist poorer households such as the Municipal Infrastructure Investment 
Framework, and other capital funds provided by national and provincial government. Nonetheless, 5 
million South Africans are still without access to piped water, and 16 million people do not have access 
to adequate sanitation (Kasrils, 2004). 
The Department of Water AITairs and Forestry has set 2008 as the goal for universal coverage of water 
supply and launched a National Sanitation Programme aimed to eradicate the sanitation backlog in 
peri-urban and informal settlements by 2010; and to eradicate the bucket system (used by 428,000 
households) by 2007 (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 2002). The government is also 
attempting to achieve the targets for service delivery set out in the Millennium Declaration and those of 
the UN World Sununit on Sustainable Development. 
Iu December 2000, the ANC announced, in the run up to the local government elections, its manifesto 
to provide a free basic amount of water, electricity, and other municipal services for all. The free 
lifeline is 6000 litres of water/household/month based on 8 sharing a household, or 25-1/person/day. 
By July 1 '' 2002, 27 million people had received the lifeline tariff. The government suggested that 50 
kW hours should be the poverty tariff for electricity, allowing for household lights, TV, and running a 
two plate stove for a month. Each household in Buffalo City receives 6kl of water, and in Mdantsane 
residents also receive 50 kW of free electricity. 
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However, the tariff has been critiqued for failing to provide enough of the service to make a major 
difference to low-income households with high numbers of occupants. Implementation of free 
sanitation is problematic, and has still has to happen in many parts of the country. Leaky infrastructure 
and disconnections further reduce the amount of services supplied, which means that people are not 
benefiting from the lifeline tariff to the extent anticipated. 
An indigent policy has been in place in East London for several years. If residents earn an income of 
less than RI, 500/month and are the legal owner or tenant of a property, they are also entitled to a 
subsidy, based on the use of the Equitable Share. Buffalo City Municipality provides Rl 00 each month 
to subsidise household rent, sewerage, electricity, and water services. A household's access to the 
subsidy is conditional on payment of 20% of any arrears of service charges. In order to apply, the 
resident has to complete an Indigent Grant Application form, swear an affidavit stating they are 
indigent at a police station or to a commissioner of oaths, and must reapply for the subsidy on a yearly 
basis. The subsidy has not been fully utilised by all households in need. Interviews revealed the 
difficulties encountered by residents in the application process range from the not knowing about the 
benefit, the complicated process of registration, and finding someone who can veruy one's indigent 
status. 
Access to urban services in Mdantsane 
Respondents were asked which municipal urban services they had access to (see Graph 5). Table 27 
below compares the findings of this research to those of a survey carried out for the Buffalo City 
municipality as a whole. These findings indicate that access to services in Mdantsane is lower than in 
other parts of the municipality, as might be expected. 
Table 27: Comparison between research fmdings and those of the Buffalo City Survey on access to services. 
Table 28 below shows which of the services are more accessible in deprived areas ofMdantsane, which 
are more accessible in non-deprived areas, and where there is no difference in access. These findings 
are consistent with those of the observation checklist shown in Table 29 (found in Appendix 1). 
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Table 28: Access to urban services in different areas ofMdantsane. 
Greater access in deprived areas Similar access Greater access in non-deprived 
areas 
Storm water drains Streetlicltts Water supply 
Connnunity halls Roads and paving Sanitation 
Refuse collection 
Many of the differences in access to services are clearly linked to the differing demographic profiles 
and characteristics of residents in deprived and non-deprived areas. The majority of those reporting 
reduced access to urban services were living in shacks, in deprived areas, and had an inadequate 
income. Table 30 below shows how access to urban services is affected by income in Mdantsane. 
Taking the example of refuse collection, the majority of residents have access to this service (61%), 
however, only 46% of those with inadequate income reported access compared to 68% with adequate 
income. 
Table 30: Access to services in Mdantsane by income. 
Access to 
sen>ices 
Total with Access for those with 
access adequate income 
Levels of service 
Access for those 
sometimes adequate 
income 
Access for with 
inadequate income 
32% 
Many of the differences in the level of services provided are also clearly linked to the differing 
demographic profiles. For example, kerbside collection of refuse, household water connections, and 
full water borne sewerage, grid electricity connections, and a piped drainage system are more widely 
available in non-deprived areas, reflecting tenure status, type of housing and level of income. On the 
other hand, pit latrines, standpipes, refuse placed in a commnnal tip or burnt, poor drainage and 
dependence on paraffin for cooking and light are more widely used by households in deprived areas. 
Table 31 below shows which level of service are more frequently found in deprived areas, which are 
found more often in non-deprived areas, and those levels of service for which there was no difference. 
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Table 31: The level of service received in different areas ofMdantsane. 
More commonly found in Levels of senice similar to all More commonly found in non-
deprived areas (Shack and NU12) areas of Mdantsane deprived areas (NU17 and Golden 
Hiehway) 
Pit latrines Access roads near house Full water borne sewera~e 
Public standpipes Household connections 
Non-grid power source Grid electricity 
Dispose of own refuse Kerbside collection 
Open drainage Pioed draina~e 
The four most important urban services to respondents were reported as water supply, sanitation, refuse 
collection and streetlights. Table 32 below shows how services were rated in deprived areas, rated 
more in non-deprived areas, and where there is no difference in the importance of services to 
respondents. 
Table 32: The four most important urban services to respoodents in different area ofMdantsane. 
Respondents from deprived areas Similar rating Respondents from non-deprived 
rated more areas rated more 
Conununity halls Water supply Refuse collection 
Streetlights Sanitation Roads and paving 
Storm water drains 
When asked whether they receive a bill for urban services, in the form of rates or bills for water and 
sanitation, the majority stated they did. However, those least likely to have received a bill were those 
iiving in deprived areas and those living in shacks. When asked if they paid for services, the majority 
said Yes, but again those living in deprived areas and living in shacks were least likely to pay. 
Respondents complained that sometimes bills did not arrive, or were not understandable, or else the 
amount charged did not reflect actual consumption, and also that pay points are often inaccessible. 
Billing is an historical problem in Mdantsane. Residents were shocked when the rates boycotts ended 
by how much water or electricity costs. Service providers recognised that some residents need help in 
making savings on water and electricity usage. For example "a lot of people have got leaking taps, 
which they do not fix so their water bill is high, and the electricity bill is high because they have got 
lots of appliances". Other interviewees reported that residents "have got bigger priorities" for their 
money, for example, they spend it on "repayments to loan sharks, Lotto, cell phones, and then, if there 
is anything leji, they pay their accounts". A local politician said "we are providing affordable services, 
but the reality is that we are doing that against a backdrop of social deficir. 
5.3.5 Accountability arrangements 
In post apartheid South Africa, it was recognised that accountability was needed to avoid the threat of 
civil war, most noticeably accountability was demonstrated through the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. A number of arrangements have been put in place to demonstrate accountability in the 
delivery of urban services. For example, the Constitution states that service delivery must be impartial, 
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fair, transparent and accountable. It is feasible for the poor to enforce their rights to urban services and 
check government action. The case study findings on the theoretical framework for political 
accountability in the literature review are summarised in Table 33 (found in Appendix I). 
Government responsibility for the provision of services 
Local government in South Africa was restructured through the re-demarcation of municipal 
boundaries, when racially divided administrations were brought together within a single tax base, and 
local government fimctions were redefined. Responsibility for the url>an services of concern to this 
research is defined as follows:-
• Local government is responsible for street lighting, refuse removal, and refuse dumps. 
• Local and provincial government perform solid waste disposal, municipal roads, and street 
cleansing. 
• Local, provincial and national government perform storm water management systems in built up 
areas, potable water supply system, domestic wastewater and sewage disposal systems. 
A programme to decentralise fimctions and capital transfers to local government underpins service 
delivery, and is aimed to ensure that accountability for investment decisions lie with the operating 
authority. The key mechanism for improving the accountability of government is to enhance popuJar 
participation in government through direct and representative mechanisms. Section 152 of the 
Constitution (1996) describes "The objects oflocal government are .. . to provide a democratic and 
accountable government for local communities; to ensure the provision of services to communities in a 
sustainable manner, to promote social and economic development ... to encourage the involvement of 
communities and community organisations in the matters of local government". 
South Africa's Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996) requires local authorities to consuJt with 
communities prior to taking any decisions that might all'ect them. The Integrated Development Plan 
(IDP) is a requirement by law under the Municipal Systems Act (Republic of South Africa, 2000). The 
IDP is the 'principal strategic planning instrument which guides and infonns all planning and 
development, in the municipality (Republic of South Mrica, 1998; section 35 (1)). The Systems Act 
stipuJates that communities shouJd participate in the preparation, implementation, and review of the 
IDP. 
IDP integrates all the development aspirations of a community and must include an assessment of 
existing levels of development, the development priorities and objectives, a financial plan and the key 
performance indicators and targets. The IDP must be aligned with the financial and human resources 
of the municipality to stop it becoming a 'wish list'. The IDP also aims to improve the financial 
positions of local government by linking budgets to the needs and wishes of residents. For example, 
the IDP for Buffalo City raised the particuJar concerns of residents in Mdantsane with sewerage and 
waste management, and has led to plans to upgrade waste depots in Mdantsane, upgrade sewerage 
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treatment works, replace sewers, and build sewer bridge pipes. The IDP can be seen as a contract 
between the municipality and the community for service delivery and good governance, a municipality 
may be taken to court if it fails to deliver on its mandate and the IDP is linked to a political term of 
office. 
Considerable emphasis has been placed on building local government planning and infrastructure 
capacity and on developing effective monitoring and evaluation systems. Chapter 6 of the Municipal 
Systems Act, requires that a municipality most establish a 'performance management system' in order 
to monitor whether the priorities of the IDP have been met. The core components of a performance 
management system are key performance indicators, measurable performance targets for development 
priorities, and a reporting process to council and the public. Key Performance Indicators (KP!s) should 
be developed for inputs41, outputs", and outcomes49, and have a target date for reaching the required 
service level, speciJY scale and coverage of service, and quality of service. Communities should be 
involved in setting indicators and targets and review municipal performance. Municipalities must 
provide an annual report, including service delivery priorities and performance targets set by 
municipality to measure and improve performance. 
Enforceable rights to services 
South Mrican urban service delivery has undergone far-reaching transformation since democracy in 
1994. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (Republic of South Africa, 1996) grants all 
citizens an equal and inalienable right to certain urban services and requires the state to fulfil these 
rights. Furthermore a free lifeline supply of 6000 litres of water is supplied to every household each 
month. The government suggested that 50 KW hours should be the poverty tariff for electricity, 
allowing for household lights, TV, and rnnuing a two plate stove for a month. However, interviewees 
in this research expressed a concern that a rights-based approach to service delivery might be 
counterproductive in the sense that "By announcing free basic services, without clarijj;ing what is 
meant by that, implies that even a rural populace can sit back and say OK now deliver" said one 
interviewee. 
However, MacDonald and Pape (2002) question whether such rights are enforceable in practice. They 
have estimated that by 2002 nearly 10 million South Africans have had their water cut-off for non-
payment of service bills, and more than 2 million have been evicted from their homes for the same 
reason. Service cut offs and flow restriction are nsed as a mechanism to enforce payment for water and 
sewerage in Mdantsane. However, residents have developed strategies to maintain an adequate water 
supply, for example, where flow has been restricted residents have bribed the provider to make a bigger 
hole in the restriction washer so that it is of no consequence, or, where people have been disconnected, 
41 Such as expenditure, activity, labour hours, quantity and type of material, equipment. 
48 Such as km of road resarfaced, km patched, km resealed, number of pothole repairs, tons of premix applied, km 
of curb/ gutter/ sidewalk replaced; number of stonn water culverts, or inlets repaired/cleaned. 
49 Such as km in poor, fair, satisfactorily or excellent condition; road rideability; pavement distress indication, 
public perception of road condition, average time to respond to public complaints. 
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they have re-connected supply by attaching a hosepipe to the mains. These illegal connections often 
mean that water leaks and floods the house below. One public works official said "where people are 
complaining of a leak on our mains, we go there and find these houses are connected via a hose pipe". 
Apparently meter tampering is prevalent in Mdantsane, but the difficulty in prosecuting offenders is 
proving who tampered with the meter. Previous attempts to enforce payment for services in 
Mdantsane, through restricting supply, resulted in social upheaval and, in one case, the death of a meter 
reader (Tandy, 1997; 53). 
Accessible government 
A ward committee is a structure designed to enhance participatory democracy in local government by 
promoting public participation in planning and implementing its progranunes. It provides a channel for 
communication between the community and political representatives at ward as well as at the council 
level. As stated in the Municipal Structures Act, "the object of a ward committee is to enhance 
participatory democracy in local government" (Republic of South Africa, 2000). The ward committee 
is also an instrument for monitoring the performance of local authorities, particularly in relation to 
service delivery and for holding ward councillors accountable. Each ward committee has 10 elected 
members and a diversity of interests are equally represented. 
Tltc ward committee interviewed for this research was Ward 42 in Buffalo City, composed of Nu 15, 
17 and 18 in Mdantsane. The ward committee has I 0 members, of whom 4 are women, one member is 
retired, and one is still at school. The remaining members are of working age and the majority are 
teachers, and vary in educational background. Out of the 10 members, 5 represent the geographic areas 
of the ward (NU 15, 17, 18), and 5 represent interests such as sports and culture, business, youth, 
women and churches. The ward committee had only been operating for I 0 months at the time of the 
research. 
The motivation of respondents to become ward committee members varied:-
• "I wanted to broaden participation and so I became involved to see what is going on" 
• "I know the people don't know their rights, so then I became a link between the people and the 
government" 
• "I have been here 10 years and the government is not delivering, people need to know what the 
government is doing". 
In general the ward committee members' motivation was to work for the community. The function of 
the ward committee was recognised by members as to "take the government closer to the people"; "to 
represent government to the people, and people to the government"; "growing nearer to the 
government, and knowing what is happening instead of throwing stones"; "we avoid the mass 
movement of people to the municipality to cry for something"; "we are a watchdog for the 
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community... if the ward councillor says he is going to do this and in a particular area we don't get 
that, we will hold him accountable". 
A public official saw the role of ward committees as making life easier for the municipality and 
councillors. They do this by aggregating and filtering out complaints "its no use accepting complaints 
from individuals. The ward committee should sit with them and bring the complaints to the 
municipality" said one public official. However, au NGO worker thought, "it would be dangerous to 
think of ward committees as pressure groups or watchdogs. They should be encompassed within the 
structures of government. They should be seen as one of the organs to enhance participatory 
democracy, to ensure visible and accessible service delivery, and better governance". 
Community liaison officers are deployed to provide committees with administrative support, attend 
ward committee meetings, and record the minutes. Officials at the municipality recognise the 
importance of providing support and capacity to ward committees so that they can take on 
responsibility for planning and budgeting in service delivery according to the priorities of the ward 
residents. However, fieldwork revealed capacity is still lacking. Buffalo City has developed training 
modules for committees to help them to understand local government, strengthen their capacity to act 
and improve community access to information. However, ward committee members interviewed were 
unclear as to the core business of the municipality, the structure of the municipality, and what line 
department functions in the municipality are. They also revealed a need to understand constitutions, 
acts, white papers and bills, as well as of the roles and responsibilities of other stakeholders in service 
delivery. At the time of research, the ward committee were developing the performance management 
systems for service delivery as required by the new regulations. 
Ward committee members meet frequently with their ward councillor to keep up with events and 
issues, and also actively arrange community meetings in their area. The committee holds meetings for 
each different area of their ward committee (NU 15, NU 17, NU 18, and Potsdarn), and there is also a 
general ward meeting. Meetings are generally well attended, but members have expressed constraints 
in terms of logistics, time and money. If there is an important problem or decision affecting the 
community, the ward committee normally alerts residents via mobile loud hailers, and informs them 
about the time and venue of a meeting. Ward committee members were concerned that, because they 
have few powers, meetings might become nothing more than talking shops. One ward committee 
member remarked "all we can do is go to the people and talk to them", another said "the people are 
crying and we talk and talk:'. 
When asked whether the ward committee represent all components of the community, the responses 
varied: "certain people aren't interested or don't attend meetings, because there are no problems 
facing them right now and so it is difficult to say all are represented'' whilst another member claimed 
"We represent all, irrespective of political attachment, we must cater for everyone and be impartiar'. 
However, at City Hall, it was reported, "most of the people in Mdantsane are just surviving. They don't 
137 
An investigation of improvements to urban services through accountability 
go to these meetings because they are after hours, they are not well attendee!'. It was reported that 
residents are aware of the ward committee but people may be reluctant to use it "many are not 
comfortable ... there is an issue of so and so is at the meeting, and so and so belongs to this. 
Therefore, I don't belong thert!'50• 
The ward councillor and committee members are the main mechanism for securing accountability in 
Mdantsane. Complaints are verbally communicated to the committee members and relayed to the 
service provider for action, or issues are taken up with the departmental head for special attention. The 
councillor has a subsidised phone so he can chase problems up and there are also emergency numbers 
where committees can call for help. One ward councillor found dealing with residents' problems with 
urban services difficult, he stated "they keep coming to see me individually ... It is difficult to cater for 
some individual who comes and says I have got this problem, and then the next day another person 
comes with another difficult thing". Another councillor said "certain residents have a strong voice in 
the running of services and ... we need to improve so we like that input. But we would like it to go with 
the proper channels, rather than coming in on an ad hoc basis". The benefit of the ward committee 
system from the councillor's point of view was that "the community can now participate. They know 
what/he process is all about, and they know what's their rights and role in their municipality. I think 
that makes us accountable in a w<ry because now they check up, and they can tell us in the municipality 
that we are supposed to be doing ABC. They have a right even to come to the mayor and complain 
about things". However, there was an acknowledgement by another councillor that "we are happy that 
all the basic services are provided in Mdantsane but ... from our interaction with the community, I 
would be lying if I said they were happy". 
Ward committees are not a new concept in South Africa. Their credibility draws on apartheid 
experiences, where networks of street committees and residents associations were both an important 
mechanism for political mobilisation and for delivering services, like street cleansing, refuse and night 
soil removal, and regulating crime. The former Ciskei Govermnent also tried to institute ward 
committees in Mdantsane in the 1960's, the Daily Dispatch (17.5.67) reported "Committees to serve as 
a link between residents and local authorities are being established at Mdantsane ... Each ward was 
made up of a black of house between two streets, elects a chairman, who then appoints a committee of 
five. The committee hears complaints from residents and takes them up with the authorities ... this is 
the great step towards the establishment of a representative body in the interest of more than 50, 000 
voiceless people of Mdantsane". 
However the success of these initiatives have been variable. After apartheid, street committees were 
replaced by Negotiating Forums and then Development Forums in the 1990's, these committees were 
composed of business, municipal service providers, civic associations, residents organisations, political 
parties, and trade unions, and were involved in planning local development activities. However, the 
momentum created around the forums has typically not been sustained. Many social activists have 
50 Reflecting the strong ANC party affiliation of the committee members. 
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become disillusioned or frustrated but also angry about the failure of govermnent to deliver on its 
promises (such as the Freedom Charter and Reconstruction and Development Progranuue), and retired 
from politics (or else have been incorporated into government), which has led to a weakening of 
community organisations. "I don't believe in politics now because we have got the government. So I 
don 'I need politics anymore. People want homes, that's what they want now" said a resident. 
Political dimensions of service delivery 
The ward committee interviewed faced a number of constraints, in particular, they lacked resources and 
often funded expenses themselves. It was estimated that it costs between R50-100 a month for the 
ward committee to operate: in terms of hiring a loudhailer, typing minutes, photocopying, phone bills, 
and other expenses, "we pay, it comes out of our own pockets". The workload involved in being on a 
ward committee has consequences for the female members in particular, that do not seem to have been 
taken into account by the municipality. For example "I leave the house without cleaning and without 
cooking for my children". A key issue raised by the committee was the lack of administrative support 
in the form of an office with necessary stationary, eqnipment, and so forth. At present, the committee 
is using the local rent office but this shuts at 4.30pm, meaning that "people come to our houses so our 
house ends up like an office", or they use local schools. The size of the ward also raises Iogistical 
problems, since the ward boundaries covers a large area, which means that some members may have to 
travel to meetings by taxi. 
Lack of resources and capacity makes organising people very difficult, and affects the committee's 
ability to get the needs and priorities of residents recognised in the agenda and practices of service 
providers. Lack of resources means it is less likely that the committee would be able to argue their case 
as efficiently as other better resourced committees elsewhere in Buffalo City. This places the 
committee in a very poor bargaining position, with respect to resource allocation in the Integrated 
Development Plan. Public officials confirmed that ward committee's ability to leverage funds out of 
the government was limited, due to competition with other committees who have a greater capacity to 
submit proposals, and thereby influence the resource allocation process. 
Mdantsane is a previously disadvantaged community and levels of literacy and numeracy are also a 
concern for some ward committee members, and may mean that residents are unable to access 
information (such as newspapers, government notices, policy papers, bills of Parliament and so forth), 
which are essential for eiTective lobbying, and engaging in debates and processes. This also makes 
organisational activities, like giving notice of meetings, taking minutes, using computers, planning and 
monitoring, lobbying activities of writing letters, faxes, and e-mails difficult. Lack of reporting skills 
might mean that technical issues are not reported accurately, or that word of mouth, or meetings are 
used to get information across to residents, rather than more formal record keeping and reporting. 
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The research revealed a degree of antagonism between civic organisations, like SAN CO, and the ward 
committee, which can undermine local governance. The category ofNGO/CBO is not recognised as an 
'Interest group' within a ward by Buffalo City, and so CBOs are not represented on the ward 
committee. This oversight led to protests and demonstrations against the ward committee election 
process in Buffalo City, including a sit in by SAN CO members. The visibility of this conflict dcponds, 
in part, on the ability of the ward councillor to deliver on issues. 
Accountability assessment 
Information: Participatory democracy emphasises the need for citizens to learn more about the 
provision and process of local government. When asked how service users find out about the services 
they use, the majority of respondents rely on leaflets, newspapers, and the radio (see Graph 6). 
Whereas women typically find out about services through newspapers, men tend to use service 
provider leaflets. Respondents from deprived areas tend to find out about services through own 
experience of using them, on the radio, or by talking to neighbours. In terms of using information to 
secure better services, it was found that only 33% of respondents said they had done so. This research 
suggests that respondents from non-deprived areas were more actively seeking information on urban 
services. Ward committees have a key role in information dissemination and reinforcing messages 
given by the service providers and central and local government. Information can be used to keep 
councillors on their toes, as it reveals whether they have kept their election promises. The IDP sets out 
community-developed priorities and is a contract between the municipality and community for service 
delivery, linked to a political term of office. 
Power: A legally enshrined role for civil society not only aims at a synergy between the efforts of local 
government and community groups, but has also set up a watchdog mechanism whereby the state can 
be held to account by people. The ward committee is intended to address the needs of the previously 
disadvantaged groups, and thus redress power imbalances in society and rework social relations. There 
is also an attempt to change resident's attitudes from dependency to self-reliance and partnership. 
However, there have been cases where local residents have felt threatened or suspicious of the ward 
committee. 
Action: The ward committee structure extends participatory democracy in local government. 
Committees are being trained to take on responsibility for planning and budgeting according to 
priorities set by the community through a participatory process. This has become a powerful basis for 
establishing new priorities in service delivery by local government. Service delivery, underpinned by a 
strong commitment to equality, means action has been taken to improve services in terms of rectifYing 
individual complaints and securing roads and street lighting projects in the ward, but is compromised 
by lack of resources. 
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5.3.6 Impact on user satisfaction 
In 1997, a month after formal inclusion in East London municipality, more than a hnndted Mdantsane 
residents marched to the public works department to hand over a petition calling for improvements in 
the provision of services. Some of the demands listed were for "underground electricity, street lights. 
pipes that bring water to their houses must be checked twice a month, all houses that have no bins must 
have steel refuse bins, all houses that have no fences must be fonced, all toilets and doors need to be 
repaired, every month toilets must be checked. and the construction of tar roads in all areas is an 
urgent matter" (Daily Dispatch, 6.8.97). Respondents to this research thought that service delivery in 
Mdantsane had generally improved since then (see Graph 7). However, the majority of respondents, 
(57%), thought that there had only been a small improvement in service delivery since the operation of 
ward committees, respondents from non-deprived areas, and those living in owned houses were more 
likely to have noticed an improvement. 27% of those living in deprived areas thought that service 
provision had in fact got worse. 
Satisfaction in Mdantsane is highest for the overall provision and the qnality of water supply, refuse 
collection and sanitation. Respondents expressed considerable dissatisfaction with the overall 
performance of drains, roads and streetlights. In terms of informing their customers, the service 
providers all score relatively lowly, particularly with respect to drains and streetlights. However, 
respondents were most satisfied with information about water supply and refuse collection. These 
findings are summarised below in Table 34. 72% of residents were dissatisfied with local government, 
with the majority being very dissatisfied (33%). Although, 88% of respondents over 56 are satisfied 
with local government, presumably, because they have seen how government has improved over their 
lifetime. 
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Table 34: General satisfaction with services in Mdantsane. 
Very Dissatisfied Fairly Fairly Satisfied Very Don't 
dissatisfied dissatisfied satisfied satisfied know 
PROVISION 
-3 -2 .] I 2 3 
Streetliehts 45% 9"/o 13% 15% 8% 9% 
Roads and 44% 14% 16% 19% 7% 4% 
navin• 
CommunTtV halls 37% 15% 14% 21% 8% 6% 
Storm drains 33% 20% 22% 15% 7% 3% 
Refhse colJection 31% 6% 18% 13% 13% 18% 
Sanitation 26% 5% 35% 19% 11% 4o/o 
Water suonlV 21% 6o/o 4% 34% 15% 20% 
QUALITY 
Streetliohts 46% 8% 12% 11% 13% 8% 
Roads and 41% 13% 15% 18% 8% 4% 1% 
oavino 
CommunTtV halls 40"/o 17% 18% 13% 8% 4% 
Storm drains 36% 18% 25% 12% 8% 3% 
Refuse collection 30% 6% 23% 7% 16% 19"/o 
Sanitation 27% 6% 31% 24% 10% 2% 0.8% 
Water siiPPlV 23% 6% 3% 34% 17% 18% 
INFORMATION 
Streetliohts 53% 18% 10"/o 10% 6% 3% 
Roads and 52% 21% 7% 12% 8% 2% navino 
CommunliV halls 52% 22% 5% 10% 6% 6% 
Stonu drains 49% 22% 9"/o 10"/o 5% 5% 
Refuse collection 48% 18% 11% 8% 9"/o 7% 
Sanitation 44% 20"/o 14% 12% 8% 2% 0.8% 
Water su;;;;iv 40% 17% 11% 8% 15% 9% 
Respondents in both deprived and non-{!eprived areas agree on the extent to which urban services fall 
short of their expectations. When asked how they would describe services respondents in both 
deprived and non-deprived areas picked out negative adjectives such as 'inefficient', 'undependable ', · 
'disinterested' and 'unresponsive'. However, the majority of those respondents aged 56 and over 
described services as 'effective'. Women were more likely to describe services as 'unresponsive' 
(26%), where as most men described services as 'undependable' (35%). Those living in deprived areas 
were most likely to describe services as 'disinterested' (38%), and those in non-{!eprived areas 
described services as 'inefficient' (48%). 
Residents ofMdantsane were also unhappy with their relationship with service providers. The majority 
of respondents agreed with the statements: 'Its dijjlcult to get improvements in services', 'Service 
providers don'ttake complaints seriously' and 'Service providers don't care about people like me'. 
There was general agreement on these top three statements and there were no differences in agreement 
according to age, gender, income, housing or area lived in. Other comments made by respondents on 
urban service delivery in Mdantsane are summarised in Table 35 (found in Appendix 1). 
Respondents were asked whether they had complained directly to service providers about problems 
they had experienced with mban services (see Graph 8). Most respondents had complained about roads 
(44%), streetlights (39%), sanitation (33%), and water supply (33%). The majority of these complaints 
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were from respondents living in deprived areas. The majority of respondents that had complained 
(37%) were very dissatisfied with the way the complaint was handled, particularly those living in 
deprived areas, as well as those with inadequate incomes. Only 11% of respondents thought that 
complaints mechanism resulted in satisfactory outcomes. Nevertheless, most respondents described 
complaints mechanisms as resulting in fair outcomes. Respondents were asked for whose benefit they 
had complained, and the majority stated that it was in self interest (48%). Interestingly, those with an 
inadequate income, and those living in deprived areas were more likely to state they have complained 
in the community interest. 
The four most common ways service users have for resolving problems with urban services are 
summarised below in Table 36. These are to hold a public meeting (53%), call service providers help 
lines (SI%), visit service provides offices (51%), and vote for a politicians promising better services 
(26%). Respondents from deprived areas were more likely to contact a politician, hold a public 
meeting, vote for politicians in order to solve problems with mban services, whereas, those respondents 
from non deprived areas were more likely to call service provider help lines, visit service provider 
offices, use a service provider suggestion box, join a user group, or look on service providers websites. 
Table36: Most common ways of resolving problems with urban services. 
Arrangement used more in by Similar arrangement! Arrangement used more in by 
respondents deprived areas respondents non·deprived areas 
Contact a politician. Contact ombudsmen or inspector. Use the law. 
Hold a public meeting. Write a letter to newspapers. Call service providers help lines. 
Vote for a politicians promising Protest/ demonstrate. Visit service providers' offices. 
better services. Use service provider's suggestion 
boxes. 
Fonn or join a user group. 
Visit service providers Internet 
sites. 
Talk to staff. 
Residents have the option of calling or visiting the public works office with complaints about services, 
where these complaints are logged and then relayed to field engineers. Yet respondents expressed 
considerable frustration with this complaint handling mechanism in Mdantsane. One respondent said 
"Sometimes when you report problems,for erample a problem with sewerage, you phone but they don 't 
come. You have to go down to their offices and report it. They still take their time". Another said "we 
are tired of complaining about these things because there is no response". Only 48% of respondents 
thought that service providers are easily accessible, particularly male respondents, those living in non-
deprived areas, and those respondents aged over 56. There are also 15 'rent offices' in Mdantsane 
where residents can also go and report problems in their NU. However, one resident said that "Our 
rent office is a disaster and we have to travel to town to sort out problems and pay for services". In 
recognition of this Buffalo City Municipality plans to open a customer care centre in Mdantsane to 
provide residents with a single point of contact for logging problems and complaints, either by 
telephone or in person. This reflects the perception that "no institution or organisation, whether it is a 
municipality, public sector organisation or private sector, will deal with its clients in a haphazard way. 
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All we are trying to do is to get a sense of what our clients want, and trying to respond to their 
requirements and needs" said a public official. 
Only 19% of respondents said they trust service providers, those that did tended to be men, and those 
living in non-deprived areas. The reason most gave for trust was because service providers are officials 
(8%), or else, because service providers have promised to improve (6%). However, one respondent 
said "how can I trust [service providers] when they always lie to me"; another stated "we do not trust 
the service providers because the roads have been like that for a long time and we are always 
complaining. We have no confidence in their ability because they haven 'I improved. We haven't seen 
any information. They do not respond to our complaints, they have not asked our opinion. We cannot 
make service providers accountable on our own~. 
The majority of respondents (22%), thought that service providers were most accountable for the 
quality of service they provide (see Graph 9), particularly men and those living in non-deprived areas, 
as shown below in Table 3 7. 
Table 37: Service users perception of provider's accountability. 
What are service providen most accountable for? No/o/o 
Providing information. 15% 
Consulting users on their needs/ priorities. 11% 
Encouraging participation in decision-makina. 13% 
Responding_ to users co111j>laints. 13% 
Having a user-friendly service. 8% 
Havinga transparent service. 4% 
Meeting service targets and standards. 22% 
41% of respondents thought they had a voice in service delivery, of those that did, the majority were 
men and those living in non-deprived areas (see Graph 10). Of those aged 25-30, only 26% thought 
they had a voice in service delivery, compared to 56% of those aged over 56. Perhaps tellingly, one 
ward committee member said, "we do say things but we don 'I have a voice." 
One interviewee said that residents in Mdantsane "don't even know what a perfect service, is. This is 
because they have had those houses from the days of homelands, and immediately after that the boycott 
of payment. So there were no adequate services, and now its post I994, so people are expecting. 
Residents are never sure as to exactly what it is they are supposed to be getting, in tenns of an 
adequate service ... what kind of pressure in the tap, the kind of voltage I should be getting, whether 
the streets are adequately maintained... Others say 'Well we have not had a decent service, so what?' 
They don 'I link their quality of life to :A Better Life for All' or the rates they are supposed to be 
paying". Satisfaction with services in Mdantsane is complex, one respondent acknowledged that 
"happiness is a relative term because I am no/likely to be happy as a resident if I am unemployed, my 
likely response is to say, I don 'I see anything that is done for me because I am employed"51 • 
51 Mdantsane has 42% unemployment. 
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The enumerators who undertook the observation checklist commented, "all these areas ofMdantsane 
are experiencing almost the same problems with municipal services, the only difference is that some 
people live in bigger houses than others'', In the low-income areas the enumerators remarked, "these 
people are simply abandoned, there are no services rendered here, none whatsoever, and it's a shame 
seeing that in this free country there are still people without a voicer' 
5.3.7 Impact on tbe performance of services 
One interviewee summed up the problem with mban services in Mdantsane as "a lot of the 
infrastructure is actually past its lifetime or really close to it. So it means you get more frequent 
repairs and longer outages, because you don't have the money to replace whatever has reached the 
end of its life". In an interview for the Daily Dispatch (6.5.2002), the city manager, Mr Tsika, 
acknowledged the degree of unhappiness with service delivery and customer care in Buffalo City as a 
whole. "Harsh criticism has landed on my desk from critics bent on believing that the history of our 
city started in 1994, and that levelling the playing fields is an easy one-off/ask". He reveals the 'root 
causes' of poor service delivery as low cost recovery, unrecoverable debt, poor revenue collection, low 
operating inefficiency, crumbling inherited infrastructure, inadequate maintenance, and enormous 
backlogs. 
With the inclusion of Mdantsane in East London in 1997, the imperative was to expand service into 
previously disadvantaged areas and address service backlogs. This necessitated a reorganisation of the 
local administration, the transfer of assets, staff, liabilities and powers, together with the creation of 
common standards of service across Buffalo City. The municipality took over about 40% of the 
workforce. It was noted that previously most of the budget for service delivery was "going to paying a 
huge workforce, who actually didn 'I achieve very much ... who didn't have picks and shovels or 
anything to do" according to a public official. The reorganisation of service delivery bas motivated the 
workforce in Mdantsane, they are "eager now because they were ready for change". For instance, now 
the workforce has power tools to cut and chamfer pipes, whereas, before, they had hacksaw blades and 
now have pumps to deal with burst mains, whereas, before, they used to scoop up the water from a 
burst main with a bucket. 
Since the end of apartheid there have been three major projects to improve service delivery in 
Mdantsane:-
• In 1997, African were contracted by East London Transitional Local Council to develop a 
maintenance management system for the infrastructure in Mdantsane. African developed technical 
performance indicators, e.g. ratio of sewage flow to bulk water supplied, number of 
water/wastewater/clectrical and road repairs, response times, repair costs, and water losses. 
Network defects were recorded on GIS so that repairs to be carried out were spatially shown on the 
network. 
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• East London Transitional Local Council also contracted Abase Monti to rehabilitate the electricity 
system, replace all cabling and street ligbting, and to recover the R33 million arrears of township 
residents. In I 997 the electrical bulk and reticulation networks in Mdantsane were on the point of 
virtnal collapse, and frequently tripped during peak demand periods. At this time, one respondent 
said "the electricity in Mdantsane would be out every second day". Abase Monti created a tamper 
proof system by converting existing domestic consumers to prepayment meters to ensure payment 
for future services. 
• More recently, President Mbeki identified Mdantsane as one of the Nodes for Urban Renewal in 
his State of the Nation address on the 9th February 200 l. The Urban Renewal Project was 
launched on the 20th May 2002, and is worth RI billion. It will address the need to build 20,000 
houses and create acceptable service delivery and deliver better living standards in Mdantsane. 
Projects underway at the time of the research included: tarred road rehabilitation, sidewalk 
rehabilitation, street lighting, replacement of pitch fibre sewers, pipe bridges, storage and break 
pressure tanks, secondary road upgrading, and replacement of water mains. The project is 
overseen by standing committees (composed offour main councillors and chaired by the mayor), 
public works line departments, a technical committee (of all thirteen ward councillors, ward 
committee members, and municipal officers) and city managers. 
The ward committee has further improved the technieal performance of urban services in a number of 
ways:-
' I. It has been involved in promoting public participation in identiJYing failing services, and in 
the construction of a loeal service delivery agenda. 
2. It provides a structured channel for raising issues concerning Uiban services at the community 
and council level. 
3. The ward committee is also an instrument for monitoring the performance ofloeal authorities, 
particularly in relation to service delivery, and for holding ward councillors accountable. 
4. The ward committee reports problems directly to the public works office, and seeks resolution 
of complaints on behalf of residents 
5. The ward committee has also been lobbying on behalf of residents for projects and secured a 
road and streetligbts in the area. 
Ward committee members thought that their successes in service delivery were "acting according to 
residents priorities", "trying to improve service delivery", "establishing better relations", "making 
recommendations", "consultation over street/ights", "knowing what is happening, not throwing 
stones". There was a general recognition that "things are moving on now, projects are taking off" and 
"people are complaining but we are getting nearer to the targef'. 
Roads and streetligbts; The development of Mdantsane as a township means that among the most 
important issues affecting the qnality of life for residents are the roads and pedestrian access routes. 
Most residents use minibus taxis from Mdantsane centre (Highway) to get to East London city centre, 
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which is costly for residents in time and money. Furthermore, reaching the minibus rank often requires 
either a taxi ride or walk, presenting a need to protect the safety ofthese commuters on their way to and 
from the Golden Highway. Africon played a role in upgrading Mdantsane taxi and bus rank facilities 
and upgrading of the Golden Highway, the primary distributor road in the area. The ward committee 
has made further requests to the municipality for pothole repairs, patching, storm water drainage, 
pedestrian facilities, and gravelling and resurfacing of roads. One resident said that the municipality 
had "just put the tar on the road once and after a few months, or a year, the tar has gone, and it was 
not repaired'. The poor condition of the roads in the ward is the main reason people give for not 
paying their council tax and water bills. The ward committee has been particularly successful in 
securing a project to upgrade the roads in the ward, and the rehabilitation of sidcwalks, as well as street 
lighting. One member said ''we met the mayor and persuaded him to repair the road, even though it is 
not in the budgef'. The ward committee is responsible for co-ordination and managing of the project, 
the ward councillor is responsible for monitoring the project. 
Sanitation; The sewerage system in Mdantsane consists of2 sewage treatment plants, 4 pump stations, 
550km of pipelines, 10,000 manholes, 100 industrial and 40,000 domestic connections. The workforce 
includes an engineer, technicians, artisans, labourers and a clerk. There are only 6 public works 
plumbers for Mdantsane's 300,000 residents. Approximately 80"/o of the residents in Mdantsane are 
served by water borne sewerage systems, with midblock (manholes) running back-to-back of the 
houses. The majority of .sewers are made of pitch fibre installed in the 1960's and 1970's. These have 
reached the end of their functional life, and there has long been concern with the overloading of some 
sewers. There is evidence that the gradients of certain sewers do not ensure self~leaning velocities in 
the pipelines, and, together with the misnse and vandalism of the sewer network, has resulted in 
pollution, blockages and manhole spillages. Some the residents in RDP housing and the informal 
settlements within Mdantsane have pit latrines. 
A programme is underway to address the design weaknesses, overloaded capacity, faulty equipment 
and machinery of Mdantsane sewerage treatments works. Service providers were clear that the 
rehabilitation and repair of the sewer netwmk has greatly improved service delivery and has resulted in 
a 'tremendous' increase in the flow reaching the works, a front line service provider said 'you have just 
got to look a/the flow into the sewage treatment works. For instance, how much spillage there used to 
be in the sewerage system and what is reaching the sewerage works today". However, improvements 
to the distribution network have resulted in overloading of the treatment works, and the need for 
additional capacity at these installations, as well as in the collector mains and puntp stations. 
Mdantsane sewage treatment works discharge into the Bnffalo River, and overloading has had an effect 
on the quality of drinking water. Eutrophication and algal blooms have caused unpleasant tastes and 
odours in the treated water, and necessitated the use of activated carbon filters to combat odour and 
purification problems. 
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The ward committee has been involved in improving sanitation through the Urban Node Project and at 
the household level. For example, service providers said that not all residents look after their toilet 
'properly', residents "throw things that you are not supposed to throw in ... A simple thing like toilet 
paper. OK you have a problem with poverty so they can't afford to buy toilet paper. They use 
newspaper or stones, and other things that you are not supposed to, and it blocks our servitude>". He 
took the view that in" township areas people need to be educated ... [about} what you are supposed to 
do in a toilet" and ward committees have a role in communicating these messages to residents. 
Fnrthermore, ward committees have encouraged residents to keep their children and cattle out of the 
treatment works, to report bursts, and not to vandalise infrastructure, or steal generators and batteries 
from pump stations. 
Water: Buffalo City owns and operates a dam, water purification works, and reticulated water supply 
system in Mdantsane. Amatola Water, a state owned water utility, supplies bulk water. One 
interviewee said "Buffalo City has some of the best water in the country because we have very modern 
water works. But you look at Mdanlsane, there are probably 70, 000 leaks in Mdan/sane alone 
because the underlying infrastructure is rotten. Its the same with the blocked sewers. Normally you 
would unblock it with rodding, but in Mdan/sane it would go straight through the pipe because it is 
rotten". 
The ward committees involvement in improvements to the water supply include network inspections, 
reporting non-functioning meters, reporting water thefts, as well as convincing residents of the need to 
pay for the water they consume. One resident said "&rvices are better now, we don 'I stay without 
water now it is there all the time". However, there are some major problems with the existing 
pumping, storage and supply of potable water in Mdantsane. For instance, water is being pumped 
around a network designed for gravity fed supply. 
Deprived areas of Mdantsane have pre-payment standpipes. This system was introduced to reduce 
administrative costs as well as the number of defaulters and amount of water wasted at the standpipes. 
However, these are "becoming a major hassle because ... people have been putting things inside, like 
screwdrivers, and bits of wood, to try and get .free water' said a public works employee. This problem 
is compounded by the fact that there is only one contractor for East London that repairs these 
standpipes, so while one is being fixed the residents have to find another standpipe "they are 
complaining because they have to walk further'' said a public works employee. Those in low income 
areas also collect their water from nearby houses, "I would say ](JO~ of the time they can get water .from 
their neighbourhood they cart buckets across and take water .from there" said one service provider. 
A telemetry system has been installed in Mdantsane to get a clearer picture of flows of water and 
sewerage in the SPrawling suburb, and to detect leaks or overflows52• Service providers reported 
" Yet the reliability of the system is undermined by the theft of the electrical cables that operate the flow meters, 
as well as the theft of the car battery used to operate the radio of telemetry when there is a power failure. 
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problems regarding residents not reporting burst mains, since service providers only 'have a sketchy 
idea' of where the underground infrastructure lies. If residents do not phone in and report bursts, they 
are picked up on the computer monitors, front line service providers then "have to check all the main 
lines, which can take 3-4 hours especially at night with a torch and you have to go around bushes, and 
behind housefi'. Respondents blame these burst pipes for high water tariffs and poor water quality. 
However "of/en when they complain about the water quality, its contamination in their plumbing 
rather than coming from us" said a service provider. 
Service providers were keen to highlight resident's responsibilities in service delivery. These included 
checking cisterns of toilets to ensure that water is not continually mnning into the bowl (i.e. that seal is 
effective), making sure no taps are dripping, checking water storage tanks are not overflowing by 
checking the overflow pipe on the roof, repairing leaks; report leaks on roadways or pavements to 
Water Services, and not tampering with the water meter. One interviewee said residents must learn that 
"You are the owners of the house, you maintain it ... Before it was a council problem if the toilets 
overflowed, now not its not a council problem ... People must realise the necessity of looking after their 
services". An incentive to do so is that resident are charged at higher rates as consumption increases. 
The interviewees said that they do use the ward committees to 'tell residents this is what we expect 
from you', to get messages across to the community about care for the operation and maintenance of 
urban services, yet commented that 'only 90"/o of ward councillors or committees convey this message 
to the communities~. 
However, where some people cannot afford to buy toilet paper, there is the concern that provision has 
not been made for those residents who conld not afford to repair dripping taps or bust pipes. In 
recognition of this problem, while public works staff are not supposed to maintain on-plot 
infrastructure, there is some leeway: one front line service providers said "we don't wan/to see a guy 
spend a day trying to sort out private problems. If you are there, in the area, and you can sort it out in 
5 or I 0 minutes, then that's fine". 
5.3.8 Impact on sustainability 
Sustainability of urban services in Mdantsane is complex. The backlogs of services have proved too 
large to be overcome in a decade, particularly in the most needy areas, despite considerable capital 
investments in municipal infrastructure. In Mdantsane, levels of water and sanitation have received 
considerable attention, which has meant that services, such as storm water drainage, and refuse 
removal, have not been sufficiently extended. 
The main constraint on sustained service delivery and accountability is "resources. We could do with 
more resources, resources is basically money' said a public works employee. Local government have 
a number of functions, but without the finances to perform them. The sustainability of services is 
severely constrained. The financial problems at the local government level are underpinned by a lack 
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of skills and capacity of municipal staff to budget for O&M. For instance, new councillors are 
changing traditional spending priorities but lacked knowledge of how to do this in practice, via the 
budget. Many local govermnent functionaries who have been in office since the apartheid era remain 
uncomfortable about consulting with people and especially to opening up local government to 
community participation. 
In addition, the levels at which services were provided were also problematic. In some instances, 
levels were so low as not to satisfY demand, for example, communal standpipes in areas with a demand 
for household connections. At the same time,. where higher levels of service were provided, these are 
proving unsnstainable because people's ability to pay is questionable. Furthermore, dissatisfaction, in 
some instances, has been caused by changes to the level of service provision, for example where 
residents used to have a dustbin, but now have plastic bags. 
SANCO (South Mrican National Civics Organisation) initiated a service payment boycott in 
Mdantsane in 1989 when the community voiced its dissatisfaction with the poor quality of services 
provided by the Ciskei homeland authority. One resident said "we used to boycott everything. We did 
nothing, did not pay for anything, did not pay for the houses. If you paid, you were burned. If someone 
saw you go and pay, you were gone. It was very tough ... It was a good weapon against the 
government, but it was terrible. When we were not paying the rent the government could not move, but 
we dropped him down" said a resident about the boycott. The Mdantsane SANCO secretaiy lifted the 
service boycott on 29.10.97 and incentives were provided for zones to resume payment. For example, 
if the zone achieved 25% payment, they received a fully equipped playground, if payment levels within 
a street reached 50%, trees would be planted in that street, and where payment reached I 00%, street 
lights were supplied. If no payments were made in an area, no capital funds were spent on that street 
(Daily Dispatch 29.10.97). In many cases, when people did start to pay for services again after the 
boycott, they were shocked by the cost of electricity and water, and incorporating these bills into the 
household budget has not been easy. 
A service provider stated "we are accountable ... we are responsible, in terms of the constitution for 
providing services. But it doesn't mean that the people can get it for nothing. They have to pay for 
them", said a service provider. National government launched the Masakhane (Let's Work Together) 
campaign in 1995, to encourage payment for services. In 2001, service payment defaulters in Buffalo 
City owed almost R300 million. The Masakhane campaign did not achieve a culture of payment for 
services in Mdantsane and the campaign itself cost the East London City Council R560 000, with more 
than 10 I workshops held in Mdantsane, (although many respondents reported they had not heard ofit). 
"The weakness with the Masakhane process was that it was only directed to the so called black areas. 
But the question of not paying for services is one for the whole of the city" said a councillor. 
Non-payment for services remains an issue in Mdantsane. Levels of payment for services have not 
increased significantly since the end of the rates boycott because of the inability of people to pay due to 
poverty, but also due to unwillingness to pay. Levels of services may be pitched too high, leaving 
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many consumers unable to pay for them. Some respondents refused to pay for malfunctioning 
services, or until they received the level of service they expect. One ward committee member said "! 
am not going to pay my water and electricity because my road isn't tarred'. A service provider 
acknowledged "residents don't see these trading services as separate. They see them as one 
municipality. For that reason there is a tremendous amount of resistance to payment" but noted "once 
they get electricity, they say now we want tarred roads. They just keep moving the goal posts". Front 
line service providers thought that ward councillors were not actively encouraging constituents to pay, 
and that many councillors were complacent with regard to service delivery. The issue of expectations 
is key in Mdantsane. One service provider said that people expect a higher level of service than the 
RDP standards: they are not satisfied with gravel roads, pit latrines, and standpipes. However, it was 
suggested "it will take centuries [to achieve the RDP standards] but that is the standard that the 
government is trying to achieve". Low levels of service are not acceptable to many communities and 
the social consequences of not providing acceptable services are potentially dire. 
Another issue that undermines the sustainabili(y of services in Mdantsane is vandalism. One 
interviewee stated, "you can loose lOOm of cable overnight". Another public official said, "all the 
handrails on the bridges are missing. All the manholes have got concrete slabs on because the cast iron 
covers have been pinched'. It is also common to find "people turning their meters backwards so that 
you get the wrong readings'. This was said to be because residents "don't have ownership of the city. 
They don't see it as their water system, or their storm water drainage. Because in the previous days, 
they paid their rent and got their house from the government, it wasn't theirs and they still have the 
perception its not theirs. So they don't mind if they see someone pinching it, it's not my property, it is 
the municipalities, or the government's property". 
The reason for non-payment of services is also due to the poor billing and revenue management 
procedures of the local authorities. Sometimes consumers did not receive bills on time, or regularly 
enough, and so were less likely to pay for services. Sustainabili(y can be improved by establishing 
customer service systems, ensure accurate and timely billing, efficient user-friendly payment and 
collection systems, effective credit control policies. Furthermore, where pay points are not numerous 
or accessible, this rednces the likelihood that people will pay for the services. Accuracy of bills and 
regular meter reading is not generally up to users expectations. Customers have the perception that the 
service they are getting is unprofessional, and a cycle is created of poor service and low levels of 
payment. 
Problems ward committee members identified with the IDP, include, lack of clarity as to the nature and 
purpose of the ward committee's role, inexperience, limited resources to implement IDPs, poor 
participatory process, technocratic and complex planning methodology, weak financial plans, tight time 
frame for planning, lack of planning skills, and poor co-ordination between wards in Buffalo City53• It 
53 There is a policy for redistribution of resources and capacity between rich and poor areas. However according to 
one official. ratepayers in the wealthier areas are showing signs of'wanting to hoard their resources• and 'guard 
151 
An investigation of improvements to urban services through accountability 
was generally acknowledged that the IDP process had a long way to go before tangible and locally 
specific Key Perfonnance Indicators could be put in place, and before the ward committee had gained 
the capacity to be able to monitor them in service delivery. Ward committee members are intended to 
encourage politicians, bnreaucrats and communities, to reach a consensus in planning infrastructure. 
However, the response from an official confirmed that systems and structures were not in place to 
support proper communication between committees, councillors and political representatives who 
develop urban service policy, and the public works department and municipality on the implementation 
side. 
The committee has been criticized for not consulting, or even conflicting with, existing civic structures 
(such as SAN CO). "So far the civic organisation are silent in the ward committee, but sometimes the 
civics misunderstand, and they think we take away their worK' said a ward committee member. A lack 
of consultation with civic structures causes confusion and tension between local government structures 
and the community, leaving respondents unsure of whom to consult with. The observation was made 
that the ward committee was politicised (members revealed party alliances in meetings) and not 
entirely inclusive in practice, (for example, men tend to dominate discussions). An official said that 
"people may use the ward system for their own political gain. So, instead of using this structure to 
discuss development issues, you will find it compromised by people wanting to push their political 
agendas". 
Committee members have been made scapegoats by residents for a nationwide frustration wilh the 
delivery of services, which at times is violent: people "don 'I understand clearly and don 't attend the 
meetings, and shout from taxis that we are protecting the municipality- it is strenuous because the 
municipality doesn 'I work fast enough", "when we don 'I get a good response from the municipality it is 
not easy to go back to the community", "it costs your life, maybe quite literally, sometimes we can be 
killed, others don't like the municipality of which you are a member', "Your life might be threatened by 
those opposing what you are doing". Others were roncemed about security because "the meetings at 
night", 'you are not safe, there are no guards", "they think we are informers", 'you run the risk of 
growing unpopular, especially when delivery doesn 'I come from the side of the municipalilj'. 
However, other interviewees suggested that the ward committee was nsed as a mechanism for 
informing residents and to curb frustration; "/think that the more people know the better they will 
understand. It is not easy to deliver these service overnight, people must be patient in many ways". 
Historically, community participation in Mdantsane has occurred ootside the formal political system, 
making it a challenge for residents to present demands lhrough formal channels of government. 
Enthusiasm for area-based forums has not been sustained and most have ceased to operate. The 
sustainability of ward committees is in doubt, as lhey are based on voluntarism but reqnire huge 
commitments in terms of time and resources to ensure community participation in development 
their tax base', and becoming more voeal and disruptive about the use of locally raised revenue in areas like 
Mdantsane. 
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planning in IDP formulation, organising meetings, monitoring service outcomes, advising ward 
councillors, finding out residents needs, as well as understanding legislature, acts, bills, white paper, 
constitution, and so forth. Committee members reported that they fund expenses out of their own 
pockets. Interviews with the members of the ward committee revealed a tension between those who 
Wili1l to become a formalised structure with an office and resources and possibly payment for meetings, 
and others who want the committee to be a grassroots organisation closer to residents, rather than 
another tier of bureaucracy. 
5.3.9 Hypothesis testing 
It was hypothesised that 'accountability arrangements will improve the outputs of urban services and 
will improve the relative chances of sustainability'. The findings of this case study have proved the 
hypothesis. The technical performance of urban services has been improved by political accountability 
in service delivery. Ward committees had improved service delivery for some residents, particularly 
the disadvantaged, by ensuring public participation in service delivery issues, monitoring performance, 
reporting problems, rectiJYing complaints, lobbying for new works, and in acting as a link between 
political representatives and communities. Respondents were satisfied with overall provision and 
quality of water, refuse collection, sanitation, and with information about water, refuse collection, and 
roads. They are most dissatisfied, overall, with drains, roads and streetlights. However, most 
respondents described service providers as 'inefficient', 'undependable', 'disinterested' and 
'unresponsive'. Ward committee members have a voice in service delivery within the city, and 
working with government means they are likely to have a significant long-term influence on the wider 
policy environment. However, the community has high expectations of services delivery since the end 
of apartheid and are frustrated by the slow pace of change. The sustainability of services in Mdantsane 
is affected by a culture of non payment, low income levels, high unemployment, the layout of 
Mdantsane, theft and tampering, law and order issues, prevalence of illegal connections, shortage of 
staff in line departments, and lack of resources. 
5.3.10 Conclusion 
The literature review (presented in Chapter 2) found that ineffective governance produces low quality 
service provision and inefficient use of resources. However, elected representatives and the electoral 
process are deemed 'too blunt' to ensure good and responsive service delivery. This has led to calls for 
local decentralisation, better urban management, and institutionalised participation in service delivery, 
together with a greater degree of control over resources. The key findings from this case study are 
summarised below in Table 38. 
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Table 38: Swnmary of the Mdantsane case study. 
Mdantsane 
What Citizens have rights to setVices set out in the constitution; these have horizontal application 
entitlements do (can be enforced between individuals). The government also provides a 'lifeline tariff', 
citizens have to offering a basic ammmt of free electricity, sanitation, and water to all citizens. However, the 
urban services? research found that non-deprived areas were still more likely to have access to water, 
sanitation, refuse and street lighting. 
How is Central government created the ward committee structure to enhance participatory democracy 
accountability in local government. httegrated Development Plan also sets out commtmity developed 
demonstrated? priorities, key performance indicators and targets, informs budgets and is a contract between 
mtmicipality and commtmity for service delivery. It is linked to a political term of office. 
Service providers were said to be most accountable for the quality of the service and for 
providing infonnation about the services. People in deprived areas are more likely to contact a 
politician, hold a public meeting, vote for politicians, whereas in non-<leprived areas arc more 
likely to call help lines, visit offices, use suggestion boxes, join a user group, or look on the 
httemet. The majority thought they did not have a voice in service delivery. 
What is the Respondents were satisfied with overall provision and quality of water, refuse collection, 
impact on user sanitation and with information about water, refuse collection and roads. They are most 
satisfaction? dissatisfied, overall, with drains, roads and streetlights. Most respondents described services 
as inefficient, nndependable, disinterested and unresponsive. Most complaints made in 
Mdantsane were about roads, streetlights and sanitation. 
What is the Technical performance of urban services has been improved by ward committee related 
impact on participation in service delivery. Perhaps because the majority of residents thought service 
performance? providers were not easily accessible (particularly in deprived areas, and those with inadequate 
income). 
How sustainable Ward members are given a voice within the city, and working with the govermnent means they 
are urban are likely to have a significant long-term influence on the wider policy enviromnent. 
services? However, the commtmity has high expectations since the end of apartheid, and are frustrated 
by the slow pace of change. The sustainability of services is affected by culture of non-
payment, lack of community participation, high unemployment, layout ofMdantsane, theft and 
tampering, law and order issues, prevalence of illegal connections, shortage of staff in line 
ents, and lack of resources aroongst other reasoos. 
Hypothesis Based on the fmdings from the fieldwork, the case has proved the hypothesis that 
testing accountability arrangements will improve the outputs of urban services and will improve the 
relative chance of sustainability. 
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5.4 User Accountability: Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
5.4.1 Introduction 
The Dhaka case study is intended to illustrate user accountability in holding service providers to 
account for service delivery. This case study illustrates increasing the influence of service users 
through two kinds of accountability arrangements: governance scorecards with grassroots pressure 
groups, and NGO initiatives that involve service users in the eo-production of services. This case study 
makes particular reference to the mban services water supply, sanitation, and refuse collection. 
5.4.2 Policy context 
There are a number of policies that affect mban service delivery in Dhaka. The Purashava Ordinance 
(Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 1977) states it is obligatory for city corporations 
in Bangladesh to ensure the availability of safe drinking water supply and sanitation services at an 
affordable cost". Moreover, the Dhaka City Corporation Ordinance (1983) has provision for 
streetlights, minor roads and paving, removal and disposal of refuse, maintenance of public latrines and 
urinal drains. 
In 1992, Dhaka Water And Sanitation Authority (DWASA) set a precedent by giving permission to an 
NGO to set up a legal water point in a slum and the Dhaka City Corporation Ordinance (1983) was 
later revised in 1994 to enable the supply of funds and other Iogistical support to community based 
projects in urban service delivery. Fmthcrmore, the National Policy for Water Supply and Sanitation 
(Govermnent of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 1998) states that 'WASAs and relevant agencies 
shall support and promote any collective initiative in slmns and squatters in accessing water supply 
services on payment'. 
The Urban Management Policy Statement (Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 1998) 
recommended giving priority to the development of water supply, sanitation and solid waste disposal in 
slums. The policy highlights the need for economic, efficient and reliable services. As such, it is 
suggested that municipalities should endeavour to contract out solid waste disposal, public and 
community latrines, drain cleaning and road maintenance. The National Policy for Water Supply and 
Sanitation (Govermuent of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 1998) also recognises that the 
"involvement of the private sector is essential to establish a closer relationship between the quality of 
services of the sector and its financial viability". Accordingly, the policy aims to coordinate the 
activities of individuals, communities, donors (bilateral, multilateral, etc.) and implementing agencies 
within the public and private sector (City Corporations, Purashava, Department of Public Health 
Engineering, Water And Sewage Authorities, Local Government Engineering Department, NGOs, 
"Dhaka Water And Sanitation Authority is responsible for safe drinking water supply, sewerage and storm water 
drainage systems. 
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etc.), in the planning, development, billing and collection, and operation and maintenance of urban 
services. 
Policies favouring for-profit and not-for-profit private sector involvement in service delivery result 
from donor concern with the effectiveness of Bangladesh's public services. A recent study of the 
public sector in Bangladesh, 'Taming Leviathan' (World Bank, 2002), diagnosed the problems with the 
public service as pervasive patron-dientism, low levels of competence, over centralisation of power, 
limited promotion based on merit, lack of customer focus, limited channels for complaint, pooi 
motivation and low morale, lack of trnst, lack of performance criteria, and resistance by the 
administration to change. These findings are supported by a previous Bank study on the 'Experience 
and Perceptions of Public Officials' in Bangladesh (Mukhetjee et a!, 2001), which found that 
politicians and senior officials show favouritism in awarding employment and contracts in the public 
sector. The report also stated that there are few rewards for excellent performance, bad performance is 
seldom formally punished, control is not delegated, public officials make more than their official 
salaries and budget management is weak. 
An earlier report, 'Govermnent that Works; Reforming the Public Sector' (World Bank, 1997) made a 
number of recommendations for enhancing accountability in the public sector: (i) increased capacity 
and ability of oversight bodies (ii) establish mechanisms to enhance the accountability of executive 
agencies; (iii) improve responsiveness to users (through stakeholder consultation, participation in 
decision making, the use of performance indicators) (iv) enhance transparency in government 
operations (through free press, law enforcement, fair and open elections, effective parliamentary 
oversight), and, (v) combat corruption (increased transparency and tighten public financial 
accountability, promotions and posting based on merit). 
5.4.3 Dhaka 
Although Bangladesh is predominately a rural country, the urban population grew almost nine times, 
from 2.6 million to 22 million during 1961-1991. Currently, the urban population makes up 
approximately 20% of the country's population of 130 million. Urbanisation is increasing by 5-6% 
annually, and it is expected that more than 50% of the population in Bangladesh will live in urban areas 
by the year 2025 (World Bank, 2002). The growing mban population has increased the burden on 
service delivery in cities. 
Dhaka is the capital city, and the main industrial and commercial centre of Bangladesh. Dhaka has a 
metropolitan population of about 10 million and is one of the world's fastest growing cities. Dhaka is 
expected to have a population of 27 million in 2025, and 50 million by 2050. In recent years, 
development agencies have become increasingly concerned with alleviating urban poverty in Dhaka. 
55% ofDhaka's population lives below the poverty line of$1 a day. The majority of people in Dhaka 
!56 
An investigation of improvements to urban services through accountability 
work in the informal sector. Infant mortality rate in Dhaka is 2.5 times the national average, and crude 
death rate is 5 times the national average (Islam et al, 1997). 
Access to land is highly skewed, with 80% of the residential land occupied by 30% of the population. 
The city is located on a level plain and access to flood free and serviced land for housing is in short 
supply. There are over 3,000 slums and squats in Dhaka, with a population of about 1.3 million people. 
97% of poor households in Dhaka do not own the plot ofland on which they live (Islam et al, 1997), 
yet access to water and sewerage, gas and electricity is dependent on legal tenure of a plot. 
Dhaka sulfers from poor urban governance in terms of the deterioration of law and order, pervasive and 
endemic corruption, dysfunctional watchdog agencies, and dissatisfaction with service delivery 
institutions. Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index in 2003 ranked Bangladesh as 
the most corrupt nation of those reviewed. Transparency International Bangladesh's Nationwide 
Household survey (1997) cited the main reasons for corruption as a desire 'to get rich quick' (76%), 
'moral degradation' (58%) and 'lack of accountability' (51%). Through donor pressure, Dhaka City 
Corporation has initiated a 'Promoting Good Urban Governance Project' to ensure that people 
participate at ward level, that administrative activities are decentralised to the local level, revenue 
collection is improved, Public Private Partnerships are fostered, and the delivery of certain urban 
services are decentralised to the ward level (street sweeping, O&M of street lights, cleaning surface 
drains, small scale engineering works, preventative public health services, sanitation facilities for slum 
dwellers and emergency relief operation). The Bangladeshi Government's Public Administration 
Reform Committee (2000; 113) notes that "the poor quality of some public services, namely, 
education, health, utilities, water and power, reflects the absence of accountability, poor value for 
money, and a lack of effective redress of grievance for the people". 
In total, 100 questionnaires were completed for this research in four areas ofDhaka, 50 in non-deprived 
areas (25 in Azimpur and 25 in Badda) and 50 in deprived areas (25 in Nilkhet and 25 in Pallabi). 
Respondents to this research were asked if they had done any of a list of activities chosen to indicate 
active citizenship. The majority of all respondents reported that they had voted in an election (88%), 
talked to neighbours on local issues (74%), and protested over local issues (58%) (see Graph 11). 
Respondents reported that they were most likely to belong to a religious society or a political party, 
however, 62% of respondents stated that they belong to no organisations, most of whom were women 
(83%). Membership of clubs or organisations was lowest in deprived areas, for example, in Pallabi 
96% of respondents did not belong to an organisations. 
66% of respondents were happy where they live, in particular women (70%), and those in non-deprived 
areas [Azimpur (80%) and Badda (68%)]. Those with satisfactory income, (92%), were happier than 
those with an inadequate income (48%). When asked whether they would like to move, the majority 
(84%) said No. 
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5.4.4 Entitlements to services 
The Constitution of Bangladesh states that the government is responsible for creating an environment 
that allows people to improve their quality of life through access to mban services". The majority of 
urban services are provided by central government, either directly or through city corporations, and 
centrally controlled autonomous agencies. The construction, provision and maintenance of roads, 
rubbish collection streetlights, drainage and public toilets in Dhaka is the responsibility ofDhaka City 
Corporation (DCC) and water supply, sewerage and storm water drainage are the responsibility of 
DW ASA. Officially, citizens need a landholding number in order to receive services from DCC. 
Although one interviewee stated that, prior to elections, the mayor or ward commissioner may make 
promises of urban services to slum communities to secure their vote. Unfortunately, once power is 
gained, or they need to be seen as having a 'strong arm' with regard to illegal settlements, they tend to 
clear slums off municipal land. 
About 50 agencies are involved in urban service provision in one way or another in Dhaka, a selected 
few are presented in Table 39. However, there are few mechanisms to C<Hlrdinate the efforts of 
different service delivery institutions; for example there is a lack of co-ordination between Rajdhani 
Unnayan Kartripakyha (RAJUK) in the issuing of building permits and DWASA in the planning and 
development of water, drainage, and sewerage networks. The result is delay, poor performance, 
duplication of effort, wastage of time and resonrccs, disputes over jurisdiction, and blaming one 
another for non-performance. It was reported that an inter-ministerial C<H>rdination counnittee was set 
up for service delivery in 1996, but became dysfunctional, due to lack of interest and leadership 
problems. 
Table 39: Different service delivery institutions in Dhaka. 
Name OI'R,anisation Se nice 
DWASA Water and Sewerage Authority Drinking water and sewerage 
DESA Electric supply authority Supply of electricity 
IDAS Titas gas transmission and distribution company Gas supply 
RAJUK Raidbani Unnayan Kartripakyba Development planning/control 
DMP Dhaka Metropolitan Police Law and Order 
DOE ent of the Envirorunent Environment 
T&T Telegraph and Telephone Board Telephone service 
WDB Water Development Board Foed Control 
BR TA/ Bangladesh Road Transport Autborityillangladesh Road Transportation 
BRTC Transport Corporation 
Getting connections to services (such as water supply, sewerage, electricity) takes time and respondents 
said it is usually quicker to offer unofficial payments (bribes), or use the influence of powerful 
intermediaries (political leaders, influential friends and mastaans- muscle men), to get connected or 
resolve any other problems in service delivery. These bribes may be demanded by officials, or paid by 
"Under Article 102 of the Constitution an 'aggrieved person' can sue the government for infringement of their 
civil rights, \\hlch is encouraged by lawyer gmups like Ain-o Shalish Kendra. Although there are few examples of 
Public Interest Litigation for urban services. 
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users in anticipation ofproblems56• Respondents suggested that mastaans commonly facilitate 'illegal' 
connections to essential services, like electricity and water in slums, and, in turn, pay bribes to officials 
to stay in business. Interviewees also reported that front line service providers within DCC or DWASA 
engage in low-level corruption in service delivery. Anecdotally, it was said to be possible to bribe 
front line service providers to provide more water to certain areas of the city, sell water to slum 
dwellers, or tamper \\ith water meters. There is also anecdotal evidence and newspaper reports of 
meter readers who become millionaires through the collection of bribes. It was reported that front line 
service providers often see their job as an 'investment', for example, someone might pay to get a job 
and then collect bribes from customers so that they can make a return on their investment. 
Access to urban services 
The respondents were asked whether they have access to a number of municipal services, their answers 
are shown below in Table 40. The majority of respondents had access to water (100%), streetlights 
(99%), roads and paving (99%), and refuse collection (92%). Greater access to community level 
services, such as community halls or drains was observed in non-deprived areas. For example, 80% of 
respondents from Azimpur, and 56% of respondents from Badda had access to community halls, 
compared to 52% of respondents from Nilkhet, and none from Pallabi (see Graph 12). 
Table 40: Services respondents had access to in Dhaka. 
Many of the differences in the level of services available to respondents were clearly linked to the 
differing demographic profiles. For example, household water connections, water borne sewerage, and 
a piped drainage system are more widely available in the non-deprived areas of Azimpur and Badda, 
reflecting tenure status, type of housing and level of income (see Graph 13). On the other hand, pit 
latrines, standpipes (Nilkbet 76%), or yard taps (Pallabi 88%), were more common in deprived areas. 
The relatively high level of water and sanitation delivery in Pallabi is related to an NGO project in the 
slum. The majority of respondents have electricity from the grid (98%), 97% of shack dwellers had 
grid electricity connections! The majority of respondents dispose of their rubbish in communal bins 
(91 %), although 3% of respondents, from Nilkhet, have kerbside collection of refuse through a local 
"However, this arrangement appears to be only a stopgap in cases of acute problems, as supply often remains 
\Uipredictable. 
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CBO. Table 41 below shows which level of the services are more frequently found in deprived areas, 
which are found more often in non-deprived areas, and those levels of service for which there was no 
difference. The observation checklist supports these findings and it is shown in Table 42 (found in 
Appendix I). 
Table 41: The level of the services in different areas ofDhaka. 
Level of senrice provided in Similar levels Level of senrice provided in non-
deprived areas (Nilkhet and deprived areas (Azimpur and 
Pallabi) Badda) 
Kerbside collection (NGO project) Transfer to communal bins. Disposal of own rubbish i.e. 
burning. 
Open drains. Grid connections Piped Drains. 
Gravel roads. Paved access Paved roads. 
Pit latrines. Flush toilet. 
Septic tank. Household connections. 
Bucket latrine. 
Standpipes. 
Yard taps (NGO project). 
5.4.5 Accountability arrangements 
Lack of accountability for urban services is generally recognised as the key reason for the failure of 
urban services in Dhaka, as illustrated by the following quotes. 
"There is broad consensus among users that an important reason for the poor quality of services and 
widespread corruption is that civil servants and service providing agencies are not held accountable 
for the services they provide" (World Bank, 2002b: 46). 
"It is widely believed that lack of accountability is largely responsible for failure of most public 
programs in Bangladesh. Accountability seems to be diffused and there is little concern among 
officials, both at central and local levels, over meeting targets and achieving goals. Moreover, lack of 
transparency and non-exposure to public scrutiny are responsible, to a large degree, for the 
inefficiencies of the public agencies in delivering services to target groups and to produce the desired 
resulf' (hhtp://wmv.dhakacity.orglhtrnl!function _ cmmi.html) 
Methodological individualism in service delivery: scorecards 
The use of score cards or report eards to assess the delivery of urban services was developed by the 
Public Affairs Centre in Bangalore and has gained credibility among officials from the World Bank, 
DFID and UNCHS. The underlying premise of the report card is that urban services fail beeause of 
lack of competition in services delivery. "Business enterprises operating in a competitive setting are 
far more sensitive to the qnality dimensions of their goods and services than monopolistic public 
service providers. They ascertain customer satisfaction and preferences, disseminate information on 
their quality dimensions and take steps to improve qnality beeause they know that if they neglect these 
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dimensions, competition may take away their business" (Paul, 2002; 130). Report Cards induce this 
kind of competition in public seJVice delivery. 
Report cards seiVe three main pwposes (Upp, 1995). First, they are an instrument to assess public 
service delivery in tenus of perfonnance and the degree of satisfaction with services. Second, they 
help to collect scientific, objective and credible data that can be used as a diagnostic tool for authorities 
to identiJY problems, or deficit areas that need attention. Third, they can be a starting point for attempts 
to achieve public participation in local decision-making, and to initiate consumer friendly practices and 
policies. Implicit in the report card methodology is an assumption that public institutions are sensitive 
to negative feedback and will respond to complaints by trying to solve the problem. 
A Governance Score Card (World Bank et at, 2002) has been used in Bangladesh to assess urban 
services delivery. Its implementation was a collaboration between PROSHlKA, Survey and Research 
System (SRS), Public Affairs Centre, AUS AID, Canadian International Development Agency, USAID 
and the World Bank. The study objectives were to assess the efficiency of governance, measure the 
performance of service providers, highlight difficulties encountered while interacting with the service 
providers, and examine the quality of urban services from the recipients and service provider's point of 
view. The methodology used was a standard sample survey; respondents were stratified according to 
gender, income, education and occupation. NGOs were used to identify local issues concerning service 
delivery, to be represented as questions on the scorecard. Professionally trained investigators were 
used to administer the structured questionnaires and interview respondents. The scorecard was 
performed on 2,400 households in Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi; the results were used for 
comparison across Bangladesh. 
The Scorecard was completed in 2001 and published in 2002. It found that: -
• Less than 12% of residents are satisfied with the electricity service. 
• Less than 11% are satisfied with the drinking water. 
• Less that 17% are satisfied with the sanitation service. 
• Less than 20% are satisfied with the transport service. 
After the report was completed and published, PROSIDKA organised a workshop in collaboration with 
the World Bank to discuss how to respond to report card findings. Representatives from the service 
provider agencies attended the workshop and it seems that none disputed the findings and conclusions 
of the report. However, these agencies failed to make any concrete pledges to review systems, or pay 
attention to the issues raised by the scorecard. Since the workshop there has since been no follow up 
activity on the part of civil society either in terms of sustained lobbying, public awareness, or advocacy 
campaigns, which means that scorecards have yet to make substantive, systemic changes in service 
delivery in Dhaka. In fact, it might take decades for the results of scorecards to become evident in 
service delivery (personnel communication with World Bank official). 
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The scorecard methodology, as a technology, tends to downplay the context of service delivery yet 
interviewees in this research indicated that the scorecard is politically sensitive; it was suggested that 
government had concerns over the independence, objectivity and ownership of findings. For example, 
there was the perception that the information collected had been tailored to fit the agendas of the World 
Bank or NGOs involved in the data collection and report preparation, in terms of streamlining 
government bureaucracy, introducing accountability in service provision, and promoting anti-
corruption efforts". In particular, PROSHIKA has experienced problems in its follow up activities to 
the scorecard" possibly as a result of its political association with the opposition party. 
Community participation: committees of concerned citizens 
Scorecards have been used more successfully by Transparency International Bangladesh, in the main, 
because the NGO also created grassroots pressure groups called Committees of Concerned Citizens 
(CCCs) to disseminate report card findings. CCCs are intended to establish Islands of Integrity in 
public services, generate debate on infrastructure provision, and lobby for higher quality public 
services through a variety of means- citizens meetings, newsletters, research papers, essay and cartoon 
competitions for school, seminars and press campaigns. TIB also has Advice and Information Centres 
to disseminate information on different government and NGO service delivery, through leaflets, fact 
sheets, and reports. CCCs and TIB have formed peoples theatre groups that give productions on 
corruption themes, such as 'Caricature of Corruption' and 'Rukhey Dandao' (Face It). Whilst the 
scorecard method is ideally suited to cities where large sample areas can be covered at small el!.')Jefise, 
interviewees revealed that committees and other forms of collective action around service delivery are 
more suited to rural areas where community pressure on service providers can operate more effectively. 
TranSP3fency International Bangladesh developed voluntary Committees of Concerned Citizens to 
'promote integrity and curb corruption in public sector service delivery SYstems in selected sites of 
Bangladesh through grassroots participation of the recipients of public services,' and CCCs have been 
formed in six areas of the country. Potential members are identified by TIB, who have developed 
membership criteria and operational guidelines set out in the CCC manual. The criteria for selecting 
members includes integrity; widely respected by all; active citizens; permanent citizen of Bangladesh; 
solvent; resident in locality; not involved in party politics or criminal activities; income tax payer; well 
informed; over 25; and educated. The number of people in a CCC ranges from 5-25 with 25-30% 
female members. Transparency International Bangladesh have a preference for CCCs to be composed 
of professional people like teachers, lawyers, journalists, doctors, businessmen, social workers, or 
retired officials. CCCs meet about once a month, and TIB covers their expenses for a certain period 
and provides office space, secretary, and technical input, as well as ideas and enthusiasm. 
" Any IMF loan to Bangladesh, in future, depends on greater accountability and transparency (Daily Star, 
16.2.2002). 
" Government of Bangladesh has imposed restrictions of the operations of national NGOs, as it did during its 
tenure 1991-1996. For example, delays in clearance of foreign funds through the Government NGO Affairn 
Bureau, much threatens projects (personal communication). 
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Report Cards have been conducted on primary education (200 1 ), publication and distribution of books 
for schools (2001), and on health services (2001). The Corruption in Primary Education report card 
survey (200 I) in the Myrnenshingh district identified corruption in illegal fees for admission, collection 
of examination fees, inclusion of stndcnts in the Food For Education Program, entitlement of food 
grain; as well as cheating among students at primary schools. Findings of report cards are launched 
through press conferences and are typically given highly visible coverage, they are also sent to the 
concerned authorities including the concerned Minister, Secretary, Deputy Commissioners of areas, 
District officers, and Upazilla Officer. The CCC organise seminars and meets with concerned 
authorities and civil society in the concerned areas. 
When asked why members had joined the CCC, most respondents stated that "we have realised 
corruption is part of our lives, every step of our lives it is a problem. We have to do it for the next 
generation, so it is not a problem for them" said one CCC member, and another said that "In the bloody 
struggle in 1971 we dreamed of a free nation, that is why, under the banner of CCC, citizens have 
become united to materialise our goal to establish sustainable society ... The dream of freedom fighters 
was to see a good Bangladesh, but these things haven't materialised'. Key to the work of the 
committee was the fact that "We don't point a finger at any one individual. I have a friend in the 
health service but we are talking about corruption in the system, and not my friends. If the system is 
made better people will improve" said one CCC member. Interviewees point to a paradox where a 
good system depends on good people, and good people depend on good systems, suggesting a need for 
ethical principals and a decent quality oflifc as well as for controls, inspection, and penalties. 
eo-production of service delivery in Pallabi and Nilkhet 
"NGO sector was created to complement government not to compete or supplement government. So 
we mean to help the government and we are really delighted to help the government, but government 
has to ensure the working environment so that we can go together" (NGO worker). 
"The only way that government can provide services to people is through partnership" (NGO worker). 
In 1992, a partnership between Dushta Sasthya Kendra (DSK- a local Bangladeshi NGO), WaterAid 
UK, World Bank, UNICEF, and DWASA, began to provide legal access to safe water supply, latrines, 
washing blocks, and hygiene education in the slums of Dhaka. Dhaka City Corporation supplies the 
land for the water tank, and permission for road cutting and excavation. DSK acts as guarantor for the 
community, and, after 2 years, the NGO passes all responsibility for ownership and management of the 
water points to the community, whilst providing some technical hack up at the end of the project 
period. The benefits of the project for DW ASA include increased revenue, increased number of legal 
customers, and reduced system and revenue losses. It was reported that 94% of slum dwellers pay their 
water bills on time: "We were surprised that the recovery from the slum areas was much better than 
the richer areas" said an official from DWASA. 
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The DSK model requires communities to participate in managing the services, collecting water charges 
from users, paying DWASA bills, appointing and paying caretakers to maintain the water point, and 
paying back construction costs in instalments to the NGO. Pre-project NGO mobilisation has been 
effective in improving citizens monitoring of public services and increased slum dwellers ability to 
articulate needs, express grievances and ideas to government institutions. By June 2002, DSK had 
constructed 97 water points in Dhaka and other NGOs have replicated the model through the city. For 
example, WaterPartners have adopted this approach in Pallabi, one of the neighbourhoods in Dhaka 
where this research was conducted. DSK have also experimented with mobile non-mechanised 
drinking water carriers for streets and hard to reach slums. 
However. the initiative has not changed the land tenure policy. slums with water points are still 
vulnerable to eviction. Indeed, I 7 water points located on government land have been evicted since the 
project began. Another problem with the model has been the failure to acknowledge the role of 
mastaans (muscle men) in slums, who may have previously sold water to slum dwellers as part of their 
income. It was reported !hat the first water point DSK established was taken over by a mastaan, who 
stopped the community•s weekly repayments to the NGO. 
Waste Concern is an NGO working on small-scale community led composting projects in Dhaka. The 
scheme is a partnership between the NGO and the Public Works Department, whereby DCC provides 
land and logistical support (water and electricity), to the programme, Waste Concern operate the 
project, and the private sector (snch as fertiliser marketing companies and PROSHIKA) buys the 
compost. Modified rickshaws are used to collect rubbish door-to-door for a fee of approximately Tk 
10/month, which is taken to small composting plants, where the waste is separated and composted. 
200kg of compost can be produced from I ton of collected solid waste. The benefits of the project are 
door-to-door waste collection for households, savings for the municipality, clean communities, and 
business opportunities. The model of a decentralised composting project with door-to-door collection 
has also been replicated in a number of wards ofDhaka59; Waste Concern, Oxfam and Water Aid, have 
adapted their model for slum communities. In this instance, a specially designed perforated parallel is 
used to compost organic waste in 3-4 months; slum dwellers can then sell the compost, worth about Tk 
IOOO-Tk!200 each year to the slum community, other benefits include a clean environment; together 
with health benefits "We asked them after 2 years. are you happy with the project. they said we are not 
happy that we are earning [money from selling the compost]. We are happy we have a healthier 
environment' said an NGO worker. 
59 Although it was said that this has had the effect of cleaning up the neighbourhood but overall making the city 
look dirtier. 
164 
An investigation of improvements to urban services through accountability 
Empowerment of service users 
"This is the capital city and all VIPs live here, so we have to always to account for that" said a 
DW ASA official. 
In general, Dhaka City Corporation has not officially decentralised responsibility for monitoring the 
quality of services at zone and ward level. As such, ward conunissioners and zonal officers lack the 
resources to monitor and supervise service delivery effectively. However, community mobilization, 
along with the fact that slum dwellers now pay for legal access to services, has empowered these 
residents to approach and negotiate directly with DWASA and Dhaka City Corporation: "There was a 
time that slum people never had the ability to talk to DWASA (Dhaka Water and Sanitation Authority) 
people but now they play with them ,. Recently, one senior engineer attended a workshop [with slum 
communities] and he was astonished ... He said why these people are shouting? He is telling to me 
that it is the first time he heard the community voice and they are blaming us ... We have got these 
connections because we like to get water legally, that's why we are giving you money. Why are you 
people not giving us water? Why aren't we getting water? Why are we not in a better position?" said 
an NGO worker. It was also reported by another NGO worker that slum dwellers have been lobbying 
their ward conunissioner and City Corporation for drainage construction in their slums, since residents 
recognised the benefits of a drainage system but could not afford to construct their own systems. 
Nevertheless, one NGO worker reported,"/ am sure, as it stands, the authority doesn't want any legal 
responsibility, or to scy they are taking responsibility for that lam!'. 
In the main, interviewees from NGOs talked about the poor as contributors to the urban economy, 
actively trying to improve their community and possessing initiative for self-help. Consequently, 
NGOs have been lobbying fur legal access to services in slums, land titles, credit, etc. However, 
interviewees from DCC tended to view slums as unsanitary and unsafe, and slum dwellers as 
'undesirables'. These respondents called for removal and relocation, reinforcement of zoning and land 
use regulations, and enforcement of bonsing and sanitation codes. However, individuals within 
DWASA and DCC involved in eo-production of urban services demonstrated some overlap between 
these conventional responses. The impact of the case study findings on the theoretical framework of 
the literature review are summarised in Table 43 (found in Appendix 1). 
Accountability assessment 
Information: When asked how respondents found out about the services they use, the majority stated 
through the TV, their own experience of using services, or talking to neighbours. Men and respondents 
from non-deprived areas were more likely to read about services in newspapers. Whereas, women and 
those from deprived areas tend to find out about services through talking to neighbours, or listening to 
the radio (see Graph 14). As an NGO worker said "The better off families know the information 
because they are literate, but overall information on urban water is still lacking". Ward 
commissioners stated that a common strategy of communication with service users at the ward level is 
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driving aronnd with a loud hailer, and the Chief Conservancy Officer of Dhaka City Corporation stated 
that he connnnnicates with residents through handbills. These strategies point to top-down one-way 
flows of information to service users rather than engaging them in service delivery in more meaningful 
ways. The print media carries extensive reports on corruption. Reactions expressed through the 
media60 might cause speedy but temporary modifications to service delivery, and there is essentially no 
public scrutiny on how money and local taxes is being utilised. 
Power: "Holding government accountable is about power ... power in Bangladesh, as in many 
societies, is tightly held by a self-perpetuating and self enriching elite which has no incentive to be 
enthusiastic about reform" (World Bank, 2002a; x). VIP consumers tend to have legally enforceable 
rights, better access to political power, can promote their interests, and have the ability to create 
individualised and personal responses to problems. The research revealed that the way slum dwellers 
exert their influence, for example, through mass protests, is typically confrontational, nnpredictable and 
uncomfortable for service providers. NGO-municipality partnerships have given power and influence 
to service users and empowered them to demand new services, or for different sorts of services, and for 
more of existing services. 
Action: Despite donor and NGO pressure, there has been no real attempt by government to improve 
service delivery in Dhaka. There are no minimum standards for service that users can expect, and no 
guarantee to provide a solution to problems in stipulated time.· Furthermore, typically, there are few 
effective procedures for receiving complaints and settling grievances in service delivery. There is 
limited help available to people complaining in person at service provider offices, offices are neither 
welcoming nor signposted, there are no information desks to ask for help and officials are not always 
present during office hours. There is the general feeling that complaining to service providers will not 
result in the problem being solved. Staff have little knowledge of the problems faced by users61 , 
despite decentralised zone offices and zonal development plans. NGOs have attempted to hold service 
providers to acconnt in two key ways: advocacy on behalf of people by getting interest of poor on the 
policy agenda, and initiating experiments in service delivery. NGO-municipal partnerships have been 
particularly effective in securing action for urban services. 
5.4.6 Impact on user satisfaction 
General attitudes to urban services 
Respondents were asked whether they had noticed an improvement in urban services in the last year 
(since the scorecard was published). The majority of respondents from non-deprived areas stated they 
60 
"Newspapers have been at the forefront in exposing cases of corruption. But it is the responsibility of the entire 
civil society, especially that of the civic groups, to raise their voices and create the pressure, so that the government 
feels obliged to take the corruption issue seriously. and act in line with its earlier promises" (The Financial 
Express, 4.9.2002). 
61 But this is not to say that they are unaware of the general service related problems. 
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had noticed a small improvement, whereas, the majority in deprived areas said there had been no 
improvement. Respondents were most satisfied with the overall provision, quality and infonnation 
about roads, sanitation and refuse collection. Respondents were least satisfied with the overall 
provision and quality of water, street lights, drains and community halls, and with the amount of 
infonnation supplied by service providers about drains, community halls, street lights. These findings 
are summarised in Table 44 below. The majority of respondents were fairly dissatisfied (31 %) with the 
way local government runs urban services, particularly men, and those living in deprived areas. 
Table 44: User satisfaction with urban services. 
Satisfied with Dissatbfted Satlsfted with Dissatisfied Satisfied with Dissatfstled 
overall with overaD quality of with quality of infonnatlon with 
provision provision 
.. -.. services infonnation %most satisfied %least satisfied %most satisfied % least satisfied %most satisfied %least satisfied 
Total% Roads and Storm drains Roads and Stoon drains Roads and Storm drains 
paving (50%) (25%) paving ( 47<'/o.) (23%) pavmg(47"/o) (24%) 
Sanitation (37%) Community hall Sanitation (34%) Conununity Sanitation (34%) Community 
Retme (25%) Refuse halls (280/o) Water supply/ halls(24%) 
collection (34%) Streetl;gbt collection (33%) StreetHgbt Refuse Streetl;ghts 
(30%) (29%) collection (32o/o)__ (27%) 
Nilkhet Streetlights Storm drains Cotnmuruty Water supply, Community Water supply, 
(36%) (0%) halls(l6%) stonn drams, halls, refuse stonn drains, 
sanitation (0%) collection sanitation (0%) 
(12%) 
Pallabi Roads and Community Roads and Halls (0%) Roads(84%) Community 
paving (84%) halls(4%) paving (80%) halls (0"/o) 
Stonnwater 
drams(4%) 
Azimpur Water supply Sanitation, roads Water supply Roads and Water supply Streetl;ghts 
(68%) andpavmg, (68%) paving. (64%) (24%) 
storm drains street!;ghts, 
(28%) storm drains. 
sanitation (28~)-
Badda Roads and Coomrunrty Roads and Water supply. Sanitation. roads Cotmnunity 
paving(80%) halls(36%) paving (76%) community halls and paving halts (40%) 
(48%) (68%) 
In general men were more satisfied with water supply and refuse collection, whereas, women were 
most satisfied with sanitation. Respondents in non-deprived areas were more satisfied with refuse 
collection than those respondents in deprived areas. 
Respondents were asked to choose from a list of the most common problems with urban services. The 
services with the most problems were water supply, drains and electricity. In non-deprived areas there 
are more problems with streetlights, drains and water supply, whereas, in deprived areas the majority of 
problems were with refuse collection. Respondents from non-deprived areas highlighted comparatively 
fewer problems with the urban services in their neighbourhoods. 
W ASA scored relatively well in tenns of the quality of water and pressure at taps, there were more 
complaints about the lack of supply to meet demands and seasonal variations in supply. Those in non-
deprived areas had fewer complaints about water supply. 
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With regard to sewerage, most respondents perceived the main problem was ntissing or damaged 
manhole covers. Respondents were more satisfied with the relatively few blocked drains, but had 
concerns about types and capacities of drains, and cleaning of drains in their neighbourhoods. 
Fewer respondents complained about the lack of individual household refuse collection and the 
frequency of waste collection. However, there were concerns about the low frequency of street 
cleaning and dumping of refuse in open areas. 
Community halls received the lowest number of complaints for all city services. The biggest complaint 
was that these halls were not frequently used, indicating that community halls are a low priority for 
respondents. 
The majority of respondents highlighted the lack of drainage for storm water, and the rough road 
surface as the main problems with roads. Fewer respondents had concerns about non-working 
streetlights or interruptions in supply; the main problem was the low number of streetlights and 
inappropriate hours of supply. 
The four services of most importance to respondents, in both deprived and non-deprived areas, are 
water supply, drains, sanitation, and refuse collection. When asked which services respondents would 
like to improve the majority stated drains, water supply and sanitation. However, respondents from 
deprived areas were more likely to opt to improve drains and water supply, whereas, those in non-
deprived areas selected streetlights and roads. 
When asked whether respondents receive a bill for services. Those respondents who thought they had 
a 'sometimes adequate' or 'adequate income' were more likely to receive a bill than those with an 
'inadequate income'. Predictably, those living in a house or a flat were more likely to get a bill that 
those living in shacks or a room. When asked whether they pay a bill for services, the majority of 
respondents, (79%), stated they paid tl1eir water bill, however payment for other services varied. 
Surprisingly, the respondents that were most likely to pay their water bill lived in Pallabi (92%) and 
lived in a shack (81%), presumably due to the NGO project in the slum. It was reported that, in some 
areas the bills are not sent regularly, are often incorrect, and people are often faced with an 
unaffordable sum to pay. 
The majority of respondents described the services with the statements 'service providers don't take 
complaints seriously', 'it's difficult to get improvements in services' and 'service providers don'! care 
about people like me'. In particular, these statements were used to describe drains, refuse collection 
and community halls. In contrast, generally positive statements were made about sanitation, such as 
'service providers are more responsive now', 'service providers are happy to hear users ideas' and 
'service providers are friendly and helpful'. Only 28% of respondents thought that service providers 
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are easily accessible, particularly male respondents (34%), and those in the non-deprived areas of 
Azimpur and Badda. 
Most respondents selected a majority of negative statements to describe urban services. Most 
respondents described urban services as 'unresponsive', 'undependable' and 'inefficient', especially to 
describe drains, streetlights, water supply and sanitation. The most common positive statements 
selected were 'value for money', 'effective' and 'reliable', respondents were most likely to chose these 
statements to describe water supply, refuse collection, community halls, roads and paving and 
sanitation. Table 45 below shows how respondents descnlJed each service under investigation. 
Table 45: Service users descriptions of urban services. 
Negative descriptions Positive descriptions 
Water supply Unresponsive, uudepeudable, Value for money, effective, concerned, transparent. 
inefficient. 
Storm drains Unresponsive, tmdepeudable, 
-
inefficient. 
Streetlicllt Unresponsive, undependable. 
-
Sanitation Unresponsive, inefficient. Value for money, effective, reliable. 
Refuse 
-
Value for money, effective, reliable, concerned, 
collection transparent. 
Roads and - Effective, reliable, concerned, transparent. 
pavin~ 
Conununity 
-
Value for money, concerned, transparent. 
halls 
Complaints about urban services 
Dhaka City Corporation has a grievance redress SYstem for complaints about its services. Problems 
should first be reported to the zonal conveyance officers or the ward commissioner's office, and if there 
is no satisfactory response they can be taken to Dhaka City Corporation. However, only a small 
proponion of households are aware of it, or bother to use formal arrangements. People feel that there 
will be no follow-up to their complaint and that service providers are often unavailable or indifferent. 
When asked for the reasons why respondents had not made a complaint the most common responses 
are shown in Table 46. 
Table 46: Reason for not complaining in sample areas ofDhaka. 
Area Reason for not complaining 
Badda 'Because we are suffering'. 
'The govemment has not provided services'. 
'The gavemment does not take any responsibiliO?'· 
Pal tan Line, Azimpur 'I have no confidence, so I do not complain'. 
'The owner of the house solves the oroblems I have'. 
Duari Para Pallabi '/have no confidence in the authority so I do not complain'. 
'I do not complain because /live illel!;allv on I!;OVemments property·. 
Nilkhet Babupura Shnn 'The problems are caused by our fate, so the government cannot solve these problems'. 
'I have no confidence in the authority, so I do not complain'. 
'I do not complain becau,ve /live illegally on government's property'. 
'The authority is not taking any responsibility', 
'The authority neglects them, so they do not go there·. 
'We do not get a proper service'. 
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Of those respondents who had complained to service providers in the last year, most respondents had 
complained about water supply, drains, streetlights and sanitation (see Graph 15). It was found that 
those with an adequate income complained mostly about water supply and drains, whereas, those with 
an inadequate income were more likely to complain about sanitation and refuse collection. In 
particular, women were more likely to complain about streetlights and men about drains. Tellingly, 
none of the respondents thought that complaints mechanism result in satisfactory outcomes. 
Only 43% of respondents stated that they trust services providers; women, and those with an 
inadequate income, were more likely to trust service provideiS than men or respondents with an 
adequate income. When asked why they trust service providers, the majority of respondents from non-
deprived areas said it was because they had 'confidence in setvice provider's ability', whereas, those in 
deprived areas tended to trust officials because 'they will be punished if they fail'. 
Table 4 7 below shows which of the services were complained about more in deprived areas, non-
deprived areas, and where there was no difference. Respondents were asked whether they were 
satisfied with the way their complaints were handled by service provideiS. No one was very satisfied 
with the way their complaint was handled, however, those respondents from non-deprived areas were 
more satisfied than those in deprived areas. When the respondents were asked why they had 
complained, the majority of respondents said it was both in their self interest, and in the community 
interest. 
Table 47: Services most often complained about in different areas ofDhaka. 
Respondents from deprived areas Similar number of complaints. Respondents from non-deprived 
complained about more. areas complained about more. 
Sanitation Water supply Storm water drains 
Nilkhet (12%) Pallabi (4%) Azimpnr (8%) Badda (0%) 
Roads and paving Streetlights 
Nilkhet (12%) Pallabi (0%) 
Refuse colleetion Community balls 
Nilkhet (8%) Pallabi (0"/o) 
If respondents had a problem with urban services, the majority would call service providers help lines, 
vote for politicians promising better services, or visit service provider offices. Table 48 shows those 
arrangements nsed more in deprived areas, in non-deprived areas, and those arrangements that were 
common to all areas surveyed. The table shows that more people in deprived areas would use indirect 
ways to complain about urban services, where those in non-deprived areas would contact the service 
provider directly. 
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Table 48: Most common ways of resolving problems with urban services. 
Arrangement used more by Similar Arrangement used more by 
respondents in deprived areas respondents in non-deprived 
• (Nilkhet and Pallabi). areas (Azimpur and Badda). 
Vote for politicians. Write to a ne Call service providers help lines. 
Protest/demonstrate. Contact a politician. Visit service provides offices. 
Use the law. Form or join a user group. Service provider's suggestion 
boxes. 
Talk to city corporation staff. Visit a local one stop for services. 
Hold a public meeting. Contact ombudsmen or inspector. 
Visit service providers intern et 
sites. 
Respondents were asked in what ways are they thought service providers were most accountable (see 
Graph 16). The majority thought service providers should be accountable for consulting users (27%), 
as shown in Table 49, particularly those in non-deprived areas. More female respondents (23%), as 
well as more of those respondents with inadequate incomes (20%), thought service providers should be 
accountable for responding to user's complaints. Whereas, men were more likely to state that seJYice 
providers should be accountable for providing a transparent service. Only 9% of respondents thought 
service providers should be accountable for the quality of services they provide. 83% of respondents 
thought they had a voice in service delivery in Dhaka, in particular men (91%) and, surprisingly, the 
majority of respondents from deprived areas [Nilkhet (92%) and Pallabi (56%)]. 
Table 49 User perception of accoWltability for urban services. 
What are senice providen most accountable for? No 0/o 
Providing information about the delivery_ of services 12% 
Consulting users on their needs/priorities 27% 
Encoura~in~ oarticipation in decision making 6% 
Responding to users complaints 17% 
Having a user friendly service 12% 
Having a transparent service 16% 
Meeting service targets and standards 9% 
5.4. 7 Impact on the perfonnance of services 
Interviewees seemed to agree that the technical performance of service delivery in Dhaka reflects social 
problems. For example, one interviewee said that service delivery is a "social problem. We have to 
hammer our workers to work, they don't have to do that in many countries. The low pay means they 
have to work other jobs in order to help the family". A DWASA official also said water quality "has 
become a social problem for WASA. The pump stations are dangerous because drug dealers, those 
kinds of people, use them. So it is not possible for the authority to have control over the quality of 
service ... Workers are afraid to go and chlorinate the water ... Sometimes workers start the pump and 
leave it, and if there is a power failure, the pumps stops-no one will go and sort it out". 
Service providers noted that services also fail because of resource shortages "materials may not be 
there, so we have to make them. Or the materials will not match the system, which was done 50 yeas 
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ago. When there is a leakage they go with some material but they find the pipe fitting doesn't fit so 
they have to make the material - all the technical problems are there". Other problems include 
negligence of dnty, a faulty reporting system, lack of supervision, poor co-ordination, lack of 
professional skills and accountability. 
It seemed that front line service providers "don't work regularly, they don't work the time they are 
allotted ... they try to quit their jobs very fast, but our inspector has a motorbike, so he tries to catch 
them" said an official from Dhaka City Corporation. Others took the view that "if someone cannot do 
his job regularly and up to standard it is because of a lot of reasons. This is a developing country, we 
are not living in developed country you know, we have lots of problems, psychological, mental, 
physical, economic, environmental. So I try to give a bit of leverage but if someone is really badly 
performing, then he will be suspended" said another official from Dhaka City Corporation. Another 
said, "I don 'I blame the WA5:4 people, it is the system which is in disrepair". However an NGO worker 
said that when "government is the provider it is very difficult to lose your job in a government set-up. 
So if I cannot lose my job I am less accountable to anyone". The impact of accountability reforms on 
the technical performance of service deliver will be discussed below with reference to refuse collection, 
water supply, sanitation and drains. 
Refuse collection: The citizens of Dhaka produce about 3500 ton/day62• Households typically carry 
their rubbish to communal bins kept in commercial, residential and industrial areas. Dhaka City 
Corporation operates a collection service, involving municipal pick-up from designated bins using open 
or closed trucks that transport it to landfills. However, the indiscriminate dumping of waste creates a 
health hazard, environmental risks, clogs the drainage system, and contaminates the water supply, and 
the burning of refuse adjacent to dwellings compounds these environmental problems. Tokais 
exacerbate waste management problems in neighbourhoods by spreading the waste in streets to 
establish if there is anything of worth for recycling. 90"/o of slums do not receive municipal solid waste 
collection services (Centre for Urban Studies, 2001), and increased congestion and narrow lanes in the 
Old City make it difficult for DCC to pick up refuse and to clean the streets. 
The lines of accountability for refuse collection in DCC are long. Sweepers and cleaners report to 
inspectors-in-charge, who are responsible to the Zonal Conservancy Officer and, in turn, to the Chief 
Conservancy Officer and the Mayor. It was reported that Dhaka City Corporation cleaners do not 
always follow their work schedules, despite supervision arrangements like telecommunications, 
wireless radios, motorbikes, and jeeps. At present, DCC is trying to increase public participation in the 
storage and disposal of waste in an attempt to increase monitoring of front liue service providers by 
sel'\ice users63 • The Chief Conservancy Officer has prepared a handbill, which states where 
households should deposit their waste, the time when they should do so (6pm-10pm), and informs 
residents that there is a maximum fine ofTk 10,000, or imprisonment for 6 months for illegal disposal 
62 But DCC can only manage to collect 1800 tons due to limited manpower and equipment. 
63 Although not as a result of scorecard findings. 
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of waste, or littering of the streets. The Chief Conveyance Officer has also devised a scheme for 
additional cleaning of each ward once a month, in addition to normal rounds. The Bangladesh National 
Cadet Core and university students have been used to publicise the initiative and inform residents of the 
proper waste management procedures at the ward level. For example, they read out the handbill with a 
loud hailer and wait by the communal bins to prevent 'misbehaviour'. The Chief Conservancy Officer 
has also run a feature on this scheme in the national dailies to publicise the initiative. 
The technical performance of refuse collection has been improved by NGO initiatives such as Waste 
Concern in terms of increased frequency of collection, increased efficiency of collection and reduced 
dumping of refuse. These improvements to the technical performance of services have translated into 
benefits for residents, such as an improved environment, breeding grounds for vectors of disease have 
been removed, potentially better drainage has been created, and health benefits have been noted. 
Water supply and sanitation: At present, about 76% of Dhaka is served by the main public water 
supply system consisting of 370 deep tube wells, and 3 small surface water sources. There are also 
about 400 private deep tube wells serving commercial customers, schools, clinics, and universities. 
Slum dwellers typically collect their daily water supply from public taps, street hydrants, public toilets, 
parks, factories or offices, or by bribing the gate-staff of DWASA pump stations. Water vendors also 
sell water to slum dwellers, as well as street restaurants, shopkeepers, roadside tea stalls, and so forth. 
Drinking water demand for the city exceeds supply and groundwater levels are falling by more than 3 
metres annually in the old area of the city, according to one interviewee. This is due to over extraction, 
poor recharge due to paving of open spaces, pollution of surface water sources, as well as losses due to 
unaccounted for water and on-metered connections. 
At present, 68% of residents in Dhaka have some kind of adequate sanitation facility, ranging from 
waterbome sewerage systems (restricted to certain areas of the city, i.e. Dhanmondi, Gulshan, Banani, 
Baridhara, and Lalmatia), to septic tanks, and pit latrines. About 32% of residents have waterbomc 
sewerage, representing about 45, 000 sewerage connections. There are ouly 18 public toilets in Dhaka 
to serve about 10 million people. It is common to see men and children using the drains as toilets and 
in some instances slum dwelleiS had hooked up to the main sewerage line, or bnilt toilets over drains or 
rivers. Access to sanitation has been improved by the FiiSI Urban Development Project (FUDP), 
whereby selected slums in old Dhaka have been sold sanitary latrines at subsidised rates, together with 
collaborations between NGOs, donors and DWASA under the "Urban Water and Sanitation Initiative 
for Dhaka Urban Poor". 
Traditionally, urban water supply and sanitation have been regarded in Bangladesh as public services to 
be provided by the state. However there is donor pressure on the Government of Bangladesh to look at 
new methods of delivering those services. One condition of World Bank funding for the Fourth Dhaka 
Water Supply Project was to contract out DWASA billing and collection system in 2 of the 7 DWASA 
administrative zones ofDhaka, with a view to extending to all other zones. In 1997, one zone went to a 
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private contractor, and one to a co-operative called the Consumer Supplies Co-operative Society L TD 
(ECSCSL). The co-operative was composed of DWASA employees who had taken leave from the 
company and returned to work as private contractors. Contracting out was intended to improve meter 
reading, preparation ofbills, delivery ofbills, and recording of payment. The co-operative staff have a 
financial incentive for revenue collection and in fact proved to be more effective at collection than the 
private contractor. 
Another example of a change to the method of delivering services is the water and sanitation project 
funded by WaterPartners in the Pallabi slum. This project is based on the DSK model, and consists of 
a water point (suction hand pumps mounted on an underground storage reservoir connected to DWASA 
mains), washing points and community pit latrines. A refuse collection scheme is also planned for the 
slwn, to be funded by WaterPartners and will be similar to the Waste Concem model. 
This project has increased the technical performance of water supply and sanitation in the slums, where 
once the community had illegal connections, legal access to water and sewer utility service lines, has 
increased the potable water supply, expanded service connections, improved meter installations, 
improved continuity of supply, and enabled leak detection. According to slum dwellers interviewed the 
technical improvements have meant that residents have benefited from improved quantity and quality 
of water supply, increased availability of water for bathing, laundry and dishwashing, reduced time and 
distance to collect water, a safe and convenient place to go to the toilet, reduction in the incidence of 
diseases, an improved environment and the creation of jobs and training of operatives, committees and 
caretakers, 
It was reported that slum dwellers with improved water and sanitation have been lobbying for better 
drains. DWASA lacks the staff, financial resources and technical competence to maintain drains 
efficiently. Some residents resolve flooding problems by removing manhole covers from the sewerage 
system so that storm water drains away. However, the storm water contains sand and gravel, which 
leads to blocking of the sewerage system, resulting in mixed storm water and sewage flooding the 
streets, or backing up to residences. Deprived areas have particular problems with water logging, due 
to urban development in low-lying areas and along drainage canals. The problems with drainage in 
deprived areas is compounded by lack of sanitation and refuse collection, some people use drains as 
toilets or else dump rubbish if there are no municipal bins. Poor drainage exacetbates malaria and 
dengue fever, gastro enteritis and cholera, all of which arc reported higher in Dhaka during the 
monsoon season. 
5.4.8 Impact on sustainability 
In general, the snstainability of utban services in Dhaka is undermined by issues of utbanisation, the 
rapid growth of urban population, high demand for service, lack of local decision making, unequal 
access, and ownership of land, unplanned construction, environmental conditions, poor urban 
governance, and the low stock and quality of housing. 
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Score cards are intended to improve the accountability of service providers and act as a proxy for 
market indicators to stimulate competition and better responsiveness by service providers, as well as 
improve participatory planning and budgeting. Score cards need to be institutionalised and carried out 
on a sustained basis, in order to be more credible, and keep up the pressure on service providers. The 
findings of the scorecard should be used to create public awareness. The media has not been used 
effectively in Dhaka in relation to the governance scorecard, in terms of printable stories, media 
friendly press releases, making findings widely known, making it difficult for any agency to ignore 
scorecard findings, or else, used by service providers to respond to criticisms. There was a lack of 
publicity for the scorecard findings for example findings might have been disseminated through major 
newspapers, seminars and meetings, a wcbsite, and other publications. 
The poor follow-up to the scorecard can be explained by the lack of a strong culture of accountability 
in Bangladesh. Tiris means that public officials are not responsive to negative feedback, adverse 
publicity, or high levels of public dissatisfaction. Dhaka City Corporation is frequently taken to task by 
the press and public for inadequate services. The experience of the Public AITairs Centre in India 
shows that agencies require time to respond to report cards and to design the interventions necessary to 
address the issues, but also that this will only happen with sustained pressure from civil society. Thus, 
the fact that the governance scorecard has had no impact on service delivery in Dhaka is perhaps not 
surprising, given that the benefits of the report card take time to develop. However the time Jag 
involved means that it will be difficult to prove causation, that it was the scorecard, and not the wider 
context, that has made the difference to service delivery. 
The social relations in service delivery have changed in some instances as a result of accountability in 
service delivery. The provision of services to slum dwellers has begun to change the attitudes, 
behaviour and organisational culture of service providers. Partnerships between government line 
departments, NGOs and slum dwellers have proved effective in addressing and articulating the needs of 
the poor. Co-operation between the municipality and NGOs in service delivery has led to selectively 
better governance relations. NGO service provision has reduced slum dwellers dependence on patron 
client relations with intermediaries like mastaans (muscle men), or ward councillors64 • Orgattised 
citizen response to government deficiencies has put increased pressure on local government to deliver, 
but again depends on the ability for the state to develop a more participatory and transparent political 
culture. 
In Dhaka, user accountability to slum dwellers resulted in major gains in access, where, previously, 
services were unavailable or difficult and expensive to reach; however, sustainability is more 
problematic. For example, instances of official service delivery to slums are patchy and officially 
recognised service provision has not resulted in a formal recognition of rights in service delivery. 
Furthermore, when slum dwellers viewed payment for services as a step towards legalising their tenure, 
64 This has created conflict where mastaans have attempted to retain their vested interests by hijacking NGO 
projects. Resistance to mastaans depends on community pressure, much is risky where shun dwellers depend on 
mastaans for livelihoods. 
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several slums had been evicted. In all aspects of service delivery there is a dominance of elite (VIP) 
interests and a bias towards these interests in resource allocation. These vested interests have resisted 
greater transparency in the services that are delivered. For example, a (former) chairman of the 
DWASA board wanted to institute consumer satisfaction surveys but was blocked, as was an attempt to 
set up an information kiosk for customers with leaflets and information. Slum dwellers have a certain 
amount of power and influence in service delivery, but this is typically confrontational, unpredictable, 
and uncomfortable for service providers. 
DCC lacks the technical know how to improve service delivery, has no technical database for service 
delivery, no standards of service, insufficient financial resources and equipment. In response the 
Municipal Support Unit has been set up within Local Government Engineering Department to provide 
technical assistance, capacity building, performance monitoring, and institutional development to urban 
municipalities. As part of the programme, computers will be installed to enable e-mail communication 
and to improve the management of information, such as payment records, inventories of municipal 
infrastructure and technical data on distribution network65• The uuit also aims to change the attitudes of 
front line service providers and building their capacity however "in building a road if you work harder 
you can get the job done quicker. But it is not the same with capacity building ... In many cases the 
door is closed from the inside as regards capacity, building, people don't want to change" said an 
official. 
DCC employees have scope for discretion in service delivery due to the absence of penalties and the 
existence of loopholes in bureaucratic procedures. Wood (1994) points out there may be 'parallel 
rationalities' in service delivery including different sets of rules, which govern behaviour in different 
spheres and at different levels. As such, corruption may serve as a "strategy of the powerless" (Lewis, 
1996; 29), for example, patronage relationships with influential friends and relatives act as a source of 
social insurance in service delivery. Similarly, bribes may be a convenient way for overworked, low-
paid officials for dealing with queues and rationing output. Other front line service providers revealed 
a moral obligation to provide services to citizens regardless ofthe legal status of their dwellings, which 
demonstrates that ethical behaviour is not just an NGO characteristic. However, the continuity of key 
personnel undermines the sustainability of service delivery projects, principally, because the turnover 
of staff means that agencies lack the necessary institutional memory. 
Residents are made aware of their role in service delivery as well as responsibilities in paying their 
taxes. "We are of course accountable because they are paying money for the conveyance in the area. 
So of course we are accountable. But, at the same time, people should also take their responsibility" 
said a DCC Worker. For example, a respondent from DW ASA also pointed out that the quality 
deterioration in water supply is often an internal fault on the consumer side. In addition, shopkeepers 
and households put out their rubbish after the last rounds of cleaners have been made, which makes 
65 This refers to accurate plans, technical inventories of existing assets (age, condition etc.), adequate maps, as built 
drawings, details of service deficits, GIS systems for land registration; and computerised stores management. 
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residents think that their neighbourhood is not being cleaned. NGO initiatives are gaining ground by 
providing better conservancy in certain neighbourhoods; however, this has had the consequence of 
making the city as a whole look dirtier. This is because piles rubbish are left on street oomers awaiting 
municipal collection. 
NGO involvement in service delivery has reduced cases of acute water/waste management problems, 
but to sustain projects in the long run means adequate measures must be taken. Sustainability of eo-
produced urban services depends on the payment of capital loans, operation and maintenance, payment 
of bills, payment of operative's salary, and on-going technical support. There is also the need for high 
levels of co-ordination with DCC and D W ASA to resolve inter-departmental and inter-agency 
problems and to provide logistical and policy support. DSK found corruption in the applications for 
water connections, which often requires the payment of bribes, or else the application gets delayed. 
However, sustainability is fundamentally undermined by the lack of legal status of the project. The 
projects remain informal arrangements based on good will of individual officers, and have not resulted 
in a change in DW ASA or DCC policy. Sustainability in service delivery is undermined by the 
dependence of slum oommuuities on the good will ofDWASA staff and means they have no power to 
ensure that agreements are honoured. Threats of eeviction mean the potential loss of capital to NGOs 
and service providers and a lack of community interest in maintaining existing infrastructure. In the 
long term, viability depends on policy change in terms of sustained co-ordination and co-operation 
between several government agencies and NGOs, rights to services for the urban poor, and de-linking 
legal land tenure from service delivery. 
5.4.9 Hypothesis testing 
It was hypothesised that 'accountability arrangements willimprove the outputs of urban services and 
will improve the relative chances of sustainability'. The findings of this case study have proved the 
hypothesis. The governance scorecard has not yet had any obvious impact on the techuical 
performance of urban services. There is resistance on the part of the most powerful people oi Dhaka 
city against reforms designed to decisively challenge the status quo. NGO participation in service 
delivery has improved access and the performance of urban services in slums and other areas. The 
problems of urban services in Dhaka highlighted in the research include nnder-resourcing, poor pay 
and conditions, politicisation, and no available technical data on networks. Respondents were most 
satisfied with the overall provision, quality about roads and paving, sanitation and refuse collection; 
and information about streetlights, drains and community halls. They are least satisfied with overall 
provision/quality and information about drains, community halls and streetlights. The services reported 
with most problems are water supply, drains, and streetlights. The majority of respondents were fairly 
dissatisfied with local government. Most respondents described services as 'unresponsive', 
'undependable' and 'inefficient'. Respondents were most likely to say 'service providers don't take 
complaints seriously' 'its difficult to get improvements', 'service providers don't care about people like 
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me'; except for sanitation, where people mostly said 'service providers are more responsive now', 
'happy to hear users ideas' and are 'friendly and helpful'. Attempts to improve the influence of 
service users in Dhaka has meant new ways to deliver service and create new nonns within Dhaka City 
Corporation, and have the potential to create public pressure from below to improve service delivery. 
5.4.1 0 Conclusion 
The literature review (presented in Chapter 2) found that increasing user influence could ensure good 
and responsive service delivery. Community participation and eo-production in service delivery has 
increased opportunities for service users to exercise voice and exit in service delivery, to get involved 
in priority setting, planning and decision making, together with a greater degree of control over 
resources. Table 50 below summarises the findings of the fieldwork. 
Table 50: Summary of the Dhaka case study. 
Dhaka 
What The level of services varied throughout the city. Respondents claimed access to services was not 
entitlements do generally a problem, although access to community halls, drains and sanitation was higher in non~ 
citizens have to deprived areas. 98% of respondents had grid electricity. Urban Management Policy Statement in 
urban services? 1988 states municipalities should give priority to slum dwellers. 
How is Report cards are used to get users views on public services and communicated to authorities 
accountability hopefully stimulating agency refonns. Although these have been generally unsuccessful in Dhaka. 
demonstrated? The arrangements have been successful where CCCs. grassroots pressure groups are used to promote 
integrity in services. NGOs are involved in the delivery of urban services as well as mediating on 
behalf of slum dwellers with formal authorities Co-production of service delivery has had :spin-off:s 
for user accountability particularly in slums. NGOs and journalists have key role in exposing cases 
of corruption in service deliverv. 
What is the Respondents were most satisfied with the overall provision, quality of roads, sanitation and refuse~ 
impact on user and information about lights, drains and halls. They are least satisfied with overall provision/quality 
satisfaction? and information about drains. haJis. and lights. The services with most problems are water, drains. 
and streetJights. The majority are fairly dissatisfied with local government. Most respondents 
described services as 'Wlresponsive', 'undependable' and 'inefficient'. Respondents were most 
likely to say 'service providers don 'I take complaints seriously' 'its difficult to gel improvements', 
'service providers don't care about people like me'; except for sanitation, where people mostly said 
'service providers are nwre responsive now', 'happy to hear users ideas'. and are 'friendly and 
lrelpfof. 
What is the While the scorecard has not yet had any obvious impact on the technical performance of urban 
impact on services. NGO participation in service delivery has improved access and performance of urban 
performance? services in slums. The problems of urban services in Dhaka highlighted in the research include 
under·resourcing, poor pay and conditions, politicisation, and no technical data on network (no 
maps, as built drawings, data base). 
How sustainable Attempts to improve the influence of service users in Dhaka has meant new ways to deliver service, 
are services? created new norms within Dhaka City Corporation, and has the potential to create public pressure to 
improve service delivery. Institutional change has been obstructed by lack of political will. which 
has reduced autonomy in decision-making and undennined continuity in management. There is 
resistance on the part of the most powerful people of Dhaka city against reforms, and reflects the 
inability of the intended beneficiaries of reforms to decisively challenge the status quo. 
Hypothesis Based on the findings from the fieldwork, the case has proved the hypothesis that accountability 
testing arrangements will improve the outputs of urban services and will improve the relative chance of 
sustainability. 
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5.5 Managerial Accountability; Seoul, South Korea 
5.5.1 Introduction 
This case study is an example of managerial accountability demonstrated by reforms to the hierarchical 
relationships of reporting in service provider agencies and an improvement to the responsiveness of 
service providers. Following the IMF crisis in South Korea in 1997, Mayor Goh implemented a reform 
or Seoul Metropolitan Government on the basis of zero tolerance of corruption. Staff were to be 
regularly rotated and individual responsibility over a specific area was abolished to remove scope for 
discretionary administrative behaviour. Transparency was increased through 'benign ethical 
competition' between departments in city administration, together with a package of anti-corruption 
measures. This case study makes particular reference to the urban services water supply and waste 
management. 
5.5.2 Policy context 
The IMF crisis in 1997 acted as catalyst to create a more effective, efficient, and transparent 
government in South Korea. Various conditions were attached to the IMF bailout in 1997, including 
financial austerity, trade liberalisations, as well as a package of good governance and anti-<:orruption 
measures. The Korean government established the Presidential Committee for Administrative Reform 
to eliminate inefficiency, abolish unnecessary administrative regulations, increase salaries for public 
servants, promotion of a citizen-oriented administration, greater information disclosure and the greater 
use oflnfonnation Communication Technologies to create a digital administration. The World Bank 
provided a grant for developing a National Anti-Corruption Programme, which involved administrative 
reforms in six corruption prone areas (construction, housing, tax administration, police work, 
environmental management, food and entertainment) 
Seoul Metropolitan Government (SMG) adopted a package nf anti-<:errnption measures in 1999 under 
its second elected mayor, Goh Kun. SMG created a number of laws to support transparency of 
government activities. These include a White Paper of City Administrative Reform (Seoul 
Metropolitan Government, 2002), New Management, Open Administration, Transparency 
Administration, New Seoul; White Paper on Administrative Reform (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 
200 I), Reinventing Seoul City Government (Seoul Metropolitan Government, 200 I) and The 
Establishment and Management of SMG Integrity Pact Ombudsmen Regulations (Regulation 3 133) 
(Seoul Metropolitan Government, 2000). In the preface of the White Paper on City Administrative 
Refonn, Goh Kun said "More efficient and productive management strategies were urgently called for 
in every sector to overcome the [ 1997] crisis. Within the SMG we were also required to downsize our 
bloated organisations and make it productive to effectively cope with the changes arising due to 
globalisation, localisation and the increased use of information. We have had to inculcate new market 
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strategies into our minds to remake &oul a city of the new millennium" (Seoul Metropolitan 
Government, 2002). 
Specific accountability initiatives in Seoul included Citizen Evaluation Systems, Online Procedures 
ENhancement for Civil Application (OPEN), an Anti-Corruption Index, Corruption Report Card to 
Mayor, Citizens Ombudsmen Systems and residents requests for inspection system in cases of 
suspected waste of budget or administrative mistakes at gu level. These initiatives were a response to 
the policy objectives of a clean and small government, results based government, creating competition 
in public service, increasing responsiveness to customers in service delivery, strengthen the competitive 
edge of Seoul as an international city, and to foster public participation in policy making. 
5.5.3 Seoul 
Seoul is split in two by the Han River and is encircled by mountain ranges. The city has a population 
of about 11 million people and 3,540 households (in 2000), this represents more than 24% of the 
national population. Seoul has experienced rapid economic growth and urbanisation in recent years but 
suffers problems associated with residential segregation, housing shortages, traffic congestion, 
environmental degradation and uneven distribution of urban services. The population is typically 
young, tech-friendly, and highly educated66• Seoul has 25 gus (autonomous districts) and 522 dongs 
(local areas within gu district). 
In total, I 00 questionnaires were completed in two Gus of Seoul; 50 in Seodaemun-gu and 50 in the 
Ganguam-gn, I 0 of which were taken in Nine Dragon Village. It was decided that rather than 
approaching people in their homes, the enumerators wonld wait in the reception areas of the Gu offices 
and asked visitors to complete a questionnaire there, however, the enumerators did travel to Nine 
Dragon Village to complete I 0 questionnaires with residents. Gangnam-gu is one of the wealthiest 
areas of Seoul, however, there are also a number of squatter areas within the gu. Seodaemun-gu and 
Nine Dragon Village by comparison are deprived areas. Seodaemun-gu is in the north of the city, part 
of old Seoul. Nine Dragon Village is an infonnal settlement ofbinilhaus in Ganguam-gu, and is where 
the authorities resettled many of the squatters evicted before the Olympic Games in 1988. 
Respondents were asked which of a list of citizenship activities they had performed (see Graph 17). 
Most people had voted in an election, talked to neighbours on local issues, and attended a public 
meeting. Those in Nine Dragon Village and Seodaemun (60%) were more likely to have protested than 
those in Gangnam (33%). 
The majority of respondents (56%) are happy about where they live, except in Nine Dragon Village 
where 70% of respondents were unhappy living there. More women (60%) than men (52%) are happy 
66 Seoul has 52 universities and colleges and has more PhDs per hesd of population than any other country. 
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about where they live. When asked whether they would like to move, the majority said Yes (52%); 
slightly more men (58%) than women (46%) wanted to move. The majority of people living in 
deprived areas stated they would like to move (Nine Dragon Village 70o/o, Seodaemun 56%), whereas, 
the majority in non-deprived area Gangnam (50%) stated they did not. 
5.5.4 Entitlements to urban services 
The South Korean Constitution (Republic of Korea, 1987) guarantees citizens a right to live a life 
worthy of humans. Accordingly, the national government has adopted policy measures such as welfare 
programmes, housing policies and other promotional measures related to the environment and health 
issues of people in marginal areas. 
The IMF Crisis of 1997 had a negative impact on entitlements to services in Seoul. The bailout led to 
falling incomes, unemployment, homelessness, falling house values and conditions, the standard of 
living declined substantially and levels of absolute poverty rose. In light of this experience, the 
Government enacted the National Basic Livelihood Security Act in 2000. 
The economic crisis meant that pre-existing ineqnalities in the distribution of housing became 
entrenched and housing in Seoul remains a divisive social problem. Forms of rent in Seoul such as 
chouse system (where renter makes a lump sum deposit of money at the beginning of occupancy which 
is refunded at end) and sakwolse (one off deposit from which rent is deducted) make homelessness 
inevitable for those who cannot save the deposit. Changes in tenure precipitated by the 1997 crisis are 
beoljip, renting a small space in basements and attics, or ilse, a daily rate for those on the lowest 
income and homeless. Social housing is typically a public private partnership between central 
government and private constrnction companies. Such schemes have been criticised for ignoring the 
urban poor, who have limited rent-paying capacity. 
Recently, exceptionally substandard residential areas of called binilhaus ('vinyl houses') have been 
created by people who have been forcibly evicted from housing renewal areas or moon villages67 • 
KOCER (2001) estimates a minimum of36,281 vinyl houses in Seoul. People living in these informal 
settlements are 'uulicensed residents' as they are trespassing on private, city or state land, and so are 
vulnerable to demolitions and crackdowns. Ironically, many vinyl commnnities are found on vacant 
pieces of land in Gangnam Gu district, the wealthiest area in Seoul. Vinyl houses tend to be privately 
owned, or residents pay monthly rent. Interviews revealed that the main reasons for people living in 
vinyl houses were because of unexpected shocks like losing a job, or because their last house was in an 
area earmarked for redevelopment. The average income of a family living in a vinyl house, is about 
67 Moon villages (daldongnes or sandongnaes) are shantytowns built on mountainsides on the outskirts of Seoul, 
so-called because they are so high up the mountainside they are close to the moon. Iu the 1980's the majority of 
moon villages were redeveloped into high rise apartments, yet a few remain. 
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1,160, 000 won, slightly above the government estimated minimum living standard of 980,000 
won/month. 
As binilhans residents are illegally occnpying land, there is no obligation on the authorities to supply 
services, although, the more established settlements appear to have water supply, communal toilets and 
electricity connections. Some unlicensed residences in Seoul have become legalised through the 
'Securing Address Movement', which notably resulted in a high court decision for people living in 
vinyl honses in the Songpa district to register as residents of the gu. There are also plans to expand the 
application of the 2001 National Minimnm Living Standards Security Act to those without a clear 
address and confers on these residents minimal rights; theoretically, citizens can also sue the 
government for infringement of basic rights (Constitution Article 10-37). Also in theory, compensation 
and temporary housing is available to victims of forced evictions from private housing development 
projects, as well as all to those who are homeless or living in 'vinyl houses'. 
From interviews with service providers and observations, it was found that in the Gus under 
investigation all citizens have access to water and electricity and sanitation. However, levels of access 
varied widely. Respondents from non-deprived areas were more likely to have water borne sewerage, 
household water connections, piped drainage and had properties set back from paved streets. Whereas, 
in deprived areas, people were more likely to have pit latrines or commnnallatrines, public standpipes, 
open drainage, and a narrow road to their honses (see Graph 18). All households are reported to have 
electricity connections and some kind of refuse collection. When asked whether they paid for services, 
the majority stated they did (72%), however, those in Nine Dragon Village (60%) were less likely to 
pay for services than respondents in other parts of Gangnam (78%). The observation checklist 
supported these findings, as shown in Table 51 (found in Appendix 1). 
5.5.5 Accountability arrangements 
The military government of South Korea (1961-1987) has been implicated in creating rent seeking in 
Korean society, whereby, chaebols68 were able to make private payments to public officials, in order to 
influence formulation of laws, rules and regulations. Presidents Chun Doo-Hwan (1981-1987), and 
Roh Tae-Woo (1988-1992), used their presidency to accnmnlate huge personal wealth. Furthermore, 
socio-cultural practices in South Korea, such as Chonji (money as a token of appreciation), gift giving 
and Kwan-Si (acquaintanceship cnlture), make transactions vulnerable to corruption. This corruption, 
together with economic growth, is said to have led to the IMF crisis: President Kim Dae Jung made 
anti-corruption a priority in coming to office in 199769, as did Mayor Gob Kun in Seoul in 1998. The 
key reforms related to urban services in Seoul are shown below in Table 52. The effects of these 
findings on the theoretical framework of the literature review are summarised in Table 53 (found in 
Appendix 1). 
68 Conglomerates dominated by single families with control of markets. 
69 However he was plagued by corruption scandals, most notably, two of his sons were arrested for allegedly 
taking bribes causing President Kim to resigu in May 2002. 
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Table 52: Selected reforms in SMG of relevance to urban services. 
Index 
Report Card 
the Mayor 
Public 
Procurement 
Services 
system 
with Mayor 
who have an application or signed a 
contract with SMG in corruption prone areas 
(sanitation. housing, taxation, fire control and 
construction). receive a postcard which they 
mail back if they have experienced wrongdoing 
in their dealings. The Mayor orders 
investigation of the reported cases,. appropriate 
punitive measures are imposed if corruption 
occurred. and the person who filed a complaint 
system was 
purchasing goods and services and 
arranging contracts for construction projects. 
This system reduces unnecessary meetings 
between contracting officer and contractors. 
enables electronic transfer of money to make 
payment procedures corruption-free. has also 
made procurement more competitive and 
publishes infonnation relating to pennits and 
licenses. Once the citizen has filed an 
application for a service with the Civil Affairs 
Department, the official posts the details of the 
application on the OPEN site; using the intemet. 
the citizen can trace progress of applications for 
pennits and approvals online, find out who is 
handling the case and whether the 
an infonnal discussion, where government 
officials can hear in more detail about citizen's 
around a round table. 
Managerial reforms 
61 
cases for sanitation-related businesses involved 
with waste water or waste materials, and 46 for 
water supply (;()llstruction companies. In 2000 
there were 72 cards for sanitation and 102 for 
water. In 2001. there were 44 report cards 
regarding sanitation and 61 for water supply. The 
system is intended to identi1)r corruption. and 
make corrupt officials aware that any 
irregularities will come to light. 
requests to 
electronic tendering, and payment is processed on 
line. Automation has simplified bidding 
procedure, improved competition, avoided 
preferential treatment,. non-arbitrary behaviour, 
open and transparency. strict punitive measures 
for wrongdoing. and officials take a 'pledge of 
integrity•. 
for 
and sanction of excreta based business (a turnkey 
project for water treatment plans. and 
sewage/wastewater processing). waste 
incineration facilities and waste disposal business. 
permit, and contracts for facility maintenance. e.g. 
sewage facility maintenance and drain channel 
maintenance. 
sector 
arranged to discuss water 
sewerage supply. construction of incinerators and 
water reservoirs in mountains. 
Mayor Goh's reform of Seoul Metropolitan Government's administration was explicitly based on the 
New Public Management and customer-<~riented government reforms of the UK and USA, under 
Thatcher, Major, and Reagan. Administrative and institntional reform involved deregulation, 
incorporating the competition principle into public service, regulatory reform, reducing public officials 
183 
An investigation of improvements to urban services through accountability 
discretionary power, perfonnance based budgeting, prevention of patron-dient relations, contracting 
out, increased efficiency in resource use, cut backs to the number of ciry employees, management by 
objective, citizen evaluation of administrative systems, benchmarking, perfonnance based budget 
systems, and zero tolerance of corruption. SMG set up an Administrative Reform Committees and 
Bureau of Administrative Reform under Mayor Goh. Restructuring of SMG involved combining the 
Roads Bureau and Sewage Bureau to produce the Roads and Sewage Bureau; the Sewage 
Administration Division, Infrastructure Management Division, and Civil Engineering Division were all 
eliminated and Water Quality Control Division was created. The management reforms of SMG 
promoted contracting out and privatisation. For example, in 1999, in Gangnam-gu and Gang-dong 
water supply offices were contracted out to the private sector, and, in 2000, Tancheon Sewage 
Treatment Plant was also contracted out (which led to a saving of 2.1 billion won in operational costs 
and the workforce was reduced to 47 people). 
The behaviour of service providers was tackled through strengthened ethical codes, greater individual 
responsibility, central investigation, surveillance, change to department structures and officials were 
punished for each wrong-doing. The changes have created a horizontal organisation within Seoul 
Metropolitan Government rather than the traditional bureaucratic pyramid organisation. Mayor Goh 
encouraged officials to become performance oriented by changing personnel management, introducing 
private sector pay levels, setting standards in appointment and promotion, welfare payments, overtime 
pay, travel expenses and performance bonus incentives for officials, (for example, for those who find 
records of unpaid taxes or report cases of corruption). These policies have attempted to change the 
paradigm in SMG of reward for years of service rather than job performance, which has created high 
cost and low efficiency in the public sector. Department heads are on performance contracts, with 
bonuses linked to achievements. Seoul Metropolitan Government has adopted a system of performance 
measurements that rate services on the basis of results achieved. The perfonnance based ranking of 
service providers is published in the press, and the best managers are given monetary benefits, and also 
gain prestige. The administration has been made more transparent through 'benign ethical competition' 
between departments. These reforms are part of a critical policy agenda aimed to create result -based 
government, and to increase responsiveness to customers in the service delivery process. 
Demand driven reforms 
The Internet has become very popular and highly accessible in South Korean society through central 
government financial support, and deregulation of the telecom sector. South Korea leads the world in 
broadband usage: over 60% of households now have broadband, and over 80% of households have 
Internet access. The high rate of adoption can be explained by the popularity of mobile 
tclcconununications, mobile Internet use, online gaming, music file downloads, dot corn registrations, 
and cyber banking with consumers. Seoul Metropolitan Government has used the popularity of t11e 
Internet to create a small, more cost effective and efficient e-government, which delivers better service 
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to citizens70 as well as a more participatory 'virtual' society. The Internet has also been adopted as a 
form of surveillance for monitoring municipal staff, preventing unaccountable, arbitrary decisions and 
delays in service. Greater information disclosure reduces the information asymmetries that create 
moral hazard for officials. 
OPEN is a web portal that publishes information relating to civil applications for the issuing of permits 
and licenses in areas that have been particularly susceptible to corruption in the past, such as the 
granting of contracts of waste management companies. Once the citizen has filed an application for a 
service with the Civil Affairs Department, the official posts the details of the application on the OPEN 
web site. The citizen can trace the progress of applications for permits and approvals online, find out 
who is handling the case and whether the permit/approval has been granted. Advertising of the OPEN 
system has been done through leaflets, stickers, posters, subway train advertisements, electronic signs, 
guides on how to use the SYstem; and prizes for those who visit the OPEN site. 
In total, 5, 000 employees in the 485 city departments dealing with applications have been trained to 
operate the SYStem. City officials did not wholeheartedly welcome the OPEN SYStem, in part, because 
it would reduce their discretionary power and increase their workload (Ahn, 2003). The use of the 
Internet has also enabled the Audit and Inspections Bureau of SMG to conduct cyber inspections of the 
work of officials. Furthermore, a compoter program checks automatically to see whether there has 
been a delay or irregularity in someone's work and a notice sent to the official assigned to the case. 
Greater information disclosure has also strengthened citizen's vigilance and control in order to create a 
more predictable administration. It is possible for users to see who is in charge of their application, 
together with a telephone number and an emai\ address. Increased surveillance in 2000 resulted in 42 
irregularities being detected, I disciplinary punishment, 9 warnings and 32 corrections. Incentives 
have also been adopted, for example, prizes for public officials who best input the data (84 prizes were 
given in 2000). 
The Internet also increases the convenience for citizens and reduces the time and cost required to 
interact with government. Seoul Metropolitan Government promotes the use of Internet through 
materials like posters, brochures, news releases, stationary and supports access through free online 
terminals throughout the city, in addition to the nnmerous Internet cafes that can be found in the city. 
However, such a heavy reliance on IT, at the expense of paper based SYstems is perhaps shortsighted. 
In 2003, a virus completely paralysed Korea's entire Internet service, causing financial loss for local 
businesses and inconvenience for Internet users. Some gu offices have provided IT support SYStem for 
the handicapped or blind. 
Following the transition to democracy in South Korea, civil society continues to exert influence over 
government in a variety of ways at the municipal level, at the Gu (ward level), dong (neighbourhood) 
70 
"£-government refers to the use of information and conummication teclmologies to improve the efficiency, 
effectiveness, transparency and accountability of government. 
185 
An investigation of improvements to urban services through accountability 
and ban (street or block) level. At the municipal level, participation occnrs through a number of 
arrangements: assemblies that monitor how budgets are spent, city hall meetings, resident requests for 
audit and investigation of local administration, as well as participation in committees set up by SMG, 
(such as the Citizens Committee for a Green Seoul); Citizen Petition can also be used to initiate local 
policy change, or resident can vote on serious local govermnent matters, (but this has never been 
undertaken in practice). People can also visit local Gu and dong level administrative offices if they 
have problems with services in their neighbourhood as well as attend Bansanghoe. These are widely 
held monthly meetings to discuss ban (street level) matters, report problems, and promote good 
relations between neighbours. These meetings are unofficial but residents are encouraged to attend. 
Organised civil society also serves as a check on the influence of the state and private companies, and 
monitors corruption in Korean society. NGOs, such as 11 Korea and the Citizens Coalitions for 
Economic Justice, secured the 'Real Names Financial Transaction Systems', (a ban on the use of false 
names in all financial transactions to prevent tax evasion and hiding of illegally collected money, in 
1993); the 'Freedom ofluformation Act'; the 'Administrative Procedures Act' (to secure transparency 
and democratic administrative procedures); the 'Act on Disclosure of Information by Public Agencies'; 
the 'Prevention of Money Laundering Act'; and 'Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Law' (pending in 
national assembly), as well as campaigning for the disclosure of political funds; and launched a 'losing 
campaign' against corrupt candidates fighting the 2000 General Elections. Another NGO Peoples 
Solidarity for Participatory Democracy has launched a minority shareholder campaign to increase the 
transparency of corporate management, and monitor freedom of information and budget misuse under 
the Sunshine Project. 
Integrity Pacts were developed as a public private partnership between SMG and the NGO Peoples 
Solidarity for Participatory Democracy. The Integrity Pact system was implemented in 1999, and 
entails an exchange of written pledges (a Letter of Special Note for Bidding) from SMG and bidders 
for public projects. The parties are required to state that bribes will not be offered or accepted in the 
contract process, bidders who have broken their pledges will have their contracts terminated and will be 
disqualified from bidding for 2 years for municipal projects. Integrity Pacts are used to safegnard 
public procurement, privatisation and government license or concessions. All private companies 
operating urban services such as waste collection, water meter reading, and management of Tancheon 
Sewage Treatment Plant had to sign an integrity pact. An official stated that "Before Integrity Pacts a 
company might want to save money by giving bribes, this led to poor construction and buildings have 
collapsed. With the Integrity Pact, people can expect the right standard of construction now". 
Integrity Pacts are monitored by 5 Citizen Ombudsmen, jointly appointed by SMG and NGOs, who 
have powers to investigate suspected cases of corruption in bidding, selection of contractors, and 
construction. Citizen Ombudsmen are intended to overcome the limitations of in-house investigations, 
to secure fairness and transparency in administrative procedure, and eubance public trust from citizen's 
point of view. If residents suspects illegal or unfair administrative procedures or misuse of budget, 
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they can make a reqnest for an inspection by the Citizen Ombudsmen, provided that they have a 
petition of 200 resident's signatures. In 2000, Integrity Pact Ombudsmen were used to study the 
validity of project selection, appropriateness of repair techniques, fairness and transparency of order 
placement procedures related to the Chonho Bridge Repair Project. 
Past irregularities in procurement have included preferential treatment of certain firms during the award 
of contracts, or the undue influence of firms when preparing specifications, preferential access to tender 
information, treating customers in a discourteons and highhanded way, issuing false documents, 
intentional delays in the process of placing orders, pre-determining successful bidders, and substandard 
performance due to excessive subcontracting. For example: -
• A mayor and chief of staff received gratuities and gifts worth 80 million won from a waste 
processing company in 2001, in return for permission to do business in their district. 
• A company asked the former chief of staff of a municipal government to help them gain the private 
contract for the cleaning service. Having granted the favour, the former chief of staff received 
gratuities and gifts worth 142 million won. 
• A cleaning service company overcharged a Gu with an excessively priced contract, which resulted 
in the budgetary waste of I billion won. 
South Korea has been keen to share the experience of Seoul in combating corruption with other cities 
to build credibility in the eyes of citizens, donors, trading partners and foreign investors. For example, 
by hosting the Seoul Anti-corruption Symposium 2001 and the 11th International Anti-corruption 
Conference held in 2003. In particular, SMG has made the link between transparency, accountability 
and e-government, and has highlighted the potential of online procedures to promote good governance. 
The customer-provider relationship 
The service provider-Qlstomer relationship has become more responsive to citizens of Seoul through 
market research in government departments and agencies; these arrangements include Citizen 
Evaluative Survey and Saturday Date with Mayor. These arrangements are part of a policy agenda 
aimed to create a results based government. 
The Citizen Satisfaction survey, conducted by Gallop Korea, began in 1999, and includes a current 
total of 26 municipal services such as bus and subway, waste collection, water services, tax and fee 
services, and public utilities. The survey is conducted bi-annually and the results are distributed to 
department heads, elected officials and news media and used in preparations of budget for next 
financial year. The aim is to create competition between departments, and thereby raise the quality of 
municipal services. Monetary incentives are provided for Gus and departments to do well in the 
survey. Department heads are on performance contracts and an annual incentive bonus is offered based 
on the citizen satisfaction survey. There is a program to develop awards for employee productivity 
improvements, and responsiveness-linked innovations within departments. 
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Interviewees reported that, overall, older residents tended to give higher satisfaction scores, perhaps 
because they depend on free public services such as welfare assistance, whereas residents in gus with 
higher budgets have higher expectations, which reportedly leads to lower satisfaction. However, 
questions have been raised about the reliability, validity and usefulness of these surveys. Officials 
claimed that the average citizen does not have sufficient knowledge of service delivery on which to 
base an accurate judgement of service delivery, 'citizens are not very reliable' in their satisfaction 
mtings. For example, if there are newspaper reports about the quality of water supply then satisfaction 
levels drop, even if the claims are false. This has led SMG to seek the satisfaction scores from 
professionals who have an understanding of service delivery and are more informed about the issues 
involved. It seems that, although Seoul Metropolitan Government has implemented reforms to ensure 
that service delivery is more consumer responsive, there is still a top-down, 'we know best' attitude. 
Where it is not feasible to improve the quality of the services, SMG has adopted a strategy of making 
residents more 'mentally satisfied' with the experience of using a service, for example, by re-branding 
tap water and putting walking escalators in subway stations. 
'Mental satisfaction' is also a key concern of the Saturday Date with Mayor. This initiative started in 
2002, and there have been 368 meetings on issues such as housing, construction, city planning, 
transportation, urban services and welfare. Saturday date with the Mayor is an opportunity for the 
'grassroots' to meet city government. The citizen can apply for a meeting with the Mayor through the 
Internet, phone, e-mails or by visiting city hall. Two topics are discussed per meeting and these are 
selected on the basis of number of applications or urgency of the case, and 2 or 3 citizens are invited to 
talk about each topic. The kinds of complaints that have been raised of relevance to this research 
were:~ 
• 22 complaints were received about waste collection. Citizens want harsher punishments for fly 
tippers, or for their rubbish to be collected once a day. Residents have also complained about the 
incinerators in their gus and want them moved. 
• Households on the North of the Han have also complained about low water pressure, yet plans to 
resolve this problem by building a new water plant in the mountains has also prompted complaints 
from environmentalists. 
• I 0 complaints have been received about drainage in the snmmer. 
It was stated that a range of citizens have applied for a Saturday Date with the Mayor and recently 
more students have been applying. However «It is the underprivileged who most often come to the 
Saturday Date because the privileged know where they have to go and who can help them" said one 
interviewee. Some government officials have been frustrated by the Saturday Date initiative as they 
have routinely been meeting with citizens to hear their complaints as part of their job description, yet it 
was acknowledged that a meeting with the mayor is a good way of closing down problems. For 
example when a citizen wants an incinerator moved, the official can explain why this is impractical but 
citizens will not accept this answer until he meets the mayor: "dates are to do with citizens feelings ... 
citizens feel when they meet the mayor they have had a resulr. Officials suggested that the Date with 
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the Mayor is a mechanism aimed at resolving civil grievances and increasing satisfaction, without 
actually solving the problem. The Date is a public relations device that helps people ventilate their 
problems with urban services, thereby reducing the likelihood of a more serious confrontation between 
city government and residents. 
Complaint redress 
Dealing with ineffective and corrupt service delivery has meant improving the redress of grievances 
through complaints procedures. Where once complaints with urban services were an opportunity to get 
bribes, complaints procedures have changed as part of the reforms to become more consumer 
responsive. For example, cnstomer complaints are registered, which enables complainants to track 
redress of the complaint over time. There have also been attempts to standardise or simplify complaint 
procedures, and attention is paid to the number of complaints registered and addressed, the time taken 
to address complaints, the outcomes of complaints and whether complaints are solved to the consumers 
satisfaction. In Gangnam-gu a response to a complaint is guaranteed in less than 30 minutes of making 
the complaint by phone, fax, interne!, and a fact-finding team is sent to deal with the problem in less 
than 3 hours. The emphasis in resolving complaints is on the citizen's convenience, for example, road 
repair is carried out at night to avoid traffic jams. Interviewees from this gu defined a good service as 
when citizens no longer complain, but if there are still people complaining in an area then they know 
they still have work to do. 
The Seoul Citizen's Charter sets standards for customer service in Seoul, for example, the 'customer' 
will be seen within 10 minutes of arrival at City Hall, be greeted with a smile and kindness. If the 
citizen phones City Hall, the phone will be picked up within 3 rings, if a disabled or elderly citizen has 
an appointment they will be met in front of City Hall, and someone will be available to fill in any 
applications forms for them. Civil servants receive twice yearly training in customer service. Notably, 
officials aim to avoid customers visiting City Hall more than twice with reference to a particular 
problem. SMG aim to minimise form filling and inconvenience to citizens, and also offer a 'complaint 
counselling' service whereby a meeting with an official can be arranged within 8 hours. Once a 
complaint has been resolved the office makes a 'happy' call/e-mail to confmn customer satisfaction 
with the management of their complaint. If a customer visits the office or telephones and they feel 
employees have been unkind (kindness is an indicator of good service) they will receive a 5,000 won 
gift and the penalty for unkind employees would be 3 day special training. The Waterworks Customer 
Service Charter sets targets that offer a level of customer service equal to that of private businesses, and 
is working to reduce the time needed to process complaints by 30%. Furthermore it pledges to dispatch 
a waterworks service teams within an hour of a civil complaint and will complete repair work on time. 
The Water department also operates a 'Customer Satisfaction Assurance Systems' by calling citizens 
who have made a complaint with service operation to check whether they are satisfied \vith the 
outcome of their complaint. 
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In addition to these arrangements, there are also ways to make complaints more anonymously. Seoul 
Metropolitan Government and Gu offices operate a 'yellow ball system'. In the front lobby of the 
government offices there is a container of yellow sponge balls and another container for complaints. If 
customers are unhappy with the service they received when visiting City Hall or gu offices they take a 
yellow ball and put it in the complaint box. The target for public offices is to receive less than 2 
balls/complaints a month. Complaints can also be made via the SMG webpage. One public official 
thought that the "advantage ofinternet complaint system is that a citizen can complain harshly when 
they need to complain, when you meet someone face to face you will be nice, even though you have a 
problem. With Internet, the City Hall can reply quicker and there are no bad feelings". 
Accountability assessment 
Information: Most service provider agencies have web sites, which they use to publish a variety of 
information, and e-mail is becoming the standard means of communication with City Hall and Gu 
offices. Ganguam-gu web site hosts a Question and Answer Bulletin Board for residents, and Tuesday 
executive staff meetings are transmitted on the Internet for residents. The Gu office has adopted e-mail 
polling of residents before making key decisions and offers an incentive for citizens to vote (provides a 
credit of 500 won for cell phone bills). At the city level, residents' opinion is typically canvassed 
through public relations, surveys, emails and public opinion polling. SMG has promoted its reforms by 
advertising, leaflets, stickers, posters, subway train adverts, guides, newspapers, and broadcast media. 
Staff are trained to be more organised and responsive to requests for information. However, 
commentators are concerned with the potential for an 'information nnderclass' to emerge. 67% of 
respondents stated that they were aware of their entitlements to services (see Graph 19), in particular, 
those respondents from deprived areas as well as those with low incomes. Nonetheless, only 23% of 
respondents had ever used the information they knew about service delivery to get improvements (see 
Graph 20). 
Power: Information Technology and opinion canvassing has been used to create predictable 
administration by strengthening citizen vigilance and control. Not all respondents were satisfied with 
these arrangements, some felt that they are only "for showy purpose:/' or participation is taking place 
''just out of forma/if)!' rather than to effect real change in service delivery. SMG's emphasis on 
gathering data from citizens individually is less good at bnilding citizen solidarity or collective power, 
and tends to only focus on those issues raised or defined by individual citizens. An accountability 
strategy that relies on the use of IT may exacerbate the digital divide between afiluent and poor, 
meaning increased transparency and accountability in government is only for the wealthy. The 
approach taken by SMG appears based on rectifying individual problems rather than a systematic 
approach of dealing with the source of complaints. NGOs in the anti<Orruption movement have a key 
role in defending the rights of those who live in informal areas, bnilding awareness around the issues 
highlighted and pressing for resolution, as well as holding public officials to account. 
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Action: Effort was made in Seoul to counter the publics negative perception of public agencies and 
lack of trust after the 1997 crisis, to make it easier and more convenient for citizens to deal with City 
Hall, (e.g. Internet applications, reduced form fl.llinglvisits to offices), and to bring citizens closer to 
government (in a carefully managed way). Reform of SMG was a political imperative and there was 
public suppurt for reform, as well as intense pressure to produce outcomes. Policies have been 
designed to fit the specific focus and objectives of anti-rorruption reform. The majority of reforms in 
Seoul have the objectives of preventing, (rather than detecting), corruption, limits scope for employees 
to exercise discretion, increase transparency and improve procedures, as well as increasing ioformation 
disclosures through performance evaluation. Yet, accountability has made service providers jobs more 
difficult, added formality to existing procedures, as well as increasing workload and work processing 
time. 
5.5.6 Impact on user satisfaction 
General attitudes to services 
Respondents were asked whether they had noticed any improvements in service delivery over the last 5 
years, since Mayor Gob Kun implemented greater consumer responsiveness in Seoul Metropolitan 
Government (see Graph 21). The majority of respondents (68%) had noticed a small improvement. 
These respondents were in the main from Gangnam-gn (78%), with a high monthly income. 
Respondents showed no gender difference in their answers, but the majority who thought there had 
been a small improvement were aged 31-35 (86%). However, those with a low income, who paid 
monthly rent or lived in a deprived area were more likely to say that there had been a big improvement 
in service delivery. 
When asked how they would describe services the words most often selected in both deprived and non-
deprived areas are 'unresponsive' (43%), 'effictive' (38%) and 'undependable' (29%). The majority of 
respondents agreed with the statement: 'service providers don '/take complaints seriously' (60%), 'it's 
difficult to get improvements in services' (42%). Respondents were also relatively more positive about 
service delivery with the statements: 'service providers are friendly and helpful' (23%), and that 
'service providers keep users informed about/he progress ofcomp/oint' (15%). 
Table 54 shows the ways respondents thought that service providers are most accountable, 43% of 
respondents thought that they were most accountable for responding to users complaints, particularly 
respondents from deprived areas (see Graph 22). However, respondents from non-deprived areas 
thought service providers should be more accountable for providing a user-friendly service, and for 
consulting users on their needs/priorities. Interestingly, only 14% of respondents thought they were 
accountable for the quality of the service provided, as defined by meeting service targets and standards. 
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Table 54: In what ways are service providers most accountable? 
How are senice providers most Total Men Women Seodaemun Gangnam Nine 
accountable? % Dragon 
Village 
Providiog information. 23 3o/o 25% 26o/o 20% 20% 
Consulting users on tbeir needs! 29 27% 31% 28% 38% 0% 
priorities. 
Encouraging participation in decision- 21 27% % 24% 18% 20% 
making. 
Resoondino to users complaints. 43 52% 35% 36% 43% 80% 
Having a user-friendly service. 35 35% 35% 32% 43% 20% 
Having a transparent service. 19 25% 13% 22% 18% 10% 
Meeting service targets and standards. 14 8% 19% 14% 13% 20% 
If respondents had a problem with nrban services, the majority stated that they would call service 
providers help liues (48%), talk to municipal staff (45%), and visit service providers Internet sites 
(43%). Table 55 shows how ways of resolving problems with nrban services differs between different 
areas of Seoul. 
Table 55: Most common ways of resolving tbe problem witb urban services. 
Arrangement used more often by Similar usage Arrangement used more often by 
respondents from deprived areas respondents from non-deprived 
areas 
Contact a politician. Write a letter to newspapers. Vote for a politicians promising 
better services. 
Hold a public meeting. Call service providers help line•. 
Contact ombudsmen or inspector. Visit service provider•s offices. 
Use tbe law. Use service provider•s suggestion 
boxes. 
ProtesVdernonstrate. Visit service providers internet 
sites. 
Form or join a user group. 
Visit one stop shop. 
Talk to municipal staff. 
Respondents were asked which of a number of possible problems they had experienced in their use of 
urban services. Overall respondents experienced the most problems with refuse collection, roads and 
paving and streetlights. However, the response varied slightly across the city, for example, in Nine 
Dragon Village strcctlights, sanitation, and refuse collection had most problems, in Gangnam-gu the 
services with the most problems were refuse collection, roads and streetlights, and in Seodaemun-gu 
the services with the most problems included refuse collection, roads and drains. 
The respondents identified the main problem with the roads as the number of potholes; this was a 
particular problem for those respondents from deprived areas. Those in non-deprived areas identified 
the problems with roads as storm water drainage, and pavements for pedestrians. Men tended to 
identify more problems with the roads in Seoul. Most respondents reported that a high number of 
streetlights were not working (43%). This was particularly a problem of women (46%), and 
respondents in deprived areas, e.g. Nine Dragon Village (90%). 
192 
An investigation of improvements to urban services through accountability 
The most common problem respondents identified with refuse removal was the lack of rubbish bins 
(62%); most female respondents and those in non-deprived areas also identified this as an issue. The 
indiscriminate dmnping of refuse was a particular problem for those in Nine Dragon Village. 
The main problem residents identified with community halls was the lack of equipment (54%), 
particularly for those respondents in non-deprived areas. Other problems included the poor condition 
of buildings, and lack of available space; respondents with low incomes identified the most problems 
with community halls. 
Water quality was perceived to be a problem by 54% of respondents, mostly male respondents (58%), 
as well as those on high monthly incomes, whereas, women had experienced more problems with 
seasonal variations in supply, and with the reliability of supply. Residents in Nine Dragon Village and 
those on low incomes stated they had problems with all aspects of water supply (the pressure, quality, 
seasonal variations, quantity, reliability of water supply), whereas, those in Seodaemun had most 
problems with quality of water supply. The main problem respondents identified with sanitation was 
the poor condition of communal toilets. This was particularly a problem for respondents with low 
incomes and those in Nine Dragon Village (50%), who do not have a private household toilet. 
Most respondents stated that there were insufficient drains in their neighbourhoods ( 49%), particularly 
in Nine Dragon Village, although upper income respondents also had experienced problems with 
blocked drains and flooding in the street. 
The majority of respondents (35%) were fairly dissatisfied with the way local government runs 
services. Although the majority of respondents aged over 56 (67%) were satisfied. In general 
respondents were most satisfied with the overall provision and quality of water supply, community 
halls, and refuse collection, and are most satisfied with information provided on water supply, 
sanitation and commuuity halls, as shown in Table 56. Respondents are least satisfied with the overall 
provision and quality of roads, drains and street lights, and are least satisfied with infonnation about 
refuse collection, roads and drains. 
Table 56: Satisfaction with the overall provision, quality and iofonnation provided about services. 
Satbft..t with Dboatlsll..t Satlsft..t with Dissatisned Satisfied "'ith Dissatbfted 
overall with overaD quality of with quality of infonnadon with 
provision provision senicn senices lnfonnatlon 
%most satisfied % least satisfied % most satisfied %least satisfied % most satisfied % least satisfied 
No Water(71%) Roads(47%) Water (6?0/o) Roads(48%) Water(61%) Refuse (35%) 
Connn. hall Drains ( 480/o) Comm. halls Streetlights Sanitation 500/o) Roads (38%), 
(69%) Streetlight (66%) (51%) Cooun. halls Drains (42%) 
Refuse (65%) (52%) Refuse (64%) Drains (55%) (52%) 
Seodaemun- Water (720/o) Drains(46%) Roads(66%) Drains(51%) Water (68%) Drains (40%) 
gu Roads (40%) 
Gangnam-gu Water, Roads (SO"/o) Water(80%) Sanitation Water supply Roads (43%) 
Sanitation. (45%) (73%) 
Refuse (80%) 
Nine Dragon Comm. halls Refuse Conun. halls Refuse Water, Comm. Refuse, Roads, 
Village (SO%) Drains (10%) (70%) Drains, halls, Drains Sanitation 
Sanitation (20"/o) (10%) 
(10"/o) 
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Residents in Seodaemun-gu were most satisfied with roads and paving; residents in Ganguam-gu were 
most satisfied with sanitation; residents in Nine Dragon Village are most satisfied with community 
halls. Low-income respondents were more likely to be satisfied with water supply, refuse collection, 
and community halls whereas, upper income respondents were more satisfied with sanitation. Younger 
respondents were more satisfied with water supply, refuse collection and sanitation, whereas those over 
36 were more satisfied with community halls and streetlights, and those over 40 were more satisfied 
with drains. These findings are summarised below in Table 57. 
Table 57: Summary of user satisfaction with services. 
Most satisfied with Most problems identified Most dissatisfied overall 
Seodaemun-gu Water supply Refuse collection Storm water drains 
Refuse collection Roads and paving Roads and paving 
Community halls Storm water drains 
Gangoam-gu Water supply Refuse collection Roads and paving 
Sanitation Roads and paving 
Community halls Streetlights 
Nine Dragon Water supply Sanitation Refuse collection 
Village Community halls Refuse collection Storm water drains 
Sanitation 
Roads and paving 
The majority of complaints made directly to service providers had been about refuse collection (13%), 
water supply (8%), sanitation (8%), roads (8%), and streetlights (8%) (see Graph 23). Those in 
Seodaemun-gu were more likely to complain about refuse collection, water supply or sanitation, 
whereas, those in Ganguam-gu mostly complained about drains, and residents in Nine Dragon village 
had complaints about community halls and refuse collection (see Table 58 for a comparison of those 
services most important to respondents, what complaints were made and what services respondents 
selected for improvements.). 
Respondents were asked which services should be improved. The majority of respondents thought that 
roads should be the top priority, particularly men, as well as those in Nine Dragon Village. Women 
tended to be more concerned with improvements to streetlights and sanitation. Those with low 
incomes were more concerned with community halls, drains, and street lights, whereas, those with high 
incomes were concerned with water supply and sanitation. 
Table 58: Comparisons between most important services to respondents, services complained about and services 
chosen for improvements. 
The four most important scnices Maioritv of complaints Which services to improve 
Refuse collection (88%) Refuse collection (13%) Roads and paving (35%) 
Sanitation ( 61%) Water supply, sanitation, roads and Streetlights ( 17%) 
pavin~ and streetli~ts (8%) 
Streetlights (58%) Storm water drains (6%) Community hall ( 17%) 
Water supply (53%) Community hall ( 4%) Water supply (13%) 
Of those respondents that had complained about urban services, only 17% were fairly satisfied with the 
way the complaint was handled, and these respondents tended to be from non-deprived areas. Most 
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respondents thought that complaint mechanisms were easy to use and have a quick response, those in 
Gangnam were more likely to say that complaints mechanism results in fair outcomes and satisfactory 
outcomes. 
Most respondents stated that when they complained it was to benefit the general public interest (53%), 
particularly those respondents from deprived areas, whereas, those that said they complained in self-
interest were from Gangnam-gn or had a high income. 
4 9% of respondents thought that they had a voice in service delivery; of these, the majority came from 
non-deprived areas of Seoul. Interestingly, the perception of having a voice in service delivery was 
higher for women (52%), and residents over 55 years (25%) (see Graph 24). 
63% of respondents stated that they trust services providers; particularly respondents from Nine 
Dragon village (90%). The relatively low trust amongst respondents can be explained by the frequency 
of corruption scandals in Seoul and the lack of rationality and predictability in service delivery. 
Interestingly, SMG aimed to promote trust by reducing the chances for officials to meet citizens face to 
face by using IT to reduce opportunities for corruption. However, only 38% of respondents thought 
that service providers were easily accessible, surprisingly most of the respondents who did were from 
Nine Dragon village. 
5.5. 7 Impact on the performance of services 
SMG officials report that accountability reforms had improved the overall performance of services in 
terms of the effectiveness of organisations, administrative efficiency, ease of complaint, the speed of 
application handling, equity of access to administrative services, citizen oriented administration, and 
citizens scrutiny via interne!. Integrity Pacts and OPEN enhance private sector operation and 
maintenance of services, for example, it has eliminated bribes in waste collection and disposal and 
incinerator construction. One official claimed that these measures have also improved the standard or 
construction of infrastructure. The impact of accountability will be discussed below with specific 
reference to water supply and refuse collection. 
Water Supply: Respondents raised a number of problems with their water supply, for example, 
inadequate water supply, low water pressure, problems in water quality, malfunctioning meters, 
overcharging, leaking or old pipes, and delayed connection requests. Complaints can be made directly 
to the Gu office or the 11 local water supply bureaus in Seoul by phone, e-mail, visit or fax. In 
addition, the Waterworks Division has its own WcbPages (www.water.seoul.go.kr) and reporting 
system for complaints, so that problems can be resolved over e-mail. 
The poor public perception of water supply stems from the 1960's/70's when inadequate sewage 
management led to widespread faecal-oral diseases and government asked citizens to boil their water. 
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Although a total of 121 water quality indicators are now monitored, as recommended by WHO, many 
poorer households continue to boil their water today, whilst richer residents tend to use water-purifying 
systems in their houses or buy mineral water. There is public concern abont the smell, turbidity and 
taste of the tap water, and concern about the use of excessive disinfectant in the treated water. 
Furthermore, Professor Kim Sang-Jong of Seoul National University claimed that 35% of the city's 
water could cause diseases like Hepatitis A, pinkeye, diarrhoea, aud respiratory problems (Korea 
Herald, 2.11.2001 ). Such media coverage has created public anxiety over the quality of their tap water, 
and has undermined trust in the service providers. 
According to an official from the water works office, the majority of water quality problems are a result 
of the lack of O&M of on-plot water pipelines, and water tanks. Water tanks are a common sight in 
Seoul and are used to overcome problems with intermittent water supply. The tanks are supposed to be 
cleaned twice a year but this rarely happens in practice, and so SMG has ordered households to remove 
them. The Water Works Office has also been encouraging households to replace the pipe from the 
main to their households to improve the quality of the water they are drinking. There are plans to loan 
the money to the poorer residents, free of interest, so that they can also do this. Those living in 
apartments have fewer individual responsibilities for the O&M of their water supply, but have also 
experienced problems. Apartment blocks usually store water in an underground storage tank and pump 
it to another storage tank on the roof of the building. However, holding water in this way can lead to 
loss of residual chlorine and diminished water quality; it is also expensive to clean the storage tanks of 
apartments. All residents have the responsibility to inform the waterworks office if there is a problem 
with their supply, inspect plumbing systems, to pay their bills on time, to look after their meters, and 
for reporting burst mains (for which there is a reward, e.g. subway tickets). 
In the first Citizens Evaluation Survey, in 1999, satisfaction ratings for water were very low. It was 
reported that the bead of Water Works staff thought the results of the survey would demoralise Water 
Works officials. However, it was reported that Mayor Goh said ~Raising the quality of the tap water is 
your duty. However, public servants in the 2000s should do more than fulfil their duties; they have to 
go a step further to ensure that the citizens understand that the tap water is safo to drink, and actually 
drink it. Citizen satisfaction should be the goal of the administration. Don't complain about citizen's 
lack of understanding about what is going on and voice discontent. Go and find a way to make them 
trust you, and drink the tap water. If customers are not satisfied the administration has failed" (BJ 
Kim, 2002). 
In order to demonstrate greater responsiveness to citizens, SMG linked the results of Citizen's 
Evaluation Surveys to policy formulation. Accordingly, the Water Works Office changed its policy 
emphasis from service provider to service consumer. The office increased PR activities and created 
more than 100 customer service standards, which led to the Waterworks Customer Service Charter 
(2000) "in an effort to show its renewed commitment in the new millennium to sincere trustworthy and 
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friendly services to the citizens, who are the end customers of the water works". Commitments to 
customers include: -
• Waterworks service teams dispatched within an hour of a civil complaint. 
• Providing an explanation prior to billing if water meter measurement increases 2-fold. 
• Notifying customers in advance if water supply will be cut-off 
• Completing repair work on time. 
• Offering a level of customer service equal to that of private businesses. 
• Reducing the time needed to process complaints by 30%. 
• Publicising complaint handling procedures. 
The Water Works Office has adopted a number of specific measures intended to ease public anxiety 
over water management and quality, such as systematic leakage detection, fast leakage repairs, exact 
meter reading, water quality inspection, installing new sewerage pipes, replacing water pipelines with 
anti -rust materials like plastics or stainless steel, using advanced water purification systems, training on 
filtration and disinfection, replacement of water pipes, and removal of water storage tanks in residential 
areas. Microbiological tests of water supplies have been used to demonstrate that municipal supplies 
are often better quality than bottled water on some criteria. The Tap Water Quality Certification 
System was introduced in 2001, in order to test water quality for ph, residual chlorine, turbidity, 
general bacteria, and coliforms. The tests are performed in the presence of representatives of the Tap 
Water Quality Evaluation Committees, comprised of citizens, water quality experts, and NGOs. The 
quality of water is tested at supply points such as household taps, purification points and water tanks, 
and residents can request an inspection of the water supply to their property. The Korea Institute of 
Science and Technology and Korea Environment and Waterworks Institute test the samples. The 
findings are made public once a month, and a test certificate is attached to the taps inspected. If the test 
results are poor the household will be given recommendations on how to improve water quality, for 
example, by cleaning household water tanks, or replacing household pipelines. In 2003 the water 
quality of 150, 000 taps had been inspected. The authorities intend to inspect tap water from I million 
taps by 2006. 
The Water Works Office has launched a customer relations campaign to build credibility, improve 
transparency, and enhance public trust in tap water: -
• Sconl Metropolitan Government applied for the International Organisation for Standardisation 
14001 certification in 2000, which means that the waterworks, 6 purification plants and the water 
technology research institute undergo external inspections by the Certification Institute twice a 
year. 
• Water Works Office has employed a private company, (selected by tender and Integrity Pact), to 
devise a marketing campaign to improve the image of tap water. 
• The Water Works Office has paid a leading newspaper reporter to go to America and write a major 
feature on the management of the US water supply, so that Seoul citizens have the kinds of 
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information necessary to make a favonrable comparison with their own water supply, (for example 
on the age of water pipes in the US and quality of their water supply). 
• Gangbuk Purification Plant has been distributing free bottles of tap water (under the description of 
mineral water! See Plate 39), at high profile public events like the World Cup, Hi Seoul festival, or 
business meetings. In 2002, 571,263 bottles of tap water were given away, yet it seems, whilst 
people are happy to drink the tap water at these events, they are still reluctant to use it in their 
homes. 
• Other components of this customer relations campaign were to open waterworks to the public; 
produce brochures and videos to help citizen understand how tap water is produced, as well as an 
essay and photo competition to help promote the high quality of tap water, and public awareness of 
water conservation. 
These changes in the Water Works Office were initiated after the 1999 Citizen Survey. Nonetheless, 
the satisfaction score for water dropped from 58.3 for the first half of2000 to 54.9 in the second half of 
the year, and citizens again rated water supply as one of the worst services in Seoul. However, the 
survey carried out for this research found that water supply was one of the services respondents were 
most satisfied with. 
Refuse collection: Seoul's 25 local gn (local government) offices are responsible for the collection, 
transfer and disposal of waste with the option of contracting out waste collection to a private company. 
There are 3 incinerators in operation, and 1 facility under construction. If the gn does not have an 
incinerator then waste is transported to landfill, or recycled. 
Seoul has a volume-based system for charging for waste collection, whereby households dispose of 
their waste in standardised plastic bags, which they can buy from supermarkets. The fee for the bags 
varies according to volume, but is also determined by the cost of waste management in the gu, (for 
example, it was reported that spending on waste management is higher in low income gus because road 
conditions are worse, there are more detached dwellings, and more small commercial waste 
generators). Gu officers are responsible for monitoring bag usage and investigating mis-use, for 
example, if residents do not use the standard bags they can be fined a maximum of 1 million won. The 
bags come in different in colonr according to use, i.e. residential, commercial and public use bags. 
Food wastes, which accounts for 22% of households waste in Seoul, is collected in separate bags that 
are made with starch so that they can be collected for livestock feed or composted. A 601 bag/person is 
distributed per household on a monthly basis to low income people in order to prevent illegal dumping. 
Since 1995, the volume-based collection charge system resulted in a decrease in waste collected from 
15,397 tons/day to 13,000 tons per day in 2001. Table 59 shows the waste production in the two Gus 
of concern to this research. 
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Table 59: Waste management and recycling in Seoul. 
District Number of Population Per day tons Per Per person 
households household lk,) 
Seodaemun-gu 131,473 373,105 389 2.96 1.04 
Ganguam-gu 193,101 555,493 756 3.92 1.36 
The volume-based collection charge system is part of efforts by SMG to make waste disposal an 
individual responsibility, a message reinforced through the removal of all waste bins from streets. 
However, people have many complaints about waste collection: residents are not happy with the 
standardised waste bags because 'they tear easily', or the 'waste is not collected well', or 'waste is not 
collected often enough'. Since these measures were introduced there has been an increase in the amount 
of waste dumped illegally in open areas near the river or mountains. By city ordinance, owners of the 
vacant land are responsible for disposing of fly-tipped waste from their land. SMG has a reward 
system for reporting illegal dumping waste, if the person can supply enough detailed information to 
catch the offender then the reporter will receive a reward of about 10,000-50,000 won. 
The main problem with waste management in Seoul is the scarcity ofland and high population density. 
A study of waste management indicated the need for SMG to construct 11 incinerators, 2 composting 
facilities, and l pulverising processing facility to cope with the growing amount of waste generated 
(Yoo, 2003 and personal conununication). 3 incinerators have been constructed, and I is under 
construction in Seoul71 • The consultation process for these facilities took about lO years, as opposed to 
the planned 3-4 years. The delay is in part due to the general public interest in Seoul on issues related 
to waste treatment facilities, waste recycling, reduction of disposable and over packaged items, food 
waste reduction, and composting. Citizens and environmental groups have collected petitions and 
protested against the construction of the incinerators, due to concerns over air pollution, smells, water 
pollution, incineration ashes, and decreasing property values. During the construction of an incinerator 
in Gangnam-gu, for example, SMG was forced to respond to the demands of local enviromnental 
groups and local residents by installing state-of-the-art equipment and setting stricter standards on 
emissions compared to those of central government. The incinerator is tested twice a year by agencies 
selected by residents, and the results of the tests are publicly announced to local residents. The Act for 
Promotion of Waste Treatment Facilities Construction and Residents Support guarantees residents 
involvement in auditing the enviromnental quality of incinerators through Conncils on Residents 
Support (CORS). However, local residents remain concerned about the possible entission of hazardous 
substances such as dioxin. 
In order to appease residents in Gangnam-gu, as in other Gus with incinerators in Seoul, Seoul 
Metropolitan Government provides financial compensation and other benefits for residents living near 
an incinerator. For example it supports 50% of residents heating costs for those living near an 
incinerator, and have built various community facilities, such as swimming pools and libraries through 
71 The design, construction and operation of the incinerators was contracted to private companies. 
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the Residents Support Fund72• The impact of incinerators on the health of residents living near 
incinerators is monitored (by Yonsei University), together with changes in real estate value (by the 
Seoul Development Institute). The results of the studies will be reflected in the package of 
compensation residents receive. 
The incinerator under construction in Mapo-gu has involved on-going consultations with resident 
representatives and the gu. Experts were consulted and citizen surveys conducted in the process of 
formulating the incinerators plan. In this gu, the government set up a community group73 to make 
decisions with regard to construction, incineration methods, as well as how best to manage dust, odour, 
and heat see Table 60. It was also reported that people in Seoul are also unhappy with recycling plants 
in their neighbourhoods and concessions to make them more acceptable include setting aside land for 
public parks and green areas for residents. 
Table 60: Residents group's opposition activities to incinerators construction (Yoo, 2003; 4). 
Residents activity 
Facility Period Scale Demonstration Petition SMG activities 
Yangchon March 1992- May 400!/day 6 20 20 
1996 
Nowon June 1992-December 800!/day 38 60 18 
1996 
Gangnam October 1994 900tlday 5 38 15 
November 200 I 
5.5.8 Impact on sustainability 
In Seoul, significant user responsiveness has taken place, which has improved service delivery in terms 
of stronger guarantees of service standards, more regular opinion surveys, and more consumer 
education. Local residents have become heavily involved in service related consultation and planning, 
especially with respect to waste management and water supply. Civic committees are consulted on 
policies for water quality, the management of municipal solid waste, waste reduction, recycling, and 
the building of incinerators. However, these civic committees are typically dominated by experts from 
waste related organisations, environmental groups, academics, company directors, and other 
professionals, rather than ordinary residents. Seoul Metropolitan Government tends to use public 
relations exercises to increase the information available to the grassroots, for example, through civic 
campaigns, media promotions (radio, TV, videos and brochures), and education courses". 
Greater accountability has led to new service norms, greater expectations and changes to the service 
delivery process. However, sustainability has been undermined because accountability arrangements 
72 The legal basis of the Fund is provided for in Articles 21 and 22 of the Act on Promoting Construction of Waste 
Treatment Facilities and Support for Neighbouring Areas and in the Municipal Ordinance on Fund to Support 
Residents Living Near Resource Recovery Facilities in Seoul. 
73 Composed of 31 residents, professionals aod members of local assembly. 
74 These have been attended by the Korean Federation of Housewives Clubs, Young Women's Christiao 
Association (YWCA), Civic Couocil to Resolve Waste Problems, Green Consumers Networks in Korea, and 
Citizens Alliaoce for Conswner Protection of Korea. 
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have fragmented users' voice and generated conflict in society, increased the number of competing 
claims on financially limited resources, and decreased efficiency in the use of resources. The outcome 
can be that more problems are presented than can be dealt with by service providers. This was 
particularly true of NIMBY concerns about incinerators in Ganguam-gu. For this reason, civic 
involvement has sometimes been frustrating for service providers when, despite all their efforts, 
services fail to meet the expectations of more informed, motivated, effective and empowered citizens. 
The strength of consumer influences has surprised many service providers - there is a danger that such 
challenges to SMG policy will conflict with secure delivery of services and increase costs. For 
example, at present the incinerator in Ganguam-gu is operated at less than their capacity because 
residents have stipulated that the facility will only receive waste from their gu and not from 
neighbouring gns. Further consultation with residents is required to improve efficiency in operation by 
ensuring that the unexploited capacity of the incinerator is utilised. 
The sustainability of the aceountability reforms implemented by Mayor Gob depends on interest being 
maintained in City Hall. Wl1ere the leadership of Gob Kun was crucial in achieving the acceptance of 
city officials for accountability reforms and zero tolerance of corruption, it was reported that, under the 
new Mayor Lee Myung-Bak, interest has begun to slide. Mayor Lee has made the Chconggyecheon 
Restoration Project the flagship project of his teffilre75 rather than ensuring that corruption and 
accountability remain high on the political agenda. 
The sustainability of Seoul reforms also depends on maintaining public interest in demanding 
accountability for nrban services. Public relations in the form of glossy brochures, stickers, posters and 
so forth has been used to create public interest in accountability, but there is a need for wider publicity 
of the arrangements, and greater information disclosure on their use. In addition, a wider variety of 
communication channels would secure easier access to information for all respondents, removing the 
digital divide between upper and lower income and the older and younger generation, and averting 
conflict between these groups. 
Whilst service delivery has become more generally responsive to service users, this responsiveness is 
selective. For example, those respondents with no legal tenure, e.g. from Nine Dragon Village, have no 
legal basis for using accountability to improve the wban services they use; the policy responses remain 
removal and relocation. Thus, the sustainability of nrban services for these people is undermined by 
threats of demolition and problems of registration. 
75 This involves the restoration of a stream flowing through the centre of Seoul, and the redevelopment of the 
surrounding area into a new business district. 
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5.5.9 Hypothesis testing 
It was hypothesised that 'accountability arrangements will improve the outputs of urban services and 
will improve the relative chances of sustainability'. The findings of this case stndy have proved the 
hypothesis. From the perspective of service providers the technical performance of all urban services, 
refuse collection and water supply in particular, had improved since greater customer reSPonsiveness 
had been implemented. This was mainly because greater consumer responsiveness had necessitated 
adopting higher standards in service delivery. The majority of the households questioned also said that 
there had been a small improvement in service delivery since the reforms of Mayor Gob. Residents 
were most satisfied with overall provision and the quality of water supply, community halls and refuse 
collection, and with information on water supply, sanitation and community halls. Residents were least 
satisfied with overall provision, quality and information about roads and paving, drains streetlights and 
refuse collection. Somewhat surprisingly, the majority of respondents were fairly dissatisfied with 
local government. Respondents deseribed services as 'unresponsive', 'effective', and 'undependable'; 
the majority agreed with were 'service providers don't take complaints seriously'; 'it's difficult to get 
improvements in services'; 'service providers are friendly and helpful'. Greater responsiveness has led 
to new service norms, greater expectations and a change in the service delivery process. However, 
sustainability has been undermined because accountability arrangements have fragmented users voice 
and has increased the number of competing claims on financially limited resources, which has the 
potential to decrease the efficiency of the response to complaints and in the use of resources. 
5.5.10 Conclusion 
Improving the responsiveness of service providers in Seoul has involved reducing the need for personal 
contact between public and officials in corruption prone areas, as well as promoting greater 
transparency of procedures and decisions, monitoring front line stafJ performance, the development of 
electronic government, changes to the way that complaints are handled, and increased access to 
information, as well as traditional arrangements like community based meetings and addressing 
problems to decentralised Gu, Dong and Ban government offices. 
The friendly and speedy reception facilities at City Hall also helped reduce social barriers, and users 
have benefited from improved co-ordination of services. In Seoul, customers' views of service quality 
are now part of the performance assessment exercises of public officials, which has led to increased 
user demand. However, such consultation can be cosmetic, citizens views can be systematically 
disregarded when they are in opposition to the central brief, and may only be adopted ifthere is strong 
public opposition to a particular initiative. Announcement of new service norms, high profile 
commitments, and greater service tranSParency, have enhanced public expectations for change, and put 
greater pressure on staff. The Seoul case stndy is summarised in Table 61. 
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Table 61: Summary of the Seoul case study. 
Seoul 
What The 2001 National Minimum Living Standards Security Act ensures universal entitlements to 
entitlements do services, and makes provision for citizens who do not have a formal address. Slum dwellers 
citizens have to also started a 'Securing Address Movement' to secure entitlements to services usually 
urban services? associated with legal tenure. Higher income respondents were more likely to have sewerage 
and household connections, whereas lower income areas are more likely to have public 
standpipes and open drainage. 
How is Arrangements have been created that prevent corruption (corruption report cards), enbance 
accountability transparency in administration (OPEN or Anti Corruption Index), PPPs (Integrity Pact, joint 
demonstrated? inspections with citizens, citizen ombudsmen). Anti--corruption refonns have focused on 
small, more cost effective and efficient government. IT is used to modernise services, increase 
the convenience for citizens, improve perfonnance, and to reduce the cost of administration to 
citizens. Remedies used by service users to solve failing services are to call provider help 
lines, talk to staff, or visit provider Internet sites. In deprived areas, people are more likely to 
contact a politician, hold meetings, or go to an ombudsmen whereas in non-deprived areas 
(Gangnam), tend to vote for a politician, call service providers help lines, visit to service 
provider offices, service provider suggestion boxes, and service provider intemet sites. 
Saturday date with Mayor is a particular mechanism the underprivileged use to sort out 
complaints. 
What is the Residents most satisfied with overall provision and the quality of water supply, community 
impact on user halls and refuse collection, and with the information supplied on water, sanitation and 
satisfaction? community halls. Residents are least satisfied with overall provision, quality and information 
about roads, drains, lights and refuse. Surprisingly, the majority are fairly dissatisfied with 
local government. Respondents described services as 'unresponsive,, 'effective\ and 
'undependable'; the majority agreed with were 'service providers do not take complaints 
seriously'; 'it's difficult to get improvements in services'; • senice providers are friendly and 
helpful'. The majority said that there had been a small improvement in service delivery since 
the customer service reforms of Mayor Goh. 
What is the From the perspective of service providers, the technieal performance of all urban service and 
impact on refuse collection and water supply, in particular, had improved since greater customer 
performance? responsiveness had been implemented. This was mainly beeause greater consumer 
responsiveness had necessitated adopting_ higher standards in service delivery. 
How sustainable More accountability makes more residents more ungovernable and has possibly created more 
are urban dissatisfaction with waste disposal and water supply. The emphasis is on making people more 
services? satisfied with the experience of using a service rather than improving the quality itself. The 
formality of the culture may mean that certain citizens are inhibited in the expression of their 
complaints. Greater accountability has led to new service norms, greater expectations and 
change in service delivery process. However, sustainability has been undennined because 
accountability arrangements have fragmented users voice and generated conflict, increased the 
number of competing claims on fmancially limited resources, and decreased the efficiency of 
response to complaints and in the use of resources. 
Hypothesis Based on the findings from the fieldwork, the case has proved the hypothesis that 
testing accountability arrangements will improve the outputs of urban services and will improve the 
relative chance of sustainability. 
203 
An investigation of improvements to urban senlices through accountability 
5.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented four case studies based on the fonns of accountability selected for furtl1er 
investigation. Accountability has been defined to include aspects of information, action and power 
with respect to a relationship between service users and providers set up to improve the outputs of 
urban services. The case studies have shown how the threefold challenge for the operation of urban 
services, namely, that of securing accountability, sustainability, and adequate outputs can be addressed. 
A within case analysis has been performed, whereby the research questions have been answered, and 
the hypothesis tested, using a comprehensive summary of data collected using qualitative and 
quantitative research techniques. 
This research applied the case study methodology, and an actor-oriented approach, to the analysis of 
how service provider institutions are accountable for urban services, and what the significance of this 
might be for the outputs and sustainability of urban services. An alternative perspective on 
accountability has emerged from the case studies. This research design has shown the limitations of a 
structural approach to the study of accountability, where a belief that the outcomes of accountability 
policies for urban services are solely determined by the planning and execution of formal 
accountability reforms. The research has demonstrated that accountability for urban services is often 
only partly and indirectly related to service providers' intentions and plans is often mediated by the 
agency of service users. Nevertheless, the research has found that successful accountability initiatives 
do exist. The challenge is then to understand why accountability is not sustained, expanded or 
institutionalised. The next chapter will elaborate on these themes with a cross-case analysis. 
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Chapter 6 Cross-Case Analysis and Discussion of Findings 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 of this thesis described the research design and methodology; it stated that this research 
would use within-case and cross<ase analyses of data. In Chapter 5 each of the four case studies taken 
ftom Bristol, Mdantsane, Dhaka and Seoul were presented in turn. Chapter 5 provided an in-depth 
analysis of accountability for urban services, answered each of the research questions for the research, 
as set out in Chapter 4, and tested the research hypothesis. The case studies , as summarised in Table 
62, were selected on the basis that an initiative has been developed that offers a different perspective on 
accountability for urban services. However, as a consequence of the research design adopted, the 
arrangements used by service users to secure accountability in urban services were also revealed 
through fieldwork and discussed. 
This chapter draws on the findings of the questionnaires, interviews, document review and observations 
documented in the previous fieldwork chapter to provide a cross-case analysis of the fieldwork76• The 
evidence provided by each of the research techniques is not a stand-alone assessment of the situation 
but has been considered in relation to the other forms of evidence collected. Although the case studies 
differ in terms of countty settings, political systems, geographical size, characteristics of respondents, 
technical challenges in service delivery, institutional arrangements, policy frameworks and so on, this 
diversity enables common lessons and principles to be drawn from their experiences. 
This chapter is divided into 4 main sections: -
1. Section I introduces the research respondents. 
2. Section 2 presents the cross<ase findings in relation to the primary and sub-research 
questions, set out in Chapter 4. 
3. Section 3 uses the cross<aSe findings to test the thesis hypothesis on the ability of 
accountability to improve the outputs and sustainability of urban services. 
4. In section 4, the conceptnal framework of this research (presented in Chapter 3) is tested in 
light of the fieldwork to see if it validates the accountability models suggested by the literature 
review. The framework is used in this chapter to judge how effective accountability is, in 
practice, in improving the outputs and sustainability of urban services. 
16 The questionnaire form, aide memoire, and observation checklist used can be fmmd in the appendices. 
205 
An investigation of improvements to urban services through accountability 
Table 62: Cross-case overview of accountability initiatives. 
Case study Accountability Key feature of Accountability Findings 
Problem the Initiative arrangement 
Bristol Social Exclusion Improved !he Project • Rapid improvemcnc of service through dedicated team, 
Unit demomtrates design and Pathfinder integrated service. 
that services dcliveryof • Importance of both decentralisation for accountable service perfonn well below oeMCCO. delivery, and central government initiative and resources. 
nati<mal average in • Com:rnuni.ty lack ability to enforce a respormc; from the 
the most private sector. 
disadvantaged 
• ACCOIUltability improved by community development 
neighbowitoods. initiatives. 
• Palhfmdcr team has substantial disctet.ion, but new pressures 
to perform come from the community. 
Mdantsane Issues of ineffective lncreued w.ro • Ward committees deal with residents' complaints, and have a 
service delivery, political committees. role in supervising and co-ordinating delivery of services. 
inefficiency, and participation. • Ward committee model ill grounded in pre-existing :wcial lack of equity in practice (although post apartheid experiences have been 
service delivery. relatively un:roccessful). 
• Ward conunittee is a loose arrangement with little scope for 
residents to monitor progress of complaint. 
• Effectiveness depends on perceived legitimacy of 
community representatives on ward committees. 
• Comnumity has high expectations and are frustrated by the 
slow pace of chan~. 
Dhaka Ineffective service Increased the Scorecard. • Success of scorecard depends on follow-up activity and an 
delivery, clientelism influence of NGO delivery enabling social and political context. 
and cotn!plion. service users. • Society driven accountability requires rc:fonncrs on the 
•inside' of government and seavicc providers. 
• There is potential for active participation of the poorest in 
service delivery. 
• Need for the institutionalisation cf arrangements in 
lawfpolicy. 
• Potential for grassroots pressure groups to promote integrity 
in services. 
Seoul Widespread red tape Improved the Anti- • Problem of top down planning 
and corruption in responsivenesiJ conuption 
• Importance oftcaruparency in society 
service delivery. of service oriented 
• More accountability has cre.'lited dissatisfaction with services . providers. managerial 
• Emphasis on making people more satisfied with the ~<form. experience of using a service, rather than improving quality. 
• Greater accountability has increased competing clailm on 
fmancial_ly limited re!IOUtces. 
6.2 Respondents 
The questionnaire sought to establish the characteristics of the respondents in terms of residential areas, 
age, gender, education, house type and income. It was assnmed that these categories would affect 
entitlements to services, expectations of urban services, and tendency to complain. With respect to the 
overall response to the questionnaire, female and male respondents were equally well represented. The 
majority of respondents from Seoul, Dhaka and Mdantsane were aged 25-30, whereas, in Bristol most 
respondents were aged 36-45. The incidence of absolute and relative poverty in these cities varies; as 
expected, poverty rates were significantly higher in Mdantsane and Dhaka. Residents in deprived areas 
had a significantly different profile from residents in non-deprived areas. People in deprived areas 
showed greater levels of social exclusion since they were more likely to report inadequate levels of 
income, lower educational levels, unemployment, doing unskilled work, or being economically 
inactive (being too old for wmk, disabled, or housewives). These respondents were also more likely to 
have higher numbers of people in their household, live in rented accommodation or shacks and do not 
have access to private transport. However, clearly not all residents in deprived areas showed these 
characteristics and there are a number of residents in non-deprived areas who could also be considered 
socially excluded. 
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Questions were asked to assess levels of social capital and social inclusion. In Bristol, Dhaka and 
Seoul, the majority of respondents were happy with where they live and would not want to move to 
another area, given the choice. However, in Mdantsane, most respondents were unhappy living there 
and would want to move if they could. Those respondents living in non-deprived areas, and those with 
an adequate income, were more likely to be happy where they live than those living in deprived area or 
with inadequate income. This finding indicates that those who are happy where they live will develop 
the kinds of horizontal networks associated with social capital such as performing civic activities or 
belonging to some form of club or association. The research found higher levels of social capital, as 
traditionally defined (Putnam, 1993), in non-deprived neighbourhoods of the case study locations. 
Accountability for m:ban services is essentially a public good, meaning that it is difficult to organise 
collective action because of the incentive to free ride on the activities of others. Putuam (1993) 
suggests that social capital reduces the incentives to free ride, reduces uncertainty, as well as fosters 
trust and co-operation. Thus, it might be concluded that the neighbourhoods with a high level of social 
capital would be more likely to use accountability in the defence of m:ban services and would be more 
successful in their efforts, however this did not necessarily prove to be the case, as will be discussed in 
this chapter. 
6.3 Entitlements to urban services 
This section considers patterns of access to urban services across the case studies, and establishes 
whether payment is made for the services. 
Fundamentally, governments have the responsibility to ensure all citizens have a standard of Jiving 
adequate for health and well-being. A review of the legal obligations of governments with respect to 
urban service provision are outlined below in Table 63. 
Table 63: Constitutional provisions for rights to adequate urban services. 
British l.kgal Framework Constitution of South Constitution of Bangladesh Constitution of South 
Africa Korea 
UK does not have a written Section 24 Environment: Article 1~: Provision of basic Article 34(Welfare} 
constitution, however the Everyone has the right necessities. (I): All citizens are entitled 
legal system covers issues (a) to an enviromnent that is ]t shall be a fundamental to a life worthy of human 
usually dealt with by a not harmful to their health or responsibility of the State to beings. 
constitution. well-being; ( .. ) securing to its citizens. 
(a) The provision of the basic 
necessities of life, including 
food, clothing, sheher, 
education and medical care 
Section 27 Home Section 27: Health care, food, Article 31: Right to Article 3 5 [Enviromnent, 
(I): Everyone has the right to water and social security protection oflaw. Housing] 
a standard ofliving adequate (I) Everyone has the right to ( .. )in particular no action (1 ): All citizens have the 
for the health and well-being have access to ~ detrimental to the life, right to a healthy and 
of himself and ofhis family, (b) sufficient food and liberty, body, reputation or pleasant environment. The 
including food, clothing, water ... property of any pcmm shall State and all citizens shall 
housing and medical care and be taken except in endeavour to protect the 
necessary social services. accordance with law. environment. 
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By way of meeting these legal obligations, governments have responsibilities for the provision of urban 
services, with local governments typically accountable for funding the maintenance of minor roads, 
drainage, conununity halls, streets lights and solid waste management. However, in some cases, the 
private sector or NGOs have been engaged in service delivery, which has often increased access by 
low-income households, i.e. Dhaka. Table 64 illustrates the cross case institutional responsibilities for 
O&M. 
Table 64: Cross-case institutional responsibilities for O&M. 
Institution R~sponsibility for maintenance of services 
Municipalities Roads and pathways (minor) 
Stonn and sullage drainage 
Sanitation (public toilets) 
Street lighting 
Municipal buildings 
Refuse collection and street sweeping 
Public Works/Engineering Department Reticulated water snpply (renewal and maintenance) 
Operation of sewerage 
Roads (mainly major roads) 
Utilities Power supply 
Water supply and sanitation 
Private sector and NGO Refuse collection and street sweeping 
Water supply and sanitation 
Household access to urban services 
Despite these legal obligations, a number of people iu the case studies lacked access to urban services, 
or else suffered problems caused by poor O&M. In Mdantsane and Dhaka, services like water supply 
and sanitation, as well as street lighting, storm water drains, conununity halls, or roads, were 
significantly more widely and regularly accessible in non-deprived areas. Many of the differences in 
access to services are clearly linked to the differing demographic profiles and characteristics of 
residents in deprived and non-deprived areas, such as place of residence, type of housing, and level of 
income. The variable access to nrban services is sununarised in Table 65 with reference to Mdantsane 
andDhaka. 
Table 65: Cross-case review of access to urban services. 
Which of these senices do Mdantsane Db aka 
vou have access to? 
Sanitation 56% 89% 
Water supply 85% 100% 
Street lighting 39"/o 99% 
Access roads and paving 31% 99% 
Refuse collection 61% 92% 
Stonn water drainage 38% 90% 
Community halls 38% 47% 
In the slum and squatter areas ofDhaka, Seoul and Mdantsane, access to water and sanitation was not 
generally perceived to be a problem by respondents, despite the fact that access may be illegal and 
unreliable. In Mdantsane, respondents from these areas sometimes obtained water and electricity by 
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connecting up to a neighbours system and receiving, or purchasing services from them. In this case, 
water and electricity is not technically being stolen from the network but is purchased from an 
intermediary. 
Raising the service coverage to poor households was a central objective of accountability and an 
explicit political priority in most of the case studies. Of significance in Dhaka, was the experiment to 
provide access to water and sanitation systems in slum areas. This case also illustrated the need to de-
link provision of services from land rights and to recognise the needs of unofficial slums. In Bristol, 
central government targets effectively mandate more equitable patterns of service coverage so that 'no 
one is disadvantaged by where they live'. This policy provides an incentive to private contractors to 
improve service delivery in deprived areas, who might not otherwise have found low-income 
neighbourhoods commercially attractive. In South Mrica, the government policy of 'a Better Life For 
All' requires service providers to make universal improvements to coverage within a certain period of 
time, and in defined locations with significant penalties for public providers who fail to do so. 
Not only was access to urban services a problem, most respondents also claimed that service providers 
were not easily accessible (in terms of local offices, enstomer service, hotlines and so forth), 
particularly the older respondents and those living in deprived areas. For example, in Dhaka only 28% 
and in Seoul 3 8% of respondents thought that service providers were easily accessible. 
Level of urban services 
The research demonstrated that levels of service delivery varied between and within the cities 
investigated, see Table 66. The research demonstrates that where people live often determines the level 
of service they receive. For example, in Barton Hill, one of the most disadvantaged neighbourhood of 
Bristol, waste management services were perfonning well below the city and national average; in 
Dhaka, the level of service is lowest in the older areas of the city (which is also where the poorest 
people live) because lack of urban planning makes sewerage installation and kerbside refuse collection 
impossible. In Seoul, the places where squatters find land (such as outlying areas of the city, or 
mountainsides) are also difficult to connect to service networks, and this also limits the level of 
services available to residents, for example, kerbside refuse collection is often not feasible. 
Respondents living in formal housing in the higher income areas of Dhaka, Seoul and Mdantsane, 
tended to have high service levels, for example, full waterborne flush toilet, refuse removal by the local 
authority at least once a week, water piped into household, and grid electricity. Informal housing 
typically had lower service levels, such as basic pit latrines, refuse placed in a communal tip or burnt 
on-plot, and water supplied by standpipes, and open drainage. However, surprisingly, the majority of 
respondents in the slum areas ofDhaka, Seoul and Mdantsane reported access to a grid power source. 
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Table 66: Cross-ease review of most common levels of services. 
Level of Mdantsane Dhaka Seoul 
se nice 
Sanitation Pit latrines (52%) Septic tanks ( 48%) Water borne sewerage (90%) 
Water borne sewerage (45%) Water borne sewerage (29"/o) Pit latrines (7%) 
Pit latrines (21%) Communal latrines (3%) 
Bucket latrine (I%) 
Water supply Household connection (70"/o) Household connection (39%) Household connection (83%) 
Standpipes (22%) Yard taps (24%) 
Standpipe; (22%) 
Standpipes (13%) 
Electricity Grid(74%) Grid(98%) Not asked 
Non-Grid (52%) 
Access roads Access roads (61%) Gravel roads ( 41%) Narrow paved streets near 
and paving Paved roads (22%) Paved roads (38%) 
Access roads .(21%) 
their property (73%) 
Refuse Kerbside ( 68%) Transfer own refuse (91%) Not asked 
collection Dispose own refuse (23%) Dispose own refuse ( 6%) 
Kerbside collection (3%) 
Storm water Piped drainage (74%) Piped drainage (49"/o) Piped drainage (88%) 
drainage O)len drainage_il %) O])en drainage (51%) 
The majority of all respondents stated that the most important urban services to them were water, 
sanitation, refuse collection and drainage!streetlights, see Table 67. Although, respondents from 
deprived areas were more likely to stress the importance of community facilities, for example, 
streetlights, drains and community halls. 
Table 67: Cross-ease presentation of the 4 most important services to respondents. 
Which 4 senices are most important to you? 
I" 2" 3'" 4m 
Bristol Refuse collection Stonn water drains Commtmity balls Water supply (47%) 
(94%) (92%) (71%) 
Mdantsane Water supply (99%) Sanitation (85%) Refuse collection Streetlights (59%) 
(85%) 
Dhaka Water supply (97%) Stonn water drains Sanitation (85%) Refuse collection 
. (88%) (59%) 
Seoul Refuse collection Sanitation (61%) Streetlights (58%) Water supply (53%) 
(88%) 
Billing and payment for services 
The cost of O&M for services like streetlights, drainage, waste collection, road maintenance are 
covered by rates or council tax. Rates are based on property values, socio-economic levels and 
geographical locations. Billing for water and sewerage is typically based on a tariff structure composed 
of connection diameters and level of water consumption. 
The potential of payment for services, as a signalling and monitoring device of service quality, to 
amplify service users voice was raised in the literature (Moore, 1989). Payment can make users more 
vigilant and demanding of improvements in service efficiency and accountability, and the threat of 
non-payment can act as an incentive for service providers. However, receiving a bill for 
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setvices/council tax as well as payment in this research was, in the main, associated with non-deprived 
areas and people living in formal housing with an adequate income. It was found that the highest 
Incidence of non-payment was among low-income groups. The problem of non-payment appeared 
more pronounced where a=ss, level and satisfaction with service provided was less good than 
elsewhere. 
The difficulties some respondents reported in paying their rates and service charges are a matter of 
concern. The case studies revealed a debt problem for service users, particularly in Mdantsane, where 
the percentage of customers disconnected for non-payment remains high. South African academics 
have provided two conflicting explanations of this trend. The first is that non-payment for services 
relates to an inability to pay for services, or, secondly, people are unwilling to pay for services due to a 
'culture of non payment' that developed during apartheid. Whatever the reason, non-payment means 
that municipalities are not collecting sufficient revenue to improve the service and thus a 'catch 22' 
develops. In Dhaka, respondents from deprived areas wanted to pay for services to reduce concerns 
about their illegal status. 
In general, the research revealed that many respondents thought that it was not reasonable to be asked 
to pay for services that did not work well. Lack of confidence in the quality of service, together with 
the metering and billing process, was part of a rationale for non-payment. Some respondents reported 
needing help in understanding bills, advice on how to pay, and explanation of the various payment 
options available. Service provider interviewees reported non-payment for services was not only an 
outcome of poverty, but that those who could afford to pay were not doing so (for example, in Dhaka 
and Mdantsane) because of a lack of peualty, and were also critical of ward councillors that either did 
not care about non-payment, or positively gympathise with non-payers as an implicit criticism of the 
political system. 
Service providers reported concern with the level of outstanding bill payment, the amount of revenue 
written off, the numbers of consumers in debt, and expenditure on debt collection. It was stated that 
failure to recover service user payments jeopardises improvements in service quality and fails to 
emphasise that resources such as water are valuable. It was reported in these cases that public utilities 
were incurring large and possibly unsustainable losses due to non-payment. However, the contracting 
out of bill collection in Dhaka has been effective, and NGO involvement in formal service provision in 
slum areas has increased revenue for the utility in Dhaka, due to the reduoed number of illegal 
connections. 
The Dhaka case, in particular, highlighted the potential of unofficial payments, (bribes), to ensure 
accountability in the provision of urban services: these may be asked for by officials, or paid by users 
in anticipation of problems. In this case, accountability is literally bought from service providers, or 
delivered in the context of patron client relations with powerful intermediaries (political leaders, 
influential friends., and mastaans- 'muscle men'). However, this arrangement appears to be only a 
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stopgap in cases of acute problems, rather than resolving chronic problems with service provision. 
People solved these chronic problems through the purchase of water tanks, fixing motors onto pipes, 
burning their refuse, bnilding their own toilets and using water filters. 
Box 5 Key findin~s on entitlements to urban senices 
• There were t)pically citywide differences in the quality and quantity of services: where people live; their 
forms of housing; legal tenure of a plot; and who they are have implications for access to urban services. 
• Accmmtability can be used to change entitlements to services, as well as improve outputs. Raising the service 
coverage to poor households was a clear political priority in Dhaka, Bristol and Mdantsane. 
• Respondents viewed services in totality and tend to address demand for urban services to the mwricipality, 
even when services are the responsibility of another agency. Tills suggests the need for an interagency 
approach to accountability. 
• Slum dwellers used payment for services in the expectation that a legitimate connection will entitle them to 
legalise their occupancy ofland. 
• Service providers reported a moral obligation to supply illegal settlements, facilitated by a lack of penalties, 
but also in some cases had a financial incentive to do so through the collection of bribes. 
6.4 Accountability arrangements 
The case studies were chosen on the basis that some change had been implemented to the 
accountability for urban services. The research design adopted by this thesis has meant tbat, whilst 
each case study was originally intended to illustrate a particular form of accountability, the sometimes 
parallel or competing arrangements for secnring accountability in the delivery of urban services 
adopted by service users were also investigated. This section will present the findings with respect to 
the top down and bottom up functioning of accountability. 
6.4.1 Providers attempts to demonstrate accountability 
This research investigated attempts to improve the design and delivery of urban services, increase 
political participation in representative democracy, extend user influence in service delivery, and 
improve service provider responsiveness. Each of these arrangements researched are presented in turn 
below, together with references, which support the conclusions, drawn from the literature review. 
The Bristol case study reflects a number of findings on professional accountability identified in the 
theoretical framework drawn from the literature review, these are summarised below in Table 68. 
Project Pathfinder recognises the key role of front line workers and their knowledge of residents needs 
in taking direct action to deliver urban services in the interests of deprived communities. Hambleton 
and Hogget (1990) note the potential of personal accountability to come through visibility at the street 
level, which emerges through proximity and accessibility of neighbourhood services. The case study 
also found that incentives used to elicit accountable behaviour such as material benefits, honours, 
status, or awards (Goulct, 1989), might not be as important as 'not wanting to let the people down'. 
The kinds of people who volunteered for the Project Pathfinder had much to do with the success of the 
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project. Chambers (1998; 227) claimed if primacy were accorded to the personnel, the problems of 
performance and accountability wonld be resolved. However, Sketcher (1996; 67) is concerned that 
such embeddedness pnts workers in "a difficnlt position of both welcoming and controlling the public". 
The initiative depended on central government resoun:es to help overcome special diflicnlties 
stemming from the physical and social enviromnent in a deprived neighbourhood. Tendler (1997) also 
found that central government plays an important role in holding service providers to account in Brazil 
in the context of health care. Project Pathfinder is a public-private partnership: Ostrom (1996) and 
Evans (1996) point to the synergies that exist, or have the potential to, between the state, private sector, 
and voluntary sector to improve service delivery. However, Day and Klein (1987) find that this 
synergy makes it more difficult to assign responsibility, since the service provision is shared amongst 
actors. 
Table 68: Sununary offmdings on the theoretical framework for the Bristol case. 
Theme Findin~ 
Purchaser- Project Pathfmder in Bristol is a partnership between Bristol City Council, SIT A GB Ltd, 
provider split ResonrceSaver (an NGO which operates the kerbside 'black box' recycling collection service 
under sub-contract) and Community at Heart (a resident-led organisation established to 
deliver the New Deal for Conununities anti~vation prowanune in the area). 
Professionalism Increased professional competence; changes to nonnal professionalism; better community 
relations; Project Pathfmder team provide democratic, accoWltable service. 
Performance hnproving performance involves central government targets together with "bending" services 
measurement (matching supply of service to the scale of the problem), and, "reshaping" services (tailoring 
service to the needs of a neighbourhood). 
Life cycle O&M The Project Pathfmder represented an integrated approach to the O&M of neighbourhood 
street management and grounds maintenance. 
The Mdantsane case study reflects a number of findings on political accountability identified in the 
theoretical framework drawn from the literature review, these are summarised below in Table 69. The 
literature suggests that representative democracy under-represents the marginalized in society 
(Hambleton and Hoggett, 1990). Instead the concepts of decentralisation and citizen participation are 
increasingly used, in the context of the democratic governance agenda (Gaventa, 2002), especially in 
South Africa. Blair (2000) finds that popular participation builds accountability into local government 
and makes its more responsive to citizens and effective in service delivery. However, Moore and 
Putzel (1999; 6) note democracy has differential outcomes for the poor. The case in Mdantsane shows 
there is a need for a balance between buildings citizens capacities to articnlate rights, and the 
capabilities of political-economic institutions to respond to being held to account (Jones and Gaventa, 
2001). Interviewees in the case study rightly stressed the importance ofeqnality in service delivery, 
however, as Wharf Higgins (1999; 30 I) notes, "The universal ideal of citizenship serves to exclude 
disadvantaged and diverse groups in society by assuring that, because differences are discounted in an 
attempt to provide equal status for all, differences no longer matter''. The Mdantsane case study also 
highlighted an unexpected consequence of enhancing participatory fonns oflocal democracy (Raco and 
Flint, 2001; 586), such as creating local tensions between elected councillors and un-elected NGO 
leaders/front line service providers, as well as between local place-based communities and other 
communities of interest, like SANCO. 
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Table 69: Summary offmdings on the theoretical framework for the Mdantsane case. 
Theme Findine 
Role of Government is perceived by citizens to be the primary provider of urban services. Ethical and fair service 
govenunent in delivery is one of the hallmarks of post apartheid South Africa. where previously services were explicitly 
service delivery organitred arOWld aparthcid imperatives. 
Political a-.pects The observation was made that the ward committee was politicised (members revealed party a11iances in 
of service meetings) and not entirely inclusive in practice (for example. men tend to dominate discussion). 
delivery Connnittee members have been made scapegoats by residents for nationwide frustration with the delivery 
of services, which, at times. is violent. 
Enforceable rights The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, (1996), grants all citizens an equa1 and inalienable right 
to services to housing, health care. water and social securitv. 
Accessible Local government is supposed to be developmental, i.e. it works with citizens to fmd sustainable ways to 
government meet their needs and improve the quality of their lives. The ward committees have a key role in promoting 
decentml;sed, participatOf)' danocrncy and governance by encouraging citizens to participate in planning. 
petfonnance monitoring, service delivery, in tenns of1he Development Plan 
The Dhaka case study reflects a number of findings on user accountability identified in the theoretical 
framework drawn from the literature review: these are summarised below in Table 70. The increased 
emphasis on user accountability coincides with calls for a reduced role for the state in providing urban 
services and inclusion of informal mban dwellers in service delivery - the very groups most 
disadvantaged by the traditional service delivery. However, the scorecard in Dhaka failed to address 
the way service users' voices are regularly ignored or over ruled in service delivery. Moreover, the 
assumption that "poor performers in the public sector will simply 'pull their socks up' and become 
more competitive as a result of the score cards depends on a particular reading of performance 
indicators insensitive to geographical contexf' (Fyfe, 1993; 226). The NGOs investigated in Dhaka 
sought to "increase people's understanding of their rights, foster clearer standards for judging the 
performance of politicians and government agencies, create a greater ability of people to demand 
accountability of leaders and officials, and reinforce peoples belief in the value of their own 
development choices and efforts outside of the state's initiatives" (Fowler, 1993; 339). However, 
Olson (1965) fonnd that small, resourceful, weli-<Jrganised groups, such as VlPs in Dhaka, can usually 
ensure that their interests prevail over those of a widespread mass of people. By definition, the poor 
lack the necessary financial and political resources (such as citizenship rights, time, resources, technical 
skills, etc.) to mobilise effectively, which compromises their ability to "strike at the heart of practice 
that preserve the powers ofbureaucrats and politicians" (Goetz and Jenkins, 2001; 9). Nevertheless, "It 
would be a mistake to blame communities for the process that victimises them" (Checkoway, 1995; 
15). 
Table 70: Sununary offmdings on the theoretical framework for the Dhaka case. 
Theme F"mding 
Principal-agent The Scorecard is built on the premises that the information it yields will is new and useful to service 
model providers; that service users will lobby for improvements; that service providers wiU respond to 
ne~ative feedback and user demands. None of which happened in the Dhaka case. 
Community Report cards have been used more successfully by Transparency International Bangladesh. in the 
participation main because the NGO also created grassroots pressure groups called Committees of Concerned 
Citizens (CCCs) to disseminate report card findings. generate debate on senrice provision,. and lobby 
for higher quality public services through a variety of means - citizens meetings, newsletters, 
research papers., seminars, and a press campaign to improve local services. 
Empowennent Community mobilisation. along with the fact that dwellers are now paying for legal access to 
services, has empowered residents to approach and negotiate with DW ASA, and Dhaka City 
Corporation. 
Co-production Water and sanitation projects have been implemented by NGOs to ensure residents have access to a 
safe and legal supply of water and sanitation. Household waste ooJJection in middle-income areas 
where householders are willing to pay for a house-to-house collection senice. 
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The Seoul case study reflects a number of findings on managerial accountability identified in the 
theoretical framework drawn from the literature review: these are summarised below in Table 71. The 
managerial reforms implemented in Seoul were characteristic of New Public Management, for example 
introducing competition into public services, restructuring and slimming down the public sector, 
improving efficiency, and obtaining value for money through performance management and auditing 
(Minogue, 2000; 5). The Seoul case illustrates a consnmerist approach to urban services whereby 
accountability is intended to enhance the responsiveness of local government service provision 
(Hambleton and Hogget, 1990; 18). However, the Seoul case showed that greater responsiveness 
might also be a major source in generating 'new inequalities and new struggles' (EIIiot and McCrone 
1982; 9). For example, the reforms have fragmented users' voice and generated conflict, increased the 
number of competing claims on financially limited resources, and decreased efficiency in the use of 
resources. Harvey's (1973, 1989) work on 'real incomes' found that inhabitants of richer (and more 
powerful) neighbourhoods in a city tend to enjoy the net benefits of decisions affecting public services, 
thereby increasing their real income. Certain residents of Seoul are able to improve their real income 
by reducing the costs associated with physical proximity to incinerators to the detriment of the poor and 
politically weak. Buchanan and Badham (1999) label these kinds of locality-based conflicts as 'turf 
politics' and determine them to be a result of urban population growth. Turf conflicts create 
competition and conflict between households but might also precipitate collective political strategies. 
However, by concentrating upon individual problems, the implicit assumption of the managerial 
approach is that the underlying social structures are not a prublem or are, at most, to be modified but 
not replaced. 
Table 71: Snmmary of findings on the theoretical framework for the Seoul case. 
Theme Finding 
Demand responsive Seoul Metropolitan Government abolished public officials discretionary administrative power to 
approach ensure that staff became demand responsive to the needs of citizens, as well as enabling 
monitorinsz; in tenns of the principal ~ent framework. 
Managerial reforms Transparency was increased through ~benign ethical competition• between departments in city 
administration; as well as a public officials code of conduct, online information disclosure~ 
integrity systems in procurement,. electronic bidding system~ and citizen inspection system. 
Customer/provider Seoul Metropolitan Government introduced a Citizen Evaluative Survey;. Citizen's Charter 
relatioruhip Saturday Date with the Mayor, &mail the Mayor programme; and Corruption Report Card to the 
Mayor 
Complaint redress Complaints can be made directly by phone, e-mail. visit, or fax: to either the Gu or dong offices. 
Response guaranteed in less than 30 minutes of making the complaint, a fact-finding team is sent 
to deal with it in less than 3 hours. The emphasis is on the citizen's convenience, e.g. minimising 
fonn filling. Once a complaint has been resolved, the office aims to make a 'happy' ca11/ e.-mail to 
confirm customer satisfaction with the management of their complaint. 
6.4.2 User arrangements for accountability 
As well as investigating the ways service providers demonstrate their accountability for urban services; 
this research was designed to understand the arrangements used by service users for securing 
downward accountability. Respondents were asked what they would do if they had a problem with 
urban services. The most common responses are outlined below in Table 72. 
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Table 72: Cross-<:ase analysis of arrangements for solving problems with urban services. 
If you had a problem with a senice what would you do? 
I, zna 3'0 
Bristol Hold a public meeting Visit service provider offices (23%) Ombudsmen (24%) 
(57%) 
Mdantsane Hold a public meeting Call service providers help lines Visit service provides offices 
(53%) (51%) (51%) 
Dhaka Call service providers help Vote for politiciaos promising Visit service provides offices 
lines (85%) better services (76%) (61%) 
Seoul Call service providers help Talk to municipal staff(45%) Visit service providers internet 
lines (48%) sites (43%) 
The fieldwork demonstrates that, if there was a problem with services in non-deprived areas, most 
respondents would call service provider help lines, visit service providers officers, use service provider 
suggestion boxes, and service provider intemet sites; whereas, in deprived areas, respondents solved 
problems with urban services, and articulated their interests in more rotmdabout ways. These 
respondents were more likely to contact politicians, organise and attend public meetings, vote for 
politicians, engage in citizen monitoring, or join a user group. This finding was borne out by a 
personal communication with an NGO worker with extensive experience of making providers 
accountable for the delivery of service in low-income areas. "The rich are of/en well connected to 'the 
powers that be'. They have a voice in the corridors of power. They are able to also create public 
opinion using media. The poor do not have these options. The poor often have to get united to raise 
their voice and be heard. The poor could also take to the streets and demonstrate to get their demands 
met. The rich wont do thaf'. 
The poorer respondents appear to diversify accotmtability and have a repertoire of activities and 
arrangements to deal with failing urban services; enabling them to select the mechanism appropriate to 
the service, time, or place. Such diversification seems consistent with the complex natnre of problems 
people face (housing, employment, income, and equality), which require multi-faceted solutions. The 
descriptive statistics show that poorer households had generally less contact with urban service 
providers, had limited knowledge about the practicalities of complaints, and that the poor users were 
consistently less satisfied with the qnality of service provision. Furthermore, the more complicated an 
interaction with service providers the less the average respondent wanted to do it (this was especially 
true of the Internet). Thus, accountability should not be viewed as a 'level playing field': some 
respondents in this research either had less opportunity to use voice, or were not listened to by service 
providers. 
In contrast, respondents from non-deprived areas tended to have one predominant accotmtability 
arrangement: a dependence on service provider's in-house arrangements. The research fotmd that those 
with greater knowledge of service provider's complaints procedures were more likely to receive high 
quality services, possibly because soch knowledge changes the incentive structures for service 
providers meaning upper income groups receive a disproportionate amount of attention and advice. As 
soch, these respondents were more likely to have noticed an improvement in the delivery of urban 
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services. Service provider related arrangements for accountability (service provider help lines, visiting 
seiVice providers officers, using service provider suggestion boxes and service provider interne! sites) 
seem to work better than more ad-hoc arrangements in terms of improving services. Whether these 
channels wonld be as effective for poorer respondents is unclear; it might not be the mechanism but the 
personal characteristics (wealth, education, access to influential networks/information) that is key in 
securing better services. This finding has significance for the current interest in promoting short, rather 
than long routes for accountability (World Bank, 2004), but also for those service providers who stated 
that they know when a service is satisfactory 'when there are no more complaints'. 
The respondents in deprived areas claimed service provider's offices are not easily accessible, but also 
that they did not trust services providers. The majority of respondents from Mdantsane, Dhaka and 
Bristol did not trost service providers, except for Seoul where the clear majority do, see Table 73. 
Trust was associated mainly with women, respondents from non-deprived areas, and respondents aged 
25-30 years. The most common reason for trust was because of service provider status as some kind of 
official figure, except in Bristol, where respondents trusted the service provider because their work is 
overseen. The research demonstrates that trust in service providers, particnlar in the private sector, 
depends on a level of care and interest beyond the cash contract. Figure 8 outlines the numerous ways 
that respondents attempted to secure accountability in the delivery of m:ban services. 
Table 73: The levels of trust respondents have in service providers. 
Do you trust senice providen? 
Yes Reason 
I" 2= 3ro 
Bristol 4% '/know there are agencie!li 'SeM'ice providers have '//mow there are 
people to ensure they do a demonstrated their ability.' accountability 
!(ood job'. arran~ements. 
Mdantsane 19% 'They are officials·. 'I know service providers The service providers have 
promise to improve. • proven their ability. ' 
Dhaka 43% 'They are officials'. 'I know service providers '/have confidence in the 
will be ounished i(thev fail'. service vrovider3 ability. ' 
Seoul 63% Not asked. 
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Figure 8: Arrangements for accountability. 
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In Bristol, Dhaka, and Mdantsane, ward conncillors were very much involved in the day-to-day 
delivery of setvices in their wards. The willingness to contact a councillor if dissatisfied with urban 
sctvices, despite a decidedly negative verdict on the way that local government provides urban 
setvices, was a arrangement used by the less well informed and more marginal social groups, (the 
unemployed and least educated). Tills was the case even when the setvices (or people) in question 
were not government responsibility. It was found that those who reported least contact with councillors 
were those from better-educated and more prosperous households. For example, those who read 
newspapers were far more likely to approach setvices providers than those who did not read 
newspapers. Respondents in deprived areas tended to have a more positive picture of local councillors 
and belief that the political system is or could be of benefit to them. However, the ability of local 
councillors to respond to local issues was limited because of a lack of powers (political, budgetary, 
administrative), and lack of resources at ward level. Furthermore, the research revealed a degree of 
criticism and rivalry between civic associations, and councillors and showed that the difficulties for 
civil society in re-orienting itself away from combating authoritative regimes to co-operating with 
government. 
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Nickson (1996) also found that responsiveness to formal complaints is a poor indicator of customer 
satisfaction, since users prefer to obtain redress through use local political channels and individual 
clientelistic relations with councillors. Clientelism may be critical to understanding these findings. 
Patron-client relationships involve an exchange of services in the content of differential power, the 
patron controls resources and gives these as favours to the client and, in return, the client offers loyalty 
and other resources to the patron. Where respondents depend on patronage for service delivery there is 
a risk for service users in using accountability arrangements, as demonstrated by the reaction of 
mastaans in Dhaka to NGO service delivery in slums. Politicians also displayed a desire to retain 
significant decision-making power or patronage opportunities with respect to urban services. Services 
were seen as an arena for personal gain, influence and status. The case studies revealed a contradiction 
between formal democracy and clientelist system of personal favours and obligations in urban service 
delivery. 
Box 6 Kev findin2:s on how accountabilitv is demonstrated 
• Service users and service providers construct accountability differently. Most service users thought providers 
should be accountable for participation in decision making and responding to users complaints. Providers 
thought themselves only accountable for the quality of services. 
• Perceptions of having a voice in service delivery was related mainly to respondents on higher income as well 
as those living in non-deprived areas. 
• The research found that contacting politicians, public meetings, voting for politicians, user groups, protests 
and organising petitions emerged as the most nseful arrangements for securing accountability in low income 
areas. Respondents from deprived areas seldom relied on a single mechanism to produce accountability. In 
contrast, service users in non-deprived areas seemed to prefer to engage with systems of hierarchical control 
over frontline service providers, through an upward chain of command. These kinds of direct accountability 
arrangements seem to be most effective. Accountability as a resource can increase social differentiation. 
• Respondents from deprived areas stated that service providers are physically and socially inaccessible and are 
untrustworthy. 
• Service users typically had little ability to enforce improvements in service delivery; the use of such sanctions 
is key to definitions of accountability. 
6.5 The outputs of urban sen-ices 
Walsh (1995; 249) defines service qnality as an assessment of performance, which can be subjective. 
This proved to be the case in the research, as service providers and users had differing perceptions of 
service outputs. All respondents were asked to evaluate the degree to which accountability had 
improved the outputs of the services they use or provide. Service users were asked to complete a 
questionnaire designed to reveal satisfaction with the quantity, quality, and information about the 
services they receive. Service providers were asked to discnss these outputs in the context of semi-
structured interviews. The majority of respondents (particularly male respondents, and those 
respondents living in non-deprived areas) said there had been a small improvement in services since the 
specific reforms had been initiated. The majority of service providers said that there had been a big 
improvement to urban services over the time accountability had been improved. 
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6.5.1 User satisfaction with urban services 
Assessments of user satisfaction were based on two components: an analysis of the level of user 
satisfaction with urban services has been complemented by an assessment of change in the perceived 
qmlity of service delivery. Respondents were asked whether services in their areas had got better, 
deteriorated, or stayed the same since the accountability reform. As stated above, it was found that the 
largest group in every case thought that there had been a small improvement in urban services since 
accountability had been improved in service delivery, see Table 74. 
Table 74: Respondents perception of improvements in urban services. 
Since reforms have the senices in this area imProve~ staved the same or worsened? 
I' 2nu 3'" 
Bristol Small imorovements (31%)" Noim_provements(45%) Worsened (18%) 
Mdantsane Small imorovement (57%) Noimprovements(24%) Worsened (15%) 
Dhaka Small imorovement(51%) No imorovements ( 40%) Bi~ improvement ( 5%) 
Seoul Small improvement ( 68%) Noimprovements(l5%) Big improvement ( 13o/o) 
Respondents were also asked whether they were satisfied with the delivery of services in their area. It 
was found that levels of satisfaction with senices were significantly higher in upper income areas. 
Table 75 provides a cross-case comparison of overall satisfaction with service provision, with the 
quality of service, and with information provided about services. Looking at particular services, there 
are a number which users in deprived areas are more satisfied with than people living in other areas. 
On the whole, levels of satisfaction were greater for excludable services than rate funded services. In 
general, all respondents were least satisfied with the overall provision, quality, and information about 
drains, roads, streetlights, and community halls, but also about the information supplied on refuse 
collection. 
Table 75: Cross case comparison of overall satisfaction with the provision, quality and information about senices. 
Satisfied with Least satisfied with Satisfied with Least satisfied Satisfied with Least satisfied 
overall provision overall provision quaHtyof with quality or information :services with Information 
sen1ces services seM'ices 
% most satisfied % least satisfied % most satisfied % least satisfied %most satisfied % least satisfied 
Refuse collection Bulky waste collection Not asked Not asked Drains Street sweeping 
Connnunity ha1Js Recycling Abandoned car Refuse collection 
Streetlight Abandoned car removal removal 
Drnins Bulky waste collection 
Water supply Drains Water supply Drnins Water supply Drains 
Refuse collection Roads and paving Refuse collection Roads and paving Refuse removal Streetlight 
Sanitation Str""'light Sanitation CommunitY halls Roads and paving Conununity balls 
Refuse collection Drnins Roads and paving Drnins Roads and paving Drains 
Sanitation Conununity halls Sanitation Conununity halls Sanitation Ccmmunity halls 
Roads and paving Streetlight. Refuse collection Streetlight. Refuse collection Streetlight 
Water supply Roads and paving Water supply Roads and paving Water supply Refuse collection 
Conununity halls Drains Community halls Strectlight Sanitation Roads and paving 
Refuse collection Streetlight Refuse coUection Drnins Cormnunity balls Drains 
77 Respondents in Bristol were asked whether there had been an improvement in the appearance of the area in the 
last 3 years (45% said No), and also whether the services had become more sustainable in the last 3 years (73% 
said Yes). 
78 Questionnaire data was complemented by data from semi-structured interviews with residents to give a more 
representative view. 
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The evidence suggested that residents in deprived areas are less satisfied with urban services in general. 
The questions on overall attitudes to services suggests that those in deprived areas, are more likely to 
be critical; they are more likely to choose negative adjectives to describe services than those in non 
deprived areas. In Dhaka, Seoul, and Mdantsane, the majority of respondents described the urban 
services they receive as 'undependable', 'unresponsive', 'inefficient', and 'disinterested', these 
descriptions are summarised below in Table 76. When looking at differences in the attitudes of 
different groups in deprived and non deprived areas, there is a clearly identifiable pattern: satisfaction 
generally increases with age and is higher among women, those with higher educational qualifications, 
income and in higher social class (based on occupation). 
Table 76: Cros~e descriptions of urban services. 
How would you describe these services in general? 
JR 200 3ro 
Bristol Reliable (84%) Under-funded (47% Effective (41%) 
Mdantsane Inefficient ( 42%) Undependable (34% Disinterested (27%) 
Dhaka Undependable (55%) Unresponsive (53% Inefficient ( 4 7%)_ 
Seoul Unresponsive ( 43%) Effective (38%) Undependable (29"/o) 
Respondents in the main were also dissatisfied with their relationship with service providers. It was 
surprising to discover the large nnmber of respondents who believed that: 'its difficult to get 
improvements'; 'service providers don 'I take complaints seriously'; 'service providers don't care 
about people like me'. However, respondents in Seoul and Bristol also said 'service providers are 
help fit I and .friendly'; in Seoul, they said 'users are kept informed about the progress of complaints': in 
Bristol they said 'service providers are more responsive now' and 'are happy to hear users' ideas'. A 
cross-case comparison of these statements is provided below in Table 77. A relatively large number of 
respondents also expressed dissatisfaction with local government suggesting that, where respondents 
thought that the situation with service delivery was poor, they blamed local government, except in 
Bristol, where the majority were satisfied with Bristol City Council. 
Table 77: A cross-case comparison of statements about services. 
Statement about these services 
l' 200 3'" 
Bristol 'Service providers are happy to 'Service providers are more 'Service providers are friendly 
hear users ideas • (55%) responsive now' (490/o) and helpful' (41%) 
Mdantsane 'It's difficult to get 'Service providers don't take 'Service providers don't care 
improvements in services • (86%) complaints seriously' (81%) about people like me' (~7%) 
Dhaka 'Service providers don 't take 'It's difficult to get 'Service providers don 't take 
complaints seriously' (95%) improvements in services' (93%) complaints seriously' (91%) 
Seoul 'Service providers don 't take 'It's difficult to get 'Setvice providers are fn'endly 
complaints seriously' (60%) improvements in services • ( 42%) and helpful' (23%) 
Respondents were asked whether they had complained to a service provider in the last 12 months, their 
responses are provided below in Table 78. The majority of respondents in Bangladesh and Bristol had 
complained about water and sanitation services. In Mdantsane, complaints were about roads, and in 
Seoul the main problem was refuse collection. 
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Table 78: Cross case complaints to service providers in the last 12 months. 
Have you complained to a senice provider in the last 12 months? 
I' 2n 3'" 
Bristol Water and sewerage (61%) None (31%) Roads and paving (18%) 
South Africa Roads and paving (44%) Streetlights (39"/o) Sanitation (33%) 
Bangladesh Water suoolv (23%) Storm water drains (17% l Streetligbts (8%) 
Seoul Refuse collection ( 13%) Water supply, sanitation, Storm water drains ( 6%) 
roads and paving, streetligbts (8%) 
Of those that had complained to service providers, the majority of respondents in Dhaka and 
Mdantsane were very dissatisfied with the way that their complaint was handled, whereas those in 
Seoul were mostly fairly satisfied. In Seoul, in particular, the accountability reform meant that 
customer care and complaint mechanisms were taken seriously, in the belief that the prompt redress of 
such complaints would help convince residents that the council meant business (quite literally), it was 
hoped this would engender a greater sense of community involvement in Seoul Metropolitan 
Government. A number of the case studies have introduced a virtual complaints system, including the 
possibility in Seoul of using video-conferencing consultations, and the Metropolitan Government has 
stationed computer tenuinals throughout the city for citizens to e-mail Seoul Metropolitan Government 
or check their website. However, the extent to which this style of customer complaints system 
succeeded in reaching older 'customers', or those from lower income groups is low. 
The research showed that some respondents had a greater tendency to report malfunctions with urban 
services. Whilst respondents from non-deprived areas encountered relatively fewer problems with 
urban services, they were more likely to complain to service providers. The research also showed that 
service providers find it easier to be accountable to this small but vocal group of residents. A cross-
sectoral overview of complaints is provided below in Table 79. 
Table 79: Cross-sectoral overview of complaints. 
Location Examnles of comnlaints 
Bristol 'I don 't knaw how to complain'. 
'How do I get a new bin?' 
Regarding the frequency of street sweeping: 'about the broken glass', 'litter dropping', 'trade 
refuse from local shops and pubs', 'litter left in the streets after robbish collections', 'dogfouling', 
'take away food containers'. 
'The rubbish is piling up.' 
'Dum pin!{ stuff~r cars arotmd the area. • 
Mdantsane 'There is only one standpipe tap for this whole area.' 
'There is no electricity in this area orelectn·city is cut off without us being informed.' 
'We build our own toilets.' 
~Lack of roads and streets are not paved. • 
'Refose is not collected.' 
'Streetlights are not working.' 
Dhaka 'Insufficient water supply.' 
'Blockage of the drains.' 
'Interruptions of electricity supply/load shedding.' 
'Lack of services. • 
'Problems with bills.' 
'Lack of J!.OVemment resvonsibi/itv.' 
Seoul 'Waste bins in the streets.' 
'Poor drainaf{e. • 
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Respondents had different perceptions of complaints mechanisms: in South Africa, the majority of 
respondents perceived them as resulting in fair outcomes, in Seoul, respondents thought they were easy 
to use and they have a quick response, whereas in Dhaka, surprisingly, most residents thought they 
were well publicised. Those respondents from non-deprived areas and female respondents were more 
likely to be satisfied with complaint handling. 
It is interesting to compare the services respondents in the different case study locations had 
complained about with those services they were most dissatisfied with, as shown in Table 80 below. 
Those in non-deprived areas tended to complain more about refuse collection and streetlights, whereas 
respondents from deprived areas complained more about sanitation and roads. Men tended to complain 
more often about roads and drains, whereas women were chiefly responsible for complaints about 
streetlights. 
Table 80: Comparison between services respondents are least satisfied with and those 'complained about'. 
SenriCH n'5pondrnts wrre ltast satl<Jf'red with Senicn respondrnts had complalnl'd about 
Bristol Bulky waste collection (92%) Water and sewerage (61 %) 
Recycling (94%) None(31%) 
Abandoned car removal (94%) Roads and paving (18%) 
Mdant=>e Storm water drains (25%) Roads and paving (44%) 
Roads and paving (30%) Streetlights (39%) 
Strectlight (33%). Sanitation (33%) 
Dhaka Storm water drains (25%) Water supply (23%) 
Community hall (2S%) Storm water drains ( 17%) 
Streetligtrt; (30%) Strectlights (8%) 
Seoul Roads and paving ( 47%) Refuse collection (13%) 
Storm water drains (48%) Water supply. Sanitation. 
Strectlights (S2%) Roads and paving. Streetlights (8%) 
As shown in Table 81, self-interest predominates as the reason why most respondents complained 
about urban services in the case studies, particularly in non-deprived areas. Interestingly, those in 
deprived areas were more likely to say they complained in the community or in the general public 
interest and their choice of complaint mechanism, (i.e. meetings, petitions, protest), also revealed a bias 
toward collective activities. This finding suggests the existence of expectations of social obligations in 
these neighbourhoods, however, respondents also suggested that collective style complaints 
mechanisms were not very effective at improving service outputs. 
Table 81: Reasons for complaints. 
If you comJ lain about senicc1, are you doing tbis out of? 
I' 2no 3'" 
Barton Hill Self interest (20% Commwrity interest (4% 
-
Mdantsane Self interest ( 48% Community interest ( 43%) Public interest ( 6% l_ 
Dhaka Self interest (98% Community interest (95%) Public interest (92%) 
Seoul Public interest (53%) Commwrity interest (30%) Self interest (! 8%) 
In general, all respondents were more likely to make complaints about those services that operate at the 
household level, (i.e. water supply or sanitation), rather than from community level services, like roads, 
community halls, streetlights, and drains. On one level it seems that some respondents had performed a 
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kind of cost benefit analysis in this respect, (based on resonrces, benefits, sense of responsibility for 
services, trust, predicted outcomes, relative bargaining power and fall back position), and some had 
decided that they would be better off waiting for problems with community level services to be 
resolved by others. Table 82 provides a cross case analysis of users relationship to urban 
services/service providers to explain this finding. 
Table 82: Cross-<:ase analysis of the user relationship with urban services (after Goetz and Gavcnta. 2001 ). 
Sl'nice Characterlstin User rt"latlonshiu with service User relationship with provider 
Water supply Private good Nature of service means that users have a Sustained contact through billing. 
(household level) high stake in and incentive for action. Cuts Typically relationship is reactive to 
and public goods in service cause immediate response. Partial service breakdoMt but also can be 
(ward and city level). exit from supply (buying water filters and prolonged by monitoring quality of 
mineral water). supplies for example. 
Refuse Private good Service has bcnefrts for individual and Nature of services presents opportunity 
collection (household level) connnunity, thus users have a high stake in for contact with frontline services 
and public goods and incentive for action. providers who have a certain amount 
(ward and citv level\ of discretion to respond to users. 
Sanitation Private good Cuts in service cause immediate problems. User orientation difficult given the 
(household level) Nature of service means that users have a nature of the service, unless users get 
and public goods 
(ward and ~ity level). 
high stake in and incentive for action. involved in monitoring disposal. 
Roads and Public goods. Poor quality roads can be endured for long Pa)11lelli: through taxes- typically no 
paving time, depending on mode of~ i.e. personal relationship with service 
potholes affect car !bike more than 
Pooestnans. 
providers. 
Community Public goods. Loog-terrn use gives clear incentives to eo-- Payment 1hrougb taxes. 
halls ordinate collective action. Although poor User groups may perform care taking. 
maintenance ofbuilding can be endured for 
longtime. 
Street Lights Public goods. Poor quality services can be endured for Payment through taxes. No petWnal 
long time, but clear incentives to cooniinate relationship. Short tennlone-off 
collective action in high crime areas. relat;ooship u complaffi. 
Stonn water Public goods. Low stake in and little incentive for Payment through taxes. No obvious 
drains collective action to repair services that they user groups towards which to be 
do not use on private basis unless damages accountable. 
home/property. 
Respondents in Seoul and Dhaka were asked which services they thought most needed improving in 
their area. Respondents were offered a list of options. Respondents differed in their views of which 
urban services they would choose to upgrade, these findings are shown in Table 83. In Seoul, 
respondents chose public services like roads, strcctlights and community halls, whereas in Dhaka, 
respondents chose services like drains, water supplies and sanitation. In Seoul and Dhaka, women and 
respondents in non-deprived areas prioritised streetlights and water, whereas men, and those in 
deprived areas, prioritised drains, community halls and roads. Interviews with service providers in 
Mdantsane revealed that they thought roads would also come top of the list for improvements for 
residents, together with other road related issues, such as street cleaning and street lighting. The stress 
on better roads was greater in non-deprived areas, not ouly because it affects transport, but also because 
lack of adequate street lighting allows crime to flourish. 
Table 83: Respondents choice of services to be upgraded. 
If you had the opportunity to up~:rade an existin~: urban service which would you choose? 
JM 200 3'" 
Dhaka Storm water drains (53%) Water supply (33%) Sanitation (6%) 
Seoul Roads and paving (35%) Streetlights (17%) Conununity hall ( 17%) 
224 
An investigation of improvements to urban services through accountability 
Box 7 Key findine-s on user satisfaction with urban services 
• There has been a slight change in user satisfaction during the period since service delivery practices 
Wlderwent change. The majority of respondents thought there had been only a small improvement in urban 
services since accowltability had been improved, indicating chronic problems with services that have not been 
addressed by service providers. These respondents were typically from non-deprived areas with an adequate 
income and living in their own house or flat. 
• Self-intffest predominates as the reason to complain about urban services in the case studies, although those 
in deprived areas were more likely to complain in the commnnity or general public interest. 
• Respondents were least satisfied with overall provision, the quality and information about drains, roads, 
strcetlights, and commnnity halls, but also about information on refuse removal. Although most complaints 
were about private/excludable services. like water and sanitation, refuse or roads. 
• Respondents were in the main also dissatisfied with their relationship with service providers, respondents felt 
• they do not care' and • they do not take complaints seriously', except Barton Hill and Seoul where services 
providers were also ~responsive' and 'happy to hear user ideas,. 
• Satisfaction with services is complex and depends on the socio-economic context, legal and policy 
envirorunent, and personal fuctors, (such as well-being, user expectation and experience, personal disposition, 
entitlements, life experience, aspirations, threshold level for putting up with problems, 'brand' loyalty, and 
willingness to complain). 
6.5.2 Performance of urban services 
In interviews, all service providers claimed that greater accountability had improved the services they 
provide, for example, by improving results, adding value, or meeting targets in specific areas, as well 
as by changing the behaviour and attitudes of service providers. 
The performance of waste management in Barton Hill has improved under Project Pathfinder; in 
particular there was a noticeable increase in the rate of O&M in the immediate aftermath of the change 
to accountability. The Pathfinder team had the discretion to decide the best means of cleaning the area 
and to change the fnequency of collection, or sweeping, depending on specific circumstances. The 
service became speedier, tonnage increased, a range of services became available in a more integrated 
way, which is more responsive to local concerns. This increase in performance related to a catch up 
effect, as service providers got the services up to standard through clearing the backlog of unsatisfied 
service requests and tasks. 
Few material incentives are generally available to encourage good performance in the public sector but 
feeling appreciated by communities, the opportunity for employees to acqnire different skills and 
undertake other roles and a sense of mission in service delivery created incentives for good 
performance. Furthermore, demands on staff increased due to closer and more extensive and open 
contact with residents, which has created pressure to continuously improve services. However, the 
increased standard of performance in Barton Hill was comparatively short lived, and services 
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intermittently revert back to pre-reform levels whenever resource or operational constraints were 
present at the city level. 
In Dhaka, the governance report card has, so far, failed to have any tangible effect on the technical 
performance of urban services. However, the range and quality of services available in the city has 
expanded through NGO activities. In some wards of the city, (and for some groups of users), profound 
increases in the quality of services have occurred in terms of water and sanitation being available near 
the home, the legality of the supply has reduced people's anxiety over access to services, the quality of 
supply is relatively better, the quantity of supply has increased and continnity and cost effectiveness 
has improved. New services have also led to dramatic improvements in social relations for slum 
dwellers, including a reduction in power differentials, which normally characterise the relationship 
between slum and Dhaka City Corporations professionals. Supplying services to previously 
hidden/ignored people has also required a change to inappropriate centralised rules and policies, and 
the working practices and attitudes of municipal staff. Similarly, some residents in Bristol said, "It's 
not the services, it's the people who make a difference". In Mdantsane, community members reported 
that engineers worked around the clock to correct technical faults- e.g. malfunctioning of drainage 
lines. This suggests that accountability could be viewed as an extension of methodological 
individualism, i.e. good service is a sum of all individual service provider actions. However, in Dhaka, 
respondents rejected tltis tendency to confuse the accountability of the organisation with the person 
working for it; instead good people depend on good systems: "Its not my friend, it's the system we are 
talking about," said a respondent from Dhaka. 
In the Seoul case, accountability was focused on the relationship between managers and citizens, rather 
than specific technical improvements to service delivery. However, the rationalisation of Seoul 
Metropolitan Goverrunent has had consequences for the technical performance of services. There were 
gains in terms of the speed of response to complaints, quality of service, reduced corruption, reliability, 
responsiveness and flexibility of services, witltin the boundaries of essentially bureaucratic procedures. 
Emergency response teams of operatives are now be deployed specifically to respond quickly to 
complaints. Dealings with City Hall were simplified through IT, which speeded up the response to 
requests and made payment procedures more convenient. The City Hall was made much more 
welcoming and user friendly: visitors received a fuller and quicker answer to queries, while 
signposting, privacy, and comfort for visitors also improved, and respondents remarked that staff took 
the time and interest to listen to their views. Respondents' views on the change were very positive. 
However, the content of work and standards for performance for SMG staffbecame more exacting, and 
discretionary powers in meeting users needs were reduced through application of rules and rationing 
criteria. To compensate for tltis staff were given opportunities to develop their skills, were given 
tangible rewards for their efforts, and were encouraged to give proposals for change to their managers. 
Nonetheless, power relations between users and managers were not overtly renegotiated. 
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In Mdantsane, it was stated that services have improved 'tremendously' in recent years with respect to 
increased inflow into the sewage treatment works, electricity outages reduced, monitoring systems 
improved, pipe networks and pumps replaced. It was reported that these improvements to service 
delivery were being partly maintained hy the ward committee system. The ward committee had a role 
in ensuring complaints with services were rectified on behalf of constituents, as well as securing a road 
and street lighting project for their ward. Ward committees also have a role in implementing the Urban 
Node Project in Mdantsane, and in formulating performance standards and in monitoring service 
delivery. Ward committee members spoke of appreciable improvements in co-ordination between 
service providers and in resident centeredness since they had been elected. The increased voice of 
citizens is expected to feed through into more significant service improvements and more acceptable 
services. The impact of the ward committee on service provider working conditions was rather mixed, 
and their effectiveness at communicating information to their constituents was reported to depend on 
the skills, diligence, and motivation of individual ward councillors and committee members. Front line 
service providers reported inadequate resources, staff and equipment, which impacts upon both their 
work and their outlook on it, although one highly motivated public works official had entered a nation 
wide competition to find the best kept sewerage plant. 
Nevertheless, increases in technical performance have ouly marginally improved user satisfaction. For 
example, the results of the Citizen Survey (1999) in Seoul led to higher service standards and better 
customer relations being instituted in the Water Works Office, which have improved the technical 
outputs of service delivery; nonetheless, in 2000 citizens rated water as one of the worst services 
provided hy Seoul Metropolitan Government. It was reported that the general public distrusts the 
quality of water supply: residents complain about the colour, taste, smell, or sediment in their water 
supply, and are worried hy media scares about bacteriological quality despite the fact that the water is 
extensively chemically and bacteriologically tested. To date, arrangements to recreate trust include 
proof of quality, provision of free bottled water, involving residents in water quality inspection, and 
international benchmarking, like ISO 9000, and Charters. The Water Works department has paid for 
marketing and favourable media reports. However, even though service providers offer more and more 
information, users will remain dissatisfied until service providers produce the kind of information that 
generates trust. 
Similarly, the Project Pathfinder has the best standard of work in Bristol and a more customised way of 
providing services, yet a sizeable number of respondents said there had been no improvements in 
services or the appearance of the area. Service providers from South Africa were clear that, despite 
improvements in service delivery in recent years, service users expect a higher standard of service than 
the minimum RDP standards. Residents are not happy with gravel roads, pit latrines and standpipes, 
and, furthermore, they are not likely to be happy with urban services if their standard ofliving has not 
improved in other ways (employment). 
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Service providers in Dhaka and Mdantsane reported that accountability for the technical performance 
of services is undermined by the poor construction of infrastructnre, the number of assets that have 
expired their useful life, theoretical budgets for o&M they are unavailable in practice, and public 
misuse of services (illegal connections, blocking sewers with solid waste, motor pumps on water 
supply connections, drug dealing from DWASA pump stations). In addition, accountability for 
standard outputs is difficult when it depends on varying physical characteristics, (rainfall, topography, 
or climatic conditions). For example, in Dhaka, the aquifer has been mined so that water supplies are 
diminishing, and in Seoul, the effectiveness of waste management is constrained by lack of land. 
Box 8 ~findin~s on technical perfomtance of urban services 
• According to service providers, outputs have improved over more or less the same period in which enhanced 
accountability was observed. Accountability has improved urban services in tenns of coverage and physical 
access to networks, affordable service connection fees and payments, the long nm operation aud maintenance 
of urban services, minimised commercial losses (inefficient billing and illegal connections) and improved the 
quality of urban services. 
• Accountability arrangements tend to be more successful at improving the technical performance of urban 
services than user satisfaction with the service. 
• In particular, service provision was improved by joined-up services delivery in a defmed geographical area, 
with a core dedicated team, area co-ordinator, long-tenn planning and community development workers. 
• NGO have a role in improving technical aspects of service delivery, as well as, bringing services up to 
standard in low-income neighbourhoods. 
• Contracting out service delivery may promote efficiency but not transparency, and weakens the accountability 
back to local community. 
6.6 Sustainability of urban services 
In any discussion of sustainability, it is important to clariJY what is being sustained, for how long, for 
whose benefit, over what area, and measured by what criteria. Sustainability was defined in the 
literature as the steady flow of outputs. If outputs remain constant, then services pass the sustainability 
test. This thesis is concerned with two forms of sustainability: technical sustainability, which refers to 
the technical performance of service delivery, and social sustainability, much is concerned with the 
social relations and societal norms that affect service delivery. The cross-case findings with relation to 
technical sustainability are summarised in Table 84 (found in Appendix 1 ), and those relating to social 
sustainability are summarised in Table 85 (found in Appendix 1). This research understands the social 
and technical aspects of sustainability not as a separate concern, but as an interactive force. 
It was predicted that accountability would improve the outputs of urban services and the relative 
chances of sustainability. The fieldwork has shown that, whilst accountability arrangements seem to 
have improved the outputs of urban services, there is little evidence to support the claims that the 
accountability may be contributing to the long-term sustainability of urban services. A lack of 
sustainability of urban services can be explained in two key ways: -
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1. Accountability for urban services has itself not been sustained, perhaps because accountability 
has only been used in relation to breakdowns or emergencies in service delivery, rather than to 
prevent problems from arising. Or else, 
2. Accountability led to changes to the delivery of urban services, which have undermined 
sustainability. 
6.6.1 Cross case findings on social sustainability of urban services 
In all aspects of public service delivery in Dhaka, there is a dominance of elite (VIP) interests and a 
bias towards these groups in resource allocation. In Dhaka, the accountability to slum dwellers 
leveraged by NGOs resulted in major gains in access where previously services were unavailable or 
difficult and expensive to reach; however, sustainability of services is more problematic. Although 
households and marginalized communities have been involved in local service delivery initiatives, they 
have generally had little impact on the policies of mainstream service providers. The DSK projects 
have not resulted in the formal recognition by Dhaka City Corporation of slum dwellers rights to 
services or moves to legalise their tenure, and several slums have been evicted despite making legal 
water connections. Dhaka City Corporation employees have scope for discretion in service delivery79, 
which has led to more widespread adoption of the DSK model throughout the city. Nevertheless, 
reliance on the goodwill of individual service providers is an unsustainable basis for service delivery. 
Furthermore, the kind of accountability initiated by the score card has not been sustained. 
Ward committees in South Africa requires community involvement iu local democracy as well as in 
planning, setting standards, and information dissemination in service delivery. The impact of the ward 
committees in Mdantsane has been variable, perhaps because they have been operating for such a short 
time, but also because there is some way to go to make them sustainable. For instance, ward 
committees are based on volnntarism but members have also been funding most expenses out of their 
own pockets as well. Furthermore, the ward committee studied has been faced with unexpectedly high 
demands and expectations of service delivery, and is exposed to violence and intimidation. 
Sustainability of urban services is undermined by such a confrontational style of accountability 
(perhaps the legacy of consumer boycotts, rent strikes, and urban movements), rather than a synergistic 
relationship with local government. The continued success of the ward committee depends on its 
ability to represent all local interests, developing skills in reporting information from and back to 
constituencies, and in managing conflict in society. However, historically, enthusiasm for area-based 
committees, such as development forums, has not been sustained and many have ceased to operate. 
Residents in Seoul have become heavily involved in service related consultation and planning, 
especially with respect to waste management and water supply. In Seoul, significant user 
responsiveness took place, which has improved service delivery in terms of stronger guarantees of 
service standards, more regular opinion surveys and more consumer education. However, 
79 Primarily due to the absence of penalties and the existence of loopholes in bureaucratic procedures. 
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accountability arrangements have fragmented users' voice and generated conflict, in terms of increased 
number of competing claims on financially limited resources. In effect, greater responsiveness to 
service users has presented more problems than can be dealt with by service providers. This was 
particularly true of NIMBY concerns about incinerators in Seoul. The strength of consumer influence 
has surprised many interviewees, who recognised that the metropolitan government is unable to cope 
with the rapidly expanding demands made on formal service systems. Civic involvement has 
sometimes been frustrating for service providers when, despite all their efforts, services fail to meet the 
expectations of more informed, motivated, effective and empowered citizens. Nevertheless, whilst 
service delivery has become more responsive to service users, this responsiveness is selective. For 
example, those respondents with no legal tenure, e.g. from Nine Dragon Village, have no legal basis for 
demanding responsiveness from service providers. 
In general, the case studies found that accountability increased people's expectations, expands what 
people know about government and service providers, enables better evaluation of performance, and 
places government and service providers under greater scrutiny. The case studies suggested that 
respondents had a set of expectations about duties and obligations of service providers to service users 
often not articulated in formal and legal processes. In particular, the research revealed that respondents 
from deprived areas typically understood problems with urban services to be symptomatic of wider 
structural problems in society. These respondents used strategic forms of accountability, that have the 
potential not only to transform service delivery, but also to further other development objectives, such 
as to change those structures in society that lead to poverty. 
6.6.2 Cross case findings on the technical sustainability of urban services 
While the improvements to technical performance demonstrated in the case studies represent a great 
achievement, in all cases there had been a regression in service delivery over time, making it hard to 
imagine that sustainable service delivery can be maintained on a permanent basis. 
The levels at which services were provided was problematic in many of the cases. Levels of water and 
sanitation tend to receive considerable attention, which has meant that services such as storm water 
drainage and refuse removal have not been sufficiently extended. In some instances, level of services 
were so low as not to satisfy demand, for example, communal standpipes in areas with a demand for 
household connections. At the same time, where higher levels of service were provided, they are 
proving unsustainable because people's ability to pay is questionable. Frequent services breakdown 
meant that respondents were sceptical about the qnality of the services they receive. This has also 
negatively affected the level of payment for services in some cases. 
In some cases, services have not been targeted to the most needy areas. It was reported that, in all 
cases, urban services frequently fall into disrepair in poor neighbourhoods. Where the urban poor are 
excluded from formal government and private sector service delivery, or where service delivery is 
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weak, parallel structures have been set up although these are rarely legalised, which makes them 
ultimately unsustainable. 
In the Mdantsane and Dhaka case studies, not only was the extent of service provision inadequate, but 
the technical capacity of service providers was also deficient Local governments lacked resources 
such as finances and staff in line departments, together with the skills and capacity to budget for O&M 
and replacements costs. In certain cases, local government is only able to manage the most basic 
functions, and tends to be driven by crisis management in relation to urban services. Maintaining and 
operating infrastructure was reported as less politically rewarding than major construction projects. In 
interviews, councillors tended to reflect concerns with more popnlist issues, which might lead to re-
election, and so tend not to prioritise urban services unless the electorate raises them as priorities. In 
addition, sustainability has also been compromised by issues around inter-governmental responsibility 
for new or existing infrastructure, such as roads where both local and provincial government has 
competency. 
It was clear from the research, that there was an overwhelming demand for improvements to roads, 
drains, and streetlights in all cases. This was a fundamental issue for people, both in formal and 
informal areas, not only because it affected their transport, but also because it had a strong bearing on 
other worries like crime. In addition, the deterioration of these services is a key part ofthe degradation 
of the local environment. However, in Dhaka, it was reported that improved refuse collection in 
neighbourhoods through CBO activities is going hand-in-hand with increased public squalor. 
Interviewees reported unhealthy and unsightly street corners where refuse has been heaped up by CBOs 
but stands for days awaiting collection by the City Corporation. 
It was also noted that sustainability is not always an appropriate response to inadequate urban services. 
In some cases, it might be better to let services deliberately run down so that obsolete equipment can be 
replaced with better technology, or to remove some infrastmcture that is damaging people, or the 
enviromnent, such as the replacement of asbestos cement pipes in Dhaka and Mdantsane. 
Box 9 Kev findin2s on sustainabilif:J:'_ofurban senices 
• Whilst accountability has secured improved outputs from urban services, sustainability was more 
problematic. 
• Sustainability has, at times, been undennined by competing claims on common resources, skills, resource 
constraints, confused roles and responsibilities and inappropriate or unsafe services. 
• Sustainability has also been undermined by the strategic use of accountability. 
6. 7 Hypothesis testing 
This section revisits the hypothesis on accountability set out in Chapter 4 of the thesis. 
The research hypothesised that 'accountability arrangements will improve the outputs of urban 
services and will improve the relative chances of sustainabilily'. This hypothesis was based on the 
findings of the literature review, and was tested in two inter-related ways; firstly, whether 
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accountability has led to improvements in the outputs of service delivery (related to the perfonnance of 
the infrastructure and to user satisfaction with services), and, secondly, whether the sustainability of 
urban services has been improved. 
This study has addressed a gap in the existing literature on accountability by looking at the outputs and 
sustainability of urban services. The conceptual framework for this thesis predicted finding 
accountability more able to improve the outputs of urban services than sustainability. The fieldwork 
demonstrated that enhanced accountability in service delivery has, on the whole, improved the outputs 
of urban services but has been less effective at ensuring the sustainability of services. This thesis 
challenges the view of accountability as able to improve both the outputs and sustainability of urban 
services. 
This research found that: 
I. The fieldwork demonstrated that accountability arrangements have improved the outputs 
of urban senices. Further investigation of this finding revealed that accountability appears to 
be more effective at improving the technical pcrfonnance of services than user satisfaction. 
2. It seems that the ability of accountability to improve the sustainability of urban services 
depends on a number of factors, including how the respondents understood problems with 
urban services, and how they solve them. It was observed that, where respondents used 
accountability to meet their practical needs, this was more likely to improve both the outputs 
of urban services, and thus sustainability. When respondents used accountability 
arrangements to solve both the immediate problem with the service, as well as underlying 
issues of equality within society, to meet strategic interests, this seems to be less effective at 
improving the outputs and sustainability of urban services. Consequently, accountability 
arrangements improve the outputs of urban senices and only the relative chances of 
sustainability. The case study material supports the hypothesis. These findings are 
summarised in Table 86. 
Table 86: Matrix of aspects of accountability and sustainability in context. 
Entitlements to Accountability Technical Uoer Technical Social 
senrlces Perfonnance Satisfaction sustalnablllty sustalnablllty _ 
Forms of Producer User Producer User Producer User Producer User Producer User Producer User 
accountability view view view view view view view view view view view view 
Bristol t t u t H t u u u ~ ~ 
Mdantmme t t t t t t t t H H H ~ 
Dhaka:NGO t t t t t t t t t H H ~ 
initiative 
Dhaka: 
- - - - - - - - - - -
ReportCatd 
Seoul t t t t t t t H t H ~ ~ 
.. t Posrttve-• .J.. Negativ~ Neutral 
There is an assumption in accountability theory that the rich and poor are able to secure their needs in 
service delivery through similar sets of relationships. The research revealed that respondents from non-
deprived areas tended to use accountability to meet their practical needs and to sustain improvements to 
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urban services in their own spaces of the city. These respondents seemed less inclined to choose those 
accountability arrangements that challenge social norms and roles, presumably because their interests 
and claims to citizenship are well served by the existing power structure. Whereas respondents from 
deprived areas tended to use accountability to satisfY a practical need (rectiJYing problems with urban 
services), as well as to support a strategic concern (e.g. social equality). Furthermore, deprived 
respondents tended to seek collective, rather than individual forms of accountability. 
Box 10 · Key flndines on accountabilitv for sustainable urban services 
• infrastructure reflects values and beliefs. 
• Accountability is an institution- a complex of norms and behaviours that persist over time by serving 
collectively valued purposes. 
• Sustainability requires a steady flow of outputs. 
• Accountability will undermine tbe sustainability of urban services if it changes values, beliefs, and behaviours 
that govern service delivery. 
• Strategic forms of accountability arrangements are likely to chaoge norms and behaviours in service delivery 
and so may undennine tbe sustainability of urban services. 
• Practical forms of accountability are likely to improve tbe sustainability of urban services. 
• Accountability arrangements focused on practical needs can undennine strategic interests. 
6.8 Testing the conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework of this research consists of four components: 
I. A threefold challenge for the operation of urban services: outputs, sustainability and 
accountability, (as previously introduced in sections 1.5, 1.7, 1.8). 
2. In the following section accountability is defined to include aspects of information, action and 
power, (as presented in section 2.2.1). 
3. Two simple alternative models are presented in the third section to illustrate how 
accountability might function in practice to enhance service outputs and sustainability, (as 
described in section 2.2.5). 
4. The four contemporary forms of accountability (professional, political, user and managerial 
accountability) were presented, (these were first presented in section 2.3). 
This section assesses the conceptual framewOik in a number of ways. It comments on the way the two 
models of accountability were observed, and it looks at whether the overall analysis validated the 
accountability models presented in Chapter 3. 
6.8.1 A three-fold challenge for urban services 
Urban services are failing with respect to technical performance of the physical facility and user 
satisfaction with the service. The literature (section 2.2. 7) indicates that the low level of accountability 
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for urban services is the cause of poor outputs. The litemture (sections 1.5, 1.7, and 1.8) points to 
accountability, quality of outputs and sustainability as a three-fold challenge for service providers. 
Outputs 
As described in section 1.5, the quality of urban services can be conceptualised in tenus of two key 
outputs: technical quality, and user satisfaction. This research has found widespread concern with both 
the technical efficiency and effectiveness of urban services, and the customer's perception of the 
service quality, dimensions of reliability, as well as staff behaviour and attitudes (Pamsumman, 
Zeithaml, and Berry, 1985). 
Sustainability 
The litemture on urban services, presented in section I. 7, found that urban services are sustainable if 
the outputs of the service continue to be realised over the long term. The fieldwork has made an 
important distinction between the outputs of urban services and their sustainability. Typically, 
accountability is described in the litemture as a mechanism to achieve constancy in service delivery, 
however, this research suggests that accountability can in fact undennine the technical and social 
sustainability of urban services. 
Accountability 
Section 1.8 found that service providers and policy makers must be made accountable for the effective 
delivery urban services. Chapter 2 examined the ways in which accountability for service outputs and 
their monitoring can be strengthened in order to improve the outputs and sustainability in urban service 
delivery. The research has demonstmted that improving professional aoeountability for the design and 
delivery of urban services, improving the service nsers-policymaker relationship through participatory 
democmcy, strengthening the voice and participation of citizens, and making service delivery more 
responsive to service users can improve the outputs of urban services. 
6.8.2 Definitions of accountability 
For the purpose of this research accountability for urban services was defined from the literature as a 
relationship between those providing and using a service set up for the purpose of improving the 
outputs of service. Accountability includes an element of subjectivity, most respondents thought 
providers should be accountable for ensuring participation in decision-making and responding to users 
complaints, see Table 87. 
Table 87: Respondents perception of the way service providers are most accountable. 
In what wa!J do you think that service providen are most accountable? 
I" 2= 3'" 
Mdantsane Meeting service targets and Providing information about the Encouraging participation in 
standards. delivery of services. decision-making. 
Dhaka Consulting users on their Responding to users complaints. Having a transparent service. 
n~~riorities. 
Seoul Responding to users Having a user-friendly service. Encouraging participation in 
complaints. decision-makin~. 
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In South Africa, the majority of respondents thought service providers should be primarily accountable 
for meeting service quality requirements, as well as information dissemination, responsiveness, and 
participation. In Seoul, accountability meant responding to complaints, user-friendliness, consultation 
and information dissemination, and, in Dhaka, for consnlting users, as well as for responsiveness, 
transparency and user friendliness. These varying kinds of accountability also represent different 
stages of service delivery and sum up different approaches to service delivery, i.e. a focus on 
performance, or with user satisfaction. 
Accountability was differently constructed from the provider's point of view. In interviews, service 
providers defined accountability in terms of technically competent service delivery, expertise, 
operational efficiency, and appropriate institutions. Most service providers, stretched for resources, 
saw accountability for aspects of service delivery, other than technical quality, as peripheral to their 
main business. The majority considered themselves only accountable for the quality of service 
delivered, rather than for the manner in which services have been provided, or for the interaction 
between users and front line providers. Service providers typically saw accountability as their 
responsibility to 'traditional' hierarchies in service delivery, as opposed to the people they serve. 
Instead, service providers were keen to stress respondents' accountabilities- for example, in cleaning 
water tanks and replacing pipes, putting refuse out at the correct times, or in separating recycling. 
Providers tended to consider user satisfaction with services a by-product of getting the technical 
hardware right. The research pointed to a paradox where much of infrastructure delivery (snch as 
underground pipes and wiring) is by definition unseen, whilst service providers are called to make 
themselves visible- to offer themselves up to the individual on the street for accountability. 
Perceptions of having a voice in local affairs and decision-making processes can create demands for 
better quality and more accountable services, and can mobilise a variety of user contributions. Table 
88 summarises the percentage of respondents who felt they had a voice in service delivery. In 
Mdantsane, a higher percentage of male respondents as well as those in non-deprived areas, thought 
they had a voice in service delivery. Whereas, in Seoul, the majority of respondents who thought they 
had a voice in service delivery were women, as well as those with high incomes, and aged over 50. 
Surprisingly, the research revealed that the perception of having a voice in service delivery was mainly 
associated with respondents with low incomes living in deprived areas in Dhaka. However, it was clear 
that service providers did not feel equally accountable to all service users. Whilst the poor may feel 
they have a voice in service delivery, it is clearly not a very powerful or effective voice, since service 
levels in their neighbourhoods remain inadequate. Furthermore, the voice of the poor has failed to 
increase the political consequence of inadequate services. Care should be taken in promoting greater 
accountability to pay attention to issnes of power and equality in order to avoid what Gaventa (2002) 
calls "voice without influence." 
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Table 88: Respondents perception of voice in service delivery. 
A substantial number of respondents, when faced with problems with urban services, chose not to take 
any measures, at least not officially, despite being affected by adverse outputs. Some respondents 
would 'never dream' of approaching service providers, or felt discouraged by personal experiences: "If 
they laugh in your face ... you are not going to shout about things," said a Bristol respondent. The key 
point here is that accountability is not simply formulaic: a matter of putting the right structures in place, 
and demands for better services will follow. It has far more emotional complexity than this. Muteness 
or reluctance to talk can be seen as a subtle form of exit, a means of distancing oneself from service 
providers. Accountability is not an issue for those with no expectation of being owed an explanation. 
When ease of communication or empowerment is perceived to be an issue, users may prefer shortened 
lines of communication with front line providers and word of mouth solutions, as in Bristol, more 
anonymous or distancing IT solutions, as in Seoul, or institutionalised ward structures, as in Dhaka and 
Mdantsane. 
Community mobilisation, along with the fact that dwellers are now paying for legal access to services, 
has empowered residents in Dhaka to approach and negotiate with DWASA and Dhaka City 
Corporation. "There was a time that slum people never had the ability to talk to the DWASA [Dhaka 
Water and Sanitation Authority} people, but now they play with them ... Recently, one senior engineer 
attended a workshop, [with slum communities], and he was astonished ... he said 'Why are these 
people shouting?' He is telling to me that it is the first time he heard the community voice, and they are 
blaming us", reported an NGO worker. However, accountability to service users can also be 
undcnnined when public service functions are contracted out to the private or NGO sector (Wood, 
1994; 541). In recognition of the tendency for certain users to exit public service provision, and of the 
weak voice of those who depend on public services, aid conditionality was nsed in Dhaka to discipline 
providers and substitute for users voice, for example private sector involvement was a pre-requisite for 
World Bank funding. Table 89 provides a cross<ase analysis of the success of service users choice of 
accountability arrangements. 
Table 89: Cross case analysis of the success of accountability arrangements. 
Example~ of where arrangements improved Examplt'S ofwhere these arrangemPnts have 
urban servlcH: been Ja~ely UDSUCCt"Ssful: 
Vote fora When ward councillor/mayor is seeking re-election Failure comes from ineffective 
politician promises are made to slum dwellers in exchange for representatives/political parties or communities that 
promising better votes. are politically weak 
services 
Write letters to Pressure from press can play a key role in educating Citywide service providers can ignore locality-
newspapers the public, building opposition, exposing the plight ba=llocal newspap<= 
of vulnerable, fostering relations within 
comrmmities, changing the perceptions of 
govermnent and civil societY and so forth. 
Fonn or join a Mobilising broad based civil society opposition by NGOs can be perceived as trouble makers by 
users group linking interests of urban poor with interests of government or service providers,. which can back 
other groups to strengthen their position. ftre on communities, as well as weaken 
accountability for urban services (e.g. the report 
card methodology adopted by PROSHIKA). 
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Protest/ Protests were effective for respondents with few Service providers reported being intimidated by 
demonstrate other options but to draw attention to their plight protest marches, and so have not helped to stop 
and make themselves more visible to service problems. Protests were ineffective where they have 
providers. been badly organised. or where scale is too small or 
didn't 2et ~media attention. 
Hold a public Where public meetings were held frequently, as part Meetings are talking shops. and there is no follow 
meeting of community development activities. these up to grievances. 
provided a forum for problems with urban services 
to be raised and identified as collective problems, 
which leads to a gradual shill in public expectations., 
stimulatinP action. 
Contact a Winning political support from representatives at Petitioning govenunent agencies for changes in 
politician/ the local and central government level was service delivery failed without also presenting 
councillor important for wlnerable people. This was also a properly developed alternatives. 
cost saving arrantrernent for residents. 
Use the law Although respondents said they would use the law to OOfend urban services no evidence was found of them 
actuallv doinP so. 
Contact an Although respondents said they would use ombudsmen to defend urban services no evidence was found of 
ombudsmen or them actually doing so. 
insocl."f:or 
Talk to staff at Administrative action was effective where residents Staff referred problems up the organisational 
municipality/ could talk to front line service providers directly, hierarchy this meant that few residents saw a quick 
and where providers had the discretion to resolve response to complaints. council 
t>roblems. 
Call service This arrangement was effective where service users Services users reported that, when they phone help· 
providers help had power to ensure a favourable and speedy lines to report a problem, there is no guarantee of a 
lines response to their complaint response and often need to follow up their call with 
a visit to offices. 
Visit service Where respondents knew the right person to talk to Respondents did not know which department to 
provider offices and could ensme that their complaint would be dealt visit, who to speak to, or lww to make sure their 
with, their visits were more effective. conmlaint would be followed uo. 
Use service Although respondents said they would use suggestion boxes to defend urban services no evidence was 
provider found of them actually doing so. 
SUP"P"estion boxes 
Visit service Complaints about urban services can be made more Service providers reported that intemetle·mail tends 
providers intcmet fully, (without fear of causing offence or of to be used by younger people; older people still tend 
sites retribution), and more conveniently over the to report problems in person. or phone up. Mobile 
internet. I nhones make renortinP: nroblems more convenient. 
Visit a local one One-stop shops have shortened the lines of Where people are at work during the day, 
stop shop for communication between service providers and conventional channels for making complaints 
residents, meaning that complaints are rectified remain important 
services 
auicker. 
6.8.2.1 Reviewing the qualities of accountability 
In Chapter 2 and 3, and subsequently in the conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 3, accountability 
was defined to include the elements of infonnation, power and action: -
• Information: SeiVice providers require infonnation about problems with seiVice delivery in order 
to resolve complaints. SeiVice users require infonnation to solve collective action problems in 
monitoring wban seiVices within a principal-agent framework. 
• Power: SeiVice users need sufficient power to control the actions of others and hold seiVice 
providers to account, whereas service providers need the power and autonomy to act, to enforce 
polices, to marshal resources and give an account to seiVice users. 
• Action: The effectiveness of accountability is ultimately judged by its result in seiVice delivery. 
SeiVice providers should explain or justify their action, but should also take active steps to improve 
the delivery of urban services. 
This research demonstrated that all three qualities of accountability were presented in the case studies. 
These qualities will be discussed in more detail below: 
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Information 
Respondents from the case studies found out about services in a number of different ways, see Table 
90. Some respondents received information about services directly from service providers, (in the form 
of leaflets or web pages), and some in indirect ways, such as through TV or newspapers. Word-of· 
mouth was also an effective means of receiving trusted information on urban services. On the whole, 
users were more likely to be interested in, and informed about, issues related to the delivery of services 
than at the policy formulation stage, for example. Users of services in non-deprived areas felt well 
informed by a greater number of services than those in deprived areas. 
Table 90: Cross-case analysis of the ways respondents found out about urban services. 
How do you find out about the senices you use? 
,. zoo 3ro 
Bristol Leaflets (29"/o) Otber(26%) Service help line (22%) 
Mdantsane Leaflets ( 40%) Newspapers (39%) Radio(38%) 
Dhaka TV(93%) Own experience of using services (87%) Talking to neighbours (69%)_ 
Seoul Not asked 
Service providers, in some cases, had instituted information dissemination measures as part of 
accountability reforms, these were intended to shorten lines of communication between residents and 
service providers. Examples of these include one-stop shops, Internet and e-mail, Integrated 
Development Plan documents, customer service desks, and emergency service phone numbers. The 
media, (particularly radio, TV and local newspapers), have a key role in highlighting the problems with 
urban services, investigating the causes of poor services, creating and informing a public debate, and 
publicising wrongdoing on behalf of citizens. In Bristol, a sympathetic local newspaper acted as a 
watchdog and represented residents attitudes to service delivery. 
However, most respondents had not used the information they were given about services to get 
improvements to service delivery. This is particularly true of those in deprived areas, and those with 
inadequate incomes. These respondents were likely to state that they had not seen any information, 
indicating issues of information asymmetry. For example, service users from deprived areas of 
Mdantsane and Dhaka did not know what kinds of service they were supposed to be getting, what 
service providers were supposed to be doing, or what service quality they could expect. These 
respondents were aware that aspects of services needed to be improved but not that the prerequisite for 
obtaining better services is information. All of which suggests limited potential for service users to 
enforce accountability. 
However, greater information disclosure does not necessarily engender greater accountability, or instil 
deeper confidence; information does not alter a strncturally unequal relationship. Heeks (1998) warns 
that information in itself has 'no innate accountability property', but that "only those information 
80 Respondents from Bristol were asked for their preferred way of finding out about services aud these were radio 
(78% ), service help line (24%) aud leaflets (22% ). 
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systems that provide monitoring, comparison and control mechanisms can be said to truly support 
accountability" (Heeks, 1998; 18). Flooding users with information can be a way of remaining 
unaccountable, as one respondent said 'the easiest Wo/ to hide a tree is in a forest'; there is a need to 
gather and sift through evidence, as well as make assessments as to whether the information is true or 
false, which presents opportunity and transaction costs to service users. For example, whilst scorecards 
in Dhaka have generated basic data on services and aimed to shame service providers into improving 
services, they have failed to act as a tool for civil society to lobby for new priorities in service delivery. 
Similarly, in Seoul, service providers tended to denigrate the residents experience of urban services as 
captured in Citizens Satisfaction Surveys. This was because ordinary citizens do not have the kinds of 
knowledge, (soch as international comparisons or professional expertise), needed to make an accurate 
judgment. In Bristol, the Pathfinder team often gets to hear of the problems the neighborhood is 
experiencing with the service, but this information is unlikely to reach management levels in SIT A, or 
Bristol City Council. Those at the point of delivery are able to control the information that feeds into 
the organizational hierarchy and define their own response to problems, but they are also able to 
subvert control. 
Power 
The Pathfinder was designed to ensore that residents have more direct control over service providers in 
the definition of needs, and in the management of services. Certain residents in Barton Hill exert a 
greater claim on service providers than others, for example, those older residents who have lived in 
Barton Hill for many years and those residents in terraced housing, whose rubbish is collected from the 
curbside. These residents were more likely to be around when the refuse is collected, and have a 
greater stake in the service than the residents of the flats for example. However, user power is 
undermined by SIT A's operational constraints elsewhere in the city, which mean that dedicated staff 
are transferred and the service delivery in Barton Hill soffers. 
A legally enshrined role for civil society in South Africa not only aims at a synergy between the efforts 
of local govermuent and community groups, but also acts as a watchdog mechanism to hold the state to 
account. As soch, the ward committee is intended to address the needs of the previously disadvantaged 
groups and to change resident's attitudes from dependency to self-reliance and partnership. However, 
there have been cases where local residents and community groops have felt threatened or suspicious of 
the power wielded by the committee. 
VIP citizens in Dhaka tend to have more power over service providers in terms of legally enforceable 
rights, better access to political power and the bureaucracy, better ability to promote their interests, and 
have the ability to create a demand pull on govermuent for individualised responses, to problems. The 
research revealed that the way slnm dwellers challenge the status quo, for example, through mass 
protests, is typically confrontational, unpredictable and uncomfortable for service providers. Donor 
conditionality, to an extent, had increased user power and created a space for civil society consultation. 
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However, NGO-municipality partnerships have given a greater sense of power and influence to service 
users and empowered them. 
The approach to accountability taken by Seoul Metropolitan Government emphasized gathering data 
from citizens and appears more ciTcctive at rectifying individual problems than building citizen 
solidarity, or challenging the inequalities in society. Not all respondents in Seoul felt empowered by 
accountability arrangements; some felt that they may only 'for showy purposes' or participation is 
taking place 'just out of formality'. An accountability arrangement that relies on the use of IT may 
exacerbate the digital divide between afiluent and poor, meaning increased transparency and 
accountability in government is only for the wealthy or computer literate. NGOs in the anti-corruption 
movement have a key role in defending the rights of the poor, who have reduced access to 
accountability, and holding public officials to account on their behalf. 
Action 
Project Pathfinder has achieved higher standards of refuse collection and street cleaning than the SIT A 
average in the rest of Bristol. The project has improved the responsiveness of waste management by 
operating at the neighbourhood level and delivering services through a team of workers dedicated to 
the area. One spin off of the project has been the Operation Cleansweep, where community has 
mobilised voluntarily to improve the appearance of the neighbourhood for themselves. 
Service delivery in South Mrica is underpinned by a strong commitment to equality and the ward 
committee structure has extended participatory democracy in local government. Committees are 
trained to take on responsibility for planning and budgeting according to priorities set by the 
community through a participatory process. This has become a powerful basis for establishing new 
priorities in service delivery by local government. Ward committees have taken action to improve 
services delivery, principally by rectifying complaints on behalf of individuals, and in securing a road 
project for their ward in Mdantsane, but action is compromised by lack of resources. 
There has, as yet, been no official action to improve service delivery by Dhaka City Corporation or 
DW ASA. Dhaka City Corporation has a grievance redressa1 system for receiving complaints and 
settling grievances concerning its services. However, only a small proportion of respondents were 
aware of it, or bother to use formal arrangements. People feel that there \\ill be no follow up to their 
complaint and that officials are often unavailable or indifferent; there are no minimum standards for 
service that users can expect, and no guarantee to provide solutions to problems in a stipnlated time. 
NGOs have attempted to hold service providers to account in two key ways: advocacy on behalf of 
people by getting interest of poor on the policy agenda, and by initiating experiments in service 
delivery for citizens living in slum communities. 
240 
An investigation of improvements to urban services through accountability 
In Seoul, action was taken to make it easier and more convenient for citizens to deal with City Hall, 
(e.g. Internet applications, reduced form filling/visits to offices), and to bring citizens closer to 
government (in a carefully managed way). Policies have been designed to fit the specific focus and 
objectives of anti-corruption reform. Accountability has improved service delivery in Seoul by 
preventing (rather than detecting) corruption, limiting scope for employees to exercise discretion, 
discourage patronage networks from developing, increases in transparency and improving 
administrative procedures, increasing information disclosures and making services more demand 
responsive, for example, through performance evaluation for services. See Table 91. 
Table 91: Qualities of accountability demonstrated in the case studies. 
Case Information Action Power 
Bristol i i i 
Mdantsane i T i 
Dhaka: Cc-production i T i 
Dhaka: Report Cards i - -
Seoul T T i 
.. t Posthve; J.. Negattve;-Neutral 
6.8.3 The two models of accountability for urban services 
This research has investigated whether accountability is conducive to achieving and sustaining the 
performance of urban services using case material from the UK, South Africa, Bangladesh and South 
Korea. This research draws in part on the practical/strategic interests distinction formulated by 
Molyncux ( 1985), and popularised by Moser ( 1989). Practical interests refer to immediate basic needs, 
such as rectifying inadequacies in urban services. Strntegic interests relate to improving one's position 
in society relative to others, (deprived and non-deprived service users will have different strategic 
interests). The framework has been used in this research to make a distinction in the use of 
accountability. 
Based on the literature review, it was suggested in Chapter 3 that accountability might be used in a 
practical sense to improve the technical process or service delivery, or strategically to improve the 
outcomes for society of service delivery, e.g. social justice. Practical accountability arrangements in 
this research include calling service provider help lines, visiting service providers officers, using 
service provider suggestion boxes, and visiting service provider interne! sites. Whereas, strntegic 
accountability arrangements refer to protesting/demonstrating, using the Jaw, forming or joining a user 
group, contacting an ombudsmen, contacting politicians, holding a public meeting, or voting for 
politicians. 
Practical accountability represent relatively safe ground for urban services organisations, since they 
primarily relate to technical specifications for service delivery, service standards, procedures, staff 
training, and so on. Service providers retain the power to determine the agenda and ground rules for 
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service delivery (Skelcher, 1993). On the basis of the case study material, it is argued that practical 
accountability arrangements are aimed primarily at solving problems with urban services, and so, in 
effect, maintain, perpetuate and consolidate existing social structures. Sole consideration of the short-
term benefits of accountability for nrban services may fail to take into account existing social relations 
and strategic goals, both of which influence the longer-term effectiveness of the benefits of urban 
services. Such a narrow focus can work against the underlying issue of accountability, which is social 
justice and equality in society. 
In contrast, strategic accountability is concerned with a fundamentally different agenda, one that 
potentially is more threatening to 'the hierarchies, routines and negotiated order of the service provider 
organisation' (Skelcher, 1993). Strategic accountability is reflected in the question: Why do people 
lack adequate nrban services in the first place? Strategic accountability aims to renegotiate the way 
urban services are provided, together with the accompanying social relations. This approach is based 
on an understanding of the problems with urban services as typically symptomatic of deeper inequities 
in society; accountability should then be used to tackle the social and economic inequalities that exist in 
the operating environment. The case studies suggest that a concern for strategic issues would have io 
be addressed if accountability is to satisfy practical concerns with nrban services and deliver social 
justice. 
Respondents in non-deprived areas used accountability primarily to solve personal problems. 
Accountability in this context reflects liberal ideas of competitive and atomistic view of the individuals, 
personal freedom, self-reliance, competitive market values, and equality of opportunity. However, 
response on an individual basis makes little sense, precisely becanse urban services by their nature are 
based on joint supply, and require collective response. The research pointed to instances of co-
operation among disadvantaged respondents who, separately, have fewer economic and political 
resources. For respondents in deprived areas, accountability can be of significance in terms of solving 
individual problems, but also structurally significant in relation to basic control over key societal 
resources. 
In sunuuary, the research has established that accountability has improved the outputs of nrban 
services, but is not necessarily an effective means of achieving sustainability. Based on the case 
studies, sustainability of nrban services has been undermined in two key ways: Firstly, it was observed 
that where respondents used accountability to meet their practical needs, to restore service delivery to 
previously acceptable levels, this was more likely to improve the outputs of nrban services and 
therefore sustainability. When respondents used accountability arrangements to solve both the 
immediate problem with the service as well as the underlying issue of equality within the society, 
furthering strategic interests, this seems to be less effective at improving the outputs and sustainability 
of urban services. In this respect, accountability could be viewed in terms of the debate on the 'tragedy 
of the commons' (Hardin, 1968). Sustainability can be undermined by the way accountability creates 
new forms of rights and obligations in relation to citizenship, and the way accountability arrangements 
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generate new expectations about the appropriate conduct of service providers, as discussed section 
6.4.5. If urban services are a couunon resource, then accountability can lead to an intensification of 
competition for resources and more numerous oompeting claims from individuals and groups on scarce 
resources, which is likely to exceed sustainable levels of service delivery. These competing claims 
might also change decisions as to what infrastructure is provided and where, to who and when, and 
how it is to be financed and managed. These changes might disrupt service delivery, also undermining 
sustainability. Consequently, accountability arrangements improve the outputs of urban services, and 
the relative chances of sustainability. 
Secondly, the sustainability of urban services has also been undermined by a loss of accountability. 
The nature of accountability and urban services as public goods can create collective action problems. 
Inttastructure requires preventative ntaintenance to minimise breakdowns, however, service providers 
in the case studies often tended to opt for crisis ntaintenance. While this may appear cheaper and easier 
in the short term, it leads to frequent breakdowns, unreliable supplies, and poor service levels. 
Similarly, the research has shown that service users had a tendency for crisis related accountability in 
response to breakdowns and emergencies, rather than using ex-ante accountability to prevent problems 
with urban services from arising. Also, apparent in the case studies was a tendency for interest in 
accountability to wane as problems with services are solved, or when resource constraints prevented 
on-going action. In addition, where community participation has led to greater demands for local 
control over resources and more active involvement in decision-making, service provider enthusiasm 
for accountability has cooled. 
6.8.4 Four contemporary forms of accountability 
The case studies investigated four specific ways that service providers had demonstrated their 
accountability for the delivery of urban services. These were described in section 6.4.1 as: -
• Professional accountability: Improving professional competence in the design and delivery of 
urban services to improve efficiency, effectiveness, eoonorny and equity. 
• Polilical accountability: Attempts to strengthen participatory democracy in the institutions and 
structures of local government. 
• User accountability: Increase the capacity of service users to participate in the design and 
management of services and exert influence on service providers. 
• Managerial accountability: Service provider led attempts to beoome more responsive to service 
users. 
Section 6.4.2 moved on to present the, sometimes parallel, ways that services users secured 
accountability for urban services. The research revealed that respondents had two broadly differing 
agendas with respect to accountability. It was found that oontaeting politicians, public meetings, voting 
for politicians, user groups, protests and organising petitions, emerged as the most useful arrangements 
for securing accountability for respondents in deprived areas (see Table 92). 
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Service users in non-deprived areas seemed to prefer to engage with systems of hierarchical control 
over frontline service providers through an upward chain of command. Non-deprived users seemed to 
preferred to contact service providers directly through service provider help lines, visit service 
providers offices, service provider suggestion boxes, and service provider intemet sites. For these 
respondents, it was found that service outputs had improved over more or less the same period in which 
accountability for urban services was increased, and that accountability had ensured the 'capacity for 
continuance' (Parkin, 2000), or sustainability of urban services. These kinds of direct accountability 
arrangements seemed to be more effective in terms of user satisfaction than the ad-hoc arrangements 
used by respondents from deprived areas. However, it is unclear whether success depends on the 
mechanism, or the personal characteristics of the respondents. 
Table 92: Use of accountability arrangemeots in case stady locations. 
Acroaatability Accountability Respondents from deprived Respondents from bOft.. Comment on suitability or 
arrangement. area use of accountability deprived area use of accountability arrangements 
in1.tituted accountability 
Professional Visit one stop shop Write to newspapeB Visit one stop shop Arrangements of professional 
Talk to staff at Contact/vote for councillor Call SP help lines accountability were more suited to 
municipality/ council Use the law Visit SP offices respondents from non-deprived areas 
Protest/demonstrate Use SP suggestion box 
Form users group Visit SP intemet sites 
Contact ombudsmen 
Ta1k to municipa]ity 
Politica1 Vote for a politician Write to newspapers Visit one stop shop Arrangements of political 
promising better Contact/vote for councillor Call SP help lines accountabili.ty were more :5\\ited to 
"""""' 
Use the law Visit SP office$ respondents from deprived areas 
Contact a politician Protest/demonstrate Use SP suggestion box 
F onn users group Visit SP intemet sites 
Contact ombudsmen 
Talk to municipality_ 
u., Hold public meeting Write to newspaper.~ Visit one stop shop Ammgements of user accountability 
Fonnljoin user group Contactlvote for councillor Call SP help lines such as eo-production or report cards 
Visit SP offices Usethelaw Visit SP offices were more suited to respondents 
Protest/demonstrate Use SP suggestion box from deprived areas. 
Fonn users group Visit SP intemet sites 
Contact ombudsmen 
Talk to muni~i~~ 
Managerial Visit one stop shop Write to newspapers Visit one stop shop Arrangements of managerial 
Call SP help lines Contact/vote for councillor Call SP help lines accountability were more suited to 
Visit SP offices Use the law Visit SP offices respondents from non deprived areas 
SP suggestion box Protest/demonstrate Use SP suggestion box 
Visit SP intemet sites Fonn users group Visit SP intemet sites 
Contact ombudsmen 
Talk to municipality 
6.8.5 Explaining the intermittent nature of accountability 
The case studies revealed that accountability for urban services was lost at times. This finding can be 
explained with reference to the qualities of accountability. The qnalities of accountability (information, 
power and action) can be deployed in mutually reinforcing ways, leading to improvements in service 
delivery (Keams, 1994; Schacter, 2000; Bertolini, 2004). However, trade offs between these qualities 
can lead to a loss of accountability, for example, the case studies showed that: -
• Action at the expense of power and vice versa: The kind of action taken by service providers may 
compromise the power of service users, for example, training frontline staff to be more teclmically 
competent, conrteous and friendly, might create a high qnality service, but it does nothing to 
empower the citizen. Alternatively, redistributing power by building the capacity or empowering 
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services users through decision making may mean that action to improve services is delayed, e.g. 
NIMBY reaction to incinerators in Seoul. 
• Information at the expense of action and vice versa: Action in service delivery can be improved 
by using the private sector, (for-profit, or NGOs), to perform key tasks, or to provide support. 
However, this involvement might lead to information asrrnmetries, or lack of transparency in 
service delivery, e.g. SlTA management did not inform residents of the reasons for changes to 
Project Pathfinder. Alternatively, a focus on informing service users about the details of senice 
delivery may lead to delays in taking action to make improvements to urban services, e.g. pre-
project preparation and community development work in Dhaka. 
• Power at the expense of information and vice versa: Seeking to empower service users may not 
result in the customer being more perfectly informed about service delivery, e.g. the hope of slum 
dwellers that legal access to water supply means legal land tenure in Dhaka. Or else, information 
dissemination may not result in a renegotiation of power relations, e.g. where IT is used to flood 
service users with unedited information, or where information may be purposively manipulated to 
ensure that power relations remain unchanged. 
6.9 Reflections of the research design 
The case study methodology, the variety of research techniques, and actor oriented research design 
adopted in this thesis enabled the collection of service provider and service users views about service 
provision. As a consequence, this research contrasts with those studies that concentrate on users views 
in isolation. In this thesis, user's views were placed in context, and complemented by service 
providers' views; accountability was investigated at the interface between service providers and service 
users. This research design proved fruitful as it revealed significant differences in the views of service 
users and providers about accountability, service outputs and sustainability. 
The implication of this approach to accountability is that significant contradictions were found between 
sustainability, and the outputs of urban services. Furthermore, the research suggests that accountability 
for urban services is only partly and indirectly related to the intentions and plans of service providers 
and policy makers. Such a finding would have been missed by an approach that took the outcomes of 
accountability reforms to be solely determined by the intentions of policy makers and neglected the 
agency of service users to change the social relations in urban service delivery. 
Nonetheless, there are methodological limitations: the most notable of which was the selection of 
discrete case studies to illustrate a single aspect of accountability. On reflection, performing discrete 
investigations and creating an artificial distinction between the different forms of accountability has the 
potential to oversimplify the findings on accountability in each case study and distract from the 
complexity (political, social, institutional) that characterised the fieldwork. However, this is in part 
mitigated by the cross<ase analysis. Furthermore, there would be a risk that this very complexity 
would mask the potential to draw out distinct lessons from the cases. 
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6.10 Chapter summary 
This study addresses a gap in the existing literature on accountability by looking at its effects on the 
sustainability of urban services. Table 93 (found in Appendix I) provides a summary of the fieldwork 
through a cross case review of accountability, and Table 94 (found in Appendix 1) outlines service 
providers interest in strengthening accountability for urban services. This thesis finds that the forms of 
accountability investigated had improved the outputs and relative chances of sustainability of urban 
services. 
The literature suggests that accountability in the delivery of urban services should enhance service 
outputs in terms of improving technical performance and user satisfaction. The research found that 
accountability has improved service outputs. However, on the whole, increased user satisfaction has 
been slower to materialise than improvements to the performance of urban services. 
Most respondents from non-deprived areas fonnd that, in their personal experience, services had 
improved since accountability arrangements were applied. However, growing personal satisfaction 
with household level services was not linked to confidence in improvements to community level 
service delivery. Overall, satisfaction ratings for urban services by the urban poor are lower than those 
given by the general households. This can be explained with reference to poor levels of coverage, 
particularly community level services like drainage, street lights, roads and community halls, poor 
operation and maintenance, unmet expectations and standards, low problems resolution rates, and poor 
staff behaviour. 
The research demonstrates that service users in non-deprived areas tended to seek accountability for 
those urban services that have a direct impact at the household level, for example, water and sanitation, 
refuse collection, or when potholes in roads cause damage to cars, (as in Mdantsane), rather than 
mobilising around problems with community level services, such as poor street lights, or community 
halls. 
When the urban poor encountered a problem with services they were less likely to approach the service 
provider concerned than upper income citizens. This finding might be explained by the fact that the 
problem resolution rate for the poor is much lower than that for other citizens, but also because the 
poor typically have less enforceable rights to urban services. Instead, the urban poor used multiple 
accountability arrangements to resolve their problems that resembled aspects of political accountability 
and user accountability; diversification presumably overcomes the risk of reliance on one predominant 
arrangement in terms of time and effort. Service users in non-deprived areas, however, seemed to 
prefer to engage with systems of hierarchical control over froutline service providers, such as 
professional or managerial accountability. These arrangements appear to be more effective at 
improving user satisfaction than the more ad-hoc arrangements used by respondents from deprived 
areas. Nevertheless, the case studies present little evidence to support the claims that accountability 
may be contributing to the over-all long-term sustainability of urban services. However, it seemed that 
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sustainability was most likely to be increased through the use of accountability arrangements to meet 
practical needs in urban service delivery. 
lbis research employed a methodology that looked at the ways service providers demonstrate their 
accountability for urban services, and, simultaneously, has paid attention to citizen's initiatives to 
improve accountability for nrban services at the neighbourhood level. This chapter has tested the 
conceptual framework of this research. Four case studies were selected to illustrate four contemporary 
forms of accountability (professional, political, user and managerial accountability). Respondents 
confirmed outputs, sustainability and accountability are indeed a threefold challenge for the operation 
of urban services. Analysis of the function of accountability, in terms of information, action and 
power, to enhance service outputs and sustainability can indeed be represented by practical and 
strategic models. It was observed that the qualities of accountability can be deployed in mutually 
reinforcing ways leading to improvements in service delivery. Trade offs between the three core 
qualities (information, power and action) might lead to a loss of accountability. 
The next chapter will revisit the testable propositions for the functioning of accountability identified in 
Chapter 2. These propositions, developed from the literature review, will be reassessed in light of the 
evidence collected from the case studies and which has been analysed in this and the previous chapter. 
Chapter 7 contains the conclusions, which identify the main findings and the contribution ofthis thesis 
to this area of research. 
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Chapter 7 Evaluation of Propositions and Implications of Findings 
7.1 Introduction 
The literature review suggested a number of general propositions for the functioning of accountability; 
these propositions were presented in section 2.2.8. In light of the practical experience and empirical 
data documented in the fieldwork chapters (Chapter 5 and 6), the purpose of this chapter is to 
reconsider these propositions. These assumptions are tested to see if accountability is demonstrated in 
the case studies in the way predicted by the literature review, and the usefulness of these propositions is 
reviewed. These propositions have been differentiated into those relating to information, power and 
action aspects of accountability, as in Chapter 2 (see Table 95). Furthermore, this chapter identifies a 
number of implications of the research findings for the existing theory and future practice of 
accountability, as well as for attempts to improve service outputs and sustainability. The last section of 
this chapter contains the conclusions, which identify the main findings and the contribution of this 
thesis to the area of research. 
Table 95: Propositions for the functioning of accountability. 
Information related propositions Power related propositions Action related propositions 
The need for infonnation and other Sanctions are needed for Multiple arrangements of 
resource svrrunetries. accountabilitv. acoauntabilitv are reQuired. 
Service providers are Service users are homogeneous. O&M is neglected in practice. 
untrustworthy. 
Service providers mtd users need Service providers should be Accountability is a cyclical process. 
incentives for action. answerable to the cotrummity. 
User voice is needed for effective Social capital is needed for Service providers and users are self-
service delivery. accountabilitv. interested. 
The fieldwork presented in Chapter 5, and cross case analysis of Chapter 6, has answered the research 
questions and tested the research hypothesis. It was demonstrated that accountability arrangements 
have improved the outputs of urban services. Further investigation of this finding revealed that 
accountability appears to be more effective at improving the technical performance of services than 
user satisfaction. Based on the case study material, the cross-<:ase analysis, (Chapter 6), found that the 
ability of accountability to improve the sustainability of urban services depends on a number of factors, 
including how the respondents understood problems with urban services, and how they solve them. 
With reference to the conceptual framework, outlined in Chapter 3, it was observed that, where 
respondents used accountability to meet their practical needs, this was more likely to improve the 
outputs of urban services, and thus sustainability. When respondents used accountability arrangements 
to solve both the immediate problem with the service, as well as the underlying issue of equality within 
society, relating to strategic interests, this seems to be less effective at improving the outputs and 
sustainability of urban services. Consequently, accountability arrangements improve the outputs of 
urban services, and improve the relative chances of sustainability. Moving on from the findings which 
relate to the research questions and hypothesis testing, it is the purpose of this chapter to discuss this 
'missing link' between the theory and practice of accountability, and between improved service outputs 
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and sustainability. The study has found timely and relevant lessons about accountability for sustainable 
urban services, and these are discussed below. 
7.2 Information related propositions for the function of accountability 
7.2.1 Information and other resource symmetries are required 
The literature makes two key suggestions with respect to resource agymmetries: firstly, it suggests that 
it is imperative that public service providers know service user's priorities and secondly, the literature 
suggests that accountability depends on gymmetries of information and other resources between the 
service provider and service user within the principal-agent framework. In practice, the case studies 
seem to support the proposition. The key findings in relation to this proposition are discussed below. 
Finding: Information asymmetries had been reduced in service delivery. 
Information agymmetries had been addressed in the case studies in a variety of ways, for example, in 
Seoul, Information Technology was used to maximise the accessibility of service providers to citizens 
by cutting through administrative complexity. In the other case studies, service providers actively 
involved residents in monitoring standards of service delivery, for example, residents had been given a 
copy of the street cleansing schedule and cleanliness standards in Bristol. In all cases, a gympathetic 
media, and particularly area-based newsletters, had a key role as a watchdog on service providers, as an 
awareness raising tool, and as a communication channel for the public. However, certain cases 
demonstrated that service users views, particularly those of poor neighbourhoods, are not necessarily 
acted on, even when information is available to service providers. This research also raised the issue of 
information agymmetries between front-line service providers and management in service delivery; 
whereby, either front line service providers withheld information from management, leading managers 
to think that services had improved because complaints had stopped. Or else, managers' knowledge of 
resource constraints/operational needs was not disclosed to front line service providers. 
Finding: Efforts to establish accountability for urban services needs to be matched by public education 
on formal procedures. 
The evidence implies that those who know service provider complaint reporting procedures and have 
used them are more likely to be satisfied with the services they receive. This suggests that greater 
procedural knowledge is likely to be a key element in reducing susceptibility to problems with services. 
Conversely, lack of knowledge on procedures to report problems to service providers seems to 
increases the risk ofbeing subject to poor services. Despite a relatively high prevalence of problems in 
deprived areas, few of these incidents are actnally reported to service providers. Service users in 
deprived areas often had no clear understanding of the division nf institutional roles and 
responsibilities. Consistent with what one would expect and what in fact emerged from the descriptive 
statistics, respondents with a satisfactory income were more likely to be aware of service providers' 
arrangements to report problems and to use them. The fact that poor households are less likely to know 
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how to report problems to service providers seems to make them more vulnerable to problems with 
urban services. A key practical issue demonstrated by the research is the need for better 
communication with deprived neighbourhoods in order to improve the household's ability to take 
action to improve the effectiveness of service provision and, at the same time, increase incentives for 
effective provision of services. 
Finding: Information asymmetries can be reduced through dialogue. 
The accountability 'problem' has been articulated as essentially one of communication. Improved 
communication, especially 'voice', is needed to better understand customers' needs and priorities, as 
well as make services more efficient and effective. The distinction can be made between the kinds 
accountability for urban services that provide a top down, one-way transmission of information from 
service providers to service users, such as an explanation or justification for decisions, and those that 
propose a dialogue between service providers and users. Service provider's definitions of 
accountability tended to reflect answerability for their decision, or action, a one-way transmission of 
information to users, whereas service users tended to require more than an explanation or justification, 
they seem to want a dialogue with service providers. 
Finding: Accountability needs to be sustained. 
The sustainability of accountability itself was raised as a concern in the fieldwork. Certain service 
users preferred to engage with accountability in an ad hoc or disorganised way, with daily interactions 
with service providers more important in shaping accountability than formal institutions. Initial 
enthusiasm in accountability reforms was also found to wane or dissipate once political terms of office 
were up, or whenever contentious, long term and unpopular issues arose in service delivery. 
Finding: Accountability has a number of costs. 
Whilst accountability provides specific advantages, accountability also has a downside- the 'costs' of 
the processes through which it is generated. The case studies demonstrated the costs of being 
accountable in terms of: -
• Complying with accountability (the staff time and resources involved, e.g. compiling performance 
data). 
• Opportunity costs (time taken up in being accountable means service providers cannot pursue other 
activities). 
• Avoidance costs (in attempting to circumvent accountability). 
• Communities resources necessary to demand accountability, to organise, to ensure that initiatives 
get off the ground, or else place themselves in a better bargaining position relative to other user 
groups. 
In certain cases, service providers did not have enough resources to move beyond statutory 
responsibility, or otherwise change the way services are carried out. For example, in Bristol, 
information about the Pathfinder initiative has not been posted on the Bristol City Council website for 
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fear of creating a demand for services which cannot be met. In Dhaka, resource constraints mean that 
exit and voice on the part of citizens, has not led to more general improvements to public services 
provided by Dhaka City Corporation in the way depicted by the literature. Where accountability 
reforms have been implemented through donor funding, pressures for accountability upward to donors 
for the use of these funds may substantially reduce accountability downwards to the public. 
Box 11 Implications of resource symmetries for the existin~ theory and future practice of accotultability 
• ln the long run the costs of accountability (technical, human, fmancial) can be offset against the benefits of 
having usable infrastructure over an extended life cycle. However, there is a need to ensure that these 
resources can be found. 
• Sustaining accountability depends on fmding ways of keeping users engaged and aware of how their 
participation makes a difference in decision-making and service delivery. 
• Communities that are presently poor in physical infrastructure are in danger of becoming so in information, 
thus compoWlding inequalities and inequities. 
• Information collection and dissemination can be used as a proxy for communication with service users, or act 
as a sWTogate for political responsiveness, but this may not be a satisfactory substitute for service users. 
• lnfonnation supplied by service providers may not be relevant, easy to deal with, or reflect people's interest 
in service issues. Respondents in this research were interested in qnality of life issues, which sometimes cut 
across organisational responsibilities into areas where it is less clear who is accountable for results. 
• Knowing how to report problems with mban services to service providers and actually doing so reduces the 
probability of being subject to problems in service delivery as well as reduces the possibility that service 
providers abuse their power for individual gain. 
• The research showed that it is importaot to understaod how citizens can use performance data in public debate 
or decision-making process. 
• Accountability reforms need to achieve a balance between political demands for quick wins and long-term 
behaviour change (which may well take decades to achieve). 
7.2.2 Service providers are untrustworthy 
The literature suggests that accountability is premised on a lack of trust that service providers will 
deliver adequate services to a prescribed standard. The case studies partly support the proposition. The 
key findings in relation to this proposition are discussed below. 
Finding: Trust does matter in service delivery. 
Respondents in this research stated that, on the whole, they did not trust services providers, but often 
have no choice but to use, or otherwise benefit from, nrhan services. It might be concluded that trust is 
not important where there is no choice in service delivery. However, in Seoul, distrust of the quality of 
water supply means scarce resources are diverted from core activities into information creation and 
dissemination. Similarly, the breakdown of trust between SIT A management and the community in 
Barton Hill, led to attempts to shame SITA management into safeguarding services in Barton Hill. 
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Finding: Levels of trust varies with the service provider. 
Respondents seemed to have a higher level of trust in local government than in the private sector. For 
example, in Dhaka, eo-production of services in slums has created a kind of blind trust in Dhaka City 
Corporation that, by paying for services, slum dwellers would not be evicted, and, in Bristol, although 
residents 'complain endlessly' about the council there is still an implicit confidence iu them. It was 
reported that the private sector involvement can feed mistrust, uncertainty, and suspicion in service 
delivery, and increase demands for regulation. The research demonstrates that trust in the private 
sector depends on service providers offering a level of care and interest in service users beyond the 
cash contract, for example, attending community events in Barton Hill after hours. 
Box 12 Implications of trust for the existin! theory and future practice of accountability 
• The local government interviewees recognised that urban service delivery can be used to establish credibility 
in corrununities. 
• Face-to-face communication between front line service providers and citizens can be used to promote the 
establishment of trust and coopemtion. 
• Trust is important in service delivery~ even where there is no choice in service provider. 
• Trust is often associated with the public sector. 
7 .2.3 Service providers and users need incentives for action 
The literature suggests that service providers need incentives to provide effective urban services, and 
that service users need incentives to monitor and discipline service providers in terms of the micro-
level behaviour of agents and principals. The case studies partly support the proposition. The key 
findings in relation to this proposition are discussed below. 
Finding: Users do not necessarily require individual incentives to take action in service delivery. 
The literatnre suggests that allocating property rights is an effective way of providing the kinds of 
incentives users need to use services efficiently, and reduce the transaction costs of policing service 
delivery. In interviews, officials bemoaned the lack of community ownership of infrastructure in 
Mdantsane, citing the theft of cables, handrails, or manholes covers. However, residents demonstrated 
an alternative kind of community ownership of services, such that slum dwellers can access water from 
the RDP housing and there are local strategies to reinstall disconnected services, undo flow restrictors, 
and reduce the cost of services through meter tampering for the poor. 
Finding: Recognition should be given to the range of motivation affecting service praviders. 
The research found that kinds of incentives relevant to more unifonn and equitable provision of service 
across the city are not necessarily associated with free markets (material benefits), but can be 
ideological, political or moral values, such as solidarity, mutual responsibility, and common good. The 
Pathfinder team in Bristol demonstrated an unusual connnitment for low wage employees. Under 
Project Pathfinder employees felt empowered by their jobs: they could act under their own initiative, 
had the flexibility to tailor services to customers, and to deal with emergency repairs. Their working 
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environments improved, the team became proud of their jobs, gained work satisfaction, and personal 
status. 
Finding: Front line service providers need discretion to be effective. 
The discretion of front line providers is a key concern of commentators. Obviously complete 
autonomy and multiple accountability are incompatible. The case studies revealed how service users 
needs, problems, and satisfaction vary widely over the city. This diversity in the operational situation 
means service providers cannot always respond according to formal procedures. Front line workers 
were seen to be deciding who gets what and where, by prioritising resources and repair work, as well as 
in response to time and resource constraints, depending on their own personal judgements, rather than 
using technical criteria based on equity or efficiency. It was the attitude oflocal service providers and 
decision makers to service consumers that deterntined how effective and democratic services were. 
Box l3 Implications of incentives for the existine- theory and future practice of accountability 
• The range of motivations for services providers should be recognised, i.e. low wage employees can 
demonstrate unusual accountability to service users. 
• Both discretion and accountability worked well where providers are visible, known in the neighbourhood, and 
there was some social symmetry in power/class relations. 
• Service provider is a narrow description: these people were often a source of neighbourhood pride, negotiator 
on behalf of residents, and advocate for their rights. 
• The current focus on the individual front line provider who can be held accountable is at the expense of an 
analysis of the more general patterns of ineqnality or discrimination, for which no one actor is responsible. 
7.2.4 User voice is needed for effective service delivery 
The literature suggests user voice is key to effective service delivery. The case studies partly support 
the proposition. The key findings in relation to this proposition are discussed below. 
Finding: The respondents from deprived areas thought that they did have a voice In service delivery. 
The research revealed that perceptions of having a voice in service delivery were often associated with 
respondents living in deprived areas. However, it was clear that service providers did not feel equally 
accountable to all service users, and, while the poor felt they have a voice in service delivery, it is 
clearly not a very powerful or effective one, since service levels in their neighbourhoods remain 
technically inadequate. VW people tended to go straight to service providers with complaints, and 
often to the top of the organisation, to the Managing Director or the chief engineer. It was reported in 
Dhaka that these people often had the ability to demand special treatment from service providers, such 
as not paying the full costs of services, or having a public tubewell installed on their private property. 
Finding: Respondents from deprived areas used collective, rather than individual arrangements, to 
enforce accountability. 
Respondents ftom non-deprived areas tended to ask for individual favours of service providers rather 
than converting competing, individual problems into collective issues. Self-interest predominates as 
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the reason for complaints about urban services in these areas, whereas, those in deprived areas were 
more likely to complain in the community, or in the general public interest. People in deprived areas 
also pointed out the effectiveness of collective pressure (e.g. demos, public protests) in getting a 
response from government to problems with services. As one respondent from Dhaka said, "our 
problems are not solved so we have to come together, we have no choice". However, service providers 
and politicians stated that they did not like collective protests and demands. For example, in Dhaka, 
providers stated, "they should not come in these groups". Service providers were also of the opinion 
that "only if you pay your charges can yau have a complaint". One service provider was astonished 
that following a DSK project, "even a slum person will come to the engineer to complain". Similarly, 
in Mdantsane, service providers disliked disordered approaches to complaints; although here it was 
reported that residents should not complain individually 'willy-nilly' because the role of the ward 
committee, or councillor, is to filter complaints. 
Finding: Complaint handling mechanisms has variable outcomes. 
A focus on complaints derives from the results orientated New Public Management approach, wherein 
a reduction in numbers of complaints is regarded as an important indicator of improvements to 
services. In this research women, and those in non-deprived areas, were more likely to be satisfied 
with complaint handling. Althongh, the majority of respondents had not complained about urban 
services. Most complaints recorded in this research were about private/exclndable services, like water 
and sanitation, or refuse. 
Finding: Greater accountability can reduce user satisfaction. 
Securing customer satisfaction has been frustrating for service providers in Seoul, when, despite all 
their efforts, services are failing to meet the expectations of more informed, motivated, effective and 
empowered citizens. Service providers commented that "the public has become more aware" and "the 
public has become more demanding". In Dhaka, one service provider stated, "if everyone is satisfied 
100% then they will still expect more". This statement suggests that satisfaction and expectations had 
to be kept in line with resonrce constraints, and explains why service providers were not more 
accountable to citizens. It appears that making commitments to improve the standard of services is 
only rational in a context where increased demands can be met In Dhaka, the pressure to perform is 
offset by water shortages, lack of manpower and financial resources. 
Finding: User satiifaction may still be low even if services meet technical targets for service delivery. 
For example, the Project Pathfinder has the best standard of work in Bristol, yet the majority of 
residents interviewed said there had been no improvements in services, or the appearance of the area in 
the last three years. Similarly, in Buffalo City, people expected higher standards of service than those 
set out in the RDP and they are not satisfied with gravel roads, pit latrines and standpipes, even when 
these are an improvement to pre-existing standards of service. 
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Box 14 lmplicatiom of 1L<rers voice for the existin2 theory and future practice of accountability 
• Accmmtability creates greater expectations in service delivery; greater accotmtability does not mean that 
services users will be more satisfied with the performance of urban services; service providers should be 
prepared for a dip in satisfaction levels following a reform to accountability. 
• Some respondents had no idea that positive changes had taken place in service delivery; lack of information 
can also mean low satisfaction with service outputs. 
• Acconntability as a value needs to be held more widely; it is often seen as the preserve of managers and 
politicians, rather than the everyday concern of service users or front line staff. 
• High rates of dissatisfaction with urban services suggest that society may be more difficult to govern. 
• Greater accountability ean also reduce the efficiency of service delivery or even stop it altogether. 
7.3 Power related propositions for the function of accountability 
7.3.1 Sanctions are needed for accountability 
The literature suggests that accountability requires that effective sanctions be in place. The case studies 
seem to partially support the proposition. The key findings in relation to this proposition are discussed 
below. 
Finding: In practice service users have few sanctions to use as leverage to demand better services. 
The theory suggests that, to be fully accountable, implies the use of sanctions. In the context of public 
urban services sanctions can refer to the power to hire and fire, recourse for reporting, ability to enforce 
a response, or legal support to protect users. Although attempts were made to draw service users in as 
monitors of service delivery in the case stodies, they typically Jacked effective sanctions to enforce a 
favourable response. Scott (1985) talks about 'hidden transcripts' through which subordinate groups 
can critique the powerful in society for example, backbiting and grumbling, and these were very much 
in evidence in Barton Hill. 
Finding: The role of payment for services as a sanction in service delivery is ambivalent., 
The theory suggests that payment for services can amplify voice, and make service providers 
responsive to needs if payment is withheld. However, the case stodies revealed that withholding 
payment was an ineffective way of seeking to improve services, often resulting in disconnections rather 
than better service delivery. In addition, receiving a bill for services was in the main associated with 
non-deprived areas and people living in formal housing. In Barton Hill some respondents were willing 
to trade reduced service levels (and potentially reduced accountability) for lower council tax. Thus, it 
should be ensured that service providers do not have an incentive to reduce costs by eroding service 
quality. 
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Finding: Embedding service providers in communities can also be a disincentive for front line service 
providers to improve service provision. 
SIT A planned to recruit staff for the Pathfinder team from existing employees who lived Barton Hill. 
However, this strategy failed precisely because of the kind of local accountability it would involve. 
Employees did not apply for the project because they did not want to be 'bothered in the pub on a 
Friday night' by disgruntled residents whose bins had not been emptied. The employees that did 
volunteer for the project were keen to deliver services in a demand driven way, but were not local 
residents. 
Finding: Forms of accountability can be traded off against each other. 
The Dhaka case study illustrates partial accountability. Frontline workers, particularly those of 
DWASA, are presented with a moral obligation, (and financial incentive through bribes), to provide 
services to citizens regardless of the legal status of their dwellings. Moral accountability to the urban 
poor in tbis case was possible because of a lack of penalties/loopholes in bureaucratic procedures. In 
the context of the NGO water and sanitation projects in slum areas, the City Corporation has become 
partially accountable to citizens in service provision, yet slum dwellers lack legal recourse in case of 
complaints, and are unable to prevent slum evictions. It was also clear in Mdantsane that 
accountability outcomes may be partially exclusive of each other. For example, water meters (and 
charging for water) might make services more financially accountable, but does not accord with users 
sense of social justice or moral accountability, i.e. the primacy of the well-being of the community. 
Finding: Intemational pressures can be effictive in making urban service delivery accountable to 
citizens. 
Accountability can be better realised if human rights were more fully and more explicitly integrated 
into the analysis and delivery of services. For example, in South Africa, urban services are part of 
every person's right to a healthy and dignified life. However, the difficulty the poor have in securing 
their rights highlights the importance of international pressures on national govermnent, to implement 
international laws, artain Millennium Development Goals, and improve the ability of poor and 
marginalized citizens to make their voices heard. The role of International Financing Institutions, such 
as the World Bank and IMF, have played a role in promoting accountability initiatives at various times 
in the UK, South Korea, Bangladesh, and South Mriea, and aid conditionality has been used as a 
sanction to discipline providers and substitute for the weak voice of users. Fergnson's (1994) work is 
instructive in this case. He talks about the tendency of development agencies to perform sensitive 
political operations under the cover of neutral, technical operations. 
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Box 15 lmplicatiom: of weak sanctions for the ex is tine: theory and future practice of accountability 
• The evidence that arrangements to raise consumers voice will discipline service providers is partial. 
Accountability to users tends to be stronger \\i!ere users have higher status. 
• Withholding user charges was not very effective as leverage to demand better performance and 
accotu1tability. Furthermore, resource constraints in service delivery may make this arrangement 
counterproductive. 
• Enforcing accountability doesn't have to be confrontational. Arrangeroents might involve collecting 
evidence, dialogae with providers, building user capacity and awareness raising, and lobbying at local 
govenuncnt level. 
• Voluntary approaches to accountability can be a public relations exercise, aod teod to have unreliable 
outcomes. They may be focused on the financial bottom line and are short tennis! 
• Respondents questioned \\i!ether accountability for urban services was introduced to promote local 
deroocraey, inclusion, and participation in service delivery or represented a cheaper way of administering and 
delivering services. 
7.3.2 Homogeneous service users 
The literature suggests that service users are homogenous. The case studies do not support the 
proposition. The key findings in relation to this proposition are discussed below. 
Finding: Some service users are better placed for acting on accountability arrangements. 
In general, the ease of communication with service providers is consistent with socio-economic factors 
(such as high income and status). The research demonstrates that service users in deprived areas, 
(those with the most service problems), rely heavily on local government and civil society 
arrangements to remedy problems, whereas service users in non-deprived areas, contacted service 
providers directly. Service providers need to be aware of the diversity and complexity oflocal social 
and economic relations. 
Finding: Service providers have attempted to entrench their strategic interests in service delivery. 
In interviews, service providers made a clear distinction between their responses to 'VIP' people from 
upper income residential areas and people from low-income areas, or slum dwellers. In Bristol, it was 
reported that, in general, SIT A employees do not take as much care of lower income areas of the city 
. because 'the place will be back to the same state by 4 o'clock'. Those neighbourhoods with chronic 
and repetitive complaints about urban services tended to be low-income areas. These residents were 
also reported to be the most difficult 'kind' of people to deal with. Furthermore, low-income residents 
claims on service providers are often seen as less legitimate because of their social status, (less well off 
and less well educated). Front line providers in Dhaka perceived slum dwellers as 'undesirables' and 
they were characterised as illiterate, pimps, prostitutes or drug dealers. In Mdantsane, service providers 
complained about residents spending priorities, for example, they spend their money on TVs, cars, 
clothes, or betting, rather than paying bills. Although people from upper income residential areas make 
many demands on service providers, service providers reported that it is easier to 'reason with these 
people and explain constraints'. Service providers had little sympathy for people in deprived areas 
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because, although they tend to have repeated problems with the services, partly because of the age of 
the infrastructure, or characteristics of the areas where they live (like narrow streets), it was suggested 
that the residents tend to cause most of the problems themselves by blocking drains with solid waste, 
putting stones down the toilets, or dropping food wrappers in the streets and so on. One service 
provider said, "it is not our fault that the services in these areas are not working properly". There were 
instances in the case studies where citizens were excluded from participation in service provider 
institutions because they were perceived as argumentative, ill-informed or troublesome, which further 
contributes to their social exclusion. 
Service providers' responses made a distinction between the 'virtuous' service users, who should be 
helped, and the 'undeserving' users, who deserve what they get because of their attitudes and 
behaviour. This moralisation in service delivery has echoes of the debate of the deserving and 
undeserving poor, and promotes an individual rather than social responsibility for service delivery. 
Nonetheless, other service providers were sympathetic and conscientious about expanding the service 
to slums, and improving service delivery in low-income areas. 
Finding: Focusing on individual accountability of front line service providers is a symptomatic 
approach to a structural problem. 
The theory suggests that accountability in the provision of urban services requires a change in the 
attitudes, values, and expectation of the individual. This assumption has parallels with those theories of 
development that require soci<H:COnomic change to be complemented by a change in the individual. 
For example, Lewis (1961) proposed the concept of the 'culture of poverty' to describe the way people 
who live in poverty share a 'culture' distinct from the mainstream, characterised by poverty, crime, 
alcoholism, and lack of hope. Instead, this research shows that it is an important to adopt a systematic 
approach to accountability, which addresses the position of people in society as well as the individnal's 
expectations in service delivery. 
Box 16 lmplkatiom oflvter~eneity for the exh:tin!: theory and future practice of accountabilitv 
• Respondents living in deprived areas had different perceptions of their rights and worth, which sometimes 
affect the belief that it is possible to challenge service provision, or else mean that people do not perceive 
injustice in service delivery, which Luke's (1974) termed the third dimension of power. 
• Service providers had prejudices against 'the kind of people' that live in low-income neighbourhoods, they 
were characterised as troublesome, difficult to please, or threatening, with little self-respect, pride, or dignity. 
7.3.3 Service providers should be answerable to the community 
The literature suggests that accountability in the provision of urban services should disintermediate 
service users, i.e. to provide service users with more direct access to service providers and sources of 
information. The case studies partly support the proposition. The key findings in relation to this 
proposition are discussed below. 
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Finding: Accountability of service providers depends on a degree of direct answerability to the 
community. 
The literature has highlighted the potential of infonnal regulation in service delivery through a mix of 
local public pressure, service users expectation, competition, information, and attempts at getting closer 
to customers. Instances of service users approaching the different service providers were quite 
widespread in all cases, although with variable evidence of successful outcomes. Although, on the 
whole, front line providers reported feeling more answerable to management rather than service users, 
in Barton Hill, the Pathfinder crew felt allied with the community against their employers. 
Finding: Political accountability continues to have an important role in the delivery of urban services. 
The literature finds that representative democracy has neither universally enhanced equitable service 
delivery nor had an impact on social exclusion. The separation of responsibility for policy, service 
provision, and monitoring is thought to improve accountability in the provision of urban services, 
together with the involvement of individuals and groups in the governance of urban services. Yet, 
despite attempts to flatten accountability, respondents in the case studies revealed that local politicians 
remain key channels for complaints about urban services, both at central government and at the ward 
level. This kind of political accountability is important in the sense of re-intermediating the more 
vulnerable service users. This finding can be explained in two ways: using a politician to rectify 
problems is a (opportunity) cost saving mechanism. However, respondents also referred problems with 
urban services to politicians because they had identified service delivery as a political issue. For 
example, in Mdantsane, a number of respondents thought that government 'must look after them'. 
These respondents acted strategically by relating their experience of service delivery to wider socio-
economic processes. The respondents highlighted the potential of certain accountability reforms to 
offioad areas of government activity onto citizens, and spoke of the inherent danger that privileged 
people may become better able to influence service providers agenda and use of public funds. The 
research revealed that issues of democracy in service delivery cannot be divorced from democracy at 
the national and international level. 
Finding: Ward Councillors have a key role to play in service delivery. 
Ward councillors can be powerful advocates in service provision. For example, in Bristol, the local 
councillor took a keen interest in service delivery in his ward, and many residents continued to contact 
him directly if they had a problem with the services provided under the Project Pathfinder, particularly 
those residents that owned their accommodation and were employed. However, he felt his role as an 
'authentic voice of the people' in the ward was being sidelined, both by the committee set up to deliver 
the New Deal funding and the shortened lines of communication between residents and service 
providers. Accountability directly to front line service providers could be viewed as undermining the 
influence of elected representatives. Lower income respondents were generally more likely to contact 
a councillor to seek help regarding their problems. This finding may indicate the existence of patron-
client relations in service delivery. Respondents might have decided not to jeopardise the advantages 
that come from relations with a local patron for, perhaps, the less concrete gains of contacting a service 
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provider directly. Varley (1999) describes the use of patron client relations rather than democratic 
rights as an 'anti-democratic model' for the provision of urban services. People in this case have, in 
elfect, traded their civic rights for material benefits and tenure security. Service providers, on the other 
hand, are more ambivalent about the role of politicians in service delivery; they claimed that political 
rent seeking was demonstrated in direct relations between councillors and residents, and that political 
involvement in service delivery may be both corrupt and counter productive. Service providers were 
critical of the tendency of councillors to rush to demonstrate elfectiveness within political elections 
time frames, rather than to ensure sustainability of urban services by providing resources and staff at 
the community level. 
Finding: Thought should be given to how to scale up accountability. 
Decentralisation of service delivery, with the necessary transfer of power, resources and capacity, had 
improved service provision; in contrast, decentralisation of responsibility for service delivery without 
the necessary resources has reduced the quality of services. Where projects have created 'islands' of 
accountability within cities (such as Project Pathfinder in the UK, ward committees in Mdantsane and 
NGO service delivery and the Committees of Concerned Citizens in Dhaka), it is thought to promote 
competitive pressures in service delivery. However, these 'islands' of accountability raise fears of 'a 
postcode lottery' of geographically varying outputs in service delivery in addition to broader concerns 
about how to replicate and scale up accountability regionally, or nationally. Furthermore, continuity of 
CBO or NGO service provision depends on well-resourced and well-established community 
organisations. 
Finding: Accountability has been shaped by broader socio-political context. 
South Korea, Bangladesh, and South Africa, have relatively recent experience of civil society 
demanding democratic reforms. In Bangladesh, general strikes, protests, transport blockades, public 
rallies and disintegration of law and order, led to the end of military rule in 1990; in South Korea, a 
strong civil society played a major role in demanding democratic reform of the ruling authoritarian 
regime; in South Africa, the struggle against apartheid was also based on an alliance of civic 
associations. The case studies revealed that the respondents in deprived areas typically relied on 
aspects of these previously successfully tactics (such as collective pressure, demos, public protests), to 
promote vertical accountability for urban services, rather than using individual demand and horizontal 
accountability to highlight problems with service delivery. 
Finding: Accountability is improved through local action. 
The literature suggests that users have a greater incentive to monitor service provision at the household 
level. Accountability for community level services can be described as a public good, and so sulfers 
from collective action failures. Respondents appeared to use accountability sporadically, when 
motivated by a particular interest or need, when they judged accountability worthwhile, and when some 
realistic possibility of gain is evident; respondents may not use accountability, (or appear not to), at 
other times. Whether users take responsibility for community level services depends on their stake in 
the service, the incentive for action, and the kind of problem presented (i.e. breakdown requiring an 
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immediate response, or chronic issues that can be endured for a loug time or reqnire sustained contact 
with service providers). There was also the suggestion from respondents that people tailored their use 
of accountability to what they understand service providers can deliver, which may not be their top 
priority in service delivery but what is possible. Introducing accountability reforms in conjunction with 
community development work seemed to prove complementary: efforts to organise, support, and 
involve residents in urban service delivery served to increase incentives for action, and to foster 
stability in areas of high resident turnover. 
Finding: The extent to which accountability arrangements have made society more governable is 
debateable. 
Accountability has been presented as a vehicle for addressing governance problems81 • The extent to 
which accountability arrangements have made society more governable is debateable. Too much 
attention has been given to the 'end of the line' in accountability, i.e. service users, and front line 
providers. This direct relationship is perhaps at the expense of the governance relationships between 
citizens, local neighbourhoods, regulators, private firms, and local government. In cases where 
accountability arrangements have coordinated users voice, (such as ward committees, or Committees of 
Concerned Citizens), this appears to have generated a consensns on a range of conflicting interests, 
reduced the number of competing claims on financially limited resources, and increased the efficiency 
both in responding to complaints and in the use of resources. This approach to accountability may 
legitimate, maintain or reinforce existing power imbalances and, thereby, silence the weaker voices of 
service users. However, in other cases where accountability arrangements have fragmented users 
voice, this can mean more problems are presented than can be dealt with by local government, which 
may lead to failure of services and increases challenges to power of government and service providers. 
Box 17 Implications of answerability to the comnnmity for the theory and practice of accotmtability 
• Accmmtability is not formulaic, i.e. put in the arrangements and demands for better services will follow, it has 
far more complexity in practice. 
• Services users are often the most powerful advocate on issues that affect them because they can speak with 
direct experience of service delivety and its consequences. 
• Paradoxically, those who would benefit most from accountability for urban services are the ones that have 
most difficulties in bringing about a satisfactory outcome. 
• Service providers must work closely with politicians, since local councillors are often keenly aware of users 
problems. 
• Accountability may be viewed as just another policy initiative, and can slip dowu the priority list as service 
providers respond to new government initiatives, or respond on a piecemeal basis as resource allow. 
• The scrutiny function of councillors requires new ways of working, skills and competencies and new 
understanding of how to engage with communities and reflect local priorities. 
• The case studies also raised the issue of the accountability of citizens to govermnent officials/service 
providers for their actions. 
• The case studies highlighted the need for balance between decentralisation to respond to needs aud 
81 Perhaps as a substitute for the wider structural reforms needed for social change, i.e. wider distribution of power; 
increased information, political refonn, equitable distribution of resources, and so forth. 
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expectations at local level and the role of central govenunent in coordination, resource provision, and to 
enforce regulations. 
• The capacity of residents to negotiate with service providers depends on political legitimacy, legality and 
security, confidence, persistence and visibility. Better organised connnnnities were in a stronger position to 
negotiate with government and service providers. 
7.3.4 Social capital is required 
The literature, (as illustrated in Section 2.2.3), shows that accountability will be affected by the social 
capital available, in terms of norms, social cohesion, social networks and civic participation. The case 
studies partially support the proposition. The key findings in relation to this proposition are discussed 
below. 
Finding: There is potential to link up professional and infonnal networks. 
In all neighbourhoods, especially deprived neighbourhoods, there was evidence that informal networks 
played a supporting role in the delivery of urban services. Ensuring formal (service provider related) 
and informal networks interact is important in order to integrate these sometimes-parallel processes. 
Linking up these networks might mean that residents become more effective in challenging the range 
and balance of services delivered in their neighbourhood, and may also make use of resources more 
effective. Furthermore, consideration should be given as to how to bring services users into some of 
these more formal networks. 
Finding: Poor and vulnerable groups have social capital in terms of access to allies in government 
and/or civil society. 
Social capital is a popular way to understand how individuals can improve or maintain their positions 
in society. The research measured membership of social groups and how people participate in civil 
society. This information was compared to the ways respondents sought accountability for urban 
services to reveal whether accountability built on what social capital was already in place. The 
research revealed the existence of different kinds of social capital; horizontal forms, (such as mutual 
support among neighbours) can reduce vulnerability and increase access to services and vertical forms 
(such as claiming rights to services through politicians), can enable poor people to influence policy. 
Attempts to improve accountability should take into account the networks, relationships, and 
organisations used by poor people. Without a better understanding of social capital of the poor it will 
not be possible to successfully engage them in service delivery institutions. As such, analysis of 
existing structures used by poor city residents to improve accountability for urban services would 
ensure that these arrangements become more effective. 
Finding: Stocks of social capital vary. 
There is a tendency to assume that urban populations are stable within the physical boundaries of a 
given neighbourhood. It is important to realise that urban populations are often mobile and transitory, 
and to recognise the diversity and complexity of urban populations, and slum neighbourhoods in 
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particular. The debate on social exclusion requires recognition that hard-to-reach groups may not 
necessarily be approachable through conventional means of accountability. 
Finding: Sustainabi/ity, like trust, depends on continuity of social relations. 
Sustainability of urban services is undennined by a lack of continuity in social relationships. However 
accountability for strategic interests appears to work by disrupting social relations in a similar way to 
participation, as described by White (1996). Accountability should be properly understood as a 
mechanism for challenging existing economic and political framework, rather than working within 
them. This research found that accountability and sustainability may be partially exclusive. 
Box 18 lmplicatiom of social capital for the existine: theory and future practice of accountabi),it_r_ 
• Service providers can be made more accountable by strengthening govenunent control or by opening up 
service providers to pressure from below. 
• One of the critical detenninants of the success of accountability initiatives is the quality of the relationship 
between the poor, resources and power. 
• The case studies illustrate a distinction between accountability arrangements that create chrumels for service 
user involvement and those that actively stimulate but do not organise their involvement. 
• Service provider/local government-society relations have a positive impact on accountability but were not 
easy to foster or sustain. 
• Lack of education, skills and experience of service users has consequences for their use of accmmtability for 
urban services. 
• Civil society, in tenns of social activists and communities, has a key role in pushing for accountability. 
However, civil society initiatives also need allies in government/service provider agencies for support so that 
their efforts are not rendered ineffective. 
• Underprivileged residents do seek accountability for urban services, perhaps more so than more privileged 
social groups, although in often ineffective ways, which fail to limit capture of service provider institutions by 
wealthy interests. 
• The more active involvement of service users in the design of accountability arrangements might mean that 
service providers' accountability arrangements are more widely used. 
7.4 Action related propositions for the function of accountability 
7.4.1 Multiple accountability arrangements are necessary 
The literature suggests that accountability works best when multiple arrangements are encouraged. The 
case studies seem to support the proposition. The key findings in relation to this proposition are 
discussed below. 
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Finding: Respondents from deprived areas use multiple arrangements of accountability to cope with 
failing services. 
For people in deprived areas, the remedies they use to solve problems with urban services are 
somewhat similar to the way they interact in civil society"2• However in non-deprived areas people use 
different arrangements, namely, direct contact with service providers. If there was a problem with 
urban services in non-deprived areas, respondents were more likely to call service provider help lines, 
visit service provider's officers, use service provider suggestion boxes, and visit service provider 
interne! sites; whereas, in deprived areas, respondents were more likely to contact a politician, hold a 
public meeting, protest, sign a petition, vote for politicians, or join a user group. The poor tended to 
have a repertoire of accountability related activities and arrangements, presumably, just as they adapt, 
change, and diversifY their survival strategies". Typically respondents from deprived areas stated that 
they did not use the formal grievance procedures that service providers offer because their offices are 
not easily accessible to those in deprived areas, but, perhaps, more importantly, because they did not 
trust services providers. However, those who used formal service provider arrangements seemed to be 
more satisfied with urban services than those who preferred the more ad-hoc arrangements. 
Finding: Accountability is not something that is achieved once and for all. 
Accountability was lost and regained many times in the case study experiences. For example, 
accountability in Barton Hiii has been lost at times because of SIT A's resource constraints and 
operational needs, which made residents suspicious that they were being manipulated or eo-opted 
acrording to agendas that are hidden to them. The key to effective delivery of urban services is 
knowing how to re-establish accountability. 
Finding: There is a need to review how accountability is defined. 
Service providers and users in the case studies had somewhat conflicting ideas of accountability. 
Service providers considered themselves accountable for technically competent service delivery. 
Accountability from the provider's perspective refers to O&M, effectiveness of services, cost of 
services, incidence of supply failure, and performance indicators. But accountability was differently 
constructed from users point of view. Most service users thought providers ought to be accountable for 
ensuring participation in decision making and responding to users complaints. More specifically, most 
respondents in South Mrica thought service providers should be accountable for meeting quality 
requirements; in Seoul, for responding to complaints; and in Dhaka, for consulting service users- these 
kinds of accountability also represent different stages of service delivery. The research also 
highlighted the analytical shortcomings of a 'off the shelf conception of accountability instead an 
understanding of accountability as intrinsically context -dependent is required. 
82 Most respondents engage in society in structured ways, like elections, public meetings, and contacting 
go:Hticians, but also in ways that are more spontaneous, such as protest and petitions. 
This fmding has echoes of Chambers' (in Bemstein 1992) description of the poor as a fox that 'knows many 
things', in order to make a living whereas the hedgehog (non-poor people) 'know one big thing'. 
264 
An irrvestigation of improvements to urban stmJices through accountability 
Finding: Accountability only exists insofar as people use it. 
The literature presents accountability arrangements as a scripted confrontation, which service users 
must learn. However, in Dhaka, it was stated that slum dweUers now 'play' with service providers in 
their attempts to get better services. In this metaphor, accountability does not have an inherent 
existence unless people engage with it, perform it, or take part in it. Playing requires service users and 
providers to be more creative and adaptive, instead of sticking to procedures in a rigid or systematic 
way with predetermined outcomes. Playing also requires service providers expand preconceived 
notions of the limits to their responsibility. Service users in all case studies stated that they found it 
difficult to say where service provider's accountability starts and stops. 
Finding: The outcomes of accountability as well as outputs should be investigated. 
The research suggests that only looking at the outputs of accountability, such as organisational capacity 
to deliver efficient and effective services, is inadequate. A narrow focus on the measurement of short-
term outputs is at the expense of long-term outcomes of accountability for people. There is a need for 
different ways of measuring the performance of accountability in order to avoid perverse incentives. 
Finding: Frameworks of accountability should refor to exclusion and eo-production. 
The Hirschmau (1970) and Lowery et a! (1992) framework of exit, loyalty, voice, and neglect, should 
be reworked to refer to the way people are excluded from a standard of Jiving and social relationships 
(De Haan, 1998; Rodgers, 1995), due to a rupture of social bonds (Cannan, 1997; 78). The research 
also points to the potential of eo-production of wban services to offer a more hands-on approach to 
accountability than was previously suggested by the preoccnpation in the literature with 'voice'. Table 
96 (in Appendix 1) gives examples of exit, voice, loyalty, neglect, eo-production, and exclusion, in the 
provision of services. 
Boi I? lmpHcatioos ofmulflpl• arrangerntnts for th• theory and future practice ofa<COUntability 
• The user-provider relationship is not always the central dynamic in service delivery; service users may prefer 
indirect influence on service providers. 
• If all service users are encouraged to use the same accountability arrangements this might increase some 
people's vulnerability. Improved service outputs are better served by tailoring arrangements to a 
heterogeneous user group. 
• Service providers should consider the voice they use to address service users. This voice must accommodate 
different users whilst remaining internally coherent. 
• Users do not necessarily want a formal pennanent voice in service delivery, preferring undefmed, episodic, 
and infonnal interactions with agencies. 
• Accountability is often sporadic, and its effects are usually localised and short lived. However stakeholders 
need to be able to re-establish accountability when necessary. 
• Accountability is often carried out through a variety of arrangements, which, in combination, are effective but 
make it difficult to evaluate the contribution of each approach. 
• The more complicated an interaction with service providers, the less people will want to do it (e.g. the 
Internet). People need incentives or reasons to change the way they deal with service providers. 
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7.4.2 O&M is neglected in practice 
The literature describes how operation and repair is critical to the success of urban services, but service 
providers, particularly traditional centralised systems, are said to be ineffective at delivering O&M. 
There is partial support for this claim from the case studies. The key findings in relation to this 
proposition are discussed below. 
Finding: The case studies showed that the most important outputs of service delivery are not always 
measurable. 
The literature advocates the use of perfonnance indicators and reporting systems to judge the 
effectiveness of service delivery. The case studies showed that the outputs of service delivery are not 
always measurable. For example, in Barton Hill, the main benefits of the service were the way front 
line service providers improved the quality of life for residents, rather than the tonnage of waste 
collected. In Seoul, the principal benefit of accountability was to make it physically, socially and 
psychologically easier for citizens to approach the City Hall, and in Mdantsane and Dhaka, 
accountability led to greater empowerment and mobilisation at the grassroots level. Performance 
measurements can be used to meet public accountability objectives but, ironically, this is often an 
exercise in public accountability rather than performance improvement. 
Finding: O&Af of urban services is often not a priority for municipalities. 
In certain cases, public service providers did lack planned maintenance schedules and showed no 
evidence pointing to strategic approaches. The O&M of urban services was often not a priority for 
municipalities, despite the on-going and widespread nature of problems with O&M. Whilst this is not a 
new finding, it seems that there has been relatively little progress in this area. In Dhaka and 
Mdantsane, service delivery was constrained by a lack of detailed records indicating asset location and 
condition at the ward level. Moreover, the performance of technical functions, such as streetlight 
replacement, solid waste collection, drain cleaning, and pothole repair, was not recorded in some cases, 
therefore, making it difficult for public works staff to plan for preventative maintenance. Yet, in other 
cases, central and local governments have taken the lead in improving O&M. 
Finding: Effective O&Af was improved by partnerships. 
Increasingly, the literature on urban services reflects a neo-liberal agenda, intended to reduce the 
activities of government through strategies of privatisation and de-regulation. The accountability 
arrangements demonstrated in the case studies typically involved building partnerships or alliances 
between business, public institutions and voluntary sectors. In certain cases, the only way that 
government can provide urban services is through such partnerships. The benefits of these partnerships 
include better service delivery, enabling civil society to act collectively to solve problems and articulate 
demands, as well as shortening lines of communication between users and providers. These kinds of 
partnerships required shared values, the resources to sustain the partnerships, communication channels, 
as well as a sense of solidarity and motivation among multiple stakeholders. Partnerships were 
particularly important in deprived areas, because many respondents reported multiple needs, (such as 
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isolation, poor environment, chronic health problems, stress, unsociable behaviour, crime, low 
incomes, unemployment, poor housing, discrimination and so on). Since no single agency has specific 
responsibilities for meeting such needs, these kinds of problems are only capable of being solved by 
co-operation. In cases where community groups and a utility have eo-produced O&M, this has reaped 
substantial benefits for low-income communities. Examples here include the Dhaka case of DSK, 
WaterPartners, and Waste Concern. However, partnerships between organisations can also reduce 
accountability, because each organisation is accountable to different government departments, for 
different targets, and different professional activities. 
Finding: Innovation in service delivery promoted O&M. 
Many of the examples of accountability described in the case studies involved experimentation with 
service delivery, like water and sanitation projects in the slums of Dhaka, and Project Pathfinder in 
Bristol. Innovation required greater dialogue with stakeholders to ensure that the supply of a service 
matches the scale of the problem, and that services were tailored to the needs of a neighbourhood. 
Many of these instances involved NGOs, who appeared relatively less accountable than government, 
and so have the flexibility to innovate and pilot new approaches to service delivery in deprived 
communities. NGOs were entrepreneurial in the sense that they were alert to and act on opportunities 
to improve services by identifying needs and gaps in provision. Accountability was often a function of 
the personal commitment and/or the ambition of individual professionals, who had the ability to 
mobilise resources. Whether their successors also have the drive to keep activities going in the face of 
inertia and opposition, only time will tell. 
Finding: Accountability is also relevant within service provider agencies. 
There is a tendency to see accountability exclusively in terms of external relations between service 
providers and service users, rnther than in terms of the internal relations within service delivery 
agencies. Management are accountable to front line service providers, to whom they have obligations 
as employers for example in employment legislation, in regulations to prevent discrimination, to 
promote equality in fair employment practices, implement whistle blowing procedures, as well as for 
training to develop knowledge and expertise. 
Finding: The term 'urban services' may be misleading. 
The urban services of concern to this research tend to be departmentalised or otherwise sectorally and 
organisationally divided. The delivery of these urban services tended to represent a patchwork of 
responsibilities, which individual residents had to patch services together for themselves across 
professioual or departmental boundaries. This research highlighted the possibility of flatter 
management, inter-Qrganisational!inter-<lepartmental work to improve accountability for urban 
services. 
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Box 20 lmplicatiom of poor O&M for the existine theory and future practice of accountability 
• Experiments in service delivery are often short-term interventions (within a project context) and require 
regular, tangible results (quick wins) for momentum. 
• hmovation requires agencies be well equipped to respond to emerging agendas (necessary resources, political 
will, local support). 
• NGOs have a key role in iiUlovation and demonstrating new concepts, govenunent can then replicate 
successful projects without the risk. 
• Service providers and users can learn from the best practice of others in service delivery. However, successes 
in accountability should be adapted to local circumstances. 
• It is possible to distinguish between instances of O&M at household level; and O&M of shared or communal 
services, which is more problematic. NGOs can improve O&M of communal services, by providing technical 
support to conummity caretakers and obtaining community contributions to cover the costs. 
• Service users often perceived a clash of values and approaches to accountability between business, public 
sector and NGOs. 
• Multi-disciplinary teams of front line service providers can improve O&M and integrate different services, 
but this requires training to develop the necessary skills and expertise. 
• AccoWltability requires that service providers take a multi-dimensional view of problems with 
neighbourhoods. 
• Partnerships in the delivery of urban services may be fonnal or informal, temporary or permanent, the focus 
can be geographical communities of place or focused on communities of interest. Nonetheless, care should 
be taken to ensure the accountability of these partnerships to the community. 
• Partnerships were successful where they coordinated activities, ensured regular communication, shared the 
same goals, set clear objectives, roles and responsibilities, and maintained the enthusiasm to keep up the 
momentum. 
7.4.3 Accountability is a cyclical process 
The literature gives the impression that securing greater accountability for urban services is essentially 
a cyclical process. The case studies do not support the proposition. Accountability should not be 
treated as a set of predictable outcomes, the execution of an already specified plan of action. The key 
findings in relation to this proposition are discussed below. 
Finding: Accountability, like urban services, are socially constructed. 
The literature describes how people engineer the form of urban services between themselves through 
their daily interaction (Burr, 1995). Gita Sen (1992) argues that it is the social context that renders 
accountability effective; she stresses the need to look at historical development and social change that 
have shaped and defined the government's role in service delivery. More specifically, Dreze and Sen 
(1989) argue that public action includes not only what is done for the public by the state, but also what 
is done by the public for itself. Accountability in South Africa, Bangladesh, and South Korea has been 
shaped by social change and democratisation and show that effective arrangements to improve service 
delivery are not necessarily dependent on high levels of national income, or high levels of government 
expenditure alone. Accountability depends on people being willing to participate in policy making, and 
the definition of social needs, as well as to ensure service providers are doing their jobs. 
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Box 21 Implications of process nature of accountability for the theory and practice of accountability 
• The poor do not often get policies on the service provider's agenda, and thus fmd it difficult to hold the state 
accountable if they do not benefit from outcomes of service delivery. 
• Accountability should not depend on the good nature of individuals but is part of wider struggles over power, 
and is often conflict ridden. 
• Policies have winners and losers, different actors or stakeholders will promote or block change in service 
delivery. 
• Time horizons in service delivery do not always fit with the time horizon of politicians (elections) and daily 
demands of citizens. 
• A fonnal, linear, mainstream approach to accountability can be a threat to service delivery. 
7.4.4 Service providers and users are self-interested 
The literature suggests that service providers and users are essentially self-interested in service 
delivery. The case studies partly support the proposition. The key findings in relation to this 
proposition are discussed below. 
Finding: The research showed that service providers and users are not necessarily self-interested 
Accountability presupposes self-interest and individualism. However, the case studies highlighted 
instances where providers act altruistically by taking on more work to improve service delivery. This 
evidence stands in opposition to a critique that blames indifferent and lazy front line providers as 
obstacles for delivering services to the poor. Service users also overcome free rider incentives" and 
take action to improve neighbourhood level services, and further common interest. This evidence 
reinforces the fact that service delivery is not an individual event but necessarily involves a range of 
people, (for example, service providers work in teams and departments) who share information and 
resources, and together determine the nature of service delivery. 
Finding: Accountability requires a perception of shared responsibility. 
Service users are responsible for the O&M of urban services within their property boundary. However, 
service providers complain residents were slow to meet their responsibilities, and so would not accept 
responsibility for service quality deterioration until it could be ascertained that residents had fulfilled 
their obligations in the delivery of urban services. For example, in Seoul, residents are required to 
clean their water tanks once a year and replace their plumbing systems regularly to protect water 
quality and facilitate the detection of leakage -yet few do so. In Mdantsane, officials recognised that 
residents were still adjusting to their new responsibilities for household level services, which, under 
homeland rule, were the responsibility of the local authority. 
Residents often lacked detailed awareness about household level repairs, meaning they might miss 
complex technical problems. The lack of information also disadvantages users when dealing with 
84 Urban services tend to be jointly consumed. Economies of scale mean it is technically difficult to stop particular 
customers from benefiting from the high quality services. 
269 
An investigation of improvements to urban se11'ices through accountability 
private contractors or statntory providers. The majority of respondents reported that they undertook 
repairs to household level services either on a regular basis, or as they become aware of a problem. 
Households were more likely to respond to acute one-off problems, like breakdown, than long term, 
and chronic issues that can be endured for long time or repaired on a piecemeal basis in order to save 
money. In Mdantsane and Seoul, it was reported that small-scale contractors were employed to fix 
difficult jobs like plumbing. However, other respondents relied on their own knowledge for repair 
diagnosis because of doubts over the value for money and effectiveness of professionals. 
Finding: Service users and providers have different strategic and practical interests in service 
delivery, but may share wider concerns. 
Castells (1977, 1983) argued that a broad based alliance of producers, consumers, and ratepayers, 
would arise in defence ofmban services. Others suggest that it is more likely that, when faced with a 
problem, there is more likely fragmentation than unification in society (Dunleavy, 1980; Saunders 
1986). Ultimately, producers are concerned with jobs and improved pay and conditions, and 
consumers concerned with adequate and reliable services. The case stndies illustrate how service users 
and providers often share wider interests in service delivery based on social symmetry (Yin, 1982). 
With social symmetry, service providers are visible, better known, and more rooted in neighbourhoods 
where they work. In such instances, the relationship between servers and served is roughly 
symmetrical, they share the same neighbourhood living conditions, and many also have religious, 
family or ethnic ties to the neighbourhood. 
Box 22 Implications of self-interest for the existing theory and future practice of accountability 
• It is in the commercial interests of service providers to include accountability arrangements in their business 
practice. 
• In a well-defined geographic area. where the community have been organised and have access to resources, 
people may be more willing to take action to defend their interests in service delivery. 
• While personal status might not affect the level of participation in service delivery, it does affect the kind of 
participation selected. Planning procedures should make room for user preferred style of participation. 
7.5 Chapter summary 
Cumulatively, the findings presented in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 have addressed a number of areas 
underdeveloped in existing research. Chapters 5 and 6 (fieldwork chapters) presented the case stndies, 
answered the research questions, and tested the research hypothesis. This chapter has considered the 
findings from the case studies within a broader framework. The literatnre review presented in Chapter 
2 identified a number of gaps in the existing knowledge on accountability arrangements for mban 
services. This chapter has tested a number of propositions about the functioning of accountability to 
see if accountability is demonstrated in the case stndies in the way predicted by the literatnre review, 
these are summarised in Table 97 (in Appendix 1). The reassessment of these propositions has a 
number of implications for the existing theory and practice of accountability, as well as for attempts to 
improve service outputs and sustainability. The next chapter will conclude this thesis with a summary 
of the research process; and the research findings and make suggestions for further research. 
270 
An investigation of improvements to urban setvices through accountability 
Chapter 8 Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
Over the last decade, efforts have been made to ensure that those who deliver urban services are 
accountable for their actions. Drawing on case studies of accountability arrangements in the delivery 
of urban services, this research sought to assess what improvement, if any, accountability arrangements 
could make to the outputs and sustainability of urban services. This thesis finds that accountability 
arrangements improve the outputs but not necessarily the sustainability of urban services, depending on 
how accountability is used and whether accountability for urban services can be sustained. 
Accountability is conventionally assumed to be an objective technical tool for rectiJYing problems with 
urban services, the results of which wonld be externally verifiable. However this research recognised 
that accountability can take multiple forms and serve many different interests. It is important to 
recognise that accountability is a political issue and as such has the potential to challenge existing 
power relations in society. It is important, therefore, to pay attention to the form of accountability, who 
uses it, how and on whose terms. The purpose of this chapter is to review the research process, identify 
the main research findings, state the contribution of the thesis to existing knowledge, and suggest areas 
for further research. 
8.2 Review of the research process 
The first three chapters of this thesis laid out the key conceptual and theoretical issues that should be 
taken into consideration when looking at accountability in the delivery of urban services. Chapter 1 
defined urban services to include water, sanitation, refuse collection, street lighting, drainage, roads 
and paving, and community halls. It was acknowledged that, internationally, urban services are falling 
short of their potential to improve outputs, and, as such, are unsustainable. Recent thinking suggests 
that to a great extent the success of service delivery depends on whether the institutions of service 
provision are accountable to citizens. Therefore, the introductory chapter of this thesis outlined a three-
fold goal for urban services, composed of outputs, sustainability and accountability. 
A literature review of accountability for urban services was carried out and the details presented in 
Chapter 2. The aim of this chapter was to develop both an understanding of the most important 
theoretical issues in thinking about accountability and urban services, and to provide some specific 
examples of how accountability can be applied to the delivery of urban services. The qualities of 
accountability were defined as information, power and action. A review of the literature helped 
identizy four contemporary forms of accountability for further study, these are-: 
• Professional accountability: Improving professional competence in the design and delivery of 
urban services to improve efficiency, effectiveness, economy and equity. 
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• Political accountability: Strengthening participatory democracy in the institutions and structures 
oflocal government. 
• User accauntability: Increasing the capacity of service users to participate in the design and 
management of services, and exert influence over service providers. 
• Managerial accountability: Service provider led attempts to become more responsive to service 
users. 
The research gaps were also listed in Chapter 2; in the main, these concerned the limited research 
carried out on the effects of accountability on the outputs and sustainability of urban services. As such, 
this thesis addresses two areas under-developed in the existing research. 
Chapter 3 developed a conceptual framewmk from the literature review. For the purpose of this 
research, accountability for urban services was defined as a relationship between those providing and 
using a service set up for the purpose ofimproving that service. Molyneux (1985) and Moser's (1989) 
distinction between practical and strategic needs was used to illustrate the way accountability might 
improve the functioning of urban services. This framework was used in subsequent chapters to 
evaluate the effectiveness of accountability in improving the sustainability of urban services. 
The literature review (presented in Chapter 2) and the conceptual framework (Chapter 3) led to the 
formulation of a number of research questions and a research hypothesis, these were stated in Chapter 
4. 
The primaty research question was: Have accountability a"angements improved the outputs and 
sustainability of urban services? 
The research also endeavoured to answer a series of sub-questions, which are listed as follows: -
I. What entitlements do citizens have to urban services? 
2. How is accountability demonstrated? 
3. How does accountability affect the outputs of urban services? 
4. How sustainable are urban services? 
The research hypothesised that accauntability a"angements can improve the outputs of urban 
services, and improve the relative chances of sustainability. 
Chapter 4 outlined the methodology selected to test the research hypothesis. This research adopted the 
case study methodology and both qualitative and quantitative techniques were used for data collection. 
The techniques included semi-stmctured interviews, observations, document review, and 
questionnaires. 
Case studies were chosen to illustrate the various forms of accountability, also identified in Chapter 2. 
The ease studies selected were from Bristol (UK), Buffalo City (South Africa), Dhaka (Bangladesh) 
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and Seoul (South Korea). These cases represent practical applications of accountability to the delivery 
of urban services. The case studies were selected on the basis that an initiative had been developed that 
offers a dilferent perspective on the issue of accountability for urban services. Details of the research 
process were presented in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 of this thesis moved on from the theoretical and conoeptual frameworks to provide case 
studies of how accountability is used in the delivery of urban services. In Chapter 5, the data collected 
from fieldwork was presented and reviewed within each separate case. The research adopted a cross-
sectoral approach to the analysis of urban services. The research design for this thesis represents both 
users' and producers' views of services, these perspectives were analysed and presented together in the 
context of this thesis. However it was recognised, on reflection, that the selection of discrete case 
studies to illustrate a single aspect of accountability had the potential to oversimplify the functioning of 
accountability in practice and distract from the complexity (political, social, institutional) that 
characterised the fieldwork. However, this is in part mitigated by the cross<ase analysis. 
Furthermore, there would be a risk that this very complexity would mask the potential to draw out 
distinct lessons from the cases. 
A cross-case analysis followed in Chapter 6, this involved a trans-national comparison of the 
similarities and differences of the case studies to assess the patterns emerging from the evidence 
collected. As described in section 6.3, the research found citywide differences in the qnality and 
quantity of services. The research found that not only did respondents in deprived areas have lower 
access to household level services, like water supply and sanitation, but that community level services 
like drainage, street lights, roads and community halls, were also less widely available to these 
respondents. 
This research found in section 6.5 that service outputs, technical performance of infrastructure and user 
satisfaction with the urban service, have improved over the period in which the accountability of front 
line service providers was enhanced. The fieldwork revealed that accountability did improve the 
outputs of urban services, although accountability tends to be more effective at improving the technical 
performance of urban services than increasing user satisfaction. The marginal increases to user 
satisfaction reported in the case studies suggest that accountability has increased expectations, 
expanded what people know about government and service providers, enabled better evaluation of 
performance, and placed government and service providers under greater scrutiny. Overall satisfaction 
ratings for respondents in deprived areas were lower than those given by respondents in non-deprived 
areas, this can be put down to poor levels of coverage, poor operation and maintenance, unmet 
expectations and standards, low problem resolution rates, and poor staff behaviour. 
The research established, in section 6.6, that accountability has improved the outputs of urban services, 
but is not necessarily an effective means of achieving technical and social sustainability. Sustainability 
of urban services has been undermined in two key ways. Firstly, it was found that when accountability 
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is used to meet practical needs, it would improve the sustainability of urban services, however, if 
accountability were sought to address strategic needs this might not improve the sustainability of urban 
services. It seems that the ability of accountability to improve the sustainability of urban services 
depends on how well respondents understand problems with urban services and how they solve them. 
Secondly, the sustainability of urban services has been undermined by a failure to maintain 
accountability. Consequently, it was found that accountability arrangements improve the outputs of 
urban services, and improve the relative chances of sustainability. 
This research employed a methodology that looked at both the top down ways service providers 
demonstrate their accountability for urban services, and, simultaneously, has paid attention to citizens 
use of accountability arrangements for urban services at the neighbourhood level. It was found that 
contacting politicians, public meetings, voting for politicians, user groups, protests and organising 
petitions, emerged as the most useful arrangements for securing accountability for respondents in 
deprived areas. Respondents in non-deprived areas seemed to prefer to contact service providers 
directly through service provider help lines, visiting service providers officers, service provider 
suggestion boxes, and service provider internet sites. These kinds of direct accountability 
arrangements seemed to be more effective in terms of user satisfaction than the ad-hoc arrangements 
used by respondents from deprived areas. However, it is unclear whether success depends on the 
mechanism or the personal characteristics of the respondents. 
In section 6.4.3, service providers defined accountability in tenus of technically competent service 
delivery, requiring expertise, appropriate resources and incentives. Accountability was differently 
constructed from users point of view. Most respondents thought providers should also be accountable 
for participation in decision making and responding to users complaints. Respondents in South Mrica 
thought service providers should be accountable for meeting quality requirements, for responding to 
complaints in Seoul, and in Dhaka for consulting users. 
Chapter 7 returned to the testable propositions for the functioning of accountability identified in 
Chapter 2. These propositions were differentiated on the basis of the action, infonnation and power 
aspects of accountability, as presented in section 2.2.8. These propositions were reviewed in light of 
the practical experience and empirical data documented in the fieldwork chapters (Chapter 5 and 6), 
and the wider implications of the findings for urban service delivery discussed. 
8.4 Contribution of thesis to existing knowledge on accountability 
The literature review (presented in Chapter 2) of this thesis identified a number of gaps in the existing 
knowledge on accountability arrangements for urban services. Aiming to fill this knowledge gap, this 
research addressed a number of areas underdeveloped in existing research. The contribution this thesis 
makes to existing knowledge can be summarised as follows: 
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I. The literature suggests that, to a great extent, the success of service delivery depends on 
whether institutions of service provision are accountable to citizens. Whilst there is evidence 
to suggest that accountability arrangements might improve the outputs of service delivery, its 
implications for sustainability appear to have gone unnoticed and understudied. This research 
has provided an approach to accountability for urban services in new detail. This research 
found that accountability arrangements improve the outputs of urban services, and relative 
chances of sustainability. The sustainability of urban services depended on how accountability 
is used, and whether accountability used can be sustained. 
2. The conceptual framework used in this research may provide a useful tool for practitioners 
and researchers in the future analysis of accountability for urban services. This framework 
consists of: the threefold challenge for urban services, the three qualities of accountability 
(information, power and action), the practical and strategic accountability models and the 
focus on contemporary forms of accountability. 
3. Existing research tends to depict accountability as a technical tool capable of rectifying 
problems with urban services, yet fails to fully recognise that accountability also has the 
potential to transform social relations. Moser's (1989) distinction between practical and 
strategic needs was used to critically engage with the way accountability works in practice to 
transform service delivery. 
4. Existing studies conflate outputs with the sustainability of urban services; this study has 
usefully differentiated between the two with reference to accountability. 
5. Existing studies of accountability for urban services tend to be desk-based studies, or else 
operate at a theoretical level; very little evidence has been presented that is grounded in 
practical experience. This research has broadened established understandings of 
accountability through the presentation of multiple in-depth case studies of accountability for 
urban services. It is hoped that a better understanding of the practical relevance of 
accountability arrangements to urban services will provide a useful companion to more 
academic work, as well as lead to more relevant advice from academics and practitioners to on 
the ground realities. 
6. This research has problematized many of the implicit assumptions made in the literature on 
the function of accountability. A list of testable propositions was developed in Chapter 2 and 
these were reassessed in Chapter 7 in light of evidence collected in the fieldwork. 
7. The existing literature tends to present accountability from the perspective of academics or 
practitioners. There are relatively fewer studies that examine accountability from the point of 
view of service providers and users. This research employed a methodology that looked at 
both the top down ways service providers demonstrate their accountability for urban services, 
and, simultaneously, has paid attention to citizens initiatives to improve accountability for 
urban services at the neighbourhood level. 
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8.5 Areas for future research 
• More research could be undertaken on front line worker commitment, motivations, interests and 
attitudes. There is the potential to explore the role of professional associations and unions in 
promoting greater accountability. 
• There is a need for a better understanding of how sanctions or incentives promote improvements in 
service delivery and for understanding what sanctions service users have at their disposal. 
• Further investigation is needed on the potential of upper income groups to secure improvements to 
urban services on behalf of, or, in alliance, with the urban poor. 
• The issue of how new forms of accountability such as 'user voice' conflict with traditional contract 
management in service delivery is poorly documented and understood. 
• There is a tendency for accountability research to focus on countries with strong liberal democratic 
values, i.e. South Mrica and India. More evidence should be collected from other, more 
'unsupportive' contexts, particularly those with unsuccessful experiences in accountability 
refonns. 
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Appendix (1): Tables 
Table 5: Topics found in the literature on accountability. 
Topic: Description 
Direction • Top-down (elections, bearin8S1 consultatioru;;), or bottom up (citizens juries, and popular protests) kinds of accountability (Pyper 1996~ 1 ). 
• Vertical and horizontal accountability (Schedler, Diamond, Plattiner, 1999~ 2) . 
• Vertical downward and upward accountability (Grant and Devas, 2000) . 
• Diagonal accountability (Goetz and Oaventa 200 I) . 
• Paul (1992, 2002) promotes accountability from below by the stakeholders concerned with perfonnance of public services . 
• Direct (within the chain of command). and indirect (acc01mtable to outsiders) accountability (Poliando and Hulme, 1999) . 
• Traditional line of accountability based on a hierarchical line of authority, in which service delivery agencies are linked to Government, Parliament and the public . 
• Networks of accountability (Considine 2002; Rhodes 1997) . 
• Schacter (2000; 2) presents an accountability eve le c~ of information, action, and response . 
Time • The present generation is accountable, both retrospectively to past and future generations (Stewart and Collet. 1998). 
• Short·tenn functional accountability (for resources. use and immediate impacts). and strategic accountability (accounting for outcomes) (Avina 1993) . 
• One-off events, that draw attention to a particular abuse of power, or more institutionalised routines such as elections and public hearings (Newell, 2002; 92) . 
• Ex-ante consultation so people can influence policy, or ex-Post reporting for outcomes of policy and resources used (Hulme and Sanderatne; 1997; 3) . 
Distance • Tiebout (1956) hypothesised accountability comes from an individuals choice of residence. 
• Decentralisation results in market-like competition between communities for residents, and promotes answerability oflocal officials to local people (Ostrom, Schroeder, Wynne, 1993) . 
• World Bank (2004) short route for accountability: clients can hold the provider directly accountable without intermediaries. Long route of accountability involves the client and provider and governments . 
• Infonnal face-to-face accountability is said to work best (Day and Klein, 1987). 
• Fowles (1993) distinguishes between external accountability (to government, law, public and media pressure etc) rather than internal accountability (hierarchical rules that govern conduct), 
• Quirk (1997) presents a new 360-d~~ model of public accountability that is multi-dimensional, and which admits the legitimacy of everyone's interest ~public services . 
Punislunent • Leat ( 1988) distinguishes between responsive accountability, explanatory accountability, and accountability with sanction. 
• Accountability is increased by people freely subjecting themselves to the scrutiny of self and others, especially experts (Foucault, 1980). 
• Dean (1999; 171) distinguishes between technologies of agency and technologies of performance, which emphasise the individual's capacity for self-management 
• Walsh (199!5) focuses on attempts by service providers to avoid surveillance and punishment . 
• Edwards and Hulme (199!5; 9) multiple accountabilities having to 'over account' (because of multiple demands) or being able to under account may result in an accountability vacuum. 
• Responsibility is taking the blame when things go wrong, accountability is having a duty to explain without accepting blame (Oliver and Drewery, 1996; 13) . 
Story • Accountability is an attempt to make behaviour and conduct observable by telling someone else what you have done. It implies a record of events, disclosure of activity, a story telling- a self-reporting. 
• "It starts with telling stories and adding up. It ends with justification and explanation". (Day and Klein, 1987; 4) . 
• Shatter's (1984) work on social accountability reveals that there are certain codes for giving an explanation or justification. People must !dve an account in social acceptable ways, 
Relationship • Accountability is both a relationship between public servants and the public and a pattern ofbehaviour (Lipsky 1980). 
• Accountability is a mechanism to regulate the principal-agent relationship (Brett, 1993) . 
• Accountability is a dependence on others (Lelto, 1993) . 
• Gray and Jenkins (1993) state accountability is a fonn of stewardship in tenns of a party entrusting responsibility and to whom the account is presented 
• Gita Sen (1992) presents the Kerala model of public accountability, which depends on people participating in the definition of their needs and in the eo-production of services . 
• Accountability is an interpersonal relationship of a moral obligation of others (Shearer 2002) . 
• To be accountable is unavoidably to establish one's identity as 'intrinsically interdependen1 with others' (Schweik~, 1993; 234) . 
• Roberts (1991) distinguishes between the socialising and individualising effects of hierarchical fonns of accountability . 
• Accountability can be defined by societal values, beliefs and assumptions, which will lead to different types of ~untability (Kearns 1994) . 
• Edwards and Hulme (1995; 9) differentiate between formal mechanisms (legal) and infonnal mechanisms (effective ties and patronage) . 
. 
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Table 17: Data collection techniques. 
Case Study Bristol, UK Mdantsane, South Africa Dhaka, Bangladesh Seoal, South Korea 
Technique 
Secondary data • Internet searches (Bristol City Council, • Internet searches, • Internet searches . • Internet searches. 
collection New Deal for Communities, national • Rhodes University East London Campus Library, • Bookshq><. • Bookshops. 
government). and the Institute for Social and Economic • Document libraries at • Libraries at TI Korea, Seoul Institute 
• Libraries at University of West Research, Rhodes University. Transparency International for Transparency, Seoul University, 
England, Bristol City Library. • East London public library, which kept books and Banglad<sh, World Bank, Dhaka Seoul Development Institute, Korean 
• Files on the Project kept at Bristol City newspaper cuttings on Mdantsane since the University, TI newspaper scan Development Institute. 
CQuncit, Community at He!U1 Offic~ creation of the township. database. • 11• International Anti-Corruption 
and the One Stop Shop in Barton Hill. • Material obtained from various interviewees. • Materials obtained from various Conference and conference papers . 
• Archive at the Daily Dispatch newspaper offices . interviewees. • Seoul Metropolitan Government 
• !MESA (Institute of Municipal Engineers South publications, 
Africa) Conference 23-25 October 2002 in 
Buffalo City. 
Observation • Direct observation checklist and • Direct observation checklist and photography • Direct observation checklist and • Observation checklist and 
photography. • Visits to Mdantsane . photography. photography. 
• Spending time on the estate. • 2 months spent in Buffalo City. • Visits to DSK project areas. • Stayed in Gangnam-gu for one week 
• Sitting in on Pathfinder meeting<; and • Sitting in on ward committee meetings . • Presentation by Committees of and made a number ofvisits. 
seminars. Concerned Citizens members in • Stayed and worked in Seodaemun-gu 
• Participant observation included days the Madhupur district. for remainder of2 months. 
collecting the bins with the Project • One month spent in Dhaka. • Visits to 9-Dragon Village and other 
Team. slums areas of Seoul. 
• Participant observation in Operation • Visit to Korea Independent 
Cleansweep with local residents. Commission Against Conuption. 
• Asking residents to sign a petition about 
Project Pathfinder in the last week of 
fieldwork. 
Questionnaire • A postal questionnaire was conducted, • 120 residents completed questionnaires. Half • 100 questionnaires; 25 in Nilkat • lOO questionnaires; 50 in 
however. only 51 questionnaires were lived in deprived areas, (25% shack dwellers and and 25 in Pallabi (low Seodaemun-gu and SO in the 
completed. 2!5% lived in 4 roomed RDP housing); SO% were income/slum areas). and 25 in Gangnam-gu (10 of which were 
drawn from upper income areas (2S% Golden Azimpur and 25 in Badda (high taken in 9-dragon viUage). 
Highway and 25% Nul7). income areas). 
Semi-structured • Interviews were conducted with • Interviews were held with officials from local • 22 interviews were conducted with • 2S interviews were conducted with 
interviews officials from SIT A, ResourceSaver, govenunent, private sector, NGOs. politicians, city officials, academics, NGOs, Seoul Metropolitan Government 
Bristol City Council and community academics and ward committee members. and ward commissioners. officials, academics, NGOs, Gu level 
workers, local councillor and 37 with officials. 
residents. 
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Table 20: An assessment of professional accountability. 
1be overall dK>ct charal."1eristic has on variable in practice 
Outputs Sustainability 
Characteristic Comment: Accountabitlty Satisfaction Performance Social T«hnical 
Purchaser/Provider According to the literature, a purchaser·providcr split is said to improve the efficiency of service delivery. The J, J, t~ J, H 
Split delivery of waste management services in Barton Hill involves differentiation between the public sector (BCC). 
community partnership (Community At Heart). private sector (SIT A GB Ltd), and NGO (ResourceSaver a not for 
profit recycling contractor). However, cross-agency partnerships were difficult to maintain, and obscures who is 
accountable for what and to whom, making it more complicated for users to understand roles and responsibilities. 
Fragmented service delivery obscures accountability, meaning users lack ability to regulate performance. 
Professionalism The Project Pathfinder changed the approach of service providers to the delivery of waste collection. street t t T ~ T 
cleaning, grounds maintenance, household bulky collections, gully emptying and recycling services. Discretion of 
staff at ward level depends on skills and training. finances. perfonnance monitoring. embeddedness of staff; 
motives and complementarity of interest and resources between actors. Social relations between people are 
important in keeping services operating to requiwl standards. 
Perfonnance Best Value includes a number of perfonnance indicators, perfonnance plans, reviews, audit and inspections to t t tJ, H tJ, 
Measurement monitor service delivery. The project must also meet national targets for waste reduction and recycling. New 
Deal for Communities aims to make services work better through localised delivery and by giving residents a say 
in how services are run. Project Pathfmder provides a service that is more costly but more responsive to the local 
neighbourhood and has improved both waste management services and the local envirorunent. However, targets to 
regulate performance do not relate to citizens concerns and priorities. Perfonnance undermined by lack of 
manpower and financial resources. 
Life cycle approach to The operation and maintenance of waste collection, street cleaning. grounds maintenance, household bulky t t T ~ t 
O&M of Services collections, gully emptying and recycling services has been improved. The service is now, according to BCC, the 
best in Bri&ol. Training on technical and managerial issues in service delivery and customer care has provided 
opportunititS to gain new skills and working practice for the team. The council has trained SITA staff on grounds 
maintenance, and ground<; maintenance staff trained as dustcart operatives. 
T Positive; i Ne ative; g Neutral 
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Table 24: Observation checklist for Barton Hill. 
Barton Hill 
Housing Redfield, Barton Hill, Lamence Hill and The Dings is a mixed residential area, Redfield has mostly terraced housing owned and occupied by a majority of elderly and 
professional people who have lived there for may years. In Barton Hill, Lamence Hill and The Dings the majority of housing is local authority high-rise flats and 
maisonettes, with some owner occupied, pre 1919 terraced family housing and flats above shops, only a few houses are detached. In Barton Hill a self-build housing project 
was completed to 1998. The housing is of varying standard, some properties are seriously substandard, others have been abandoned or boarded up, and in addition the area 
is dotted with empty unused spaces. The high rises are spaced in order to avoid overshadowing the pre-existing terraced housing, make economic use of land and avoid 
creating high winds at ground level. Three of the Tower Blocks, Barton House, Hartland House and Chetwood House, have been earmarked for demolition because they are 
too costlv to upgrade or are unpopular. 
Water Residents have household connections but complain about supply problems in particular leaks and burst pipes. 
Sewerage Households are served by water borne sewerage systems. There are also complaints about blockages in sewers and manholes. There are public toilets in Lamence Hill. 
Access and The area has tarred roads with separate arrangements for vehicular and pedestrian traffic. A main arterial road was constructed in 1993, St Philips Causeway, which diverts 
Paving the traffic from Barton Hill's narrow roads Within the New Deal for Community area, social cohesion is undermined by this main arterial roads, a railway station at 
Lamence Hill, the Feeder Canal and by Council ward boundsries creating problems of co-ordination and accountability. 
Street lighting Streetlights are provided on main roads and a recent project has increased the number of street lights, particularly around the terraced housing. The area around the high rise 
flats is still perceived as unsafe at night and a CCTV proiect is plarmed. 
Solid waste Bristol City Council provides free wheeled bins for household refuse collection, and free removal of a small number bulky waste items, and street sweeping. There is also a 
management black box kerbside collection of recycling for the terraced housing and a mini recycling centre outside the parade of shops. It was observed that refuse is not properly 
bagged or binned for collection making collection time consunting and results in unhealthy and unsightly streets. There are litter hot spots around take-aways and schools in 
the New Deal area. Litter blows around the flats because of wind vortices. Street scene issues include litter removal of fly tipping (beds and sofas) and abandoned cars. 
Community halls Community hall and other community buildings are available and well used but are in poor condition. Barton Hill Settlement provides community services and facilities for 
voluntary groups such as Family Play Centre, Elderly Persons Day Centre, Adult Education and Training, Bristol Community Transport, Dhek Bhal (Asian women's 
project), Community Action Around Alcohol and Drugs and other projects. Work is underway to increase the size of the Settlement building and updste its facilities, funded 
by Community At Heart. In addition plans are being made for The Barton Hill Healthy Living Centre, which will function as a medical centre, cafe, cnlche, arts space, 
community kitchen, and meeting rooms. The Centre is a community driven project and the design of the building, selection of architects and the site result from community 
consultation exercise. The community will own the building and rent the space to the health service and pharmacy, the centre is funded by Community at Heart. 
Draina~e Project Pathfmder team performs gully emptying. Floodin~ of the street is visible after heavy rains. Some drains are blocked with rubbish/weeds. 
Additional Historically, much younger families tend to occupy the lower half of the estate in Barton Hill, families who are very well established in the area tend to live at the top end. 
comments Some high-rise residents make use of the seated areas outside the shops and benches around the flats to sit and be sociable, the same faces can be seen daily, chatting with 
friends. These casual meeting places are an important feature of local life and are places for making and meeting friends they act a compensation for isolation associated 
with tower life. The area is fairly well served by shops and services, such as banks, supermarkets, newsagents, post office, pubs, chemists, takeaways, doctors surgery, 
schools and temples. Within the New Deal area there is a light-industrial park, car showrooms and car/ bike repair workshops. The Community has access to open green 
spaces such as The Netharn Park, used for football, dog walking, playing and sitting, a bowling green, as well as social club and tenant association buildings. Bristol City 
Council has a local Housing Office in Barton Hill and there is also a Social Services Officer in the area and the Benefits Agency has a representative in the New Deal Shop. 
There are a number of families in the high rises, and although there are children's play areas around the flats, parents feel that it is not safe to let kids go out and play on their 
own because thev can not keep an eve on them. 
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Table 29: Observation checklist for Mdantsane. 
NU17 Golden Highwny RDP Housing in NUll Shack 
Housing Houses built mostly of building blocks, or face brick Housing in good coodition and have numbers, 4-roomed houses arc in fairly good Shacks are made of metal sheets, wood, 
and the houses have numbers. (See Plate 13). common open spaces well-maintained, public condition; they are made of concrete plastic and cardboard 
telephones nearby. (See Plate 14). blocks and have numbers. 
Water Residents have household COIUlections but suffer Residents have household connections but suffer Residents have household connections There is only one standpipe tap for the 
unpleasant taste and odour problem. and leaks and unpleasant taste and odour problems, and leaks and but suffer unpleasant taste and odour shacks in NU12, and households report 
burst pipes. There are few stand posts in the area. burst pipes. There are few stand posts in the area. problems, and leaks and burst pipes. supplementing their supply with water 
There are general problems of supply/storage/ There are general problems of supply, storage and There are stand posts in the area. frotnRDPhouses. (See Plate IS). 
conveyance of potable water. conveyance of potable water. 
Sewerage Households are served by water borne sewerage Households are served by water borne sewerage Households are served by either water Shacks dwellers have built their own pit 
systems, with midblock (manholes) running back to systems, with midblock (manholes) running back to borne sewerage systems or pit latrines. latrines with com~gated metal shecting. 
back of the houses. There are often blockages in back of the houses. There are often blockages in (See Plate 17). 
sewers and manhole. (See Plate 16). sewers and manhole. Misuse, abuse and vandalism of 
the sewer network cause further problems. 
Access and The area had tarred and gravel roads with separate The area had tarred and gravel roads with separate Mostly tar and gravel roads in poor Access refers to footpaths, and means 
Paving arrangements for vehicular and pedestrian traffic; arrangements for vehicular and pedestrian traffic. conditions, no separate access routes there is no car access and poor safety of 
pavements and roads are in poor condition and this There is a high movement of people, cars and mini- for pedestrians on their way to and these conunuters on their way to and 
causes damage to cars. (See Plate 18). buses. from the Highway. from the Highway. 
Street lighting Streetlights are provided on main roads, they have Street lighting is provided on main road The provision of street lighting is poor. There are no streetlights, households do 
not been working for a long time. not receive grid electricity, respondents 
light candles and use paraffin stoves to 
cook. 
Solid waste Refuse is not properly bagged or binned for Refuse is collected once a week from kerbsides. Steel Rubbish is collected once a week but Refuse is not collected and residents 
management collection making collection time consuming and drums are available for refuse collection by shops, also dumped indiscriminately and dump it indiscriminately, and bum it at 
results in unhealthy and unsightly streets. littering is a problem on the street, taxi rank and burned by the roadside or on vacant the back oftheir homes. (See Plate 19). 
Complaint that garden waste disposal site has been dumping of rubbish in open areas. land. Street cleaning is done 
closed. infrequently. 
Community Community buildings are available and well used Community halls are available and well used. There are many community buildings No conununity buildings. 
halls but are in poor condition. available for use. 
Drainage Shallow cement gutters have been installed at the Shallow cement gutters have been installed at the sides Very limited storm water drainage No drainage and there is evidettce of 
sides of the tarred roads and water is channelled to of the tarred roads and water is channelled to ditches, system. Storm water tends to collect on flooding in the area. 
ditches, flooding ofthe street is visible. but there is tlooding in 1he streets. Springs also cause the gravel roads and often rerna ins for 
floodin"" (Se< Plate 20). weeks after the rain. (See Plate 21 ). 
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Table 35: Respondents comments on se!Vices in Mdantsane. 
Golden Hlghwav NU17 NU12 Shacks 
"Houses are leaking and I had to call a ''What bothers me most is the crime rate in 1his "I had a problem with sewerage system and I "It 6 hard for the public cars to access our squatter camp. 
plumber to fix the leak, not the municipality ... area. and I think the fact that the street lights are phoned, but did not get help. I had to go to the There area no proper toilets we just dig and build them 
not working encourages the situation Roads are offices myself and when I did they told me they ourselves with metal sheets. We are unable to do washing 
also not up to standard whilst we pay a lot of would send someone who only came the foUowing instead we would queue for one standpipe to do our washing 
money for living in these big houses. They even day" and laundry. We do not have electricity in our camp nor in 
cut our water/ electricity without informing us!' our shack we would use paraffm lamps and candles as our 
light inside. There is no co1lection of refuse which are 
hazardous to our children." 
"I have a problem with water pipes in my area "We moved from a four·roomed house because we .. Electricity is sometimes cut out without us being "Sometimes I come home late at night, and its very dark in 
... If I call them they do not know how to thought that its better living here in these big informed, and, when you do pay, they take a while this area and now even tsotsis (youth gangster) from 4 
repair it because some houses are situated on houses, but its become a liability living here. Most reconnecting to your house. Maybe it is a lesson for roomed areas come to rob us here. It's frustrating living 
these spring9". people have moved to town. and I am also thinking us, that we should always pay, but we do not always here, we receive no services, there is no progress" 
about it" have the money ..• I didn't expect that I owed that 
much monev." 
"Our houses are in danger of falling down .. Refuse collection is done only once a week and "I have stopped complaining now because not ••we try to report these matters, but no one cares. There is 
because pipes are old and burst underground. by then rubbish is already too much to handle, this everything is going to be what we expect them to no response; we have no local offices around this area. I 
Everyday the wall of the house is wet (damp). leads to infections like kwasa-kwasa (skin be." know I should have a voice but I do not believe I do 
Just think what the foundation of the house is disease), even dogs play around with rubbish. The because, if it were so, our complaints would have been taken 
like. One day I will be a dead man because of streets aroood here are a disaster, especially when seriously by now. •• 
this situation". it rains because access roads are not paved." 
"There is no street cleaning, so our area is •'They cut out electricity when you have not paid. ••Employees of the municipality would ftrst attend ••we do not even have electricity here and we use candles 
dirty, we have even built our own dumping but then when you are paying they take days to their friends and neighbours. When we are in the and become victims of fire and despair. I stopped believing 
site". recomect it to your home." municipal offices. we stay a long time to get I have a voice a long time ago. N<Hme seems to be 
attention. even when you must be at work." accountable, no one cares about our situation. We are 
forgotten here, no one cares" 
"There is no drain maintenance, we clean our ••111ere are no street lighb., at least they are not "I think it ridiculous that we pay for services which ••Everything is a problem here, what bothers me is the fact 
own drains and, when we encounter problems working, and, as a result there are a lot of people are not up to standard". that we've been complaining and complaining here, but no 
and call the municipality, they take their own who are robbed and stabbed when they go home one answers ... 
time attending to problems." late from work, .. 
.. There is no street lighb., our streets are dirty, ••There is an i$Ue of road repair and paving here in "They even cut out electricity/water sometimes "I know that my vote is supposed to be my voice, but I see 
there is running water in our strC"-~." Zone 17. There is no tarred road between house without infonning us. that these people do not care about us. 
only from the main road." 
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Table 3 3: Assessment of the political accountability model. 
The overall effect characteristic has on variable in practice 
Outcomes Sustainability 
Characteristico Comment: Accountability Satisfaction Perfonnance SOOa1 Te<hnlcal 
Role of Central government has political will and vision to transfonn service delivery, and an emphasis on T H t J, J, 
goverrunent decentralisation and democratisation in government policy. The ward councillor is a key person in monitoring 
service delivery. However. their effectiveness varies depending on the diligence of individual councillor and 
the ability of residents to keep councillors on their toes by linking their vote to demands for accountability. 
From the service provider's perspective, politica1 involvement in service delivery can be cowtter productive 
when services become over politicised, or corrupted, when political rent seeking attempts to sideline seavice 
providers by encouraging direct relations with residents. 
Political The end of apartheid created space for previously marginalized groups. Ward committees can mobilises T H t J, J, 
responsibility disaffected and alienated voters. as well as ensure that local government understands the diversity and 
complexity of socio-economic relations. However there is the danger that the conunittee may become over-
institutionalised. There have been instances of conunittee members being abused, ostracised, or assaulted and 
fear going to meetings. Ward committee may amplifY citizen voice through innovative participatory 
mechanisms, yet it still can be disregarded when citizens are in opposition. Continued success relies on 
capacity building. and on the process being further recognised and legitimised in powerful arenas of 
government. 
Rights to service The South African Government is committed to rights and there is room for leverage on these issues. Having T H J, J, J, 
enforceable rights to urban services gives the electorate the capacity to make demands of their representatives. 
However, the research showed that a rights-based approach might conflict with the objective of universal access 
in service delivery; people are waiting for their entitlements to be deli\Tefed 
Accessible The principal of subsidiarity implies power and responsibility at lowest institutional level. Civil society are T t.l- t J, 
-
govennnent fonnally involved in the process of planning. discussion. and negotiation with local government. Committees 
are set up to ensure that conununity level priorities are reflected in municipal investment decisions through the 
construction of a local development agenda. The conunittee is intended to support participation by a range of 
people, since it recognises tenitorial based communities as well as communities cf interest A key feature of 
the ward committee is creating a forum for grievances with urban services 1hrough community meeting 
mechanisms. Integrated Development Plan process creates consensus and a coherent plan for citizens to 
present to the council for negotiation purposes and influence policy formulation in practice. 
T Positive~ ,), Ne tive;-Neutral ga 
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Table 42: ObseiVation checklist for Dhaka. 
Azimpur Baddo Nilkhet PaUabi 
Housing Flats and houses in relati':ely good condition. Flats and houses in relatively good condition. Shacks made of wood. plastics and cardboards, Shacks are in very poor condition. 
and are in very poor condition. 
Water Not all houses have piped water supply. Water Not all houses have piped water supply. Water There are public taps where the slum dwellers NGO water project for hand pumps and 
supply is intennittent, unreliable and quality is supply is intermittent and quality is dubious. can collect their daily supply. underground tanks used for storage in the 
dubious. Physical leakages and illegal connections Physical leakages and illegal connections to area. (See Plate 22). 
to distribution system. Outdated. or broken distribution system. 
infrastructure. 
Sewerage Sanitation includes waterborne sewerage. septic Not all houses have waterborne sewerage Inadequate sanitation. most use pit latrines. NGO and community have built their O\VIl 
tanks, or pit latrines, signs of blocked sewers, systems, some have septic tanks. Sewage (See Plate 23). pit latrines. (See Plate 24). 
sewage overflows into the stonn drains in the rainy overflows into the stonn drains in the rainy 
seasons. season. 
Access and Paved and unpaved roads in the area. Pavements Paved and unpaved roaW. in the area. Paved and unpaved roads in the area. Condition of roads (as well as few 
Paving and roads are in fairly poor condition: heavy Pavements and roaW. are in fairly poor Condition of roads, (as well as few sidewalks sidewalks and inadequate road signs), is 
traffic, weak hardcore base, water logging. condition. (See Plate 2S). and inad!!quate road signs), is poor in places. poor in places. 
insufficient tannac anc!_p_9tholes. 
Street lighting Fairly good provision but problems with load Fairly good provision, but problems with load Residents reliant on grid electricity, kerosene Residents reliant on grid electricity, 
and power shedding, safety hazards, repairs and maintenance. shedding, safety hazards, repairs and and light candles. kerosene and light candles. 
maintenance. 
Solid waste Bins overflow, which smells in the heat Refuse People cany their rubbish to communal Few rubbish bins accessible in poor areas, Indiscriminate dumping and burning of 
management not properly binned for collection. The absence of masonry in residential areas. Collection made rubbish dumped in open areas. creates a health refuse in the streets, it causes noxious 
covers on bins promotes breeding grounds for flies every few days, irrespective of population hazard, environmental risks. clogs the drainage fumes. Increased congestion in the Old 
and pest. and animals scavenge the refuse. There density or waste generated, but no regular system, and contaminates the water supply. City, makes it too densely populated for 
is considerable indiscriminate dumping and disposal time. There is dumping of rubbish in Densely populated, and narrow lanes make it waste bins, and narrow lanes make it 
burning of refuse in the streets. (See Plate 26). open areas. Reportedly risky going alone to difficult to clean streets for waste bins difficult to clean the streets. 
dump rubbish. 
Community Community halls are available and well used, but Few conununity buildings available There are many community buildings available No community halls. 
halls are in poor condition. for use. 
Drainage Inadequate arrangement~ have been made for Some residents removed the manhole covers so The neglected drainage in deprived are-as is There is evidt-'1lce of flooding in the street, 
drainage, mixed stonn water and sf:wage flooding that storm water drains away. Blocked drains compourrled by Jack of sanitation and 1·efuse mixed storm water and sewage flooding 
the streets, or backing up to residences. (See Plate means mixed storm water and sewa@i' flooding collectiou. the streets or backing up to houses. (See 
27). the streets, or back in~ up to houses. Plate 28). 
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Table 43: An assessment of user accountability model. 
The overall effect characteristic has on variable in practice 
Outcomes Sustainabitity 
Characteristics Comment Accountabllity Satisfaction Perfonnance Social Technical 
Principal agent Governance Scorecards have been used in Bangladesh to assess the perfonnance of service providers. 
- -
model Agencies failed to respond, for instance by making pledges to work more effectively or review systems. 
There has been no follow up activity on the part of civil society. which means that score cards have yet 
to secure improvements in service delivery. The scorecard mechanism tends to take a technocratic. 
politics free view of efficient service delivery. However, this approach runs into difficulties when the 
results are intended to transform the wider socio-cultural. political and economic context of service 
delivery. Upper income residents have individualised and privatised solutions, which creates a two-tier 
service. The individual acts of exit and voice do not appear to have improved public urban services 
because hierarchical control is absent. or resource constraints means it is ineffective. 
Community Grassroots pressure groups called Committees of Concerned Citizens (CCCs) have proved effective in t t t ~ u 
participation disseminating report card findings on health and education, establishing Islands of Integrity in public 
services. generating debate on infrastructure provision, and lobbying for higher quality public services. 
However, there seems to be a possible mismatch between the effectiveness of rural grassroots pressure 
groups and the scorecard method, which is better suited to cities. Furthermore. the effectiveness of 
committees depends on a more participatory and transparency political culture. Service providers and 
politicians dislike the crowd/disordered approaches. 
Empowennent The literature suggests authentic empowerment increases capacity within the individual to question T t t ~ u 
social and political positions. and respond stmtegically to events. Community mobilization, along with 
the fact that slum dwellers now pay for acoess to services, has amplified peoples voice and ability to 
negotiate with DW ASA and Dhaka City Corporation. Payment can also make users more vigilant and 
demanding in the delivery of urban services. Empowered customers are changing provider-citizens 
relations, but providers were unwilling/unprepared to respond to the grievances of the poor. Service 
delivery normally catered to VIP citizens, who tend to have enforceable rights, better access to political 
power and bureaucracy, can promote their interests, and have the ability to create a demand-pull on 
government. 
eo-production Government cannot provide services effectively and so needs citizen's involvement. NGOs were T t t ~ H 
effective at expanding services and being resp::msive to need. Communities have eo-produced services 
with NGOs and the City Corporation, by investing their own finance and labour in the design, 
construction and management of infrastructure. The main benefit for communities is access and flexible 
services that are responsive to local problems and needs of communities. In Pallabi there was a 
partnership with communities to construct legal access to safe water points, latrines, washing blocks, 
storm water drainage and hygiene education and in Nilkhet slum there is a waste rubbish collection 
service, runs by CBO on a cost recovery basis. 
T Positive;.} Negative; Neutral 
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Table 51: Observation checklist for Seonl. 
Housing 
Water 
Sewerage 
Access and 
Paving 
Street lighting 
and power 
Solid waste 
management 
Community 
halls 
Drainage 
Additional 
conunents 
Nine Dragon Village 
Houses have a number which suggests residents are registered with the 
Gangnam district office and can have mail delivered. There are public 
phones and mailboxes near the village. The houses are small with one or 
two rooms and some have windows. Structures are not heatproof and 
become sodden when it rains, there are also problems with soundproofing, 
ventilation, lighting, air-coolinR and heating. (See Plate 29). 
Water supply has been installed with households having their own taps. 
(See Plates 32 and 34 ). 
There are a number of communal toilets dotted around the area., which are 
padlocked, but no bathroom was observed. (See Plate 35). 
A number of private cars were parked in the area; there is a bus station but 
no tube nearby. 
Streetlights installed. There is evidence of residents using electrical 
appliances such as fans, TVs, and fridges. Most houses have a bottle of 
gas near the front door for cooking. 
At the centre of the village is a refuse transfer station. Households take 
their refuse to concrete holdings bins, or the transfer station. 
There is a health clinic and a disproportionate number of small churches. 
Open drainage channels installed. The land is also used for agricultural 
purposes. (See Plate 38). 
There is a (broken) community notice board, there appears to be a sense of 
community spirit with people sitting on doorsteps and chatting. Houses 
are prone to fire because of arson or accidents, the area is inaccessible to 
fire engines, most hoU<;e have fin: extinguishers. 
Gangnam-gu 
Residents mainly live in high-rise tlats The 
maintenance of common open spaces is very 
good, with public telephones and mailboxes. 
(See Plate 30). 
Evidence of unreliable water supplies, i.e. water 
tanks on most of the flats and houses. 
No evidence of undesirable arrangements. Very 
good provision of public toilets. 
Private car use and ownership is higher, with 
apartment car parks full and the roads are busy. 
Paving is noticeably wider and is made with 
decorative paving stones. There are many tube 
stops, 
Very good provision of street lighting. 
There appears to be a high frequency of street 
cleaning and low dumping of rubbish in open 
areas has increased (See Plate 37). 
Good availability of community spaces, for 
sitting, and playgrounds, as well as community 
buildings. 
Little evidence of flooding in the streets, despite 
the heavy rains. However in the monsoon 
season, heavy rains mix with the sewage in 
combined sewers means sewage is discharged 
into the streams, inundates the main streets, and 
even subway system. 
Gangnam Gu office communicates through web 
page, leaflets, pamphlets, newsletters, LED 
notice boards, banners, user consultations. 
Seodaemun~u 
The maintenance of common open spaces, and the 
provision of public telephones and mailboxes and the 
houses have numbers. There are small slum areas of 
about 20-30 families dotted around the gu, especially 
near the highway, these are provided with servie{!s. (See 
Plate 31). 
Residential buildings have water tanks on their roofs. 
(See Plate 33). 
No evidence of undesirable arrangements for sanitation, 
and there are plenty of public toilets, especially near the 
tube station. 
There is separate vehicular and pedestrian traffic with 
fairly high traffic frequency. as well as own tube stop. 
(See Plate 36). The most common complaints have been 
about the tarmac surfacing of roads, which is affected 
bv hhzh temperatures and oressures. 
Streetlights are fairly good. 
No incinerator, but recycles waste with some obvious 
dumping of bulky waste. Some houses are reached by 
narrow alleyways, which are difficult for street cleaners 
and refuse collection to Ret to. 
Community halls are available and appear to be 
frequently used. 
Evidence of drains blocked with solid waste and 
flooding after heavy rains. Seodaemun-gu has a river 
running through it and low-lying land is particularly 
prone to flooding. The Gu office has a broadcast 
system to alert residents in case of floods, as well as 
round the clock teams to check drainage facilities. 
The Gu claims to have the 'perfect public works 
system'. Citizens can communicate with 21 dong 
offices in the gu, either by telephone (older residents) 
and intemet (younger ones). 
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Table 53: An assessment of managerial accountability model. 
The overall effect characteristic ha" on variable in practice 
Out<omes Sustainability 
Characteristics Comment Aecountamnty Sat.l.sfaction Performance Social Technical 
Demand responsive A demand driven approach reflects a tension between achieving sufficient professionalism, and H T T J, J, 
approach greater emphasis on popular participation. Increasing demand responsiveness involves making 
public providers directly accountable to customers by assurance of quality, access to information 
and guarantee of redress when things go wrong. Customers are required to understand 
constraints and limitations on service providers, but in practice they do not always accept these. 
The research showed that some views are not regarded as valid by service providers, meaning 
that these demands are not met. 
Managerial reforms The literature reflects an ideological concern with reducing bureaucratic discretion and choice. H tJ, - J, 
Commercially orientated, creditworthy and customer focnsed services. In essence, the Seoul 
reforms replace collectivised decision making with forms of individual choice and encourages a 
stronger sense of personal responsibility for service provision. NPM style management reflects 
managerial accountability for resource allocation asstUDptions about inefficiency, and 
responsiveness of govenunent to the needs of consumers and a results orientation. 
The customer- The literature assumes each individual has equal opportunity to access to services and t-1- t t .. J, 
provider presupposes independent, freely contracting individual. However, an individualisation of the 
relationship relation of users to services can disernpower the vulnerable and upholds a system of values 
consistent with sustaining the status quo in society. The research has demonstrated that one's 
status affects one's bargaining position- those with higher social status are better able to 
negotiate more effectively in service delivery. The fieldwork revealed some people are better 
able to manage the relationship with service providers. Attempts to operate on neutral 
commercial relationship has failed. 
Complaint redress Grester sensitivity to users is a way to improve service quality and efficiency. Thus, lodging ,j, J, 
-
,j, 
-
complaints was made easier and citizens were given assurances that their complaints are being 
dealt with appropriately but redress mechanisms do not give service users any way of holding 
producers to account. Problems with services tend to be treated as individual problems, to be 
solved by the individual, which undermines collective character of services. The research shows 
that individual service users may be easier to handle than groups making organised demands in 
policy making. Public relations function was viewed as appeasement. Reduced number of 
complaints indicates good service. 
1' Positive; -1- Negative~ Neutral 
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Table 84: Cross case analysis of the technical snstainability of urban services. 
Technical Bristol Mdantsane Dhaka S...ul 
oustalnablllty 
Assessment of Bristol City Council and A range of different methods of service Most infrastructures has expired design life. Low quality of Knowledge exists oflocation. physical 
existing SIT A prescribe the service provision. Flexible standards/quality assurance materials necessitates more O&M. Current project to identify and attributes, condition, maintenance 
infrastructure technology to be provided. systems for local variations. Most categorise assets., condition, and maintenance histories. Division of histories and levels of service. 
Attempts to alter the •we infrastructures has expired design life, tasks between govcnunent departments not clearly defmed. Maintenance works planned and 
know best' attitude in service Emphasis on capital projects. Explicit levels of Multiple and conflicting roles. Tendency to avoid responsibilities prioritised, financial forec~ life cycle 
delivery. service. Options for level of service, tow cost and pass them on to others. Poorly defined authority and plans, ability to predict asset failure 
technology options, labour based approaches, autonomy associated with responsibilities. Incoherent or (structural, capacity, obsolescence), and 
cost recovery options. contradictory guidelines and rules, Privileged access to outsourcing non--core activities. 
information. NGO working with squatters to build infrastructure, 
the community has little rote in the design of service, but major 
role in O&M. 
Current status of Planned preventative Blend of planned and unplanned maintenance Preventative maintenance is not done due to scarcity of funds, Planned preventative maintenance carried 
O&M. maintenance and emergency activities carried out by skilled and unskilled only corrective maintenance, fire fighting. when system faits. out, as well as unscheduled. Household is 
work. labour, responsible for smaller maintenance in 
prO,.,ty. 
Problems with Meeting contract standards Issues with leaks, burst mains, theft. vandalism, Problems with resources (financial, materials, personnel, spares, Asset managed to avoid inconvenience, 
the day-to-day for waste management and damage, blockages in sewers, irregular hou~ equipment and work) and infonnation; how work is planned for example, by carrying works out at 
O&M street sweeping within to-house waste collection, meter issues, lack of (strategic, preventative. corrective, day to day): reporting night. 
resource constraints. finances. (technical, and financial). In addition there are lengthy formalities 
Resources and investments to get O&M work done. Poorly defmed job description, 
needed to maintain incompetence. poor working methods. Fundamental capacity 
accountability, shortcomings. Ineffective punishmenVreward mechanisms. 
Perception of Residents are uncertain about Household level problems are still asaumed to Dhak.a City Corporation (wrongly) assumed to be responsible for Responsibility decentralised to zonal and 
responsibility responsibility for different be the responsibility of Public Work all services provided in the city. Instead there are a number of ward departments supervise and monitor 
for problems services. and hold Bristol department. Minimum perfonnance different organisations dealing with provision of services at local, services carried out by line departments, 
City Council ultimately specifications are required by central regional, national level. Services provided by hierarchy of staff Services like meter reading and waste 
responsible for all problems. government legislation and cost effectiveness. (skilled, semi-<killed and qualified) and area btued office~ there collection have been privatised. 
are officers, engineers, supervisors and workers. Squatters willing 
to undertake O&M for community managed scheme. 
Meet Project Pathfmder is demand Ward conunittee members are consulted in NGOs involved in service provision are better able to meet Emphasis on meeting needs and the 
communities responsive, and able to tenns ofteclmical specifications, perfonnance conununity needs, NGO consults with residents in tenns of convenience of citizens demonstrated by 
needs? respond quickly to unplanned plans, goals and standards for service delivery. teclmical specifications, and communities acquire skills and have strategic goals, levels of services and 
work. NGO back-up. Surveys and report cards have been unsuccessfully perfonnance standards, and review 
used to get user feedback to improve service delivery. mechanisms to meet user needs. 
Level of Multi-disciplinary training Lack of staff, poor financial management Insufficient skills across departments at all levels reflected in Staff trained and access to asset data, 
expertise for for Project Team procedures, procurement procedures, O&M teclmological options for service, poor staff appointment systems, information systems, attitudinal refonn, 
typeofO&M planning, monitoring and evaluation of service, few incentive structures. no quality c>f service delivery standards. revised strutdards and qualification, 
lack of resources to address conrtraints. managem~t through line departments. 
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Table 85: Cross case analysis of the social sustainability of urban services. 
Social 
sustalnabllltv 
Communities 
invoh·ed in the 
O&M of service 
provision 
Monitoring, 
feedback and 
evaluation 
systems 
Routes through 
which users can 
contact services 
providers 
Factors affecting 
willingness to 
pay 
Bristol 
Community role in project 
identification was marginal; BCC 
and SITA took the lead Although 
certain management decision 
were taken in consultation with 
the community. Issues of social 
stability. 
Participatory monitoring and 
evaluation of waste management 
from residents. Lack of 
infonnation to support policy and 
managerial decisions, and 
accountability. 
Residents can attend weekly and 
monthly meetings attended by 
BCC/SIT A representatives. But 
respondents do not feel they have 
a voice which is listened to, they 
are not involved in the process 
that affects them, they cannot take 
action to initiate change. 
Residents' pay for waste 
management through their council 
tax. some people get income 
related reductions. Some residents 
reported that they would trade 
lower service levels for reduced 
taxes. 
Mdantsane 
Unequal access to services. Theft and vandalism, 
lack of feelings of responsibility or ownernhip of 
municipal infrastructure. Poor not aware of 
technological options available, poor less involved 
in decision making process over the quality of 
services they receive- some prefer higher levels of 
services and some lower. Fonnation of ward 
committees may be politicised-people using 
personal influence or access. Issues of social 
stability in areas. Existing traditions of self-help. 
Conununity is involved through monitoring and 
management. paying user charges. General public 
feedback on policies at regular intervals. Involving 
people in budgetary policy making., external 
reviews, Integrated Development Plan and ward 
committee meetings. 
Local ward committees represent people of wards. 
and work with elected councillor on local areas 
development. Accountability tends to be a one 
shot affair, 
Legacy of rent boycotts and unwillingness to pay 
for services until a certain level of service is 
reached. Willingness to pay though by 
governments to be dependent on ownership created 
through participation in service delivery. Service is 
poor and so withholding payment is justified. 
Dhaka 
Misuse of services by public, i.e. dumping waste in 
drains oc illegal pumps on water supply 
connections, theft of manhole covers. Services 
provided on a self-help basis with skilled 
conununity labour. Lack of funds prevents making 
service standard conunitments. Main link between 
City Corporation and conununities is through NGO 
as an intennediary. Patronage evident in service 
delivery. 
Complaints can be delivered personally, by 
telephone, through the ward and zone office; 
complaints should be registered and handed over to 
the concerned supervisor or engineer for 
rectification. Feedback may be given to the 
complainant. Resistance to further involving 
conununity in dccision-makin~ 
There are mechanisms but action is not taken 
according to public demands. Awareness about 
services created through media campaigns, drama, 
miking, posters, leaflets, public hearings. and 
handbills. In general respondents had tolerance of 
poor services. 
Financial instability, such as high cost of services, 
poor billing, and revenue management procedures, 
non-payment .. under recovery of costs. Public 
complaints about late billing, no check that 
customers have received a bill, disconnections are 
difficult, and so little incentive for users to pay, 
furthennore, service is poor and so withholding 
payment is felt justified. Meter readers can be 
bribed Privatising bill collection has increased 
revenues in certain areas of Dhaka. NGO based 
projects finance O&M repairs through users fees, 
which also cover caretaker's salaries. 
Seoul 
Conununity involved in more of a supetVisory 
role, residents getting involved in municipal 
(mther than household) level services, 
trano;;parency and accountability in issues 
affecting neighbourhoods. 
Conununities involved in plaruting, and 
implementing waste management 
infrastructure, communities playing a central 
role in monitoring construction through 
committees (comprising representatives from 
community, SMO, contractor) and community 
supervision of O&M is promoted. 
IT is used to avoid the need to deal with fonnal 
institutions in persof4 or else residents can visit 
local ward/ complaints centres. Example of 
sustained citizen action to demand 
accountability. The needs ofthe urban poor are 
not on service providers' agenda. Upper 
income groups more likely to be effective in 
getting improvements. There is little political 
commitment to outcomes of service delivery 
for poor. 
Good revenue collection from customers and 
incentives to pay early and to pay over the 
internet. Payment increased by attempts to 
overcome corruption in service delivery, for 
example, in household meter reading and in the 
giving of contracts. 
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Table 93: Cross case review of accountability linked reform. 
Bristol Mdantsane Seoul Dhaka 
Stage of policy Implementation. Fonnulation and implementation. Implementation. Fonnulatioo and implementation. 
making cycle 
Policy sector Service delivery procedures. Administrative and planning procedures at the level of Administrative procedures at the level of metropolitan Service delivery procedures. 
local government government. 
Key feature Best Value in service delivery, New rights for citizens, Bathe Pele for customer On-line infonnation and administrative and civil Service delivery run in partnership 
dedicated service delivery, and service, IDPs local planning and governance. service reforms, anti-comtption focus. between authorities, conununities and 
shortened lines of communication. NGO. Increasing user voice is a key 
objective for donors. 
Level of National and local. National and local. Metropolitan. City Corporation. 
government 
Services Drainage, waste collection. street Water and sanitation, drainage, waste collection, street Water and sanitati~ drainage, waste collection. street Water and sanitation, drainage, waste 
Involved lightint> lighting, halls, roads and paving. lighting, halls, roads and paving. collection. street lighting, halls, roads 
and paving. 
Objective Bending and reshaping service Decentralised participation, eo-monitoring with service Refonns intended to reduce the need for personal Diagnostic reports in service delivery. 
delivery in a low-income users, and popular participation through a legally contact between public and officials in corruption NGO involvement in service delivery. 
neighbourhood Attention to the four enshrined role for democratically elected ward prone areas, increase oversight, and petfonnance Empower the poor in overseeing 
C's (challenge, compare, consult and committees. Ward committee can also exercise evaluation and bring citizens closer to government (in government actions and spending. 
comoete). scrutiny over the municipalities. a carefully managed wav). 
Legal basis Contract and policy initiative. Constitution and policy initiative. Policy initiative. No legal basis. 
Initiator National government, Bristol City National govennnent. Seoul Metropolitan Government policies have been Donors/ Civil society (NGOs). 
Council and SIT A designed to fit the specific focus and objectives of 
anti-comtption refonn funded by World Bank. 
Organisers Departmental head of BCC, SIT A National and municipal goverrunent administration and Mayor Gob, OPEN development team, SMO. Civil society (NGOs). 
regional manager, Community at politicians. 
Heart management. 
Target groups Individual residents, community and Community level priorities are reflected in municipal Individual citizens. Local govenunent, slum dwellers and 
BCC, Attempts to normalise or decisions. Recognises territorial based groups of middle class areas, service users and 
regularise civil society participation place, as well as connnunities of interest. other stakeholders e.g. NGO. 
failed. 
Information lnfonnal word-of.mouth, newspapers, Performance agreements in service delivery, Integrated Website and publicity. Donors have opened a space for civil 
sources as well as traditional channels. Development Plan, feedback via ward committees, society consultation and NGOs have 
ward level meetings. attempted to hold service providers to 
account. 
Feedback and Comments to the local one--stop shop, Govennnent must listen to and act on people's Typically took the form of surveys of citizens and e· To NGOs and City Corporation. 
consultation councillor, community newspaper, demands in services provision through a participatory mail options. Citizens have no easy mechanism to 
Pathfmder crew. process. make service providers take their 
interests into account 
Evaluation Meeting national targets and public Sanctions applied to ward councillors based on IDP. Public opinion polling. NGO partnerships address and 
opinion, anticipated that will generate articulate needs of poor. Increasing fee 
financial savings in long term. collection means DW ASA is 
I potentially more accountable to users. 
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Table 94: Cross case comparison of agency interest in accountability. 
government to seen as 
innovative (by national government}, 
experimenting with community 
involvement in joined up service 
delivery, working in partnership, re· 
shaping and bending service delivery to 
meet needs of users. 
delivery more efficient, and cost 
effective, enabling users to monitor 
providers, ensuring that services reach 
the poor, empower the poor, to make 
best use of government resources, 
redirect government spending for better 
development outcomes. attracting donor 
aid and increasing level of funding for 
accountable, but majority resist oversight 
and limits on their power, some have 
eased social conscience by supplying 
services to slums, and others are 
accountable within patron-client 
framework. 
customer allows for detection to reduce 
petty corruption, reward perfonnance, 
accountability for results and delivery-
orientated services. 
Best 
Value targets, EC Directives, and election 
promises. Ideological concerns with self-
help and improving the functioning of 
local government, establishing a direct 
relationship between provider and user, 
Increased economic efficiency in service 
user 
public services as strategy to create a 
more equitable society, equal opportunity 
creates social justice, expresses social 
solidarity, Linked to poverty objectives 
and a •better life for all'. Increased 
economic efficiency in service provision. 
outside pressures from donors to curb 
corruption and begin institutional refonn. 
Unaccountability comes from lack of 
potiticat will, resources and incentives. 
corruption initiatives and promotion of 
economic refonn (public expmditure 
mana!)mlent, administrative and civil 
Private Sector 
particular targets as set by 
central/local government 
Concern with positive 
publicity/ brand image, 
envirorunent values and 
corporate social 
opportunities for private 
sector involvement 
through Municipal 
Service Partnerships, 
stimulating competition, 
and business opportunities 
accountable services, e.g. 
meter reading and fee 
collection. 
sector 
strategy to 
increase the amount of recycling, 
sustainability of waste management. 
and accountability to future 
generations. 
resources and political power to seek 
accountability from govenunents and 
service providers, promote rights 
based development framework. NGOs 
in a watchdog role and can express 
the voice of the poor. NGOs have to 
make govenunents and service 
providers accountable. 
and stimulating demands from 
communities for adequate services. 
Assumption that raising poor voice 
would empower them to demand 
better services. Seek greater justice 
and greater dignity for those denied it. 
Rights based framework for 
service delivery, detection of 
corruption, act as watchdogs and 
promote transparency. 
live, perceptions of accountability 
through local democratic channels 
(councillor and BCC). No clear 
understanding of who is accorn1table and 
for what in the area. 
perceived to be primarily accountable. 
Perception of a confrontational approach 
of accountability linked to history of 
rent boycotts. Feelings of entitlement to 
service delivery. 
Government as 
accountable for service delivery. Urban 
poor are dependent on goodwill of 
service operators for supply. Protest 
used to meet collective needs but 
essentially symbolic. Services delivery 
as dis-empowering, no information! 
access/support, feelings of anger, 
of citizens 
government actions and spending. 
353 
Table 96: Cross case analysis of exit, voice, loyalty and neglect; examples. 
Lotadon Exit Voice Co-productlon O&M l,oyalty Ne~lect Exclusion 
Bristol Residents move Attending Pathfinder meetings. Request for replacement of street Not complaining when there is a Litter dropping. Deprived areas like Barton Hill 
frequently- high Signing petitions. light bulbs. grievan=e. Bins not put out. have long been neglected in 
turnover rates. Writing letters to Grassroots. Maintenance of Hope for change. Bags of rubbish left in street. public service provision. 
Talking to crew. churcheslconununity hall. People do not complain because Fly tipping. 
Using the one stop shop. Instances of road sweeping in they trust the crew/corporation Feeling that things will not 
Contacting counciVcaretakers. front of house. change. 
Telling the kids off for Operation Cleansweeps. Not bothered about area. 
vandalism. ROf<lrting fly·tipping. Not recycling. 
Mdantsane Non·paymentiboycott Elections. Road sweeping in front of Loyalty to and patience with Vandalism. Exclusion from public services 
for services represents Public meetings. houses. ANC government and Theft. means that slum dwellers 
partial exit. Petitions. Maintenance of church and local politicians. Illegal power and water construct VIP latrines, bum own 
Demonstrations. community hall. connections. rubbish. 
Media coverage. Zone based clean up campaigns. Failure to report problems 
Complaints to rent offices. 1breats to ward committee 
Talk to counci11ors. 
Dhaka CBO/NOO set up for Public meetings. Financing construction ofNOO Ineffective voice means users Blocking drains. Exclusion from public services 
provision of refuse Demonstrations. project. stop complaining about service. Dumping of solid waste. means no rights or entitlements 
collection in middle Media coverage. Collecting money for Hope that paying for services Illegal power and water or standards of service in slums. 
class as well as water Complaints to DCC. maintenance and to pay will mean that slum dwellers are connections. Lack of communication and 
and sanitation in low- Talk to councillors. caretakers. not evicted. Corruption and rent seeking. coordination of government 
income areas. Talk to Mast.aam Training for infrastructure repair. No skills and knowledge to activities. 
Report cards. manage services. 
Seoul Government is Surveys. Community planning, Loyalty to SMG in return for Lack of ability to challenge Exclusion from public services 
typically service Public meetings. opportunities to provide demands met. government, means that in Nine Dragon 
provider although Demonstrations. feedback on local policies for Demand responsive focus on No entitlements to service. Village there are isolated 
private waste Media coverage. waste what users want and can afford Illegitimate status. instances of drain cleaning and 
management but Complaints to Gu offices. No perception of procedural road patching, cleaning of 
capabilities and fairness. communal latrine; maintenance 
polici<.:S vary across Feeling unable to change of churches & community halls. 
Gus. govemment policy. 
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Table 97: Summary of findings from testing propositions. 
Proposition for The overall effect practice has on proposition Finding 
accountabilitv 
Comment Support Partially Dispute 
support 
Multiple strategies Respondents from deprived areas use different strategies from non-deprived areas to cope with failing services. Accountability is not 
something that is achieved once and for all. There is a need to review how accountability is defined. Accountability only exists insofar • 
as people make it exist bv usina it. Frameworks of accountability_ should refer to exclusion and eo-production. 
Infonnationlresource Information asymmetries had been reduced in service delivery. Information asymmetries can be reduced through dialogue. • 
svmmetries Accountability needs to be sustained. Accountability has a number of costs. 
O&M doesn't work in The case studies showed that the most important outputs of service delivery are not always measurable. O&M of urban services is often • 
practice not a priority for municipalities. Effective O&M was improved by partnerships. 
AccountabilitY must be appropriate to servic~_rovider agencies. 
Innovation in service delivery promoted O&M. 
Sanctions are needed In practice. service users have few sanctions to use as leverage to demand better services. The role of payment for services as a sanction • 
in service delivery is variable. Embedding service providers in communities can also be a dis-incentive to front line service providers. 
Forms of accountability can be traded off against each other. International pressures can be effective in making urban service delivery 
accountable to citizens. 
Providers are Trust does matter in service delivery. Levels of trust vary with the service provider. • 
untrustworthy 
Homogeneous service Some groups are better placed for acting on accountability arrangements. Service providers have attempted to entrench their strategic • 
users interests and practical needs in service delivery. Focusing on individual accountability of front line service providers is a symptomatic 
approach to a structural problem. 
Providers answerable to Accountability of service providers depends on a degree of direct answerability to the community. Political accountability continues to • 
community have an important role in the delivery of urban services. Ward Councillors have a key role to play in service delivery. Thought should be 
given to how to scale up accountability from the project context. Accountability has been shaped by broader socio-political context. 
Accountability is improved through local action. The extent to which accountability arrangements have made society more governable is 
debateable. 
Incentives for action Users do not necessarily require individual incentives to take action in service delivery. Recognition should be give to the range of • incentives affecting service providers. Front line service providers often need discretion to be effective. 
Accountability is Accountability is socially constructed and the outcomes of accountability cannot be predicted. • 
circular 
Providers and users are The research showed that service providers and users are not necessarily self-interested. Accountability requires a perception of shared • 
self-interested responsibility. Service users and providers have different strategic and practical interests in service delivery. but may share wider 
concerns. 
User voice is needed The respondents from deprived areas thought that they did have a voice in service delivery. Respondents from deprived areas used • 
collective rnther than individual mechanisms to enforce accountability. The outcomes of complaint handling mechanisms is variable. 
Accountalllity can reduce user satisfaction. User satisfaction may still be low even if services meet technical tarJZ:ets for service delivery. 
Social capital is required Sustainability. like trust, depends on continuity of social relations as welt ru: wider shared interests beyond urban services • 
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Appendix (2): Confidentially agreement. 
The researcher guarantees that the data obtained from this research interview is 
confidential and is collected solely for the purposes of a PhD research project 
undertaken by the researcher. The researcher is solely responsible for transcribing and 
analysing the data. No data attributable to those interviewed will be made available to 
any third party. Only anonymous summaries of the data will be included in the final 
report or any publications in which the research results may be used. Each respondent 
may have a copy of the tape recordings, notes, and final reports should they wish to 
obtain a copy. 
D I acknowledge the above statement and give permission to the researcher to 
use the interview material for the purpose of her PhD Research Project 
The Respondent 
Date Name Signed 
The Researcher 
Date Name Signed 
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Appendix (3): Aide memoire for semi-structured interviews. 
Intenriew Schedule for Semi Structured Interviews with Scn'ice Providen 
RQl What entitlements do citi7.ens have to urban 
services? 
• Providers & users define formaVinformal entitlement 
• Perceived/actual Expectations of quality 
• Variations in entitlements /expectations 
• Gendered dimension 
• Tenure (securelinsecure) and how this affects access to 
urban services/ability to negotiate with service 
providers. 
• Local organizations set up to tackle pnor urban 
services. 
RQJ How does accountability affect user satisfaction? 
• Expectations of service quality? 
• Range of satisfaction with and performance of urban 
services? 
• Equal treatment & outcomes? 
• ·Define good services/satisfaction? 
• Have accountability arrangements improved levels of 
nser satisfaction? Why and for whom? 
• Willingness of officials to engage with community 
-representatives 
• Discover the grievances/complaint redress systems -
residents' awareness of complaint mechanisms? 
• The role of the local media/CUOsl NGOs in airing 
residents problems? 
RQS How sustainable are seniccs? 
• Assess accountability? Who benefits most? 
• Factors promote/constrain M. 
• Variations in ability to use AA (users/providers). 
• Have accountability arrangements improved the quality 
of urban services? Why and for whom; how has this 
impacted on users/service providers? 
• How do people rate the effectiveness of services. what 
factors do they consider to judge effectiveness~ are 
there differences? How do people rate or assess 
accountability arrangements to improve urban services? 
• What services do people think they have some 
influence over. who has most control? 
• How do householdsfmdividuals cope with decline in 
quality of urban services? Are M imp. component of 
users coping strategies 
• . Which problems can be solved by accountability 
arrangements and which require other solutions? 
RQ2 How is accountability demonstrated? 
• How do users/providers dcfme accountability? 
• How can users seek redress for failing services? 
• What the mechanisms are and how they work? 
• Have opportunities for improving urban services 
increased or decreased? Why and for whom? 
• Who enforces accountability? Evidence of 
compliance? 
• Are service providers accountability arrangements an 
important component of people"s coping strategies? 
• What are the most important formal and informal • 
accountability arrangements and why? 
• What are the effects of accountability arrangements? 
RQ4 How does accountability affect performance? 
• Describe what O&M schedule involves 
• Rate services e.g. %working 
• Common faults 
• How to judge successful service (Formal service 
standards & codes conduct, incentives and sanctions, 
external stakeholders (regulator, public and local groups) 
• eo-production? 
• Arrangements for breakdown 
• Constraints in service delivery? 
• Promotion & recruitment 
• Job satisfaction 
• Plarming O&M work? 
• Quality and quantity of contact with users? 
• Level of discretion/flexibility 
CLARIFY: 
D Standards of compliance/ performance to which agency 
should be accountable? 
D Agency objectives/interests in accountability? 
D What are the provider & user accountable for? Where is 
overall responsibility? 
D Trust among stakeholders? 
D Resources needed to maintain accmmtability? 
D Measures/behaviours/processes/outcomes to assess 
accountability? 
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Appendix ( 4): Key informants interviewed during the research 
Bristol 
1. David Foster SITAGBLtd. 
2. Dave Swires SIT A GB Ltd. 
3. Michael Dixon Infrastructure Services, Bristol City Conncil 
4. Caroline Hollies Ground Force Co-ordinator 
5. Paul Bannenuan Housing Manager, Barton Hill Office 
6. Liz Jones Community Involvement Officer, Community At Heart 
7. Neil Burwell Community Safety Office, Community At Heart 
8. KurtJarnes Community Involvement Officer, Community At Heart 
9. JohnDeasy SARI 
10. Pam Vinicombe New Deal Shop Manager, Community At Heart 
11. John Astley Conncillor 
12. JulianCox Client Office for Bristol City Council 
13. Peter Hall The Recvcling Consortium 
14. Christine Williarns Client Officer for Bristol City Conncil 
15. Charlie Maccaulder ResourceSaver 
16. Project Pathfinder Crew Jim, Phi!, Phi!, Martyn, Darren 
17. Dave Ralph Director, Community At Heart 
East London, South Africa 
1. CraigSarn Director of Planning and Economic Development 
2. Hamish Forrest Director of Engineering 
3. Conncillor Dikimolo Councilor for Engineering Services 
4. Councillor Mosana Councillor for Administration 
5. Amanda Magwentshu Director of Corporate Affairs 
6. MrsNMafu General Manager of Executive Mayoral Support 
7. DaveMurray General Manger of Income 
8. Water engineer Public Works Dept. at Mdantsane 
9. Sewerage engineer Public Works Dept. at Mdantsane 
10. Des Halley Deputy Mayor 
11. Sakhiwo Mvasi Africon 
12. Dewald Coetzee Regional Director ofDW AF for Eastern Cape 
13. Johan Killian Amatola Water 
14. Oliver Ive Amanz' Abantn Services 
15. Robin Richard Rhodes University 
16. LeslieBank Rhodes University 
17. Audile SALGA 
18. AndreNnde SBA Consultants 
19. DWAFEL General manager 
20. Conncillor Nkula. Ward 42 Buffalo City Mnnicipality (Nus 15, 17, 18) 
21. Ward committee member Ward 42 Buffalo City Municipality 
22. Ward committee member Ward 42 Buffalo City Municipality 
23. Ward conunittee member Ward 42 Buffalo City Mnnicipality 
24. Ward committee member Ward 42 Buffalo City Municipality 
25. Ward committee member Ward 42 Buffalo City Municipality 
26. Ward committee member Ward 42 Buffalo City Municipality 
27. Ward committee member Ward 42 Buffalo City Municipality 
28. Ward committee member Ward 42 Buffalo City Municil)ality 
29. Ward committee member Ward 42 Buffalo City Municipality 
30. Ward conunittee member Ward 42 Buffalo CityMunicipality 
31. Ward committee member Ward 42 Buffalo City Municipality 
Bangladesh 
I. Dr Shalmaz Karim TransParency International 
2. Engr. Reba Paul Bangladesh Water Partnership 
3. ZahedHKhan Senior Urban Specialist, World Bank 
4. Prof. Nurul Islam Dept. of Geography and Environment, University of Dhaka 
Nazem 
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5. Shafiul Azam Ahmed Water and Sanitation Specialist World Bank 
6. Mohd. Delwar Hossain Municipal Services Project 
7. Quamrul Islam GWP South Asia Regional Water Partnership 
Siddique 
8. lftekhar Ahmed Local Government Enl(incering Dept./Municipal Services Project 
9. Commissioner Sohel Chief Conservancy Officer 
10. Mr Tapan Das Gupta Chief Town Planner 
11. Dr Abdul Milton NGO Forum for Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation 
12. Iftekhar Enayetullah Waste Concern 
13. .Md. Maqsood Sinha Waste Concern 
14. Md. Golam Samsani Committee of Concerned Citizens Madhupur 
15. Engr. Kazi Md. Sheesh Chief Engineer -W ASA 
16. Md. Kalim Ullah Koli Project Coordinator, Dustha Shasthya Kendra 
17. AFM Abdul Alim Ward Commissioner, Ward 19, DCC, 
Naqui 
18. 3 women ward conunissioners at DCC offices 
19. Manzoor Hassan TIB Executive Director 
20. Asgar Ali Sabri, Research Fellow Policy Research Department, IDP AA Proshika 
21. MrKaPOOr World Bank Delhi 
22. Arvind Kepriwal Parivartan 
Seoul, South Korea 
I. Public Official Citizen's Ombudsman 
2. MrHwang Audit and Inspections Office, OPEN System 
3. Mr Cho Waste Management Division 
4. Mr Seo Audit and Inspections Officer, OPEN System 
5. Public Official Sewerage Department 
6. MrLee Seoul Institute for Transparency 
7. MrKim Civil Service Affairs Office 
8. MrChunl( Contracts Examination Division, Integrity Pacts 
9. MrKim Local Authority Assistant Division, Saturday Date with Mayor 
10. MrYun Satisfaction Surveys, Policy Evaluation Dept. 
11. MrYoon lnvestil(ation Division, Centre for Clean Hands 
12. MrKoo Roads Management Division 
13. MrSong Roads Management Division 
14. MrKim Waterworks 
15. MrKim Water Quality 
16. DrYoo, Seoul Development Institute, Urban Environment Division 
17. DrLce Seoul Development Institute, Urban Management Division 
18. DrAim Specialist on OPEN System 
19. Prof. Park Seoul University 
20. MrChung Public Works Office Gangnam-Gu 
21. MsKim Waste Management Office, Gangnam-Gu 
22. MrPark Sewerage Management Office, Gangnam-Gu 
23. Public Official Public Works Office, Seodaemun-Gu 
24. Public Official Sewerage D~artment, Seodaemun-Gu 
25. MrUh Vice Mayor, Seodaemun-Gu 
26. Researcher Korea Centre for City and Environment Research 
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Appendix (5): Questionnaire schedule 
ACCOUNTABILITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR URBAN SERVICES 
QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY 
Introduction 
Hello. Your household has been randomly selected to participate in a survey on urban services. The survey aims to 
obtain your views on service provision and the acrountability of service providers. Your assistance in this survey 
would be appreciated. A report will be compiled in such a manner that it cannot be traced back to any individual. The 
completed report will be made public so that you can be infomned of the results. 
TO BE FILLED IN BY INTERVIEWER 
A) I B) Date of ~~m* I Interviewers interview C) Length of interview name 
D) Area of 
survey 
E) Selected household number 
F) Address 
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Section 1: Personal Data 
1.1. 1.2. 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6. 1.7. 1.8. 1.9. 
Age in Gender Highest What work Total in Years lived Adequate Vehicle Housing 
years level of do you do? house? in area income? owned? 
education 1=House 
1 = 25-30 Male =0 1= None 1= Pensioner 1= 1 1= lesslhan 1=Yes 1= None 2= Flat 
2= 31-35 Female =1 2= Primary 2= Professional 2=2or3 5years 2=No 2= Bicycle 3=Room 3=Teooher 3= 36-40 3= S.COndary 4= Skired 3=4or5 2= 5-10 3= Sometimes 3= Mo1Dfbike 4= Shack 
4= 41-45 4= University Worker 4=6or7 3=11-15 4= Don't 4=Car 5= Other 
5= 46-55 5= Olher 5= Non-skil>d 5=8or9 4= 16-20 Know 5=Van 
6=56+ """" 6= More 5= 21-30 6= Other 6= Unempbyed 6=30-
2.0 
Do you belong to any of the following associations? 
Enter number 
Nn nrYM ((J =Nn· 1 = YRf.:. 7= fJon'tKoowl 
2.1 Reliqious qroup 
2.2 Political party 
2.3 Youth orqanisationiclub 
2.4 Community based organisation 
2.5 Schools associations 
2.6 Campaigning group 
2.7 Woman's club/orqanisation 
2.8 Sports club 
2.9 Other 
2.10 None 
3.1 Are you happy living in this area? 
1 =Yes 2=No 3=DonYKnow Enter number 
3.2 Would you like to move to another area? 
1 =Yes 2=No 3=DonYKnow 
Have you ever done any of the following? 
4 Enter number 
No or Yes (0 =No; 1 = Yes; 2= Don't Know} 
4.1 T elephone<Vwritlen In/ me I with a local politician 
4.2 Voted in an election 
4.3 Attended a public meeting 
4.4 Protested OVEr a local issue 
4.5 Talked with neighbours on local issues 
4.6 Spoken ala public meetinq 
4.7 Wlitlen to a local n 
4.8 Siqned a petition CNf!f a local issue 
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I Section 2: Household Services 
5 Which of these services do you have access to: Enter number No or Yes (0 =No; 1 = Yes; 2= Don't Know) 
5.1 .. Water supply 
5.2 Street lighting 
5.3 Sanitation/ sewerage 
5.4 Refuse removal 
5.5 Storm water drains 
5.6 Road surfaces/ pavements 
5.7 Community hall 
What type of toilet facility Is available In this house/ on plot? Enter number 
6.1 
1=Bucket system 
2= Pit latrine 
3:= Septic tank (on site disposaQ 
4= Full waterborne flush toilet (~ff site disposal) 
What is the main water source for this household? 
6.2 1= Public standpipes 2=Yardtaps 
3= Household connections 
6.3 
What is the level of electrical supply? 
1= Non grid (other energy source i.e. gas, pa<llffin, wood, dung) 
2 = Grid electricity 
What is the kind of access road to the household? 
6.4 1= House set on tarmac road with paved streets 2= Access to house by a narrow access tsrmsc road 
3=Access to house by a gravel paved access road to dwelling 
4= Access house by a dirt road 
How is the refuse of this household disposed of? 
6.5 1=Household transfer to communal skip 2=Bum, bury, dispose of refuse yourself 
3= Kerbside collection of rubbish 
6.6 
What type of storm water drainage Is available in this area? 
1=0pen channel 
2= Piped system 
Which 4 services are most important to you? 
Enter number 
7 No or Yes (0 =No; 1 = Yes; 2= Don't Know) 
7.1 Water supply 
7.2 Sanitation! sewerage 
7.3 Storm water drainage 
7.4 Roads/ paving 
7.5 Street lighting 
7.6 Refuse collection 
7.7 Community halls 
Do you get a bill for these services? 
Enter number 
8.1 
No or Yes (0 =No; 1 = Yes; 2= Don't Know) 
8.1.1 Water supply 
8.1.2 Sanitation! sewerag9 
8.1.3 Storm water drainage 
8.1.4 Roads/ paving 
8.1.5 Street lighting 
8.1.6 Refuse collection 
6.1.7 Community halfs 
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Enter number 
8.2 Do you pay for these services? No or Yes (0 =No; 1 = Yes; 2= Don't Know) 
8.2.1 Water supply 
8.2.2 Sanitation! sewerage 
8.2.3 Storm water drainage 
8.2.4 Roads! paving 
8.2.5 Stroet lighting 
8.2.6 Refuse coffectkm 
8.2.1 Community halls 
I Section 3: Satisfaction with services I 
9 How would you describe these services in general? No or Yes (0 =No; 1• Yes; 2= Don't Know) 
9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.8 
Effective Unrosoonsive Concerned Value for Monev Inefficient T ransoarent Undooendable Reliable 
(A) Water supply 
(B) Sanitation! 
sewerage 
(C)Stormw-
drainage 
(D) Roads/ 
paving 
(E) Street 
lloh6no 
{F) Refuse 
collection 
(G) Community 
halls 
10 How do you find out about the services you use Enter number 
No or Yes (0 =No; 1 = Yes; 2= Don't Know)) 
10.1 Nempapers 
10.2 Radio 
10.3 Notice boards 
10.4 TV 
10.5 Service PrlMder leafte1s and pamphle1s 
10.6 Meeting slaff 
10.7 Free phone numbers 
10.8 Own experience of using the senlices 
10.9 Talking with neighbours/word of mouth 
10.10 Other (please !peCily) 
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11 Thinking about these services, please state which of the following you agree with 
No or Yes (0 -No· 1- Yes· 2- Don'1 Know) 
Refuse Communily Stoonwater S~eet lighting Roads/ paving Water supply Sanitation/ 
removal halls eta ins sewerage 
11.11fsdifticultloget 
improvements in services 
11.2 Se!Vice providers don't 
take complaints seriously. 
11.3 Se!Vice providers are 
happy to hear users ideas 
11.4 Se!Vice providers are 
more responsive now 
11.5 There is no point 
cornplaininQ about services 
11.6 Problemswilh services 
sort lhemselves out 
11.7 Complaints have been 
satisfactorily resolved 
11.8 Se!Vice providers are 
fiiendlv and helpful I 
11.9 Se!Vice providers don't 
care about people like me 
11 . 1 0 Se!Vice providers 
communicate well wilh users 
11.11 Users complaints receive 
I fair and equal ~earnent 
1 t . t 2 Se!Vice providers deal I 
wilh queries prornpHy 
11.13 Service providers keep 
users informed about !he 
progress of complaint I 
12. Please indicate which of the followin2 factors apply to the urban services you use: 
Poor Quality Low Availability Long walking High water (taste! smeiV low Pressure at Seasonal 12.1 Water supply appearance) of taps low re1iab'r1ity distance to demands var"rations 
.· potable water supply 
12.2 Roadl pavements Many potholes Rough road No drainage of No pavements for No1:1armac Roadside Narrow Width surface storm water pedestrian vegetation 
low number of Wrong location of Wrong type of Low capacity of Silting/ Blockage Flooding in the Low frequency of 12.3 Stonn water drains drains of existing drains 
•• 
. 
drains drain drains 
-by solid waste streeff houses drain cieaning 
Not Available Not fiequently Poor condition of Not enough 12A Community halls used? buildings space available 
. . No provision of Dumping of Low frequency of Long distance to No individual rubbish bins low frequency of No vehicles for 12.5 Refuse removal (public l:ld street cleansing rubbish in open collection of collecting waste communal household 
. private areas waste collection points collection 
Dissatisfaction Poor condition of Blockages in Low capacity of Toilets not Missing or Overflowing 12.8 Sanitation with latrine type damaged communal toilets sewern existing sewers flushing properly manhole covers manholes i 
Electrtclly supply low number of Interruptions in Poor location of Illegal power Wrong type of Non·working Inappropriate I 12.7 streetr19hting 
street lights supply street lights connections street lights street lights hours of supply 
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13 Can you tell me 
. 
how satisfied you are Very Satisfied Fairly Fairly Dissatisfied Very Don't 
with these aspects of satisfied satisfied dissatisfied dissatisfied know 
the facilities? 
How satisfied are you with the overall provision of the following services? Ring Number 
13.1 Refuse removal 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 0 
13.2 Community halls 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 0 
13.3 Storm water drains 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 0 
13.4 Street lighting 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 G 
13.5 Road surfaces/ 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 0 Pavements 
13.6 Water supply 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 0 
13.7 Sanitation 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 0 
How satisfied are you with the quali ~of these services? 
13.8 Refuse removal 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 0 
13.9 CommunLtyhalls 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 0 
13.10 Storm water drains 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 0 
13.11 Street lighting 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 0 
13.12 Road surfaces/ 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 0 pavements 
13.13 Water supply 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 0 
13.14 Sanitation 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 0 
How satisfied are you with the way the service provider keeps you infonned? 
13.15 Refuse removal 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 0 
13.16 Community halls 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 0 
13.17 Storm water drains 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 0 
13.18 Street lighting 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 0 
13.19 Road surfaces/ 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 0 pavements 
13.20 Water supply 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 0 
13.21 Sanitation 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3 0 
If satisfied, what is the main reason? 
14.1 
If dissatisfied, what is the main reason and how do you cope with problems? 
14.2 
Very Satisfied Fairly Fairly Dissatisfied Very Do Not Satisfied Satisfied dissatisfied Dissatisfied Know 
How satisfied are you 
15 with the local 3 2 1 -1 ·2 ·3 0 
government overall? 
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Since the reform (Seoul5 years; Mdantsane 8 years; Dhaka 12 months; 
16 
Bristol3 years) have the services in this area improved, stayed the same 
or worsened? 
1 = Yes a big improvement 2 = Yes a small improvement 3 = No improvement 
4 = Things have got wome Enter number 
If you had the opportunity to upgrade an existing urban service which 
17 would you choose? 
1 = Water supplies 2 = Sanftation 3 =Drains 
4= Slmel tiahitng. 5= Road surfaces & oavements 6= Communitv halts Enter nllmber 
18 If you had a problem with a service what would you do? Enter number No or Yes (O-No; 1 =Yes; 2= Don't Know) 
18.1 Vote for a politician/ councillor prornisng better services 
18.2 Write letters In newspapeiS 
18.3 Conlact a politician/ councillor 
18.4 Visit a local one slop shop for services 
18.5 ProtesV demonstrate 
18.6 Use the law 
18.7 Call service providers help lines 
18.8 Visit service provider offices 
18.9 Use service provider suggestion boxes 
18.10 Fonn or join a users group 
18.11 Conlact an ombudsmen or inspector 
18.12 Vtsit service providers Internet sites 
18.13 Talk In slaff at municipality/ council 
18.14 Hold a public meeting 
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I Section 4: Complaints Mechanisms I 
Have you complained directly to a service provider in the last 12 Enter number 
19 months? About which services? 
No or Yes (0 =No; 1 = Yes; 2= Don't Know) 
19.1 Water supply 
19.2 Sanitation! sewerage 
19.3 Pavements! roads 
19.4 Street lighting 
19.5 Community halls 
19.6 Storm water drains 
19.7 Refuse removal 
If NO go to Question 20 
19.8 How satisfied were you with the way the complaint was handled? Enter number 
o = Did not Compfain 1= Very Satisfied 2 =Farfy Satisfied 3= Fairly Dissatisfied 
4= Very Dissatisfied 
19.9 What was the main reason for your complaint? 
19.10 Please indicate the statements you agree with Enter number 
Complaints Mechanisms are: 
No or Yes (0 =No; 1 =Yes; 2= Don't Know} 
19.10.1 Well publicised 
19.10.2 Easy to use 
19.10.3 Result in fair outcomes 
19.10.4 Result in satisfactory outcomes 
19.10.5 Have a quick response 
20 Are service providers easily accessible Oocal oflices, customer service, phone 
numbers and so forth)? 
NoorYes(O =No; 1 =Yes; 2= Don't Know) 
Have you ever used the information you know about services to get Enter number 
21.1 improvements in their provision? 
No or Yes {0 =No; 1 = Yes; 2= Don't Know);) 
If YES go to Question 22 
If not Why? No or Yes (0 =No; 1= Yes; 2= Don't Know) Enter number 
21.2 The infronation we get is dlfflcu" to IJ!Idetstand 
21.3 The information we get is difficult to use 
21.4 The information is difficult to get hold of 
21.5 The information is inaccurate 
21.6 J am not interested 
21.7 I haven't seen any information 
21.8 Other (specify) 
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22 
22.1 
22.2 
22.3 
22.4 
23 
23.1 
23.2 
23.3 
23.4 
23.5 
23.6 
23.7 
24 
24.1 
24.2 
24.3 
24.4 
24.5 
24.6 
24.7 
If you complain about services are you doing this out of? Enter number 
No orYes(O=No; 1 =Yes; 2= Don't Know) 
Self Interest 
The interest of your community 
The general public interest 
Don1know 
Do you trust service providers? Enter number 
No orYes(O =No; 1 =Yes; 2= Don't Know) 
If NO go to Question 24 
If Yes why? Enter number 
NoorYes(.O=No: 1 =Yes; 2=Don'tKnow) 
They are officials 
I have confidencs in the service providers ability 
The service providers have proven their ability 
f know there are accountability arrangements 
I know there are agencies/ people to ensurB they do a good job 
I know service providers will be punished if they fail 
f know service providers promise to improve 
In what ways do you think that service providers are most accountable? 
No orYes(O=No; 1 =Yes; 2= Don't Know) 
SERVICE PROVIDERS ARE ACCOUNT ABLE BECAUSE •• 
THEY PROVIDE INFORMATION ABOUT THE OB.IVERY OF SERVICES AND DECISIONS, SPENDING, PROGRESS ETC 
THEY CONSULT USERS ON THEIR NEEDs/ PRIORITIES 
THEY ENCOURAGE PARTICIPATION fN DECISION MAKING 
THEY RESPONDING TO USERS COMPLAINTS 
THEY HAVE A USER FRIENDLY SERVICE 
THEY HAVE A TRANSPARENT SERVICE 
THEY MEET SERVICE TARGETS AND ST ANDAROS 
Do you think that you have a voice in service delivery? 
No orYes(O =No; 1 =Yes; 2= Don't Know) 
Thank you vety much for taking part in this survey! 
Enter number 
Enter number 
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OBSERVATION CHECKLIST 
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS OF THE AREA 
Description of housing DGood DFair DPoor DNone 
Kinds of Materials used for Construction 
Maintenance of common open spaces? DGood 0 Fair DPoor DNone 
Provision of public telephones? DGood D Fair DPoor DNone 
Provision of mail boxes? DGood DFair DPoor DNone 
Do houses have numbers? DYes ONo 
CHECKLIST FOR SPECIFIC SERVICES 
WATER 
Do households have piped connections? DYes ONo 0 Don't know 
Do households have booster pumps DYes ONo 0 Don't know 
Do households use water filters? DYes ONo 0 Don't know 
Do households have water tanks? DYes ONo 0 Don't know 
Are there stand posts in area? 
Is there evidence of illegal water connections? 
SEWERAGE 
Is there evidence of households with undesirable arrangements (latrines DYes ONo D Don't know 
emptying into drains, open defecation, overflowing septic tanks/ blocked 
sewers, smells) 
Are there communal latrines? DYes ONo 0 Don't know 
Attempts to clear blockages/ improve sanitation? DYes ONo 0 Don't know 
ACCESS AND PAVING 
Separate vehicular and pedestrian traffic DYes ONo 0 Don't know 
Frequency of pedestrian movement DGood 0 Fair DPoor DNone 
Frequency of traffic DGood D Fair DPoor DNone 
Comment on vehicle type 
Condition of pavements DGood D Fair I D Poor ID None 
Condition of roads DGood D Fair DPoor DNone 
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Comment of quantity roads serving the community 
STREET LIGHTING/ POWER 
Do households have an electricity connection? DYes ONo 0 Don't know 
Are there electricity meters? DYes ONo D Don't know 
Is there adequate provision of street lighting DYes ONo 0 Don't know 
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT 
Are rubbish bins (public and private) provided? DGood DFair DPoor DNone 
Is street cleansing frequent? DGood D Fair DPoor DNone 
Are street cleaners visible? DYes ONo D Don't know 
Has rubbish been dumped in open areas? DYes ONo 0 Don't know 
Is there evidence of regular waste collection? DYes ONo 0 Don't know 
Is there evidence of recycling? DYes ONo 0 Don't know 
COMMUNITY HALLS 
Are community halls (centres, clinic, school, temple etc.) available? DYes ONo 0 Don't know 
What is the condition of community halls DGood 0 Fair DPoor DNone 
Are these community halls frequently used? DGood DFair DPoor DNone 
DRAINAGE 
Are there adequate arrangements for drainage DGood DFair DPoor DNone 
Have arrangements been made for street paving? DGood DFair DPoor DNone 
Are drains cleaned frequently? DGood DFair DPoor DNone 
Is there flooding in the street? DYes ONo 0 Don't know 
Is there flooding inside houses? DYes ONo 0 Don't know 
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS 
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Appendix 7: Plates 
Case Study: Bristol 
Plate l : An article asking New Deal Area residents to complete the questionnaire for this research. 
Pathrmder Research 
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Plate 2: The dedicated flat-bed truck for grounds maintenance. 
Plate 3: The dedicated Pathfinder truck. 
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Plate 5: An example of the new street lighting. 
Plate 6 : A notice to local residents letting them know their petition had been successful. 
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Plate 7: Community newspaper demonstrating support for Pathfinder crew. 
Support Your 
Local Bin Men 
Plate 8: An example of bin bags stored on the street and littering. 
Plate 9: Fly-tipping in the area. 
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Case Study: Mdantsane 
Plate 10: A map showing Mdantsanc in relation to East London. 
Plate 11 : A map showing the NUs of Mdantsane. 
tolli!- ········ 
Plate 12: A view of Mdantsane from the Golden Highway. 
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Plate l 3: Examples of formal and informal housing. 
Plate 14: An example of housing in Golden Highway. 
Plate 15: Collecting water from a standpipe. 
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Plate J 6: A mid-block of the sewerage system. 
Plate 17: An example of a latrine consLructed by residents in squatter areas. 
Plate 18: An example of poor drainage and inadequate access roads in the squatter areas. 
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Plate 19: An example of households burning their own refuse in tyres. 
Plate 20: An example of poor drainage in the Golden Highway. 
Plate 2 1: An example of refuse waiting for collection and poor drainage in M dantsane. 
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Case Study: Dhaka 
Plate 22 : A handpump in a DSK project area. 
Plate 23 : An informal connection to sewerage system. 
Plate 24: The toi let block of a DSK project. 
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Plate 25 : A pot hole in Badda. 
Plate 26: A handbiJJ prepared by Lhe Chief Conveyance Officer. 
Plate 27: An example of open drainage in Az.impur. 
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Plate 28: An example of poor drainage in Pallabi. 
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Case Study: Seoul 
Plate 29: An example of housing in 9-Dragon Village. 
Plate 30: A block of flats in Gangnam-gu. 
Plate 31: A view of housing in Seodaemun-gu. 
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Plate 32: An example of household water supply in 9-Dragon ViUage. 
Plate 33: A water tank in Seodaemun-gu. 
Plate 34: Water distribution network in 9-Dragon Village. 
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Plate 35: The communal toilet block in 9-Dragon Village. 
Plate 36: Narrow aJieyways in Seodaemun-gu. 
Plate 37: Separate refuse collection system in Seoul. 
Plate 38: Open drainage channel in 9-Dragon Village. 
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Plate 39: Label from a bottle of tap water. 
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Appendix (8) Graphs 
GRAPH 1: Respondents who had done the 
following civic activities (Bristol) 
0 Telephone or met 
with a politician 
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32% 0 Protested 
•Talked to neighbours 
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17% 0 Spoken at a public 
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El Written to a local 
newspaper 
GRAPH 3: Respondents who had 
noticed an improvement in the quality 
of w a ste management in the last 3 
years (Bristol) 
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GRAPH 2: Respondents who had noticed 
an improvement in the NDC area in the 
last 3 years (Bristol) l 
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0 Big Improvement 
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improvement 
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•Don't Know 
GRAPH 4: Respondents w ho had done 
the following civic activities 
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GRAPH 6: How respondents find out about 
the services they use (by income) 
(Mdantsane) 
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GRAPH 7: Respondents who thought 
services had improved, stayed the same or 
worsened In the past year (Mdantsane) 
o Big improvement l 
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O Worse 
l• 0on'know 
GRAPH 9: The ways respondents thought 
that service providers are most accountable 
(Mdantsane) 
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GRAPH 11: Respondents who had done any 
of the following civic activities (by area) 
(Dhaka) 
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GRAPH 8: Services respondents had 
complained to a service provider about in 
the last 12 months (Mdantsane) 
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GRAPH 10: Respondents who thought they 
have a voice in service delivery (by Income) 
(Mdantsane) 
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GRAPH 12: Services respondents had access 
to (by area) (Dhaka) l 
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GRAPH 13: Levels of service (by area) 
(Dhaka) 
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GRAPH 15: Service respondents had 
complained to a service provider about in the 
last 12 months (by area) (Dhaka) 
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GRAPH 17: Respondents who had ever done 
any of the following citizenship activities 
(Seoul) 
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GRAPH 14: How respondents found out 
about the services they pruohaka 
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GRAPH 16: The ways respondents thought 
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GRAPH 19: Respondents aware of their 
entitlements to services (by house type) 
(Seoul) 
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GRAPH 21: Respondents who thought that 
during the past 5 years services have 
improved, stayed the same or worsened (by 
area) (Seoul) 
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GRAPH 23: Services respondents had 
complained about in the last 12 months (by 
area) (Seoul) 
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GRAPH 20: Respondents that have used 
information to get improvements in urban 
services (by house type) (Seoul) 
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GRAPH 22: The ways respondents thought 
that service providers are most accountable 
(by gender) (Seoul) 
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GRAPH 24: Respondents that felt they have 
a voice in service delivery (by area) (Seoul) 
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